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Executive Summary 
 
By enabling automatic identification – or automated confirmation of the identity of 
individuals – biometric methods offer a very wide range of opportunities for improving 
the convenience and security of computer-based systems. 
 
Though there are mature applications in some domains – most notably for physical 
security and in the use of AFIS in criminal justice systems – the take-up has been slower 
than anticipated. Certain problems remain to be fully addressed and the market has 
exhibited significant fragmentation. However since the start of 2003, there has been 
substantial interest by the European Commission and governments both in the EU and 
USA - accompanied by a number of formal requests for proposals.  
 
Over the past decade there have been numerous projects through which the biometric 
community has gained a more mature understanding of the possibilities – and the aspects 
that still remain to be addressed. In addition, both at the European and Member State 
level, we see numbers of key suppliers of biometric hardware and software, together with 
major research groups who are driving forward the technologies. 
 
In preparation for the Sixth Framework of support for R&D in key technologies, the 
European Commission has asked for the compilation of Roadmaps to identify the critical 
challenges in key technologies. Biometrics has been identified as one such critical 
technology, and the BIOVISION consortium offers this Roadmap for consideration by the 
biometrics community, whether they be suppliers, implementers, researchers, ordinary 
end users, or other stakeholders such as the data protection commissioners interested in 
protecting users’ privacy.  
 
In contrast with many other technology-focussed roadmaps, the aim was to balance the 
understanding of developments in the technology with the potential applications that will 
make use of them. In particular, we were interested in those factors that will determine the 
success of future deployments, especially those in the European Union. Among these are 
the addressing of user concerns (whether these be related to privacy or medical 
implications); the security of devices and systems; legal and regulatory issues; and 
standardisation. We have reviewed the main biometric technologies from such 
perspectives. An overview of emerging techniques is qualified by an appreciation of the 
long process that a newly developed method has to undergo before it stands a chance of 
commercial acceptance. 
 
The resulting Research Agenda (Appendix 1) with its list of 38 prioritised Research 
Challenges offers the biometrics community in Europe pointers to system level issues that 
require continued support at both national and cross-national levels if applications using 
biometrics are to be successfully deployed in the many areas that we have identified. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The underlying insight that informed our approach was that, 
 
Biometric technologies should be viewed as mechanisms  that address one aspect of 
an application. Whether the use of biometrics enhances or reduces personal privacy, 
improves or worsens security, makes authentication more or less convenient, will 
depend on other features of the application. This is no different from many other 
technologies. It follows, therefore, that discussion of biometric performance, legality 
or usability should be in the context of a specific application. Moreover, the value of 
biometric methods - in improving security, convenience, etc - should be judged from 
the perspective of operators of services using these methods, and from the 
experience of the end users of such services. 
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We have considered both government and privately managed applications using 
biometrics. However, during the 14 months of this study, there have been major 
initiatives that have transformed the outlook for biometrics in Europe: 
 
· An ISO committee has been established and has already made very significant 
progress in the development of standards in biometrics. (For many years the lack of 
standards has been offered as a reason for the low take-up of biometrics.) The 
BIOVISION team was actively involved in this standards committee, notably 
ensuring that a further study group was convened to ensure that cross-jurisdictional 
and societal aspects are taken account of in deployments. In view of the complexity 
of the issues, we have recommended that the European Commission (or an 
alternative pan-European group such as the European Biometric Forum) act to 
disseminate the knowledge on the development of these standards amongst all 
relevant national bodies in the EU. 
 
· The US has ratified the Enhanced Border Security Act1 requiring the use of 
biometrics in passports from late 2004 for those countries that take advantage of the 
Visa Waiver programme. ICAO has determined the technical requirements for such 
use of biometrics. In response to the US proposals, a measure of co-ordination 
amongst European member states has started, although there appear to be no formal 
plans for a reciprocal requirement for citizens of non-European countries to use such 
passports on entry into the EU.  
 
· There has also been increasing interest in securing national identity and health 
insurance cards, with many non-European countries planning to use biometrics. The 
UK, one of the few member states without an identity card, has undertaken both 
public consultation and feasibility studies on a card that is backed by a national 
biometrics database. The acceptance by citizens of these initiatives will depend on 
how governments respond to issues such as the protection of personal privacy and 
compromise by poor security designs. (The work of the BIOVISION team in 
developing a first draft of the Best Practices on privacy and a comprehensive 
inventory of security issues mark a significant contribution in these directions.) 
Furthermore, failure to respond adequately to the concerns of users in these 
deployments could put back public acceptance of commercial implementations. 
However, sensitively introduced implementations - with first class user interfaces - 
will encourage the more extensive use of biometrics in everyday life. There is 
evidence that citizens are willing to accept such use for the common good, provided 
that adequate safeguards are in place against abuse and failures in the system. 
However, relatively little is known about those who cannot use these systems, 
through the lack of a critical body feature (finger or iris), a disability or infirmity, 
medical conditions such as obsessive-compulsive disorders or even a culturally 
determined fear. It is clear that the aggressive timescales of the passport initiative 
may not allow sufficient time for an adequate development of such sensitively 
designed systems. Citizens and their representatives need to participate in an 
informed debate on their introduction and use, in order to ensure that such systems 
serve the people. The BIOVISION consortium has been in the forefront of 
developing methods of ascertaining which issues are crucial to the acceptance of 
biometrics by the population at large. 
 
In contrast to these large-scale deployments by national governments, the private sector 
has not advanced significantly over the past year. Clearly, if identity cards using 
biometrics are issued, financial organisations and employers will consider ways of 
making use of them. This would require that sufficient legal, technical and procedural 
measures are in place to ensure that the user's trust is not abused. The greater danger is if 
similar cards were introduced without the safeguards that citizens can expect from 
government identity cards. In a globalised world, there are many states that have no 
adequate protection for the individual, and consumers could be unaware that their 
                                                                 
1 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act 2002 
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biometric (and other personal) data might be extracted in insecurely designed systems. 
One further concern that has been voiced is that such data might yield information about 
the user's medical status, and a methodology has been developed in the BIOVISION 
project to ascertain the possibility of such inference. For these reasons, private 
organisations may choose to introduce biometrics first in the 'back offices', gaining 
experience in their use in a controlled environment, before progressing towards 
application in services for the consumer. 
 
The BIOVISION consortium has examined three specific application areas from both a 
long (2006-10) and nearer (2003-5) term perspective: the use of biometrics for physical 
access control (and ‘time and attendance’), their application in travel and identity 
documents, and the potential for their use by financial institutions. Other sectors have 
been viewed from just one time horizon: near term assessments of the way in which these 
methods are likely to be applied for e-Health, car travel and on-line authentication.  
Together these snapshots will enable the reader to note recurrent themes that should apply 
to the successful deployment of biometrics in other sectors and time horizons. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
There have been many research projects in this field that have enabled the participants to 
gain a better understanding of the algorithms and sensor aspects. The research field has 
recognised the limitations of single conventional biometric methods and substantial work 
is underway to use multi-modal and multi-classifier systems, modelling features such as 
the face in three dimensions and using intelligent agents. However, relatively little effort 
has been devoted to fundamental work on cross-cutting issues such as design 
methodologies that take account of the particular aspects of biometric deployments. 
Future research projects should therefore address this imbalance, so as to ensure that these 
issues are considered and that the results of the research are communicated to the rest of 
the biometric community in a clear way.  
 
This Roadmap is one of a set of documents that represent a comprehensive viewpoint on 
issues in the deployment and use of biometrics in Europe. The principal supporting 
materials are: 
 
· Best Practices in Privacy in Biometrics (Draft 1.0) 
· Report on end-user perceptions 
· Technology and application issues for biometric identification systems 
· List of Research Challenges facing European biometrics community (Appendix 1 of 
this roadmap) 
· A database of projects and deployments  
 
The BIOVISION consortium, recognising the need for a body that will bring together the 
fragmented biometrics community in Europe, launched the European Biometric Forum 
in July 2003, initially headquartered in Dublin. The EBF will work towards the resolution 
of many of the recommendations of this Roadmap, alongside existing groups such as the 
Association for Biometrics and with the support of other national and regional bodies. All 
participants in biometrics-related activities in Europe are encouraged to join the Forum 
and involve themselves actively in the EBF's initiatives. 
 
Note: 
 
The BIOVISION members are interested in receiving suggestions from the biometric 
community, whether in the EU or elsewhere, for additions or alterations to the Roadmap. 
An interim update of the Roadmap will be published in November 2003, taking into 
account any comments and corrections received by 13 November. A workshop is planned 
for 23 February 2004 in the UK, after which it is envisaged that a second issue will be 
distributed. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1  Introductory overview of biometric methods and their application 
 
Biometric methods relate to the authentication of living individuals in three ways: 
 
· verification of identity, confirming that you are who you claim to be; such claims 
including entry of a user name or presentation of a token (e.g. a smart card) issued to 
a person; 
· identification, the system recognising a person by their characteristic being the 
closest match to a person on a master database of such characteristics; 
· non-identification2, checking that a user has not been previously enrolled into a 
database.  
 
These methods are conventionally segmented into two main types: 
 
1. Physiological methods that are under no (or very limited) control of the subject. 
These include the most widely used techniques, such as fingerprint verification, iris 
recognition and automatic face recognition. 
2. Behavioural techniques, that allow a greater degree of freedom to the individual. 
Such techniques include speaker recognition and dynamic signature verification 
(DSV), 
 
although it is acknowledged that there is a degree of overlap between these groups that 
makes it difficult to demarcate an absolute division between these categories.  
 
Even though biometric methods are generally positioned as security mechanisms, their 
application in other areas should not be forgotten.  Their use in personalisation or 
customisation of user interfaces or services directed at a specific individual is one case in 
point.  Biometric methods can also be used to improve internal business processes, for 
example, as in the initial deployment of signature verification by the UK's Nationwide 
Building Society. Facial recognition techniques from the biometric industry are also being 
used by the police service in the UK to sort through the numerous Internet images of the 
victims of paedophiles obtained during the course of investigations. 
 
The use of fingerprint (AFIS) or facial images in 'scene of crime' and forensic activities is 
allied to the application of such methods in more conventional services and we shall 
occasionally make reference to these in this report. 
 
Nevertheless, when considering the use of biometric methods as a means of 
authenticating an individual, we should be aware of the alternatives to the use of 
biometrics: 
 
1. Authentication by demonstration of knowledge of a secret known only to the 
individual (e.g. PINs  - Personal Identification Numbers, such as the 4-figure PIN 
used in automatic cash dispensers in some countries, passwords or recognition by the 
individual of a group of pre-memorised faces from a selection offered at the time of 
authentication);  
2. Identity by possession and use of a unique, unalterable token held by the individual, 
such as a smart card with a personal identifier securely stored in its chip. 
3. Proof by presence at a specific geographical position, such as that offered by caller 
identification in telephony. 
 
For each biometric method (e.g. speaker verification, facial recognition, etc.), there are a 
number of different implementations. These may use different sensors; each will 
certainly use different algorithms to process the signals captured by the sensor; and the 
                                                                 
2 Or ‘negative identification’ 
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interface presented to the individuals being authenticated will vary between 
implementations. In addition, performance will depend to a large extent on the way the 
biometric is deployed in a specific application or service. Therefore, it makes little sense 
to compare the performance of biometric methods in general (e.g. fingerprint against 
facial recognition), as is often done in introductory articles on biometrics. . 
 
A single biometric may not offer the performance or other capabilities that a customer 
requires. In some cases, this can be supplemented by one of the alternative methods 
mentioned above, or multiple biometrics can be employed, requiring the capture of more 
than one characteristic either sequentially (e.g. a fingerprint recognition followed by a 
spoken password) or in parallel. An example of the latter is the imaging of the face and 
iris at the same time using a dual function camera. 
Almost all systems using a biometric require an initial enrolment stage, when an 
individual is registered to the system. In many cases, this enrolment will be supervised by 
an official who has been trained in the use of the biometric and the way in which it will be 
utilised in a specific application. This stage may involve confirmation of the identity of 
the individual though presentation of trustworthy documentation (a passport, identity card 
or driving licence) and/or through corroboration of identity by a trusted individual. 
During enrolment, a number of biometric images or samples of data from a biometric 
reader will be obtained, from which a compressed or simplified dataset - termed the 
(reference) template - is derived. This template, which in commercial implementations 
ranges in size from 9 bytes to many kilobytes, is designed to extract features from the 
image or data sample that are most characteristic of individuals, since it will be used as 
the standard representation of the person's biometric in subsequent operation. Note that 
the quality of the template is of paramount importance in assuring the optimal 
performance of the biometric method in subsequent, operational uses. Many systems set a 
quality threshold  to enforce a repeat enrolment should the images or processing fail to 
provide a sufficiently good template. However, a significant proportion of the population 
may be unable to make use of a biometric at all, and this failure to enrol rate is an 
important limitation on the application of biometric systems. Storage of the template can 
be either in a central database, on a local terminal or on a token held by the individual. 
The selection of storage medium will depend on security requirements, costs, user 
expectations, etc. 
 
In operation, the enrolled individual presents their biometric to a sensor, which captures 
the signal and processes it using an (often) proprietary algorithm into a form that allows 
comparison with the reference template3; this is retrieved from its stored form to make the 
comparison. Since a person's submission of a biometric to a sensor is subject to variability 
(e.g. marginally different positioning of a finger on a fingerprint reader, changes in 
orientation of a face in front of a camera, or suffering a viral infection to affect the 
performance of a speaker recognition system4), it will be rare for a perfect match to be 
made with the template. One of the key determinants in the successful operation of a 
biometric enabled system is the setting of the threshold for acceptable matching of the 
two signals. Demanding too close a match risks false rejection of the enrolled individual, 
while widening the tolerance allows the possibility of false acceptance by someone with 
a similar template. Testing  of a prototype system under conditions similar to the proposed 
deployment is often a prerequisite for a successful application - with tests being a realistic 
preview of the performance in the field provided that the subject population is 
representative of the end user group (both in demographics and in motivation) and that 
sufficient numbers are tested over a sufficiently long period. 
 
Should a person be unable to enrol, or to operate a biometric method during normal 
operation, provision should be made for an alternative or fall-back system. On grounds 
                                                                 
3 A few writers use the term ‘request template’ for the signal processed during the operation of a 
biometric, which is then compared with the (reference) template. 
4 Indeed, there are many other causes of short term changes in the individual. 
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of cost, this may be an automatically operated application, although for reasons of 
security or convenience, manual fall-back may be the preferred option. 
 
In spite of the discussion so far, it is vital to recognise that biometric technologies should 
be viewed as mechanisms  that address one aspect of an application. Whether the use of 
biometrics enhances or reduces personal privacy, improves or worsens security, makes 
authentication more or less convenient, will depend on other features of the application. 
This is no different from many other technologies. It follows, therefore, that discussion of 
biometric performance, legality or usability should be in the context of a specific 
application. Moreover, the value of biometric methods - in improving security, 
convenience, etc - should be judged from the perspective of operators of services using 
these methods, and from the experience of the end users of such services. 
 
The classification of applications can be considered in a number of ways. AFNOR, the 
French national standards body, has proposed four classes of service based upon the 
performance requirements of the technology: 
 
· Class 1 (verification of identity) - against the prior issues of a card or token 
· Class 2 (authorisation of privilege) - access to benefits  
· Class 3 (proof of uniqueness) - search through a database to ensure that the person 
has not been previously enrolled, using the non-identification approach 
· Class 4 (identity search) - search through a database for a match to data from an 
unknown person (e.g. criminal AFIS system) 
 
Alternatively, the classification can be viewed from the benefit to the end user or operator 
- a choice that has been made by the BIOVISION group: 
 
· Authentication of identity 
- For access control (physical or logical) 
- For authentication of a transaction (online or offline) 
· Personalisation (physical or logical) 
· Authorisation 
- Tracking (identity known or unknown) 
- Tracing (identity known or unknown) 
 
System developers should be aware that requirements capture and system definition for 
biometric-enabled systems are more time-consuming and expensive activities than for 
most other IT systems. For example, biometric subsystems are often not designed with 
security in mind, and systems integrators will need to address the security requirements 
of the deployed application in this light. User perceptions (such as any fears and concerns 
of a significant segment of the user population) need also to be addressed as early as 
possible in the design process, to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to 
reassure such users. The concerns may relate to privacy or to safety issues, which may be 
addressed in part through legal and regulatory measures. Biometric methods are unusual 
as an IT component in that, in general, they require the motivated co-operation of the 
individual if they are to work in an optimal way. Any impediment to ease of use - whether 
technical, social or psychological in nature - will detract from the successful operation of 
systems using biometrics. On the other hand, use of a biometric can be privacy-
enhancing, e.g. by securing access to databases of sensitive material in a more secure and 
accountable manner. 
 
One particular biometric technology often causing concern is fingerprinting. Some users 
wish to be assured that it will be difficult for the police authorities to make use of 
templates stored in other applications, so as to match them with the records in criminal 
fingerprint databases. The biometrics industry has for many years relied on the statement 
that the original images cannot be reconstructed from the templates. Although this is 
correct, it is also possible for many fingerprint biometric systems to offer some data to 
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help in cross-matching to law enforcement databases5. For the foreseeable future 
however, the opportunities for such cross-application transfer of data will be very limited 
indeed, even though systems could be designed to improve such interoperability. 
 
Designers need also to be aware of the current international efforts in standardisation of 
APIs, protocols for the exchange of images or templates, security etc. 
 
This short overview of the key aspects relating to the successful design, deployment and 
operation of systems and services using a biometric method highlights many of the issues 
that are explored in more depth in this roadmap. Even though the first method was 
developed more than four decades ago, the industry is still in its infancy, both in size and 
in maturity. There are relatively few centres of expertise in spite of the entry of numerous 
consultants eager to capitalise on the response to the events of September 11th 2001. For 
a naïve designer, it can appear temptingly obvious to use an 'off the shelf' solution from 
the supplier of a biometric sensor, buy in an algorithm from another source, conduct a few 
in house trials and proceed to deployment in order to meet an urgent requirement from a 
customer – and at minimal cost. This approach may carry a low risk when the numbers of 
users are small and the biometric is used in a controlled way, but a failure of a large scale 
system through inadequate investment could damage the prospects for other deployments. 
A recent example is the continuing debate following the attempt to use automatic face 
recognition in the 2001 Super Bowl final without any prior warning to the fans. 
 
This should not detract from the large number of successful deployments, with many 
smaller scale systems in daily operation throughout the world. Access control to 
buildings, authentication to computers and electronic networks and the recording of time-
and-attendance on the factory floor are the prime examples of their use. A few larger 
scale systems have also been reported, most notably in the welfare benefits programmes 
of individual states in the US, predominantly using AFIS-type systems, with others such 
as Massachusetts making use of facial recognition. Identity systems addressing the needs 
of governments and social security programmes have also been deployed  - in the main in 
developing countries - and with little published material relating to their performance and 
cost effectiveness. A very long standing example of a successful system is the distribution 
of pensions to 1.2 million pensioners and their dependants in South Africa, using 
fingerprint readers on armoured vans. In operation since 1990, this deployment 
demonstrates that systems can be built that work with non-optimal subject populations. 
 
Throughout the roadmap, we shall be highlighting the research challenges that need to be 
addressed, especially in the context of application in the European Union. These will be 
identified as follows, with a collated list appended at the end of this report. 
 
RC/SD1  RC - SYSTEMS and DESIGN 1: Successful implementation of systems 
using biometric methods requires an inter-disciplinary design approach. There are 
few specialist designers able to put together an integrated design that addresses the 
already documented issues and concerns. 
 
 
RC/Dep  RC - DEPLOYMENTS 1: The impact of a high profile failure in the 
application of a biometric method could impact on the willingness of other 
customers to specify such methods, and adverse media comment could increase the 
resistance to their use by individuals and groups. 
 
                                                                 
5 Manfred Bromba, On the reconstruction of biometric raw data from template data, 
http://manfred.bromba.bei.t-online.de/biometrics/temppriv.htm  (July 2003) 
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1.2  Personal identity: implication of the widespread adoption of 
biometrics 
 
1.2.1  Biometrics: a new technology 
 
The introduction of a new technology can have significant unforeseen impacts upon 
society. Looking back from 2003, the centenary year of the commercialisation of the 
motor car, it is clear that the impact on social mobility, on global warming and on noise 
pollution could hardly have been foreseen by those early pioneers. In the 1950's, we note 
the assertion that the market for computers would be in single or double figures; today, 
we are still to understand the impact of the PC on society - either through the 
displacement of millions of clerical jobs or the increased connectivity of peoples in the 
virtual world of the Internet.  
 
In the eyes of some writers, biometric technologies could turn out to be just as radical in 
transforming societies.  Accordingly, in their view, large scale deployments need to be 
examined carefully (and even regulated). Even though this may wildly overstate the case, 
we should consider the impact of the widespread use of these methods in the light of 
technical developments in complementary fields such as data mining, intelligent CCTV 
and pervasive computing.  
 
1.2.2  Identity and Authentication 
 
The concept of identity can be approached from a number of standpoints: for example, we 
can view it from philosophical, psychological, sociological, legal and technical 
perspectives. It is not our aim to pursue any of these in detail, but it is important to 
recognise that naïve interpretations of this multi-faceted concept could result in poorly 
configured systems that do not address the fundamental opportunity or problem. 
Furthermore, systems could be over-bearing in their complexity or requirements on the 
capabilities of the individual. Of even more concern are possible unforeseen long term 
consequences of fixing identities, and the impact of such fixe dness if identities are reused 
beyond the domain of which the individual was aware (resulting from so called ‘function 
creep’).  
 
In her review of the literature on roles and identities as applied to new ICT technologies, 
especially in relation to online activities and Ambient Intelligence, Rebecca Ellis of the 
University of Essex comments that there is a lack of an agreed definition of identity in 
this context 6. Specifically, there is a debate contrasting ‘having’ an identity, with the 
expression of that identity through actions that are performed by an individual. In the 
past, an identity was often thought of in the context of social categories – gender, class, 
ethnicity, sexuality – to define an authentic self which would differentiate an individual 
from others in society. Postmodern authors challenge this fixedness, offering a view of 
identity as ‘a multiple, interwoven and hybrid thing, part of a process of reflection on who 
we are and how we experience the world from our social position’. From such a 
viewpoint, authentication of identity presents new challenges, and attempts to fix on a 
single identity for many applications (especially in government-controlled services) can 
lead to concerns that can be difficult for individuals to articulate confidently, and hence 
are often reduced to statements about reduction of personal privacy.  
 
However, to start our analysis of identity, we will follow the discussion and definitions 
offered in a recent analysis of authentication schemes, which identified some of the 
unintended consequences for individual human rights, especially those relating to 
                                                                 
6 Ed. Rebecca Ellis, Roles and Identities – Review and identification of the state of the art, 
EURESCOM project PROFIT P1302 (May 2003) http://www.eurescom.de/public/projects/P1300-
series/p1302/P1302_portal.asp#P1302%20Deliverable%201  
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personal privacy7. Within this simplified view, identity relates to the individual human 
being and the ways in which attributes of individuals are used by others in their 
environment to distinguish one from another. Of course, this view also acknowledges a 
person has a separate self-identity that may – in certain exceptional cases – be at variance 
from those attributes perceived and used by others, including government entities that 
determine the rights and obligations of that individual to the rest of society.  
 
From this perspective, the Identity of a person is the set of data about that individual 
which is associated with that person in the context of a system that requires knowledge of 
the distinctiveness of individuals. 
 
The individual is describable by other people or systems in terms of  
 
· Identifiers: pointers to a person; for example, a personal name or an identity 
card number.  
· Attributes: describing a property associated with the individual; e.g. height, hair 
colour or role in an organisation. Some attributes are observable, while others 
require the individual or other entity to divulge relevant information. 
 
Key concepts in this context 8 are: 
 
· Identification refers to the process of using claimed or observed attributes to 
infer the identity of the individual.  
· Authentication is the process of establishing confidence in the truth of a claim.  
· An Authenticator is evidence that is presented to support the authentication of a 
claim. For example, a passport could be an authenticator for the particular 
individual’s name – his identifier. Knowledge of a password or the iris pattern in 
the eye are other types of authenticators for the same identifier. 
· Authorisation determines what an individual is permitted to do. Often, this is 
brought together with authentication, as in physical access control using 
fingerprint biometrics. 
 
The complexity of authentication is evidenced by the following distinguishable processes:  
 
· identity authentication establishes that an identifier refers to an identity (not 
necessarily to an individual) to an understood level of confidence. An email 
address shared by a family might need to be authenticated, but would not 
necessarily relate to a single individual. Each member of the family could share 
the authenticator (e.g. knowledge of the password that is bound to the email 
address)  
· individual authentication of an identifier (or ‘verification’ in the biometric 
literature) establishes an understandable level of confidence that the identifier 
refers to a particular individual. The person has first to claim an identifier (‘I am 
John Smith’); then, the system (which could be another person) uses an 
authenticator (e.g. a passport) to authenticate the individual’s claim to the 
defined confidence level. 
· attribute authentication establishes that an attribute applies to a particular 
individual – to an understood level of confidence. In such a process, the attribute 
is selected first, followed either i) by direct observation of the attribute (if 
accessible) or ii) by challenging the person to produce an authenticator that 
supports the claim that the attribute refers to him. 
 
                                                                 
7 Stephen Kent and Lynette Millet, Editors for the Committee on Authentication Technologies and 
Their Privacy Implications, Who goes there? Authentication through the lens of privacy, National 
Academies Press (2003) at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309088968/html/  
8 Note that the vocabulary in use for biometric applications (as noted in the Vocabulary section) 
differs from this terminology. 
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Note that in each case, the assurance of correct authentication is limited, whether by 
technical factors (such as inherent FAR/FRR performance limits of biometric systems or 
by the resistance to duplication of cards and tokens) or by social norms such as issue of 
‘breeder’ documents such as birth certificates on demand - not just to the data subject. 
 
Stronger authentication, e.g. using biometric methods, can be a component of excellent 
privacy-protecting systems, providing a higher level of assurance that only correctly 
authenticated and authorised persons are allowed access to databases of personal 
information. Secure integration with alarm systems and usable audit trails is required. 
 
Nevertheless, the discussion on the use of more widespread strong authentication centres 
on apparent trade-offs between the higher security that could be realised and the increased 
risks to personal privacy that might result. An apparently logically consistent solution to 
several societal problems (such as identity theft) is for universally recognised single 
identifiers to be used together with a restricted range of attributes and attribute 
authenticators whenever an activity or transaction merits strong authentication. Many 
cultures, especially those that place a higher value on the rights of the individual over 
those of society, take the view that the risks inherent in such an apparently simple 
solution outweigh the potential for harm; these cultures place limitations on the power of 
government or commercial organisations to insist upon the use of such a limited data set. 
These limitations take the form of constitutional rights and legal protection for personal 
data. In this way, individuals feel able to express dissent, to take part in legitimate 
political activities and engage in lawful actions without fear of being tracked (regardless 
of whether such fears are justified), allowing them to choose to use one of a number of 
identities - or none at all when this is appropriate.  
 
Of course, many systems suffer from inherent vulnerabilities that could be exploited by 
criminal elements, or by individuals refusing to accept responsibility by repudiating 
transactions or refusing to be held accountable for their actions. In some cases, these 
vulnerabilities could be addressed by stronger authentication. However, in many other 
situations, such improvements in identification may offer transient benefits (through 
deterrence) or fail to address the real challenges. The trade-off between personal privacy 
and improved security is not always obvious, especially when an authentication scheme 
can be reused in widely differing environments. The debate on the right balance requires 
an understanding of the issues and the technical capabilities of novel technologies such as 
biometrics. The BIOVISION Roadmap and the results of associated studies offer a set of 
resources in this debate9. 
 
1.2.3  A world of single identities 
 
The perceived danger is not from a single sector in which biometric methods are applied, 
but in the interoperation of many identity management systems. A measure of protection 
against the homogenisation of identity across every aspect of an individual's life is offered 
by the existence of at least six principal biometric methods, each of which can be 
implemented in a number of ways. 
 
Notwithstanding such diversity, for these commentators, it is the possibility of defining a 
single, unique identity for every citizen that causes greatest concern, and the 'function 
creep' that could propagate its use into every aspect of a person's life. Even though many 
developed countries have unique (non-biometric) identifiers for their population (even in 
the USA, there is a Social Security Number), legal limitations in their use across 
government - and by the private sector - have restricted their benefit.  More prosaically, 
the diversity of IT architectures in use by governments is often the limiting factor in the 
linkage of data about a person between tax authorities, social security systems, health 
                                                                 
9 A detailed research agenda for privacy and identity management is a deliverable from the 
European Commission funded RAPID project. Miriam Lips et al, Roadmap for socio-cultural and 
economic research in privacy and identity management, (Deliverable ST 2.3.2, 13 December 2002). 
http://www.ra-pid.org/  
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records and financial institutions. Clearly, this perpetuates the opportunities for fraud both 
against government agencies and against other individuals in society. The lack of fixed 
identity may no longer be defendable for a world of mass travel and e-commerce. Such 
demands for secure identities may find parallels with the 19th century. As the population 
of cities grew exponentially, authorities responded by official registrations of births and 
deaths, insistence on the use of surnames and the development of fingerprint systems to 
identify criminals. 
 
Yet, a level of inefficiency reassures a part of the population that distrusts the motives of  
'big' government and politicians. It may allow greater freedom for dissenting voices while 
entrepreneurs (whether commercial or social) are left with greater opportunity to 
experiment, especially at the margins of the legal or socially acceptable. The balance 
between such conflicting views can only be resolved by debate within each society. The 
possible application of biometrics adds another dimension to this discussion, requiring a 
clear appreciation of the operation and limitations of these technologies.   
 
At the start of the 21st century, for many people, theirs is no longer an integrated identity. 
Their personas at work, in their family life, in their choice of friends, and their use of the 
Internet may be very different, and may also change as they move through successive 
stages in their lives. Perceived attempts to fix a single identity may be behind some of the 
unease that is expressed about biometrics, and which is often expressed in the shorthand 
of ‘fear about loss of privacy’. In the UK, for example, citizens are allowed to change 
their name without the need to register it formally – provided that there is no attempt to 
deceive or engage in fraud10. There are valid reasons for a person wanting to change their 
identity, and the power of an organisation to stop such a change is open to philosophical 
enquiry. Discussion about the merits of the introduction of biometrics needs to take 
account of such views since most biometric-enabled systems require the co-operation of 
users, and the unwillingness of significant minorities to engage with new services risks 
their complete failure. 
 
Haralambos and Holborn11 have reviewed key papers in the recent sociological literature 
on identity. They note a progressive change from a pre-modern view of the lack of 
individual identity – a human being just one part of God's 'chain of being'  - through to the 
post-modern concepts of fractured identities. Stuart Hall12, for example, identifies 
intermediate stages of the Enlightenment view of the indivisible individual, building on 
the philosophical dualism of Descartes and the later, modernist approach of the 19th 
century recognising the social framing of identity: a person reflects their concept of 
themselves through the reactions of their immediate social groups. In a post-modern 
world, it is no longer possible to determine one's identity in the context of a single social 
group. Numerous factors have affected this change: the growth of a surveillance society, 
the rapid globalisation of societies and the economy, the impact of the feminist movement 
and the rise of the 'green' political awareness. Harriet Bradley13 refers to the element of 
choice in the selection of identities and emphasises their dynamic nature. What defines us 
as individuals is our difference from others, and that difference is an ever-changing 
response to those around us. This situational, dynamic view of identity needs to be borne 
in mind as we examine the opportunities offered by biometrics to fix identity in the 
context of one or more applications. By fixing identity and using biometrics to confirm 
that single identity in daily transactions, we may be changing society in unpredictable 
ways. 
 
Action: More fundamental research is needed (in line with the recommendation RC/TTL2 
below) to address the issues of multiple identities and personas.  In addition, studies 
                                                                 
10 This is not the case for some other EU countries, notably Germany. 
11 Michael Haralambos et al, Sociology: Themes and Perspectives , Fifth Edition, Collins pp 922-
933 (2000) 
12 S Hall and P du Gay, eds, Questions of Cultural Identity Sage (1996) 
13 H Bradley, Fractured Identities: Changing Patterns of Inequality,  Polity Press (1997) 
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should be undertaken that examine the impact of simultaneously deploying systems using 
biometrics. 
 
1.2.4  Other concerns 
 
Among the other concerns that have exercised commentators on biometrics, the most 
prominent in the context of large-scale application appear to be14: 
 
1. That the solution employing a biometric does not address the real problem, merely 
offering a technical fix that placates calls for political or commercial action. Many 
authentication problems arise from poor registration procedures, or from systems that 
were designed for other purposes.  
Action: Development of requirements capture methodologies similar to those 
described in Section 3.8. 
 
2. The cost of a secure, usable and robust biometric solution may far outweigh the 
benefits that it is supposed to offer. Costs may be understated, especially in the areas 
of enrolment and maintenance. The performance of the systems may be inadequate to 
ensure the required operational effectiveness. 
Action: Collation of experience and lessons learnt on the true costs of systems. 
Research on economic models of security systems. An approach to cost-benefit 
analysis of systems using biometrics has been outlined in a BIOVISION paper15. 
 
3. Dehumanising of individuals by reduction of their identities to numerical entities in a 
database.  
Action: The recommendation below (RC/TTL1) proposes the investigation of 
alternative ethical frameworks to assess the issues that are inherent in this fear. 
 
4. The individual’s rights over their body are overridden by imposed use of its attributes 
Action: The recommendation below (RC/TTL1) proposes the investigation of 
alternative ethical frameworks to assess the issues that are inherent in this fear. 
 
5. Exemptions and exceptions that would exclude some people. In certain cases (e.g. the 
disabled), this may be inevitable and appropriate mechanisms are required to avoid 
discrimination. Procedures developed during the design process should attempt to 
limit the opportunities for misuse of exception cases. 
Action: RC/TTL3, RC/TTL9 
 
6. Having deployed the biometric in one system, organisations may find it useful to 
justify extending its use on grounds of cost, security or political expediency. 
Action: Results of the BIOVISION Security Study, RC/Sec4, RC/TTL7, RC/TTL8  
 
 
RC/TTL1  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 1: There is no clear ethical 
framework for the development and use of biometrics. To some extent this will be 
determined by individual societies and cultures. However, currently, the agenda is 
set by cost-benefit analysis for improved security, without reference to a more 
fundamental assessment of the advisability of cross-application unique identification 
of individual citizens and consumers. 
 
                                                                 
14 A list of 13 concerns that have been voiced about the use of biometrics in identity cards has been 
tabled in: chair Joe Fontana, A national identity card for Canada? Report of the standing committee 
on citizenship and immigration, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/Documents/37/2/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/cimmrp06-
e.htm (October 2003) 
  
15 BIOVISION project report: Michael Behrens and Maik Weber, Proposal for a Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (2003) 
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RC/TTL2  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 2: Social and socio-psychological 
research should be encouraged to understand how identities and personas are used 
at present, and the implication of the use of biometrics on legitimate expression of 
such multiple identities. 
 
 
RC/TTL3  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 3: The impact of long term 
exclusion of those unable to make use of certain biometrics. 
 
 
RC/Sec4:  RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 4: Biometric data for 
different applications (or held centrally and on-card) may require to be of different 
types (or held in incompatible formats) in order that centrally held information 
cannot be misused. 
 
 
RC/TTL7:  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 7: Further development of the 
Best Practices, based upon experience of similar codes in other fields. One specific 
application could be in the integration with Privacy Impact Assessments, together 
with advice to auditors confirming the adherence to such a Code. 
 
 
RC/TTL8: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 8: Further studies should 
continue to monitor the progress towards a uniform interpretation of the privacy 
issues surrounding the use of biometrics in the countries of the EU (including the 
Newly Accessioning States), and support the activity of the Article 29 Working Party 
with impartial information about developments in biometrics. Users' experience in 
the application of biometrics should be collated and interpreted with the aim of 
either lobbying for a revision in the legal regime or for retention of the status quo . 
 
 
RC/TTL9:  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 9: The status of those unable to 
use the preferred biometric solutions should be recognised, whether these are in the 
private or in the public sector. Solutions are required that will limit the long term 
exclusion of such individuals from the opportunities offered by uniform secure 
authentication. 
 
 
1.3  Biometric methods - the European scene 
 
As has been hinted previously, there are a large number of biometric methods that have 
been researched and commercialised. Among the possibilities that are currently exploited 
commercially (or are close to exploitation) are  
 
· automatic facial recognition, using either visible light or infra-red illumination (or 
both) 
· recognition by fingerprint(s) or surface features extending along the finger 
· iris recognition 
· recognition by representation of the blood vessel patterns in the retina  
· hand geometry 
· the pattern of veins on the back of the hand 
· speaker verification 
· dynamic signature recognition 
· keystroke dynamics.  
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Others, such as gait recognition, are in development. (A detailed analysis of the 
technologies is presented in section 4.),  
 
This is a market characterised by a large number of suppliers, many of which are small 
and privately owned. Some supply the sensors, others are specialist software companies 
developing better recognition algorithms or improved middleware. We believe that there 
are currently upwards of 200 suppliers of such devices and subsystems and the estimated 
220meuro16 worldwide market is fragmented, especially in Europe.  
 
In spite of this fragmentation, Europe leads in many segments of the international 
biometrics market.  Sagem (France) is considered a world leader in the deployment of 
large-scale fingerprint systems.  Infineon (Germany) and Fingerprint Cards (Sweden) are 
leaders in fingerprint sensor chip technology and associated security integrated circuits, 
with the Infineon product commercialised for mass market application in PCs.  Precise 
Biometrics (Sweden) has quickly become recognised as a supplier of consumer 
fingerprint systems for consumers and PKI applications. Cognitec and ZN Vision (now 
part of Viisage) are recognised as international leaders in facial recognition technologies.  
Keyware Technologies (Belgium) was an early leading developer of multiple biometric 
solutions.  
 
There are well-established organisations. Within the TeleTrusT Working Group 6 
“Biometrics” most of the German manufacturers of biometric solutions are represented, 
such as fingerprint, signature and speaker verification, facial and iris recognition, 
multimodal solutions, as well as system integrators with a strong experience in the 
combination of biometrics with smart cards and other tokens. The US government has 
contracts with UK and German researchers for the exploitation of face, fingerprint and 
gait recognition technologies; we anticipate that Europe’s future ability to export 
biometric systems and knowledge will build substantially on the current high status of its 
industrial academic research base, particularly in the core areas of smart cards, image and 
pattern recognition.  
 
It is often forgotten that the biometric is only one part of a fully deployed application and 
experience gained in system integration and deployment needs also to be shared within 
the European community of interest. European organisations have led the world in many 
innovative biometrics applications. The European tradition of socio-technical system 
design affords a perspective that may be absent in many non-European approaches – a 
possible advantage when European organisations compete for projects world-wide and a 
perspective which is embraced in this project. 
 
The first biometric-based border crossing system in the world was installed at Schiphol 
Airport in 1992 (an early fingerprint based deployment), and a new system using iris 
recognition started operation in December 2001. (Trials in other airports such as 
Heathrow continue.)  Fingerprint and facial recognition systems have been used at 
nightclubs in the Netherlands.  Facial recognition systems linked with CCTV surveillance 
have been implemented in the London Borough of Newham – with local reduction of 
crime17. Application of fingerprint verification with the Spanish social security card 
started in Andalucia in the early 1990’s. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Justice is 
currently deploying a fingerprint secured PKI for systems access authorisation, and 
industry too is making use of biometrics at the world’s largest port in Rotterdam, where 
hand geometry is used to secure the entire cargo tracking process. In the UK, the 
Immigration and Naturalisation department will have saved millions of pounds in 2002 
following the deployment of a fingerprint recognition system to screen asylum applicants. 
Recently, the pan European EURODAC fingerprint system has demonstrated the benefit 
of co-operation between European countries, whilst respecting the rights of individuals 
under law. 
                                                                 
16 The Biometric Industry report, Market and Technology Forecasts to 2003, Elsevier Advanced 
Technology (2001). Figure is for Year 2000. 
17 Note that the crime reduction could be due to deterrence. 
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Clearly, the application landscape is strong in many countries of Europe.  However, the 
future could see many more cost saving and efficiency-enhancing applications with the 
right mix of expertise, knowledge and consumer awareness. It appears that many 
suppliers develop their devices and systems without knowledge of the results of current 
and past research, both from other European Commission sponsored projects in the 
Fourth and Fifth Frameworks, as well as from universities and national projects in 
Europe, USA and Asia - and non-academic initiatives such as those sponsored by the 
Biometric Working Group and those undertaken by the TeleTrusT Working Group 6 
“Biometrics” e.g. through its BioTrusT project. 
 
Furthermore the links of researchers in institutions to these suppliers, and between 
suppliers and system integrators (who will ultimately deploy the biometric method as just 
one part of a complete project) are poorly developed. This requires the creation of a pan-
European organisation that shares knowledge and best practice, which encourages high 
standards in development and design and that links researchers, developers, end user 
organisations and other stakeholders across national frontiers. Such a European Biometric 
Forum will build on the experience of a number of mainly nationally based initiatives 
such as the UK’s Association for Biometrics, Germany’s TeleTrusT organisation and the 
Dutch Biometrics Forum while linking to other organisations such as the US-based 
Biometric Consortium. 
 
1.4  The BIOVISION Roadmap project 
 
The BIOVISION consortium developed from a workshop on biometrics held in January 
2002 and organised by the European Commission18. The consensus developed at that 
meeting resulted in the proposal for this project that commenced on 1 June 2002, with a 
duration of 14 months. The website for the current version of the BIOVISION roadmap 
and other materials is at http://www.eubiometricforum.com.  
 
The BIOVISION Consortium undertook this Roadmap with a number of aims in mind. It 
did not see its primary remit as the preparation of yet another quantitative prediction of 
the future growth in the biometrics market over the period to 2010. Although such 
assessments are useful and will be referred to in this roadmap, we believe that the 
European biometric community needs a set of tools with which to develop alternative 
scenarios of different types of applications. These should be designed to be robust against 
changes in the economic and political landscapes, whilst being responsive to wild card 
events such as those of 11th September 2001. The output is firstly directed to the 
European Commission, as customers for this study, so as to guide them in supporting 
areas of research, development and trial deployment that appear to be most critical for the 
biometrics industry in Europe. However, it is also directed towards individuals and 
organisations that are considering the application of biometric technologies, to support 
their understanding and confidence in moving forward with their ideas. 
 
The key elements of this roadmap project are: 
 
1. This document collating the results of the studies and workshops undertaken as part 
of the contract. 
2. A listing of the key research challenges that face the European biometric community 
and which could be addressed by projects proposed under the Sixth Framework 
programme. 
3. A collation of previous and current research projects in the field of biometrics, with 
the principal results obtained to date. 
4. The results of a series of focussed studies in areas critical to the development of 
legal, secure and acceptable biometric-enabled applications, using both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches. The primary areas are:  
                                                                 
18 Paving the way for the adoption of biometrics, workshop in Brussels, 15 January 2002, 
http://www.cordis.lu/ist/ka2/biometricsworkshop.htm  
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· End User Perceptions,  
· Security,   
· Safety and Medical issues,  
· Future directions in the underlying technologies and applications, 
· Legal, regulatory and standards arena. 
 
5. Assessment of the key factors in the commercial take-up of such systems, building 
upon the work of the BEE project and by the market research of commercial 
organisations. 
6. Two primary workshops where the results of such studies were brought together. 
7. The development of a community of interest amongst all players involved in the 
successful deployment of biometric-enabled applications - the European Biometrics 
Forum.  
 
To this end, the consortium had been selected to represent as many of the stakeholder 
groups, either directly - through participation as one of the nine principal contractors, or 
indirectly through either subcontracting or affiliation with the main organisations. 
 
CESG, an agency of the UK government, co-ordinates the Biometric Working Group 
with the specific aim of fostering activities directed at successful use by government and 
working closely together with other national certification bodies as the BSI in Germany. 
As the premier agency responsible for electronic security in the UK, it leads on the 
security aspects of implementing biometric enabled solutions. 
 
The German TeleTrusT consortium was the second major player -in particular, its 
working Group 6 “Biometrics”, which has been addressing the opportunities in several 
sectors in an interdisciplinary way19. The BioTrusT project group is specifically interested 
in developments in the financial sector, with representatives of industrial and academic 
entities, test institutes and certification bodies, consumer agencies and data protection 
commissioners.  
 
Major end user organisations were represented by BT Exact Technologies - the research 
and development arm of British Telecommunications, and Nationwide Building Society 
– a leading UK financial institution.  
 
The supplier focus was provided by Daon: an SME (small to medium enterprise) 
developing biometric systems.  
 
The international perspective, together with an independent view on applications, was 
provided by Avanti, who additionally represent the IBIA (International Biometrics 
Industry Association) within the BWG. 
 
B&L Management Consulting have undertaken studies on the future of biometrics in 
German-speaking countries in Europe. 
 
The academic community had representation from CWI, Amsterdam, University College 
London, the University of Applied Sciences Giessen-Friedberg in collaboration with 
the Fraunhofer Institute, and the National Research Council of Italy. 
 
Furthermore, the members of the consortium were positioned to involve the other major 
players in Europe through their links to the UK’s long-established Association for 
Biometrics , the Dutch Biometric Forum, the newly-formed Italian Biometrics Forum 
and the other participants in the TeleTrusT association, which involves most of the key 
players in Germany. Many of the members also participate in the activities of the US-
based Biometrics Consortium, which brings together government, academia and industry 
worldwide. 
                                                                 
19 Project summaries of work undertaken in 1999-2002 are available at www.biotrust.de  
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The partners in this project have been informed through a number of other avenues, which 
has enabled the consortium to have access to the latest thinking and activities in the field 
throughout the period of this study. Examples of this wider involvement of the biometrics 
community include: 
 
· Networks of personal contacts of the individual members of the project 
· Participation of four of the partners in the ISO SC37 standards subcommittee on 
biometrics 
· Involvement in external projects, such as B&L’s management of the electronic 
identity project for the European Commission and external review of other 
projects by the members of the consortium 
· In-depth discussions with all stakeholders in the field, from officials in the data 
protection commissions of member states of the EU, to specialist suppliers – 
both industry leaders and emerging SMEs, through to potential end users, both 
for large and small scale deployments. 
· Responses to presentations made at conferences and meetings of key groups 
such as the Association for Biometrics. 
· Attendance at key industry conferences such as Biometrics 2002 in London; 
CardTech/SecurTech in New Orleans in April 2002 and in Orlando in May 
200320; and the 4th International conference on Audio- and Video- Based Person 
Authentication (AVBPA) in Guildford (UK) in June 200321 
· Invitation of outside representatives to scenario modelling workshops such as 
those held in Amsterdam 
· The holding of a well-attended 3-day open workshop in Rome in January 2003 
· Presentations to country groups in Madrid and Paris and to the participants at the 
Sixth Framework information day in March 2003 
· Information gained from leading specialist newsletters such as Biometrics 
Technology Today22 and the Biometrics in Human Services User Group23 and 
from online forums such as the Biometrics Consortium listserv. 
· Input from consultants’ reports on various aspects of the industry 
 
Taken together, the results should provide a validated view of numerous stakeholders on 
the current direction of biometric programmes in Europe and the prospects for the future 
through to 2010. 
 
1.5  The relationship to other Roadmap projects 
 
This Roadmap is part of a portfolio of 25 projects sponsored by the European 
Commission as a precursor to the next major programme of European research in the 
application of information and communication technologies: the Sixth Framework. Of 
these roadmaps, the following relate to the security and 'trust and confidence' themes24. 
Their findings were integrated into the final roadmap insofar as the final versions were 
available at publication time, with the outputs of the BIOVISION project discussed with 
the project participants in these studies: 
 
· AMSD: Accompanying Measure on System Dependability www.am-sd.org 
· RAPID: Roadmap for Advanced Research in Privacy and Identity Management, 
www.ra-pid.org 
· ACIP: Analysis and Assessment for Critical Infrastructure Protection, www.eu-
acip.de 
· PAMPAS: Pioneering Advanced Mobile Privacy and Security, www.pampas.eu.org 
                                                                 
20 http://www.ctst.com/  
21 http://avbpa2003.ee.surrey.ac.uk/  
22 http://www.compseconline.com/publications/prodbio.htm  
23 http://www.dss.state.ct.us/digital/news33/bhsug33.htm  
24 http://www.cordis.lu/ist/ka2/rmapsecurity.html  
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· RESET: Roadmaps for European Research in Smartcard Technologies, 
www.ercim.org/reset 
· STORK: Strategic Roadmap for Cryptology, www.stork.eu.org  
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2. Roadmaps and Roadmapping 
2.1  An application- and user-oriented roadmap for European biometrics 
 
An initial aim of this Roadmap was to determine the best opportunities for the application 
of biometrics in key sectors of the European economy over the period to 2010 and to 
advise the European Commission and other bodies on how best to foster these.  
As such, it was firmly grounded in the application-pull end of the spectrum of possible 
roadmaps, rather than starting from a consideration of the possibilities that novel 
technologies can offer, and from these possibilities deriving application scenarios (see 
section 2.2 for a discussion on the taxonomies of roadmaps).  
 
We believe that many of the over-optimistic projections of the uptake of innovative 
technologies - such as biometrics - have resulted from a fascination with the technology 
itself rather than in what benefits the technology can deliver for customers and end-users 
in the context of a specific application or service. Such technology-focussed approaches 
have also neglected to take into consideration the potential risks and disadvantages of 
using biometrics, and the claims of alternative solutions, which may offer similar 
functions or performance, albeit without some of the exciting user-facing hardware. 
 
However, this does not mean that we should adopt a conservative view on the potential of 
new technologies. We have attempted to balance the projection of existing trends in the 
adoption and use of systems employing biometric devices, with a scenario modelling 
method to explore some of the options beyond the near term (2003-5). These longer term 
visions (2006 onwards) will make use of the results of research currently underway in 
universities and commercial R&D laboratories.  
 
As the project progressed, it became clear that the BIOVISION project should not 
necessarily aim to determine the ‘best’ applications, but to identify those areas where the 
current scarce resources in the EU could be deployed to the most effective effect. In any 
case, the use of the qualifier - 'best' - would depend on the perspective of the stakeholder 
in a particular application and is therefore inappropriate when we aim to bring together all 
the players in a fragmented European marketplace. Examples of where such different 
perspectives can offer the biometrics community valuable insights are: 
 
§ For device and software suppliers, ‘best’ may refer to applications that generate 
sufficient revenue and publicity to ensure the continued survival of the large number 
of small companies in this crowded sector (worldwide, over 200 companies offer a 
biometric solution of some kind).  
§ For a customer, whether it is a government institution (with security also a major 
concern) or a corporate entity creating a service for niche markets or large 
populations of consumers, ‘best’ may be an optimal return on the total investment of 
which the biometric component may be only a small part. Nevertheless, price-
performance considerations in the use of the biometric subsystem will play some part 
in the overall profitability of the total design.  
§ For system integrators , ease of interfacing to other sub-systems, robust and easily 
predictable performance, low maintenance costs and availability of multiple sources 
of standardised components could be the prime considerations. 
§ While for an end-user, the 'best' application may be determined by the convenience 
of not needing to remember PINs or passwords, or carry more keys or cards, with 
minimal implications for personal privacy or health and safety. 
 
There are inevitable compromises to be made, as applications are unlikely to meet the 
aims of each of these stakeholders. Nevertheless, through its diverse membership, the 
BIOVISION consortium has been able to assess the positioning of each of these groups. 
 
The focus of the Roadmap is on applications in Europe, but in an increasingly globalised 
world, it would be pointless to take a narrowly defined view that excluded the impact of 
events, research and experience outside the 300 million population of the EU. Indeed, it is 
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likely that many of the biometric-enabled deployments in Europe will include devices 
from the US or the Far East, and these deployments will be realised by multi-national 
system integrators. In particular the impact of the US decision to require the use of 
biometrics in passports and visas in the near term has changed the perspective on the 
application of biometrics since the initial proposal was drafted in February 2002. 
 
Nevertheless there are specific features of the European market that influence the 
selection of biometric technique and the details of the application. For example, in 
contrast with the US, Europe has a commitment to government regulation of consumer 
rights to privacy, fair trading, etc rather than offering the individual a recourse to law as 
the preferred method of establishing their rights. Europe differs significantly in many 
other ways that are relevant in this context: there is a commitment to maintenance of the 
cultural, linguistic and personal diversity, a rich and complex heritage, and the provision 
of government funded health and welfare benefits for all its citizens. These differences 
may be reflected - for at least some system designers - in a preference for socio-technical 
design of systems, where the needs, perceptions and existing working practices of end 
users are given equal weight with the requirements defined by the customer of a system. 
 
2.2  Roadmapping - from concept to implementation 
 
The use of roadmaps to capture a view on the future of technology-driven developments, 
for either a single company or at a national or international level, is relatively recent. 
Early adopters such as Motorola, Philips and major oil multinationals, demonstrated the 
value of bringing together experts from a number of departments to collate information 
and knowledge held across an organisation and then display it in a simple visual way to 
show the linkages between research, development, products and the requirements of 
applications along a timeline. In the mid-1990's the value of an industry-wide roadmap 
began to be appreciated, mainly through a successful US initiative for the semiconductor 
industry. The SIA (Semiconductor Industry Association) Roadmap is now a major 
fixture, being revisited at two-yearly intervals, with work on the next version 
commencing once the current issue is published. These can be major projects in their own 
right, with the latest International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors  - ITRS - 
released in November 2001 being the combined output of the work of 800 specialists 
worldwide25. This, and allied maps for the electronics industry in the USA, culminated in 
the creation of a roadmap for the entire sector, under the National Electronics 
Manufacturing Initiative. 
 
However, the literature on roadmaps, and what makes them successful or not, is relatively 
sparse, and this overview draws upon some key papers, backed by the experience of 
individual members of the consortium. Perhaps as a response to this low level of 
analytical response, two centres of excellence have been formed, Purdue University in 
Indiana26, and Cambridge University's Institute for Manufacturing in the UK.  
 
In an early initiative in 1997, EIRMA, the European Industrial Research Management 
Association, reviewed the state of the art, as seen from the European perspective, building 
upon the lessons learnt from years of experience in the consortium.27 
 
Examples of other resources that are available include: 
 
· Cambridge University's Centre for Technology Management technical papers and the 
T-Plan approach, a fast-track process for Technology Roadmaps28.  
                                                                 
25 http://public.itrs.net  
26 J Duckles and E Coyle, Purdue's Center for Technology Roadmapping: A Resource for Research 
and Education in technology Mapping, (2002) 
27 EIRMA, Technology Roadmapping: Delivering Business Vision (Paris, 1997) 
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· A paper on Motorola's recent work in this field29 
 
In 1998, Sandia National Laboratories in the US published a report on Fundamentals of 
Technology Roadmapping30 that summarised the roadmapping process as a three phase 
endeavour. More recently, Kostoff and Schaller31 have reviewed some of the elements of 
successful roadmap initiatives on behalf of the US Department of the Navy. 
 
This latter paper quotes Robert Galvin, an ex-chairman of Motorola and a keen proponent 
of the use of roadmaps: 
 
'A roadmap is an extended look at the future of a chosen field of enquiry composed of the 
collected knowledge and imagination of the brightest drivers of change in that field … 
Roadmaps communicate visions, attract resources from business and government, 
stimulate investigations and monitor progress. They become the inventory of possibilities 
for a particular field.' 
 
One fundamental point emphasised throughout the literature is the importance of the 
process of generating the Roadmap. For example, EIRMA note that 'the greatest value  
… comes from the business processes that have to be put in place to create it, rather than 
the possession of a TRM itself. Consequently, a TRM is not something that can be 
purchased from a consultant, or created by an individual. It must be the output of an 
empowered team activity…' 
 
Roadmaps can be either prospective - looking to the future - or retrospective, examining 
the steps that led to a particular successful or not so successful result, from the 
fundamental research through to the development and the released product or service. 
Their fundamental orientation may be either technology-pushed or application- (or 
requirements-) pulled, and the methodology of generation of the roadmap can be based 
upon the synthesis of knowledge of industry experts or through the computer analysis of 
documents, research papers, news items, etc. Figure 1 illustrates these options and hybrids 
of the various possibilities are, of course, possible. In this project we will be using a 
future oriented, predominantly application-pull approach (60% of importance), using 
experts and potential customer assessment, validated by an external community of 
stakeholders. 
 
 Figure 1 Options for the Roadmapping process (underlined terms represent the BIOVISION approach) 
 
Time perspective  Push/pull Approach 
 Prospective  Technology push (40)  Human experts 
 Retrospective  Application pull (60)  Computer analysis  
 
                                                                 
28 R Phaal et al, Technology Roadmapping: Linking technology resources to business objectives , 
http://www-mmd.eng.cam.ac.uk/ctm/pubs/TPlan/TRM_white_paper.pdf and R Phaal et al, T-
Plan:the fast start to Technology Roadmapping: Planning your route to success (University of 
Cambridge, Institute for Manufacturing, 2001) 
29 M Grinnell et al Case Study:Innovation Roadmapping using Enterprise Automation Software 
http://roadmap.ecn.purdue.edu/CTR/documents/MotorolaCaseStudy.pdf  
30 M L Garcia and Bray, Fundamentals of Technology Roadmapping, 
http://www.sandia.gov/Roadmap/home.htm (1998) 
31 R N Kostoff and R R Schaller, Science and Technology Roadmaps, IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management 48(2) pp 132-143 (May 2001) 
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2.3  Successful Roadmaps 
 
Based upon their analysis of the literature, Kostoff and Schaller offer a list of critical 
success factors for high quality roadmaps. They rightly point out that there is no agreed 
measure by which the quality of roadmaps can be judged. Even if a roadmap's predictions 
are fulfilled, it could be that these were set too conservatively and end users followed the 
route of least resistance. On the other hand, the consensus building approach by the SIA 
has generated a competitive atmosphere of trying to 'beat the roadmap' perhaps to the 
detriment of a more commercially logical approach. 
 
The pre-requisites for a successful roadmap, as suggested by the authors are many and 
diverse and drawing on their list, the following seem to be relevant to the BIOVISION 
roadmap: 
 
1. A comprehensive and broad appreciation of the current status of the science and 
technology base, grounded in an understanding of how the industry got to the present 
state. Where are we now and how did we get there? This survey of the present 
situation should encompass all the latest relevant projects, activities or events that 
may impinge on the objectives of the roadmap. 
2. Looking to the future, the experts should develop a comprehensive vision across all 
the relevant areas that impact on the technology. 
3. A commitment by senior decision-makers to the continuation of the process. 
Customers, and other users of roadmaps, should realise that the value lies to a large 
extent in the maintenance of the roadmap as the technology develops and 
assessments are updated. 
4. A strong competent team of experts drawn from research, technology and product 
lines - led by a roadmap manager who scopes the roadmap, structures the working 
groups and chooses the final outputs from the large number of inputs gathered in the 
process of developing the roadmap. 
5. A clear sense of purpose and ownership, with the roadmap preferably undertaken by 
those people who will have a stake in the outcomes. The forming question and 
resulting recommendations should be relevant to the subsequent activities of the 
customer. 
6. Standardisation of approach to the roadmap, if there is a need for an integrated view 
across a whole industry sector. 
7. A process is required to determine the rationale for the selection of nodes in the 
timeline and the links between nodes. 
8. Validation of the roadmap through the involvement of as large a number as possible 
of the community of practitioners. 
9. A clear vision and action plan detailing what needs to be done - or not done - to 
foster and ensure support for the achievement of the optimum directions identified in 
the Roadmap. 
 
2.4  The Roadmapping process 
 
The Sandia paper referred to above offers a detailed account of the roadmapping process 
in a  three phased approach and illustrates its application to the previously mentioned SIA 
roadmap. The phases comprise an initial preparatory stage, the core phase of developing 
the roadmap and the final stage of follow-up. Although the Sandia roadmapping 
process is predicated on a technology-push roadmap, the BIOVISION project used some 
of its insights, although it had to modify them in the context of a more complex 
application-led framework. 
2.4.1 Phase 1: Initial Preparation 
 
· Acceptance of the need for the roadmap from a larger constituency than just a single 
organisation commissioning or undertaking the project. Furthermore, the rationale 
should be driven by a defined set of needs rather than be solutions-driven. With the 
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adoption of such a needs-based approach, the scoping and setting of boundaries of 
the roadmap will be immeasurably improved. 
· Assembly of a team with expertise across all aspects of the technologies, led by a 
group that will benefit from the results 
· Assurance that a vision can be developed for the industry, and that there is at least the 
possibility of genuine collaboration between the major industry stakeholders. 
 
2.4.2  Phase 2: Roadmap development 
2.4.2.1  Technology Push Perspective 
In the Sandia framework, the development of roadmaps is treated from a strictly 
'technology push' perspective, which is at odds with the presumption in BIOVISION: 
 
· The most critical step is the agreement of the team undertaking the roadmap on the 
common needs that the project will address. Eliciting these needs can be 
facilitated by a scenario modelling process, and the BIOVISION project refined the 
needs for key application areas over the longer timescale through the use of such a 
methodology. 
 
· If a quantitative measure of the final goal of the technologies can be defined, this 
will aid in focussing the efforts of the experts involved. For the range of biometric-
enabled applications considered in this project, such a quantification was considered 
to be inapplicable. 
 
· The next consideration is a listing of the principal areas of technology that ought to 
be considered. For BIOVISION, this included all of the biometric methods (e.g. 
fingerprint, voice, iris recognition), but the team also needed to take account of 
software processing developments such as advances in image processing, 
improvements in user interface design, and changes in costs and performance of 
specialist and general purpose hardware. This was taken into account to some extent 
during the work on Section 3.6 
 
· Having determined the technology, the work should move towards a consideration of 
the technology drivers and the targets that will determine which technology will 
address the requirements in the best way and the dates by which these targets can be 
met. Some of these drivers were identified in the BIOVISION project, but the major 
uncertainties in development of biometric and parallel technologies over the extended 
timescale have precluded this type of analysis. 
 
· This is followed through by an analysis of the alternative technologies and the 
timelines for developments in each. For example, will an attractive technology meet 
the target requirements in a relatively easy way, but require the solution of tough 
problems along the way? If more than one approach can address the target 
requirements, when will decisions have to be made as to which option to pursue and 
which to relegate (or devote less resource to)? Section 4.0 considers such 
alternatives, most notably of course, the retention of the status quo in which PINs and 
passwords, keys and smart cards will play a role. By virtue of their cost and the 
familiarity of end users with them, these established options will continue to 
dominate the marketplace for many years. 
 
· Having identified the alternatives, probably the most difficult aspect of the roadmap 
is the recommendation of which technologies to emphasise in the allocation of 
scarce resources. Although some approaches may look attractive in the short term, 
premature investment in these may prejudice the more profitable options, leading to 
increased whole life costs as systems have to be updated, or resulting in confusion in 
the marketplace as deployments are put on hold for fear of making the wrong 
decision. Disruptive technologies need to be taken into account: those that do not 
appear to meet the intermediate requirements, but will simplify the final system. In 
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BIOVISION, the consortium noted that the existing group of technologies offered 
solutions to most of the authentication requirements (perhaps with the exception of 
tracking and tracing individuals, in which gait recognition may have a role). The 
likelihood of a novel biometric method making an impact over the study period was 
considered to be remote. Therefore, any proposals for support of research into novel 
methods should be supported by a clear analysis of why current approaches are 
unlikely to meet the requirements set by service operators. Current projections for the 
biometric market view three technologies as particularly significant: facial 
recognition, fingerprint systems and iris recognition. There are niche opportunities 
for speaker verification, hand geometry and dynamic signature verification, perhaps 
to be used in conjunction with another method in so-called multimodal biometrics. 
2.4.2.2  Application Pull Perspective 
Biometric methods are often seen as purely a security measure to ensure a higher standard 
of authentication than can be offered by either 'something you know' or 'something you 
have'. This may be true for many applications, but often other considerations come into 
play. Hence, a biometric could be used as: 
 
· security mechanism for more secure authentication of an individual person 
· security mechanism to limit a registration for a service to one user at any time 
· a visible deterrent to stop abuse or criminal activity 
· symbolic value to brand a service as 'high tech'. 
 
Other distinctive benefits include improved usability of a system and cost reduction due 
to the elimination of manual processes. 
 
In analysing the future of biometric-enabled systems from an application-pull perspective, 
several steps need to be considered: 
 
· The application class within which it falls. In section 3 we shall provide an initial 
classification of applications that will support the application-oriented elements of 
the Roadmap. 
 
· For each application class, there will be exemplar applications that fall within the 
class, while other applications are likely to make use of a mix of these fundamental 
elements. These exemplar applications will form the focus of the more detailed 
roadmapping in Section 6, using the insights that were gained in the scenario models 
of Section 3. 
 
· Current and future developments in these exemplar applications were considered. In 
some cases, the view of a key body may determine whether a biometric will be 
considered appropriate and which biometric is to be used. For example, for the case 
of biometrics to be used in passports and other machine-readable documents, the 
industry body, ICAO determined that - on the basis of its own studies - face 
recognition would be the universal biometric, with iris and fingerprint based options 
available to individual countries. 
 
· Further examination of the exemplar application will focus on the biometric quality 
requirements (both technical and non-technical) that a biometric-enabled solution 
would be required to meet so as to justify the investment in systems that can utilise 
these novel technologies. Note that the word 'quality' covers a wide range of 
attributes, amongst which are robustness, security of operation, usability, cost-
effectiveness, interoperability, user friendliness. Not surprisingly, many of these are 
the critical areas in which there are significant unknowns and which were selected as 
the themes of special studies in this project. Assessing the way in which quality of a 
biometric solution meets the application requirements of a service was the subject of 
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a companion study and the resulting analysis is available in a separate document32. 
Although at present this work is still theoretical, future work is envisaged in testing 
the validity of this approach. 
 
· Many biometric-enabled solutions to the applications under consideration above will 
be implemented. However, one of the major uncertainties is the timescale in which 
these will start and the rate at which they will take over from existing solutions. This 
part of the roadmap analysis is one of the more problematic areas, as it is dependant 
on many factors, only some of which are determined by progress in technology (as 
discussed in the 'technology push' perspective). Other factors which will influence 
the speed of adoption and the rate of transition from non-biometric solutions 
include: 
 
· developments in complementary technologies and in technologies that reduce 
the need for a biometric solution, e.g. the mass use of smart cards, or more 
improbably, the use of implanted radio frequency tags in humans (Note that in 
some cases these could enhance the value of a biometric element to the solution.) 
These complementary technologies and developments are considered in Sections 
3.6 and 3.7.  
· changes in the social, economic and political environment that will either 
bring forward the adoption of a biometric-enabled solution or delay it. Examples 
of such changes are: 
 
- social: divergence of populations in the advanced economies into two 
identifiable groups: the wealthy, but 'time poor' and those excluded 
from the ICT-based services with poorly paid jobs and little stake in the 
new knowledge based economies 
- economic:  the increasing proportion of elderly in the population, with 
greater expectations from health and welfare provision by the state and 
private enterprise 
- political: the impact of new terrorist threats such as those manifested in 
the September 11th events. 
 
Section 3.7 reviews some of these predictable developments. 
 
· The size and potential value of the market for the new biometric-enabled solutions 
addressing the exemplar applications, together with an appraisal of the key players 
who are best placed to take advantage of these opportunities. The reports of market 
research consultants provides some limited guidance. 
 
· Residual uncertainties that have not been captured elsewhere in the process. 
 
2.4.2.3  Integrating the Two Perspectives into a Single View 
For each of the applications, there could be a number of technology solutions, some of 
which fit well with the quality requirements as determined from the application 
perspective - others of which are inappropriate. Conceptually, a two-dimensional matrix 
would be required to assess the appropriateness of each technology for every application. 
In this case, the timeline (generally a linear axis in conventional roadmaps) translates to a 
non-linear form. Although such a solution is attractive from a philosophical standpoint, its 
generality is obtained at the expense of extreme complexity, thereby losing the main 
advantage of the roadmap, its diagrammatic simplicity. The BIOVISION project 
determined that this would be inappropriate, although future editions of the Roadmap may 
wish to pursue this aim. 
                                                                 
32 Michael Behrens and Maik Weber, Report on technology and application: Issues for biometric 
identification systems, (May 2003). Note that similar approaches are being pursued by the Japanese 
national standards organisation. 
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2.4.3  The BIOVISION Roadmap 
 
The Roadmap examines a selection of major application areas through the lens of certain 
key determinants of the likely success of implementation: user acceptance, security, a 
medical dimension, legal and regulatory issues and standardisation activities. In many 
cases, this has been achieved through a listing of the critical issues as identified in a 
workshop including participants outside of the project. The individual studies that relate 
to the key determinants are often not made explicit, but colour the assessment of the 
likelihood of the specific scenario. 
 
2.4.4  Phase 3: Follow-through Work 
 
· Exposure of the methodologies, conclusions and recommendations for review by the 
community at large, firstly through an invitation to comment, followed by 
socialisation of the conclusions through workshops, conference papers, and 
networking with thought leaders and decision makers in the industry. The 
BIOVISION project incorporated this into the roadmap development process and will 
continue it through the open invitation to comment on the Roadmap. 
 
· Recommendations in the form of Research Challenges  that identify the cross-cutting 
issues common to applications and technologies. 
 
· Review, to ensure that the roadmap takes advantage of the most up-to-date 
knowledge and incorporates innovations and the impact of changes in the external 
environment. In the BIOVISION context, this will form one of the aims of the 
proposed European Biometric Forum, as well being the subject of a review workshop 
in February 2004. 
 
2.5  The BIOVISION Roadmap – an alternative view 
 
The Roadmap figure (at the end of this document) is a schematic representation of the 
diagrammatic element of the Roadmap for a specific Government-oriented application. It 
illustrates a form of the Roadmap concept grounded in the conventional - technology-
focussed – approach to roadmapping. Of limited use in the present roadmap report (due to 
the diversity of applications and underlying technologies, as discussed previously), it 
nevertheless demonstrates the value of such an approach. In future versions of the 
BIOVISION Roadmap it may be appropriate to examine specific applications and 
services with the aim of constructing such diagrammatic forms of the roadmap concept. 
 
This format draws heavily on the Philips approach as documented by Groenvald 33, with 
BIOVISION extending it to take account of the strong balancing of the application focus 
in our work. The timeline summary shown in this Roadmap figure illustrates a number of 
features of the BIOVISION roadmap: 
 
· The timeline, as the x-axis, stretches to the end of 2010, but the application 
dimension (at the very top of the page) can continue beyond this date to illustrate the 
onward development of government plans. It may also be appropriate to include 
activities that have already commenced  - in which case, the timeline will have a 
historical element as well. 
 
· The bold vertical line at the end of 2005 indicates the boundary between two time 
periods - short term and long term - as discussed previously. 
 
                                                                 
33 P Groenvald, op cit (1997) 
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· The BIOVISION project timescale is indicated by the activity labelled BVN in the 
top left of the figure. (The work of envisioning the future of European biometrics 
should continue beyond the end of the project through the efforts of organisations 
such as the European Biometric Forum.) In this particular application, the goal is to 
deploy a biometric-enabled system for a government (or a department within a 
government) at the start of 2008 - indicated by the inverted black triangle. The task of 
refining the vision is shown as continuing to the end of 2004. 
 
· The key components, in addition to a clearly defined application, are  
 
· research,  
 
· technology development (often by suppliers),  
 
· the products offered by suppliers,  
 
· the processes which need to be in place to make use of these products in the 
application, and  
 
· drivers and inhibitors that can either advance or delay the introduction date 
of 2008.  
 
These components are marked as separate layers in the schematic, working from 
the bottom of the diagrammatic roadmap to the top. 
 
· Activities such as BIOVISION and the national and European funding bodies 
develop a set of requirements for priorities in research to support the biometric 
community in meeting the needs of application sectors. The response of consortia 
and individual organisations is to put forward proposals to meet these requirements 
and if successful, these will gather the resources to start a research project, for 
illustrative purposes shown as lasting for a period of 3 years. Note that even if there 
are tangible outputs at the end of year 1 of this research that can be moved towards 
commercialisation, the productisation at the end of the lifetime of the research project 
will only catch a second phase of the deployment of this application, beyond the end 
of this time horizon. One of the useful outputs of such a Roadmap is that it can  
clarify the rate-determining steps and highlight opportunities for increased effort to 
reduce critical timescales.  
 
· Existing technologies that are under development (such as 'Improved Biom 1') can be 
mapped; in this case, this activity is being carried out by Supplier 1 who is able to 
capitalise on its research through the introduction of product P2 in 2005. This can be 
included in pilot trials and (if successful) included in the procurement cycle, meeting 
the 'required by' date. A competitor, to whom this technology is licensed a year later 
will probably miss the deadline with its product, R2, but with its commitment to the 
'Radical Biom 1' deriving from the research project described above, it is well placed 
to take advantage when phase 2 of the application is launched in the next decade. 
 
· Other, non-technical, activities can be included - such as the legislation that needs to 
be in place in order to start the procurement process. 
 
· Finally, the start date of the deployment may change in response to political, 
economic or social factors. A list of such possibilities should be added as an aid to 
policy makers. 
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3. Applications 
3.1  Matching the biometric technology and the application 
 
3.1.1  Failure of adoption of biometric technologies 
 
As has been mentioned in an earlier section, there are numerous ways in which biometric 
methods can be applied. A few have been widely deployed, such as the South African 
Pensions use of fingerprint verification (1990-date) and the numerous welfare benefit 
schemes in the USA that have been implemented to reduce the incidence of fraud. There 
are also many, quite small schemes that continue operating without much publicity, e.g. in 
access control to sensitive areas in nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, many more were 
prototyped amidst a high degree of publicity only to be forgotten - perhaps even quietly 
withdrawn. This roadmap project collated publicly available information about the current 
status of biometric-enabled applications in order to assess the reasons for this failure of 
biometric methods to reach the market. (Section 7.1 discusses these reasons in a more 
general way.) 
 
3.1.2  Generic Application Classes 
 
The BIOVISION analysis of the applications for which biometric methods could be used 
has derived the top level classification of: 
 
1. Access control 
2. Transaction security 
3. Tracking and tracing 
4. Personalisation 
 
Applications can be viewed as either an exemplar of an application class (e.g. a 
fingerprint control on a door lock is a clear example of the access control application), or 
a combination of the elements of one or more of these primary application classes. 
 
3.1.3  The 'Application Pull' Framework 
 
For an application to merit the use of a biometric method, there must be additional 
features of that technology that will drive its adoption and subsequent diffusion.  This can 
be termed application pull. and the extent to which such an application pull is realised in 
the marketplace is determined by three factors as illustrated in the schema of Figure 2: 
 
· Application class 
· Requirements 
· Market players 
 
                 Figure 2: Reference frame for an application pull model
Market players
Application Classes
Requirements
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We have described the types of application classes, and a more complete classification of 
applications in terms of these base classes has been developed during the course of this 
project. 
 
Each player in the value chain will have different requirements for a specific application. 
The complete set of requirements, even for a relatively simple deployment, could be quite 
complex, and work is underway to define such a comp lete set in more detail34. Figure 3 
illustrates some of the dimensions of the set of Technological Requirements. 
 
Figure 3: Requirements for Applications with Biometric Identification from the Operator’s viewpoint 
Performance
Environ
-ment
Application
Requirements
Security Class
Recognition Quality
Enrolment Specific
 Performance
Integration Environment
Physical Environment 
Conditions
End User 
Environment
Operator Environment
 
 
 
 
The third dimension in the application pull framework is the perspective of the market 
players. We have identified the following players, although there may well be others, 
whose identity and role will surface during detailed analysis of exemplar applications: 
 
1. Sensor manufacturer 
2. Algorithm and software developer 
3. Biometric system integrator 
4. System provider 
5. End-user 
 
3.1.4  The 'Application-Technology' Compiler 
 
The final analysis tool is the Application-Technology Compiler, that assesses the extent to 
which a specific technology matches the requirements of an application in all - or only 
some of the dimensions - of a specification. Figure 4 highlights certain dimensions for 
which one technology may be the most suitable, such as Technology B in the case of 
Scalability, where the metric (or 'Intensity') as measured in a standardised manner shows 
that Technology B does not reach the threshold for adoption in this application. 
Technology A, however, reaches it in this application. Clearly a set of profiles for each 
technology and application would be a useful analysis tool with which to understand to 
what extent current technological implementations fall short of the minimum required to 
justify deployment of cost-effective, appropriate and user-friendly applications in Europe. 
 
                                                                 
34 A summary of the current status of this methodology is available as a BIOVISION deliverable: 
Michael Behrens and Maik Weber, Report on technology and application issues for biometric 
identification systems (July 2003) 
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Figure 4: Compiling the 'Intensity' of technologies and applications 
3.2  Specific applications - the use of scenario modelling  
 
In order to understand the future opportunities offered by the widespread use of biometric 
devices, the BIOVISION partners used a mix of techniques, spanning traditional 
forecasting methods (such as the Delphi) approach and scenario-based modelling 
techniques aiming to offer alternative views of the future, rather than committing the 
participants to a single view.  
 
The scenario approach, which is perhaps less familiar to readers will be described in some 
detail. There are a number of recent books that explore this technique in even more 
detail.35 This method attempts to integrate the accumulated knowledge of a team as to i) 
drivers, ii) well-establis h projections and the iii) the unknowns in a situation set some 
time into the future. Clearly the more diversity in the group the less constrained will be 
the range of possible scenarios created, provided that the members are willing to work 
together constructively. 
 
The scenario experience brings together a group of experts both in the field and related 
areas over one or two days - under the direction of an impartial moderator/facilitator - 
with the aim of answering a problematic area relevant to the needs of an organisation. 
There may also be some outsider 'wise men' and creative people whose aim is to free up 
the discussion from the predictable directions that have been already well-rehearsed at 
conferences and in consultants' reports.  
 
An introduction positions the method as neither being crystal ball gazing into the future 
on the part of a small group, nor a debate between opposing viewpoints in the world as it 
is today. Its aim is to uncover the real forces that will shape the future of an industry, a 
company or a country. The resulting output of such a workshop should acknowledge the 
uncertainties in the forecasts, but the act of working together as a team will have dug 
deeper into the unconsciously held knowledge of all of the participants.  
 
After the introduction, the process continues in the following way. 
                                                                 
35 Kees van der Heijden  et al, The Sixth Sense - Accelerating Organisational Learning with 
Scenarios, John Wiley & Sons (2002) 
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1. The question is clarified in as much detail as is appropriate to the circumstances, by 
agreeing the key issue, so that the participants are able to test its relevance to the 
scenarios that are developed subsequently. 
 
2. The next stage identifies the key driving forces at work that will shape the future, in 
the areas of social dynamics, the economic context, political developments and 
technology changes. Some of these forces in these four sectors will be easy to 
forecast: they are predetermined (e.g. the age and gender distribution of those who 
are already born), whereas some are subject to a great deal of uncertainty. The 
scenario building process should aim to isolate the major areas of uncertainty that 
relate to the key question, and understand the relationships between the driving 
forces that will impact on the key question. This may be carried out through an 
exercise that asks each participant to individually identify and write down the key 
forces. These are then collated on a board, and organised into common themes. 
 
3. The matrix of uncertainties. This phase aims to collect the major uncertainties into at 
most two related groups, each of which are plotted along two axes at right angles 
with high-low measures in each dimension. 
 
4. Four stories are developed in the four quadrants of the matrix, corresponding to 
HIGH-HIGH, HIGH-LOW, LOW-HIGH, LOW-LOW, but recognising that none 
will really come to pass. Indeed the real future will be some mix of all four worlds. 
Note that the stories should not be selected as particularly extreme cases of 'good' and 
'bad' worlds (hence the need for an experienced facilitator to avoid such extremes). 
Each story or scenario is named to identify them in future discussions. 
 
5. Two or four of these stories are expanded in syndicate groups whose leaders report 
back in plenary session. Discussion continues to refine the scenarios and note 
similarities and differences. Rapporteurs write out the scenarios for future more 
detailed assessment. 
 
6. Over subsequent meetings, the implications of the scenarios for the interested 
organisations are explored. 
 
3.3  Specific applications: the case of physical access control 
 
This scenario modelling exercise was the first undertaken in this roadmap project, with 
the participants being drawn exclusively from the BIOVISION partners and contractors. 
The independent facilitator (as in the subsequent workshops) was Dr. Michael Lyons of 
BT Exact Technologies who has many years of experience heading the BT Business 
Modelling group. The introductory sessions explained the process of scenario modelling, 
giving examples of how it has been used in a high technology context.  
 
The forming question, aimed to assess the drivers and inhibitors for the widespread 
adoption of biometric methods for access control into campuses, buildings and rooms, 
was circulated in advance of the meeting: 
 
How will biometrics be used for physical access control by large organisations in 
Europe in 2010? 
 
3.3.1 The scenario process 
 
The exercise commenced with participants individually listing their views on the main 
drivers and factors that would impact the widespread deployment of biometrics in this 
application by 2010. Each driver was written on a separate 'Post-It' note and placed 
randomly on the whiteboard. At the end of the 30 minute session, these notes were 
organised into themes, led by the facilitator, but with the co-operation of the participants.  
 
 
BIOVISION Roadmap Issue 1.1                                                                              15 October 2003  
38 
The next stage consisted of placing these themes on a two-dimensional grid with axes of 
uncertainty and importance, so as to identify the most important and uncertain issues. 
Three areas emerged: User Reaction, Physical Threat and Legislation. After a discussion, 
the Physical Threat was taken out of consideration, and a 2x2 matrix of the other two 
themes yielded a set of four world scenarios, of which two were selected for investigation 
by two teams selected randomly by the facilitator. The aim was to create a story line for 
each of the scenarios together with a realistic description of how the world would have 
evolved towards this situation. 
 
3.3.2  Outputs from the exercise: Issues (drivers and other key factors) 
 
The following were the contributions by the participants as written on 'Post-It' notelets, 
organised by the themes into which they were finally placed by a joint decision-making 
process of the participants: 
 
Miscellaneous (did not fit into other categories) 
 
· Developments in beauty surgery 
· Failure by 'driving countries' to listen and cajole the 'hesitant countries' 
 
Economic 
 
· Global recession 
· Further economic recession 
 
Office Security 
 
· Dishonesty of security personnel 
· Increase in subcontracting of cleaners, etc 
· Easy to get someone's entry card and engage in industrial espionage 
· Increasing variability of the workforce 
· Multiple occupancy offices - so need to stop unauthorised people moving into your 
space 
· Part of a 'fun' environment for creative organisations 
· Increase in the use of smart cards in other applications 
· Strengthening of alternative technologies 
· Can't afford security staff for a small (e.g. 2 person) office for a company with many 
small offices 
· Trend towards staff working from home - large organisations don't own buildings 
 
Cost 
 
· Security guards cost money and they will cost increasingly more as additional govt 
regulations come into force 
· Cost saving (re: security staff) 
· Cost of security personnel 
· Cost of tokens and consistency of supply 
· Intensive use to reduce costs  
· Costs 
· Cost saving 
· Increased availability of cheap and robust biometrics 
· Proprietary systems and willingness to standardise systems and products  
· Standardisation (twice) 
 
Legislation 
 
· Privacy policy increasingly requiring 'self protection' 
· Legislation requiring company to know who is in building at any time 
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· Legal requirements in workplace - 'hot desking' means you don't know who is in the 
building 
· Biometrics are mandated 
· External Legislation and related developments 
· Conformity with data protection issues and directive 
· Legislation - positive and negative 
· Big Brother fear 
· Trend to more legal 'framework' and self-regulation (US approach also in Europe) 
· Increasing fear of no longer being able to control personal data 
· Integration with existing systems and support  
· Lack of respect for privacy and data protection rights 
· Assign actions to individuals (accountability) 
· Reliable responsibility for electronic transactions 
· Privacy organisations successful in getting biometrics banned 
· Internal audit requirements 
· Need for reliable legal transactions in electronic transactions 
· Not feeling disadvantaged and oppressed in comparison with colleagues not having 
biometric access (psychology) 
· Discrimination 
· Requirements of people to be anonymous in a networked /linked world 
 
Technology 
 
· How will we trust computers in 2010? 
· The effectiveness of biometric being undermined by another technological advance 
· Access control a by-product of time and attendance system 
· Dispute (cause and resolution) 
· Failure of other mechanisms like PIN/Passwords in relevant transactions with new 
technologies like electronic signatures 
· How will the key and PIN/password market react? 
· No 100% decision with biometrics36 
· Scalability 
· PINs and tokens repeatedly compromised 
· Maybe we have 'better' solutions for access control 
· High turnaround systems will be required 
· Touchless sensors will be preferred 
· Technical improvements like robustness and scalability 
· Throughput 
· Performance (Rejection) 
· Security 
 
Physical Threats 
 
· The security used to store the tokens being compromised 
· Bigger inequality between ‘haves’ and ‘have not's’ 
· Major security breach/leak, Incidents of transgression against the organisation 
· Increase in direct activism - fear of activists getting hold of cards and disrupting your 
work or gaining access to your information 
· Increasing fear of terrorism 
· Another terrorist attack 
· Physical threats 
 
Health and Safety 
 
· Health concerns around technology 
                                                                 
36 In contrast with the assurance that a password matches the reference one. 
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· Health and safety 
· The technology must be totally safe for users 
· Governments will be first - global companies will follow 
· Enormous power of technologists 
· It will be used to stop people from a blacklist 
 
User Reaction 
 
· Geographical environment (changes, etc) 
· More strict environmental regime in order to protect own country/public buildings 
· Incentive to users (The users must gain something using a biometric system) 
· External PR consideration in reaction to social trends) 
· Willingness of people to use their body in order to authenticate themselves 
· Consumer fears, Media: lack of support 
· Perceived benefits - not necessarily qualified - but understood from the political 
perspective 
· People more likely to embrace biometrics if they have experience from work 
· Is it a must? or a can? -> what if people deny? 
· The ability to use the access control biometric in other areas outside of the business 
· No one will discuss it anymore 
· The trade unions will not be an obstacle to the biometric process - agreement with the 
trade unions 
· The user's associations should approve the technology - agreement with user's 
associations. 
 
3.3.3 Output: Themes displayed on axes of Importance v Uncertainty 
 
These themes were then positioned on the following two-dimensional graph to identify 
those two themes that were both very important and highly uncertain. This process 
resulted in vigorous debate, although the participants recognised that relative positions of 
the themes was of significance, rather than their positioning in absolute terms on the 
figure. 
 
Figure 5:  Importance/Uncertainty Plot for Physical Access Control 
 
 
The two themes that were selected were User Reaction and Legislation. A discussion 
ensued on the naming of the four scenarios. In view of the limited time, only two 
scenarios were named and the group split into two syndicates to develop the scenarios in 
more details. 
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3.3.4 Output: 2x2 Matrix for Case of Physical Access Control 
 
The naming of the quadrants was as follows: 
 
Figure 6: 2x2 Matrix for Physical Access Control 
 
 
'Scandinavia 2010' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'Britain 2010' 
 
 
3.3.5  Output scenario: 'Scandinavia 2010' 
 
Origin of scenario name: Scandinavian countries are seen to be more advanced and 
receptive to novel systems (e.g. Finland with its high penetration of mobile phones), but 
seem to be quite proactive to support the rights of the individual. 
  
Scenario Offices in the new age of biometrics are characterised by workers in them 
feeling safe and secure. PC security is no longer a problem with the use of semi-
continuous, user-friendly authentication. Partly this comes about through the tough 
regulation that requires strict controls on security and use of biometrics, and allowing the 
introduction of biometrics only with the vote of an overwhelming majority of workers at 
the place of work. The fully audited use of any biometric data is controlled by clearly 
defined security countermeasures and processes that are laid down as the result of 
European standards, that - for example - enforce separation of data relating to biometric 
authentication from any other data in use by the company. New entrants to the company 
are introduced to the technology through a 'fun' game that makes the enrolment process 
simple and easy to understand.  
 
Much of the template data is stored on a smart card that also doubles up as an electronic 
cash card. In case of loss of this card, there is a backup process that uses encrypted data of 
the part of the template held in a database, supported by a positive authentication by two 
of the colleagues of the person whose card has been lost. 
 
Two biometric systems work in harmony to gain the best of identification (iris scanning 
for entry to the offices and access to e-cash services and ensuring positive assent to a an 
electronic transaction) and semi-continuous verification of identity whilst on line in the 
ambient intelligent terminals that support the work of the office (face recognition). 
Wireless LANs mean that the camera-equipped terminals can work anywhere (except 
where blocked out for personal or security reasons). When a transaction is required, the 
terminal is brought close to an iris portal and an interchange between this and the terminal 
results in a date- and time-stamped authentication that is wrapped into the digitally signed 
message. 
 
How did we get here? During the early application of biometrics to the workplace in the 
USA there were no safeguards In a number of headline-making cases, the FBI managed to 
use the minutiae data in the company's databases to look for matches to a small number of 
fingerprint records in their files. Although such a computationally intensive process 
User Reaction 
Pro 
Legislation pro 
biometrics 
User reaction 
against 
Legislation against 
biometrics 
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would only have been possible for specific cases, the fear was that faster computers and 
specialised processors would make this a more feasible option in the future. In a South 
East Asian country that had used a common biometric application for government and 
commercial applications, the governing party had made use of the system (not the 
biometric itself) to target dissidents and this had caused a furore in Europe.  
 
Moreover, hopes for Biometric Privacy-Enhancing Technologies that would preserve 
anonymity - whilst ensuring strong authentication - never took off, with the result that 
stronger legal sanctions were the only way to protect the individual's rights. Of course, the 
privacy and civil rights lobby were able to write in very strict controls, as there was no 
unified biometrics voice in Europe that could speak up for the industry as a whole.  
 
What had not helped was the general increase in fear of technology when studies had 
shown that there was a small, but measurable effect, of cellphone radiation on the health 
of individuals. This discovery had led to questions about the long term effects of infra-red 
light sources used in certain biometric systems – even at the ‘safe’ low levels.  
 
3.3.6  Output scenario: Britain 2010' 
 
Background: The governments have been keen to make use of biometric security systems 
and have provided legislation to support their use. 
 
The general population is against the use of biometrics. 
 
Scenario The governments have made the use of biometrics for personal citizen ID 
mandatory; this was done without full consultation and general consent.  On the back of 
this legislation public and private bodies introduced biometric systems to expedite their 
own interests. As a consequence there is a proliferation of biometric systems to the extent 
that citizens view them as overbearing.   
 
How did we get here? There is a growing lobby of public opinion that opposes what they 
see as an overly prescriptive regime in favour of the use of biometric systems.  This has 
come about as a consequence of several well reported incidents including: 
 
· The loss and theft of biometric tokens from poorly and unsecured systems.  
 
· The rising incidence of identity theft that, due to the level of confidence placed on 
biometric evidence, resulted in the victims being unable to prove their innocence. 
 
· Major security breaches perpetrated from the acquisition of false IDs from biometric 
systems. Incidents of this nature have led to a large public lack of trust and certainty 
with regard to biometrics. 
 
· There is also public disquiet surrounding several aspects of the use of biometric 
systems which have led to a perceived loss of personal individual freedom: 
 
· The inability to remain anonymous in many situations. 
 
· The inability to carry out normal practices, e.g. a wife uses her husband’s ATM card. 
 
· The mood of disenfranchisement by citizens leading to a feeling that they are 
regarded as identity numbers rather than individuals. 
 
· The possibility that there are health threats surrounding the use of some biometrics 
which have never been satisfactorily examined. 
 
· The proliferation of trade amongst commercial organisations of biometric data. 
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· The use, by government agencies, of privately held biometric data to carry out 
surveillance on citizens. 
 
· The use, by commercial organisations, of biometric data to carry out intrusive 
marketing campaigns. 
 
· The marginalisation of people due to blacklisting, failure to be able to enrol in 
systems due to racial/ ethnic/ethical grounds as well as the inability to enrol or use 
certain systems. 
 
The public are irritated by the costs of setting up and maintaining these systems which 
have been passed on to them by the Government and commercial organisations.  There is 
a growing groundswell of opinion that calls for the tighter regulation and licensing of 
biometric systems; lobby groups form to pressurise the governments into formulating and 
enforcing data protection and privacy regulations for the use of biometrics.  Commercial 
pressure groups press governments to maintain the status quo pointing out that any 
changes would lead to huge implementation costs. 
 
The Governments are happy with the current situation as they can use biometric data 
without hindrance.  Also, they fear that any change that were made would lead to a 
proliferation of changes that would add greatly to their legislative overheads.  They 
advocate the self-regulation of the commercial sector with schemes of best practice and 
code of conduct.  They refuse to include biometrics in any specific health and safety 
legislation under the pretext that no firm evidence of any risk has been proven. 
 
3.3.7  Discussion 
 
Security  
 
Current levels of performance are generally adequate for likely applications in this area 
 
Spoofing is a key security issue that can be countered with effective liveness testing. 
Supervised operation may be effective in some circumstances but it is not always 
effective where artifacts might be inconspicuous (e.g. fake laminar fingerprint stuck on 
top of normal fingerprint), and it may not be feasible for out-of hours use (e.g. access by 
cleaning staff). 
 
Privacy is not a major issue in self-contained applications. The user population is likely to 
be limited in size (e.g. employees) and cooperative. 
 
Failure to enrol may be a problem, particularly with larger scale applications. The system 
may become dysfunctional and rely too heavily on fallback measures. 
 
Different trust levels of user population (e.g. regular staff, cleaning staff, third party 
users) may be a problem; however this is not specific to biometric access control systems. 
 
Larger, multi-function applications may present additional problems e.g. 
 
· Integrated biometric system used for access control and payment for canteen food or 
other services. Privacy of data that may be used by third party service providers 
 
· Compartmentalised systems with disparate security requirements and 
implementation. If the highest level of security requirements are not applied 
uniformly, compromises at the low level points in the system may be used to launch 
attacks on high level parts. 
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3.4  Specific applications: financial application of biometrics 
 
This application was one of two examined during a workshop on large scale system 
opportunities in biometrics. The forming question was: 
 
What will be the use of biometric methods in large scale financial applications in 2010? 
 
This section should be read in conjunction with Section 6.5 that summarises the near term 
outlook for the use of biometrics in this sector. 
 
3.4.2  Outputs from the exercise: Issues (drivers and other key factors) 
 
Inhibitors for Financial Applications in 2010 
 
User Issues . 
 
Acceptance: 
 
· Media objections 
· Rumours 
· Bad press 
· Low user trust 
· Trade Union objections 
· Biometric may drive customers away 
· Politics of single persons 
· Biometrics may put customers off. 
 
Usability: 
  
· Difficult to use 
· Banks close down branches 
· How do you enrol such a system at home? In a bank with fewer branches? 
· User rejection of transactions. 
· Genetic engineering. Cloning of live eyes, fingers. 
· Population structure e.g. is unfamiliar with technology. 
· How to manage users who are unable to enrol 
· Lack of awareness. Education. 
· Use is made compulsory. 
 
Security: 
 
· How do we create different levels of security? 
· High profile case: headline that a dog transfers owner’s money to RSPCA. 
· Kidnapping for finance theft/fraud. 
· Process in beauty surgery. 
· Theft harvesting of biometric data. (Spoofing, etc.) 
· Ageing population fraud by hospital nursing home staff. 
· Terrorist attack. 
· User impersonation. 
· Low levels of fraud make biometrics unnecessary 
 
Legal: 
 
· Identity fraud harder to revoke 
· Details sold to other service providers 
· Legislation on privacy (inhibitor) e.g. US or UK legislation prohibits use of face 
recognition. 
· Data leakage to government agencies 
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· Misuse by service providers. 
· Privacy concerns. 
· Legal issues (data protection) 
· Legal issues. 
· User’s biometric put on black list. 
· Legislation may make secure authentication superfluous. 
· Biometric data used for other application.  (‘function creep’) 
· Lack of recognition by regulators (world bank/FSA/IMF) 
· Who bears risk if thing go wrong? 
 
Cost issues 
 
End user: 
 
· Unemployment 
· Risk of loss/theft of money. 
· Too expensive. 
· High bank charges. 
· High cost, expensive devices 
· Technology scepticism rejection (comp uters replaced by humans) 
 
Organisation: 
 
· High development costs 
· Instances of fraud 
· Major hack results in massive losses. (Barings!) 
· Cost for infrastructure. 
· Large investment required. 
· Unknown benefit. 
· Operation cost higher than benefit. 
· Owner of networks. Costs for transaction process. 
· Structure of financial institutions e.g. infrastructure fails. 
· Expensive devices. 
 
Technology issues 
 
Standards: 
 
· Can it be made available everywhere? 
· Lack of inter-operability 
 
Applications: 
 
· Can it be made proportional? Anonymous biometric virtual PIN. 
· Non-acceptance of technology e.g. iris -recognition. Considered intrusive/invasive or 
difficult to use. 
· Surveillance of transactions. 
· Security through bureaucracy. 
· Perceived lack of security (nor obvious). 
 
Integration: 
 
· Low number of platforms. 
· Different systems from different providers. 
· Wireless home networks (if not properly secured) 
· Interoperability, one system for all. 
· Vendors of competitive security technology. 
· Lack of penetration of Internet to communities. 
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· Other alternative technologies. 
· Standards not agreed results in biometrics not being used across national boundaries 
 
Performance: 
 
· No channel available. 
· Security weakness. 
· Reliance on single channel (technology) 
· Slow transactions, lack of bandwidth. 
· Bad FRR, Bad FAR 
· Failed support scenarios. 
· Consequence of failure of ID. 
· Repudiation of transactions. 
· Uncertainty about system performance. 
· Technology doesn’t work well. 
· Breach of security data dumped on Internet. 
 
Drivers for use of biometric methods in financial applications in 2010 
 
User Issues 
 
Security: 
 
· High profile fraud cases involving identity theft. 
· Safeguard users transactions. 
 
Acceptance: 
 
· Large scale theft/break-in with on a system not using biometrics. 
· Trust. 
· High user trust 
· Enthusiastic press. 
· A service is only provided if a biometric is in place/agreed by user (e.g. home 
banking needs a biometric at home) 
· How industry (vendors) and media communicates the story about biometric systems. 
· Other financial institutions have it. 
· Good marketing of a service (available if you accept a biometric) 
· Social change: the delivery mechanism into the home e.g. home-banking needs 
verification of user. 
· Bodyline scanning: made-to-measure clothes. 
· Giving incentives for using biometrics. 
· The confidence in buying on line will grow. 
· Offering the ‘option’ of using a biometric 
 
Legal: 
 
Legislation (driver) e.g. US legislation requires use of biometrics. 
 
Usability: 
 
· Ease of use. 
· Will stimulate biometrics because of convenience. 
· Easy to use. 
· User convenience. 
· Make service more comfortable. 
· Environmentally friendly. 
· Number of pins in 2010. 
· People will get used at using biometrics. 
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· Ageing population growth in PC/Internet usage. Home banking bad memory login to 
PClogon to bank account. 
· No need to travel. 
· Inconvenience linked to value of transaction. 
· Banking at a touch. 
· Reduce process times of e.g. bills. 
· Ease of access/transactions. 
 
Cost Issues 
 
End user: 
 
· Will it make transactions more expensive? 
· ‘Pay’ on a personal level. Person to person or only business to consumer. 
· Save time. 
 
Organisation: 
 
· Increase service penetration. 
· Money laundering. 
· Close branches save. 
· Cost reduction. 
· Cash flow of financial list. 
· Return of investment. 
· Internet fraud will grow. 
· Cost of hardware + processing power 
· Current transaction fraud is very high. 
· Cheap devices. 
· Reduce fraud. 
· Low cost. 
· Reduce employers. 
· Declining number of bank branches. Need for phone/PC banking. Digital signatures 
or equivalent for transactions. 
· Sensors and processor become less expensive. 
 
Technology issues 
 
Standards: 
 
· Interoperability. Global availability of biometric-systems. 
 
Applications: 
 
· Video-assisted shopping & browsing. 
· Widen range of online transactions. 
· Financial institutions want to offer their services on line. 
· Technology friendly people. 
· Quality of services which need authorisation. 
· Need to secure phones/terminals. 
· Mobility and teleworking. 
· The right biometric for the right purpose (e.g. face-recognition at a distance) 
· Ability to produce new innovative services. 
· Key applications for biometrics. 
 
Integration: 
 
· Smartcards. Industry/vendors. 
· PKI. 
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Performance: 
 
· High number of supported platforms. 
· Fast. 
· Mobility. 
· Fallback position or technologies. 
· Automatic process without manual intervention. 
· Good long term stability of the biometric world. 
· Development of multi-modal biometric systems. Progress of life-recognition. 
· Trust from valid tests of biometrics 
· Good FRR. Good FAR, FTE = O 
· False acceptance of technology. (e.g. London Borough of Newham + people count 
more cameras even if evidence of success is not proven) 
 
3.4.3  Output: Themes displayed on axes of Importance v Uncertainty 
 
Figure 7: Importance v Uncertainty Plot for Financial Application of Biometrics 
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Output: 2x2 Matrix for Case of Financial Applications of Biometrics 
 
Figure 8: 2x2 Matrix for Financial Application of Biometrics  
3.4.5  'Amsterdam 2010' Scenario 
 
In order to develop a scenario for 2010, in which the use of biometric systems is highly 
accepted and biometric systems are globally integrated and standardized, two main 
questions have to be addressed: 
 
1. How may different visions under these conditions be illustrated in a way that 
adequately demonstrates that these conditions have been met? 
 
2. How did we get there? 
 
Establishing the visions 
 
1. Customer Recognition  
 
The first vision relates to the application fields “Tracking & Tracing” and 
“Personalisation” (See Section 3.1.2) using biometric identification systems. An 
individual enters a branch of a Financial Institute (Bank) where he has an account. The 
biometric surveillance system identifies him and tracks him on his  way to a teller. The 
bank’s personalisation system will make all of the customer’s CRM information available 
to the teller. In this scenario the customer has a large sum of money (10,000€) which he 
wishes to invest. He has previously been interviewed, by a specialist investment adviser at 
the Bank.  At the time of the interview no suitable opportunities were available. However, 
the bank has just announced a High Return, Low Risk, Long Term, Investment Bond that 
ideally suits this customer’s requirements.  The teller is informed of this, on his 
information screen, and is able to alert the customer to this fact.  The customer is given 
the details of the Bond by the teller, decides that it is a sound proposition and the 
investment is made, there and then. The goal of this vision is to illustrate how the ability 
to discretely identify and track an individual can be used to offer a personalised and 
convenient service. 
 
Figure 9 illustrates this vision:  
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Figure 9: Using biometrics for customer recognition 
 
 
2. Shared bank account 
 
The second vision relates to the application fields “Validation & Verification” for 
“Privacy Enhancement” using biometric security systems.  
 
Tom is an 8-year-old schoolboy, living in Europe. In order to make the process of 
purchasing school lunches faster and cash-free his school has installed a biometric 
verification system, which uses fingerprint technology. When Tom selects his lunch and 
goes to the POS (Point of Sale), he inserts his Smart Purse and verifies the payment by 
placing a finger on the fingerprint reader, the cost of the lunch being deducted from the 
balance in his Purse. On one occasion Tom goes through this process but on this day there 
are insufficient funds in the Purse to meet the cost of the purchase.  The POS system 
immediately contacts the bank, which administers his Purse.  The Bank's system is aware 
that Tom’s account is administered by his father and sends an urgent message to him, by 
means of a mobile communication device, suggesting a transfer transaction and 
requesting authorisation to carry out the transaction.  Tom’s father is in Australia on a 
business trip.  He receives the message on the device, and acknowledges his agreement to 
the transfer using speaker verification. The Bank credits Tom’s purse with the agreed 
amount and the lunch purchase is completed. Figure 10 illustrates the vision. 
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Figure 10: Using biometrics for a shared bank account 
 
 
 
How did we get there? 
 
To achieve the visions of 'Financial Applications in 2010' characterized by a high user 
acceptance of biometric systems and a global technology integration, the participants of 
the Amsterdam 2010 Scenario determined the following milestones: 
 
· Legislation 
· Education 
· Global Co-operation 
· Technological Advancement 
 
The actions that would need to be achieved in order to meet these milestones are: 
 
Legislation 
 
· Regulations on Finance 
· Strong legislation on the secure use of biometrics 
· Effective European Data Protection Act 
 
Education 
 
· The European Biometric Forum co-ordinating media dissemination 
· Sponsored socio-economic research 
· Sponsoring of large scale biometric system pilots 
 
Global Co-operation 
 
· Championing International Standards 
· Drafting International Legislation  
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Technological Advancement 
 
· Promoting Interoperability 
· Sponsoring and Promoting Technical Research 
· Developing links between research and industry 
 
3.4.6   Washington 2010' Scenario 
 
Scenario description 
 
Step 1  
 
High availability. A major application (for example, biometrics on ID or 'entitlement' 
cards, introduced by one or more EU governments in response to mounting pressure to 
deal with the growing problem of illegal immigrants) has created a standard (de facto or 
proscribed) for the implementation of one or multiple biometrics, and created an 
integrated market.  This has led to a supply of low-cost readers and software together with 
an appropriate infrastructure. 
 
Step 2:  
 
Credit card issuers and/or banks use this opportunity to agree to use the same biometric(s) 
on credit and cash cards.  All customers receiving new cards are requested to register one 
or more biometric for those new cards, and existing cardholders are encouraged to swap 
theirs as soon as possible.  Persistent 'refuseniks' are issued an old-style card, but  
 
- customers are told that cash dispensers that do not require biometric identification 
will be gradually reduced, and 
- credit card transactions over the certain amount are not authorised or insured unless 
biometric identification is used. 
 
Legislation lags behind introduction of the application (e.g. responsibilit ies for 
safekeeping of biometric identifiers have not been defined). 
 
The process of registration and safekeeping creates additional bureaucracy with the 
financial institutions, which inconveniences customers and increases the cost of running 
the system. 
 
Step 3:  
 
Bad experience and a lack of perceived benefit results in low user acceptance 
 
Bad experience: Several of the following occur and become public: 
 
1. Misuse of biometric ID data by government officials or employees of financial 
institutions.  
2. Cases of fraud involving identity theft by employees of financial institution or third 
party.  (Made worse if prosecution fails because the legal system lags behind.) 
3. A poor implementation or incompetence in registration/data safekeeping creates 
confusion. 
4. Usability problems (with reader, or delay in any part of authentication) leads to 
queues at cash dispensers and sales terminals. 
 
Lack of perceived benefit: Several of the following occur and become public 
 
1. Banks close local branches and reduce counter staff; banks and credit card centres 
replace staff in call centres with automatic phone transaction systems and/or self-
service Internet services. 
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2. Trade unions object to job losses in financial sector, which they blame on increasing 
automation. 
3. Customer perception of low quality of service, due to lack of “human touch”. 
4. Customers see no financial benefit from introduction, maybe even increasing cost 
because of increasing bureaucracy. 
 
Complete list of drivers 
 
High availability: 
 
- Coherent standards 
- Low infrastructure costs  
- Coordinated responsible approach by EU and governments. 
- Big application need will mainstream biometrics 
- De facto standards through market dominance (Microsoft, DVD, CD, GSM) 
- Mainstream products build in biometrics. 
- Products are good and useful. 
- Acceptance of biometrics by powerful players e.g. smartcard companies and vendors. 
 
Low user acceptance: 
 
- Hostility from customers who feel it is just another technology inflicted on them. 
- Media reports say technology does not work. 
- Reported cases of identity theft. 
- Insufficient time for implementation, testing, refinement and properly managed 
deployment. 
- Technology cannot be improved beyond certain level, e.g. FAR or FRR remains too 
high.  
- Just enough customers are annoyed often enough to conclude “it’s not worth it.” 
- Customers feel “personally” rejected by technology. 
- Fundamental failure of technology in action leads to crisis shortly after introduction – 
similar to London Ambulance case.  
- Manufacturers and/or vendors fail to listen to user problems and concerns. 
- Cost too high. 
- Removal of options for customer – threatened or actual penalties for non-use. 
- Benefits not clear. 
- Build-up of resentment. 
- Function creep. 
- Data shared between institutions. 
- Lack of protection and/or recourse for customers. 
- Lack of certainty – technology backlash. 
 
3.4.7  Contributions from the specific perspectives: 
 
Security  
 
False rejection is likely to be a major issue here. Banks and other financial institutions. 
cannot afford to alienate customers. This may result in threshold adjustment that 
compromises security. However, in financial applications, authentication is likely to be 
1:1 verification of identity and the biometric may well be supplemented by other means 
(e.g. possession of a card), which may mean that the security required by the biometric 
component is not over-demanding. 
 
Repudiation and legal acceptability of biometric authentication is an issue in cases of 
dispute. 
 
The perceived risk levels of financial transactions may be quite different from the 
supplier's viewpoint than for the user. What is an insignificant sum for the bank or 
supplier may be far from insignificant for the user. Thus the user and supplier view of 
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necessary security might differ, and the supplier may be forced to implement more 
rigorous and costly security measures than he would otherwise wish. 
 
Large scale centralised databases of user biometric data may be vulnerable points for 
directed attacks and will need to be protected. The consequences of disclosure may be 
more serious than for conventional personal data (which is not directly used for 
authentication). 
 
Biometric authentication used within the finance company may help to reduce insider 
fraud through the existence of an audit trail that has stronger binding to responsible staff. 
In itself, this may have a deterrent effect on insider fraud. 
 
Spoofing is probably not a major issued for the majority of "high street" applications 
because of the small sums involved, and the limited attacker opportunity and expertise. 
 
Users may be concerned over function creep and the undisclosed use that their biometric 
data may be put to. Binding of user data (templates) to application and user consent may 
help in addressing these concerns. 
 
Use of unproven biometric technology in large-scale public applications is a high risk 
strategy, particularly if it is replacing - rather than augmenting - the existing (well known) 
security measures. 
 
 
3.5  Specific applications: monitoring of cross-border travel 
 
This scenario was the second of two examined during a workshop on large scale system 
opportunities in biometrics. The forming question was: 
 
How will biometrics be used by governments to monitor cross-border travel in 2010? 
 
3.5.1 Introduction 
 
Consideration of this application has been accelerated following the events of 11th 
September 2001. In particular the US congress has passed the Enhanced Border Security 
and Visa Reform Act which will mandate the use of a biometric for entry visas into the 
US, as well as requiring countries whose citizens take advantage of the visa waiver 
programme to incorporate this type of authentication mechanism. To support these 
initiatives, a number of activities are underway both in the US as well as in Europe. NIST, 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, in the US reported on the 
technological feasibility of various biometric technologies. Also, in the US, the General 
Accounting Office has prepared a comprehensive assessment of the technological and 
economic aspects of the use of biometrics for cross-border security.37 Note that this 
addresses a very specific set of requirements, and in this scenario workshop, the 
BIOVISION consortium chose to look more widely than is envisaged in the proposals 
from the US, and without the constraint of current proposals by European governments. 
We will return to examine the near term outlook in more detail in sections 6.2 and 6.3. 
 
In Europe, at least four countries are looking specifically at the challenges of including 
biometrics in national identity documents: UK, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. In 
the UK, a proposal by the Home Office was the subject of a public consultation to 
develop an entitlement card for Citizen-to-Government transactions.38 One option 
envisages the creation of a national biometric database, which would be the point of 
reference for all applications for passports, driving licenses and entitlement cards. 
                                                                 
37 United States General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment; Using Biometrics for Border 
Security, GAO-03-174 at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf  
38 Entitlement Cards Unit http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/dob/ecu.htm  
 
 BIOVISION Roadmap Issue 1.1                                                                             15 October 2003  
55 
  
Opportunities for the implementation of biometrics in European travel documents were 
discussed in a recent conference in The Hague39. The European Commission has also 
commissioned a study on the current status and future prospects for identity cards40. 
 
3.5.2  Outputs from the exercise: Issues (drivers and other key factors) 
 
Security compromise 
 
· National travel documents become easier to forge through excellent digital printing. 
· Security of database. 
· To reduce fraudulent applications. 
· Data might be safe with own government but with others? 
· Different sorts of people; different security levels needed. 
· Passports can be forged. 
· Different security levels in more or less developed countries. 
· Compromised biometric in another country. 
· An enrolment process within a particular country is flawed. 
· National newspapers/media/civil liberty groups demonstrate how easy it is to fool the 
chosen system 
· No system secure enough for European requirements 
 
 
 
Failure of Biometrics to work properly; feasibility of doing it at all. 
 
· Breakthrough in face recognition technology means face + digitised photo is unique. 
· Available alternatives (double operation) for people who can’t supply biometric data. 
· Concerns with reliability of solutions. 
· Concern with robustness of solutions. 
· Use more than one biometric technique. 
· Positive trials. 
· Biometrically enabling all border crossings not possible. 
· Avoid discrimination for people who fail to enrol 
· No discrimination. 
· ICAO preferred biometric- face recognition - is not up to the task.  
· Maturity in functionality and performance of biometrics. 
· How would the system cope with power failure or denial of service attack? 
· Stability of biometric features (age, illness) has to be researched. 
· Biometrics don’t work well for young children or babies. 
· Failure to enrol. 
· Uncertainty about the quality of biometric systems  
 
Interoperability. 
 
· Are there possible gaps with biometric systems? 
· Economic disputes between EU + US stop the development of harmonised passports. 
· Has to work world-wide. 
· Interoperability of standards. 
· Inhibitor. Need for interoperability between countries. 
· Interoperability. 
· Passport must not be forgotten. 
· Too many biometric templates needed…. different IDs for different countries. 
                                                                 
39 European Conference for Issuing Authorities of Travel Documents, The Hague, 20-21 June 2002 
40 B&L Management Consulting, Study on the Deployment and Interoperability of Electronic and 
Biometric Authentication and Identification (report to the European Commission, 2003) 
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· Lack of standards. 
· Data formats have to be interchangeable. 
· Standardisation. 
 
Efficiency at ports of entry (operators) 
 
· Save time. 
· Border control takes at least 20 sec. without waiting. 
· Border crossing is more easy and fast. 
· Passports have validity times of 10 years (and more). 
· Biometric renewal required more frequently than current passport renewal. 
· Back-up systems and add human check in case of false reject 
· Need to change airport, seaport procedures so biometric check is not side-stepped. 
· Big numbers of users. 
· Speed up flow of travellers. 
· To help speed passenger traffic through airports. 
· Time needed to enrol large population. 
· Fast transit through congested airports. 
· Processing biometrics will slow down current border crossing checks especially in 
vehicles. 
· Entry efficiency at airport/other ports. 
 
Benefits and efficiency for travellers. 
 
· Not mandatory. 
· Opt-in or opt-out system. 
· Objectors can use same fall-back as ‘goats’. 
· Gratification for user. 
· Lack of necessity to bring paper document. 
· Service to passengers. 
 
Fear of abuse. Trust. 
 
· Who owns the data? 
· Impression of higher security. 
· Trust in Governmental trails. 
· Extremely strict privacy regulations and strong civil liberties groups. 
· Use of Biometric data to deny entrance/border crossing. 
· Guaranteed level of trust in biometrics. 
· Respect of human rights and privacy. 
· Fear of function creep. 
· Biometrics can’t be forced upon the people - need to convince them. 
· Public acceptance. 
· Who has access to my biometric record? 
· Where my biometric record will be stored. 
· Lack of information. 
 
Biometrics as a country prestige project. 
 
· National prestige being one of the ‘first’ to introduce biometrics. 
· To try and stay one step ahead of fraudsters. 
· To create a user acceptable need upon which to build an unacceptable ID card. 
· To be seen to be moving with the times by adopting hi-tech solutions. 
 
Government: terrorism threat reduction. 
 
· Strong need for security e.g. to counter terrorism. 
· Crime registry control. 
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· Improve security by detecting criminals. 
· Find and identify terrorists, gangsters …. 
· Government fear of terrorists (internal/external) 
· Re-use 
· Mixed use for governmental and private purposes possible e.g. banning certain 
individuals  
· To reduce multi-applications. 
· Implementation of other biometric national ID. 
· Combines well with smart card passports. 
· Mobile phone becomes the cash/credit card/passport with simple biometric. 
· Commercial pressure for fraud reduction and ID theft provision forces government. 
to act. 
 
Governments' requirements 
 
· No borders; extension of Schengen agreement to all of the developed world. No need 
for passports. 
· Government rules border control. 
· Prevent misuse of ID-cards by combining them with biometrics. 
· Improve tracking of travellers. 
· Secure national border. 
· Traditional border control seen as not secure enough. Need for alternatives. 
· No look-a-like risk with valid ID. 
 
Cost 
 
· Lack of investment by US ports and entry locations to obtain sufficient numbers of 
adequate readers. 
· Technology over-sold. Who pays for damage/penalty? 
· Low cost or High Tech approach. 
· Decreasing costs in technology but high costs in operational fields. 
· It’s too expensive to have biometrics at each border control station. 
· Costs. 
· Too costly. Compared to benefit of reduced fraud. 
· Cost-intensive. Personnel-intensive. 
· Cost of issuing and maintaining biometric identities? 
 
Alternatives non-biometric. 
 
· Efficient database search of citizens means no need for biometric. No more secrets 
from government. 
· Implanted sensor technology becomes feasible cheaply and quickly. 
 
Legislation. 
 
· Enabling legislation. 
· French data protection law stops EU wide cross-border scheme. 
 
Increasing travel. 
 
· Virtual tourism takes over from real tourism as multimedia becomes very cheap. 
· Increase in ‘green’ vote stops growth in tourism and therefore no need for airports of 
fast track. 
· Very high increase in travel between countries as tourism from non-EU, non-US 
countries takes off. 
· Increased cross border traffic. 
· Increase in price of oil reduces level of international air travel. 
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Other countries starting similar schemes. 
 
· To comply with US visa waiver requirements. 
· Visa waiver mandates specific US based solutions. 
· Border control all over the world. Other technologies used. 
 
Taxation opportunity 
 
· Increase in numbers of retired people. 
· Travelling, increase in medical costs – countries want to reduce these costs. 
· Tax on tourism becomes a big new form of revenue government. 
· A new way to make more money. 
 
Governments seek better immigration controls. 
 
· Political dimensions. 
· Need to control asylum seeker flow by knowing who is in the country at any time. 
· Helps immigration control, and national agencies dealing with refugees 
 
3.5.3  Output: Themes displayed on axes of Importance v Uncertainty 
 
Figure 11: Importance v Uncertainty Plot for Cross-Border Travel Monitoring  
 
3.5.4  Output: 2x2 Matrix for Case of cross-border travel monitoring 
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Figure 12: 2x2 Matrix for Cross-border travel monitoring 
 
3.5.5  'Citizen card' Scenario  
 
Mario Rossi is a specialist roofer living in Milan, sometimes working on contract to a 
major manufacturer of roofing materials. The most popular innovation this season has 
been the introduction of Verazzo - a new line of terracotta tiles only made by the one 
Italian supplier. Mario is engaged by this supplier to re-roof a group of houses in 
Stockholm: four jobs which should take him about a month. He will be taking with him 
his three man team: Paulo, Giuseppe and Mario.  
 
The Internet way of working is commonplace in 2010, so the use of digital signatures to 
sign off jobs once they are complete is normal practice. At the same time, Mario can 
countersign for the team, while simultaneously the tax authorities are automatically 
notified back in Italy and the guarantee period is started. Biometric validation of the 
digital signature on a citizen card is  now used in preference to the use of PIN numbers. 
Although there is a choice offered throughout Europe as to which biometric is used, face 
and voice recognition is preferred by many as many labourers find the use of fingerprints 
problematic. For this multi-modal system they insert the citizen card into a mobile phone 
that has camera capabilities. 
 
During his time in Sweden, Paulo develops a toothache, and goes to the local dentist who 
is able to check Paulo's health record on his citizen card, when both people authenticate 
correctly to the citizen card using their biometric measures. That's lucky, as Paulo had 
forgotten that once he had an allergic reaction to the anaesthetic that the dentist was 
considering using. Checking the validity of his health insurance with Paulo's insurer in 
Milan is also no trouble for the dentist, but in both instances the amount of information 
that he is able to read is very strictly controlled in accordance with a Code of Practice to 
which many entities in the health sector in Europe subscribe. 
 
On the following weekend, Giuseppe goes around the local bars on his own. 
Unfortunately he gets into a fight after drinking too much alcohol, and the police are 
called. His citizen card shows the police that he has had problems with excessive drinking 
in the recent past, back in Italy, and recognising the social offence that overindulgence in 
alcohol has become in Scandinavia, they offer him the choice of a week in prison in 
Sweden or to undergo an equivalent period of community service on his return to Italy. 
Following an agreement between the two countries, entries in criminal databases of the 
respective states (when not related to major offences such as terrorism) can be checked 
and added to, provided that the unambiguous consent of a properly verified identity is 
obtained. In this case, Giuseppe has to make the fingerprint verification system work, 
albeit with difficulty (a special terminal using ultrasonic fingerprint detection is used to 
High Security 
Low Security 
Single 
application  
Interoperable  
Citizen Card 
AirFast 
 
BIOVISION Roadmap Issue 1.1                                                                              15 October 2003  
60 
obtain sub-surface fingerprints). This is checked at the central Italian database using a 
challenge-response protocol that does not allow the Swedish authorities access to either 
template or image. Once this method of verification has been used, it cannot be reused 
until the activity that caused the need for verification is discharged. In this way, the 
system is prevented from 'function creep'. Giuseppe elects to serve his sentence in Italy.. 
 
The next week's job is proving more complex than they had planned, and they need the 
services of a local builder for a less specialist task. A non-EU national is found at the 
nearby employment agency and his resident's citizen card shows that he has permission to 
work for no more than 80 hours a month, that he is a member of the trade association and 
has a number of signed recommendations by past customers in the optional section of the 
Swedish card. He is taken on, does an excellent job, and Mario is happy to add his own 
reference to those already on the card, digitally signed using just his voice pattern, as that 
level of security is deemed to be sufficient by the trade association. 
 
On the last weekend of their stay, after the work has been completed, the group of artisans 
decide to take a short break in St Petersburg in Russia. Unhappily, Marco has had his 
passport stolen by a pickpocket while at the dock, and he only realises that he is missing 
this document with its visa for Russia while on the ferry. The Russians do not subscribe to 
the international biometric citizen card convention, so they would normally not allow 
Marco to land with his friends. Mario remembers that there is an Italian consul in St 
Petersburg who can issue a 'one off' passport and visa through the use of a multiple 
fingerprint enabled portable reader that checks higher security level information on the 
citizen card … at a price! Marco phones him at the consulate, and arranges to meet the 
official at the dockside to arrange the issue of a temporary passport with a digitised 
photograph. 
 
When the four return to Milan, they reflect that it was worth signing up for the full public-
private version of the citizen card, rather than applying only for the basic identity card. 
Even though there was always going to be some doubt in their mind about trust in 
governments not accessing and reusing all that additional data, it was on occasions such 
as these that it was useful to have a highly secure store of credentials with different 
protection mechanisms and varying levels of biometric authentication. This system had 
not been introduced overnight, but had grown over a period of time, allowing citizens to 
understand step by step what was involved in these innovations. 
 
How did we get there? 
 
Again, as in the previous example of a large scale biometric deployment, certain 
prerequisites are needed for such systems to work: 
 
· Legislation 
· Education 
· Cross-European Co-operation and standardisation 
· Technological Advances  
 
Legislation 
 
Identity cards have in the most part been the preserve of governments, and these guard 
their rights over issue, design and use, especially from use by other governments. The 
scenario envisages sharing of the use of the memory on a smart card, which by 2010 
could allow the storage of many megabytes of data in securely partitioned areas.  
 
   Education 
 
Clearly there are many different facilities associated with the card, either stored on the 
card or referenced through it to a central database. At least three types of biometric will 
be used, but this multiplicity of authentication methods must be managed by the user in a 
secure manner. Hence, we believe that one of the costs of introducing such a complex 
card will be the marketing of its capabilities through an ongoing marketing campaign. 
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Users will need to be reassured as to the methods employed to minimise the opportunities 
for function creep, otherwise there will be a significant minority that will refuse to engage 
with such systems. 
 
Cross-European Co-operation and Standardisation 
 
The particular applications described and their uses across borders will require 
standardisation and agreements. Interoperability of templates and assessment of the 
strength of security offered by less strong biometric methods such as speaker verification 
will need to be realised.  
 
Technological Advances 
 
Much of the technology required to realise this scenario is already in existence, with some 
of the cryptographic interchanges and security of biometric operation still to be resolved.  
 
3.5.6  ‘AirFast' Scenario 
 
It is 2010 and biometric authentication systems are routinely used at many airports.  
 
The users   
 
Mr & Mrs Brown arrive at the airport with their children Sam (7) and Rachel (10) on a 
package holiday to Crete, their first foreign holiday since their children were born. None 
of them have biometrics in their passports: the adults’ passports were issued in 2003, 
while the children are too young to have stable biometrics. At check-in their face images 
are automatically recorded. 
 
As they pass to ‘airside’, a camera checks their face images (against those who have 
checked in, but not yet passed through to departures).  Mrs Brown is stopped as she was 
looking down at the kids, but is recognised when she glances up, so does not have to use 
the re-present her passport and boarding card (the back-up system) to the security officer. 
They are all checked again as they board the plane, to confirm that the same people are 
boarding as those who checked in.  
 
Herr Schwartz is travelling on business back to Zurich. Again, he has no biometric on his 
passport, and his face image is used as a biometric to pass through security. While in the 
business class lounge he is offered biometrics enrolment. His fingerprints are enrolled on 
a remote enrolment unit, and a 2D barcode encoding the template, passport number, and 
other enrolment details is stamped in his passport. On his next  visit to the UK he will be 
able to use the automated express lanes to pass through check-in, and passport control.  
 
Mrs White has one of the new biometric passports. She is able to check in using an 
automated unit, which checks her fingerprint matches the details encoded on her passport. 
On her return she will use the automated express lane at passport control. She prefers this 
option to the previous inspections by immigration officials, as it is completely free from 
racial bias. Previously, she had been stopped and questioned almost every time at passport 
control.  
 
Technology 
 
The system uses face and fingerprint recognition. (Some countries/airports use iris 
recognition instead of fingerprint recognition). 
 
Users are tracked through the airport using face recognition operating in one-to-few 
identification mode. The system keeps track of where travellers should be, thereby 
reducing the number of stored face templates that need to be checked. Where users fail 
checks, fingerprint can be used as a backup, as the biometric is stored on the new range of 
passports. Face enrolments use the face image at check in comparing it with that stored on 
the passport.  
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Fingerprint recognition uses the two (usually) index fingers. Fingerprint templates are 
stored on a smart chip (or 2D-barcode as an interim measure) on the passport, but to save 
having to read the passport at all the check-points in the airport, the templates are copied 
in the airport security system, and are deleted once the passenger is airborne. 
 
How did we get there? 
 
In the first half of the decade, airport congestion within airports was a serious problem. 
The terrorist threat post 11th September 2001 and the additional security checks had 
exacerbated the problem. Easing the problem by building new terminals was not an 
option at some of the busiest airports due to local opposition and environmentalist 
protests. To help speed up security checks and transition of people through the airport, 
airlines, airports and government agreed to the implementation of biometric checks of 
passports. Moreover, the US requirement for biometrics on passports or visas brought 
forward these plans. 
 
Fortunately in 2001-2002 trials had commenced to test the feasibility of such systems, 
such as those at Schiphol and Heathrow. These initial small trials had been successful and 
larger trials commenced in 2003. Also in 2002 standardisation in the field of biometrics 
commenced with a new standards committee for biometrics, which immediately started to 
address the issues of interoperability.  
 
During 2003, consideration was given to a national biometric ID scheme within some 
European countries. However it was realised that such a complex system could not be 
brought into operation by 2007, and would take many years to enrol the population (and 
would meet with opposition of privacy groups), while the congestion at airports needed to 
be addressed much more urgently.  Instead a simpler scheme was proposed, where 
biometrics would be incorporated into passports from 2004  (for one-to-one verification 
only, and one-to-few identification).  In the interim (until 2017), travellers’ biometrics 
could be recorded in existing passports as a 2D barcode. Such enrolments could be made 
at international airports, where in addition to a special office at the airport, passport 
agency staff had a mobile enrolment unit, whereby they could enrol passengers in the 
business class lounges.  
 
A variety of trials and user consultations took place during 2004 and 2005 to determine 
which system the public found easiest to use, and to determine the optimum procedures. 
As a result, these procedures vary between airports.  
 
In 2004 biometrics started to be recorded in passports. Applicants had to request such 
passports, and the main use of biometrics was for travel to countries such as the USA 
requiring biometric visas or passports. 
 
In 2006 the live and well features for fingerprint sensors improved immensely, when 
research projects combining a variety of ideas for liveness tests were completed, and the 
results rapidly commercialised by the main fingerprint system suppliers. This addressed 
the main outstanding security issue delaying implementation. 
 
From 2006 all new passports were issued with biometrics41.  
 
In the first years of operation, the system underwent several biometric security audits, 
with security improvements having to be made, many of these addressed by 
improvements in the biometric products themselves. 
 
 
3.5.7  Contributions from the specific perspectives: 
                                                                 
41 Note that events have overtaken this forecast. As discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, passports with 
biometric images stored on contactless ICs are due to be introduced from late 2004.  
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Security  
 
Enrolment integrity is crucial in this application. There will be a need to establish trust 
relationships between the enrolment services operated in many different countries. 
 
Performance is also a very critical factor. Systems will require fairly good performance in 
verification mode (where no particular problem is envisaged), but also in negative 
identification mode against huge populations. This is currently an unproven factor and is 
questionable with current technology. Potential solutions include: (radical) improvements 
in biometric technology, or the use of multi-mode biometrics. 
 
There are likely to be large numbers of strongly motivated individuals who are seeking to 
force system errors so that their true identity (or alter ego) is not revealed. 
 
For this scenario, the security of the central database is critical. There is high threat of an 
insider attack and/or a denial of service attack. The central database is a vulnerable point. 
 
Difficult environments at borders (e.g. at a land border where scanning of individuals is 
done with them still in their cars) may cause lowering of thresholds to prevent high reject 
rates and hence poor detection of illegal immigrants. 
 
There will be a need to integrate cross-border solutions and share data internationally. 
This has many implications for privacy and security, since much of the time the data will 
be out of the control of a single nation. 
 
Data may be used by multiple parties, e.g. immigration authorities, airline companies, 
police services. Again, there are many privacy and security issues. 
 
Citizen card scenario 
 
This revisits many of the same issues as for border control. There will be some 
simplification because the card is limited to a national boundary. However, because of the 
(intentionally) broader scope of use of the card, security and privacy issues related to 
multiple functions predominate. Separation of functionality and limitation of functionality 
in individual cases presents a security challenge. For example a citizen may be enabled 
for a subset of card functions only. 
 
Issues include: 
 
Should the user authentication be a separate function for each enabled service? 
 
Security requirements for different services may vary. 
 
How to prevent user data leakage between different services? 
 
Standardisation aspects 
 
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 is developing the standards for interoperable biometric systems. 
ICAO has determined that for machine-readable travel documents, the universal biometric 
will be facial recognition with optional use of fingerprint or iris recognition. Certainly, a 
measure of interoperability is possible, and by 2010, the use of travel documents with a 
base level of interoperability should be unquestioned. 
 
 Preview of near term developments 
 
In Section 6.2 and 6.3 we will return to consider how moves to create the infrastructure 
for greater control on travellers (especially those moving by airplane) will make use of 
biometrics. The security and privacy concerns have been recognised and considerable 
work is under way to standardise on key aspects of identity cards and other types of 
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machine-readable documents, together with the interchange formats for exchange of 
biometric data. 
 
3.6  Synergies with other technology developments 
 
We have discussed future scenarios that make assumptions of the direction in which 
biometric technologies and applications will develop in the period to 2010. However, 
there will be advances in other technical systems, and possibly even the emergence of 
new technologies. It is not possible to predict the extent to which these will be 
commercialised, and as a precursor to a more comprehensive overview of the societal, 
commercial and technological future, we offer the following scenarios that were 
developed at an open BIOVISION workshop in Rome in January 2003.  
 
Prior to the exercise, the participants were invited to consider some of the headline 
forecasts from the future of other technologies, e.g. ambient intelligence, wearable 
computers in custom-designed clothing, more natural IT interfaces, better interfaces with 
knowledge, true multimedia 3G-4G mobility, … We could anticipate that the 
performance of biometric systems would have improved by 2010 and that these would 
have become more secure. Legal concerns could have been resolved, but perhaps new 
concerns would take their place? The opportunities for better privacy protection, the 
degree to which governments would become more or less authoritarian, and the extent of 
the digital divide were all uncertain and would need to be considered in each group’s 
scenario. Examples of how biometrics could work with advances in other technologies 
were: 
 
· Integration of face, gesture and emotion recognition to provide a more 
comprehensive package of authentication and profiling 
· Intelligent scene analysis could have advanced significantly with cross view 
handover and interpretation. Small 2cm size processor cubes containing various 
sensors and miniature CMOS cameras, together with short range networking and 
small solar cells become available at low cost. 
 
Further discussion of technological developments and political and social trends is 
postponed to Section 3.7. 
 
3.6.1 Scenarios for technology synergies 
 
3.6.1.1 Scenario 1:  ‘Italian Mother’ 
 
The customer for the ‘Italian Mother’ service in 2010 has the reassurance that his health 
and welfare monitoring systems are working on his behalf 24 hours a day. Biometric 
methods are no longer authentication tools. They are embedded seamlessly into other 
systems that give a user the feeling of greater personal security and health. Wherever he 
is, his monitoring systems are personalised and secured by the use of a biometric – 
whether a conventional one that is available in 2003, or by supplementing this with 
biometric information from, for example, sensors that measure the quality of a person’s 
sleep. So, authentication is combined with monitoring and tracking of an individual’s 
activities.  
 
Buildings are becoming more intelligent, so that everything from a coffee machine to a 
shower has sensors that can respond to your preferences as derived from optimisation of 
your daily routine and assessment of your current needs. 
 
At work, your concentration and productivity is monitored (for your own benefit to help 
you improve performance), with periodic changes of your environment (temperature, 
breeze, colour, music) to stimulate or relax you, as and when required. Access to 
buildings is no longer just a matter of determining whether to allow you inside or not, but 
more importantly to offer guidance to help you with your visit, whether it is to a hospital, 
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a public building or an office. Speech recognition in cars responds to the individual 
driver, so that when he hires a rental car, a downloaded package enables all the settings to 
be reconfigured to suit his needs and preferences. 
 
This support functionality is distributed between hardware that a person carries on them 
in the form of a personal trusted device (see scenario 2), and networked support systems 
with ubiquitous sensors and locally networked knowledge. Much is under the control of 
the customer, with clear interfaces that enable him to know (and intuit) its status at any 
time. Although it is possible that the data could be accumulated and used to track him, 
there are considerable penalties attached to attempting to defeat the complex, interlocking 
security measures that are in place to defeat attempts to access such data. 
 
Contribution from the specific perspectives 
 
End user perspectives 
 
Clearly this is a commercial offering that will only be successfully marketed if all the 
components fit together to provide an easy-to-use and valuable service. Ubiquitous 
computing plays a key role, but so does the effectiveness of the system training and 
integration between the personal device and networked components. Two groups of 
people could be attracted to this type of service: the growing number of retired, yet 
physically able, individuals, who continue to lead an active life, but have concerns about 
potential health problems. The second group consists of younger people with a high 
pressure career and involvement in diverse activities outside of work.  
 
The interviews held with current early users of biometrics shows that convenience may 
outweigh concerns with privacy, provided that the benefits are clear to end users. Such a 
pervasive system may not appeal to other groups in the population. Amongst these are 
those people who are not convinced about the security measures and the protection 
against data aggregation. Personalisation of services and customisation can be carried out 
insensitively with the aim of using this kind of systems for direct marketing of other 
services. Also, we can foresee the temptation to obtain an early payback through less 
investment in the design of user-friendly systems, which could impact on lower take-up 
rates. 
 
Security  
 
In this application, the issues are mostly privacy rather than security. The main threat is to 
the user rather than to the application. However stalkers could find out information about 
users that would pose a physical threat to the user - which is a security issue. If any such 
system were to be implemented, enrolment would be a key issue. 
 
There would probably need to be an external check on credentials before enrolment was 
permitted (e.g. does this person have a criminal conviction?). 
 
The user would need to be firmly in control of the functionality. Where external services 
(i.e. services that are not under the direct control of the user) are involved, the security 
needs to protect the user from unsolicited services. 
 
There are likely to be conflicts between the provision of personalized services (which 
implies identification) and the user’s right or wish to remain anonymous. These may 
ultimately be insoluble, and the user may be forced to make a choice between acceptance 
of the service or retention of his anonymity 
 
3.6.1.2. Scenario 2: Personal Identity Agent 
 
By 2010, a small electronic device has been developed that is biometrically activated by 
its owner (this could be using voice, finger or face), or perhaps one that only works in 
proximity of its owner, his identity to be confirmed by some as yet undefined biometric 
that does not require active behaviour or specific action by the owner but is passively 
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activated or deactivated. This PIA stores personal and professional information about the 
owner in a series of profiles defined for various social and professional events/situations.  
The device is owner configurable to broadcast identify information based on the given 
event or situation and will retrieve identities based again on user configurable criteria. 
The device authenticates the identities it receives with the cooperating PIA. (An initial 
background check and identify confirmation would be required to initially activate the 
PIA).  
 
Organisers of events can require participants to submit to biometrically verified 
background checks so that their PIA can be activated for that given event. Possible uses 
of such a system could include businesses networking, locating individuals at large public 
or private venues, social networking to identify potential dates or partners (readers can 
use their imagination here). PIAs could also be used for physical and logical access as 
well as ID confirmation for border crossing, travel, obtaining licenses, etc. All such 
possibilities would be highly dependent on the development of secure wireless 
transmission.  
 
3.6.1.3 Scenario 3:  Service Wonderland 
 
· Technology Synergies:  
1. Ubiquitous connectivity: connectivity is cheap – all sort of devices everywhere are 
connected and have an IP address. 
2. Smart cameras: smart cameras become ubiquitous, and replace sensors in most 
biometric applications, offering contact-free sensing of fingerprint, hand geometry, face. 
· Functionality: networked devices equipped with smart cameras can recognise 
persons and retrieve information such as entitlements, profiles, preferences, past 
behaviour. 
· Scenarios .  
o Ubiquitous access. People can access their own information anywhere, 
from a personal device (next -generation mobile) or publicly available 
networked devices. 
o Intelligent shopping 1. Shopper enters mall and uses device to specify what 
she is looking for.  System signposts shops that have items and prices.  User 
identifies herself, and goes to shops she is interested in.  When she enters 
shop, rails with specified items in her size move towards her.  The shop is 
aware what she is looking for, and may offer matching items and discounts 
for purchases. When trying on items, shopper can activate videoconference 
with significant other/personal stylist/mother/friends to get feedback and 
help with selection.  She can also check whether anyone on the guest list for 
a particular event has bought a dress similar to the one in which she is 
interested . 
o Intelligent shopping 2: On the way to a birthday party, friends can stop off 
at book, music or wine store.  On providing a biometric ID, they can access 
the birthday girl’s home database, which contains a list of all her 
book/music/wine items (all items are automatically scanned and registered 
when they are brought into the house).  They can identify her preferences, 
and whether specific items have already been bought for her already. 
o Ad-hoc Services: Carpooling and taxi booking. People transmit where they 
want to go together with their identity, with the system checking their claim 
of identity (to ensure personal security) and optimises matches between 
carpoolers and taxis and customers by current location and destination. 
· Issues  
o Personal vs. ubiquitous devices – what information and functionality do 
people want on a personal device, what will they use public access points 
for. 
o Convenience vs. control/privacy – safeguarding privacy and retaining 
control, whilst at the same time maximising benefits and convenience, will 
require much involvement and work for individual. 
o Trusted third-party - required to verify participants in ad-hoc services.  
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3.7  Societal and technological drivers, inhibitors and wildcards 
 
Although technologies may be mature and the applications appear to be ready for mass 
deployment, a biometric technology may never be implemented, or at least its start 
delayed, by other, non-technical, considerations. Exa mples of these inhibitors are adverse 
comment in the mass media and interference of unrelated political events. Alternatively, 
system development and deployment may be accelerated by unpredicted events such as 
11th September 2001. Such wildcard events are of course impossible to predict and even 
to assess the consequent impact on take-up of particular technologies, whether in the 
timescale over which the impact occurs or the extent to which they hasten or impede their 
use42.  
 
In this section, we list a numb er of technological developments together with political and 
economic drivers that are forecast to impact on the lives of people in Europe over the next 
decade. 
 
3.7.1 Visions of future, non-biometric, technology developments  
 
For many years, BT Exact has been refining and updating a ‘Technology Calendar’, that 
brings together inputs from a number of sources43.  The timeline below selects some of 
the possible developments from this resource as an aid to envisioning possible futures. As 
in the case of scenarios, for the purposes of this Roadmap it is best to view these not as 
precise predictions, but as indicators of the ways in which technology could impact upon 
the lives of citizens.  Whether these innovations become part of their everyday life 
depends to a large extent on economic and social factors that are very difficult to predict. 
Note that the timeline was published just after the 9/11 events, and before the full impact 
of the 'dotcom' crash became evident.  Some of the predictions for 2003 have been 
included to indicate those developments that were considered to be imminent at that time.  
 
 Demographics   
2010 25% of the UK workforce are teleworking at least 2 days a week 
40% of paid workforce will be women (worldwide) 
World population of over 65's increases by 1 million a month 
 
   
 Business  
2003 Air mouse and air typing  
2004 Displays with image quality comparable to paper  
2005 Paperless working is the norm internally in most UK businesses 
3-dimensional fax 
Polymer screen advertising billboards 
Talking head technology used in public terminals 
Voice synthesis quality up to human standard 
Full voice interaction with machine 
Totally managed world logistics systems 
1 billion Internet users 
1 billion Bluetooth devices worldwide 
TV Internet users overtakes computer-based users 
 
2006  Software trained rather than written  
2007 Lifestyle brands predominate 
Portable translation device for simple conversation 
 
2008 Universal monitoring of all business transactions 
'Expert system' software competes with lawyers, doctors and other 
professionals 
 
GWU 
2010 95% of people in advanced nations are computer literate  
                                                                 
42 John Petersen, Wild cards in our future; preparing for the improbable, The Futurist pp43-47 
(July-August 1997) 
43 Ian Pearson and Ian Neild, Technology Timeline 
http://www.btexact.com/docimages/42270/42270.pdf (Issue 1, 21 November 2001). Other dates 
from timelines prepared by  
GWU: George Washington University Forecast (Newsweek, 18-23 September 2002) 
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Virtual companies and co-operatives dominate the business world 
Inter-business financial transactions are all electronic 
Solar reflector satellites bringing sunlight to major Northern cities 
Computers used for creativity enhancement 
   
 Manufacturing and Computer Hardware   
2003  Use of molecular computing  
2004  Smart paint available (contains ICs)  
Tactile sensors comparable to human 
 
2005 New engineered organisms used to produce chemicals 
Odour and flavour sensors comparable to human 
Semiconductor devices based on 0.01 micron technology 
Solid state replacement for CD 
Fire-fighting robots that can find and rescue people 
Fractal shape-changing robots 
 
2006 Activators make any household object  
First artificial electronic life 
 
2007 Optical neuro-computers 
Totally automated factories 
 
2008 Anthropomorphic robots used for factory jobs  
2010 Green manufacturing and renewable energy blossom 
Self monitoring infrastructures using smart materials and sensors 
Homes made in prefabricated modules 
Radio transceivers in all Intel's silicon ICs  
Molecular sized switches 
Self organising adaptive Ics 
Quantum dot memory using 20nm dots: 50 Mbytes in a full stop 
DNA storage device 
1 Terabit memory chip  
Optical Card storage- replaces CD, VHS, audiotape, magnetic disc 
GWU 
   
 Government  
2005 Half of all UK government services are delivered electronically  
Global electronic currency in use 
 
GWU agrees 
2007 People reduce tax liability by being paid partially in information 
products 
 
2008 All UK government services delivered electronically  
E-mail used to communicate with most social security claimants 
Replacement of people leads to anti-technology culture 
Widespread online voting in the UK 
 
2010 Effective prediction of most natural disasters 
National UK decisions influenced by electronic referenda 
Universal ID card in the UK 
 
   
 Defence and warfare   
2005 Soldiers fire weapons remotely 
Crime and terrorism mostly  computer based 
 
2007 Remote override capability on planes  
2010 Insect-like robots used in warfare 
Most fighters and bombers flown remotely  
Most weapons attack systems rather than injure people 
Attacks based on facilitating natural disasters 
 
   
 Education  
2004 AI teachers in school  
2005 Widespread use of virtual reality for education and recreation  
2007 Network-based learning causes polarisation in classes – streaming is 
essential 
Global classes used for multicultural immersion 
 
2010 Superstar teachers use telepresence to lecture to dispersed classes 
Personalised degrees are awarded based upon performance and 
understanding of individual lectures 
Translation software replaces foreign language teachers 
 
 
 
GWU 
   
 Health and medical  
2003 Smart pills with chip dispensing drugs 
Kitchen food tester that identifies the presence of food poisoning 
bacteria 
ICs on food packaging tell when food is at its best  
Various forms of electronic addiction 
 
2004 Telepresence used extensively in rural clinics 
Retinal implants linked to external video cameras 
Instant electronic diagnosis of illnesses 
 
2005 All patients tagged in hospitals  
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Designer babies 
Synthetic retinal implants for simple vision 
Electronic prescriptions reduce fraud and improve speed 
Electronic patient records become valuable data mines 
Brief human suspended animation 
Frequent use of multiple identities causes personality disorders 
2008 Neural networks used for patient appointment management 
Hospitals use virtual queuing systems 
Expert systems used extensively in GP surgeries 
Holistic healthcare gains widespread acceptance 
 
 
 
GWU 
2010 Online surgeries dominate first line medical care 
Direct electronic pleasure production 
Use of human's own tissues to grow replacement organs 
Operations videod and stored as part of the multimedia medical record 
Lifestyle monitoring and insurance linked to medical records 
Genetic screening widely used 
Devices roaming within blood vessels under own power 
Make-up by numbers 
Active contact lens 
Video tatoos 
 
   
 Home Life   
2003 Electronic paintings  
2004 People cyberspace wardrobe 
Cash badges 
 
2005 Clothes collect and store solar power 
Video tiles, Fibre optic plants in gardens, Video photo frames 
Jewellery that changes shape and colour  
Emotion badges 
Polymer video screens built into clothes 
Personal shopping tablets; shopping lists automatically complied by 
supermarkets 
Living area use of virtual reality scenes 
 
2007 AI systems to understand text and drawing (e.g. patient information) 
Domestic appliances with personality and talking head interface 
Emotional objects, switches, etc around the home 
Electronic cash migrates from the Internet onto the high street as paper 
and coins largely replaced by electronic cash 
Kaleidoscope clothes using materials with embedded pigment micro-
capsules 
 
2008 Personalised response from household gadgets 
Electronic newspapers and magazine tablets 
Majority of people use PDAs 
Digital bathroom mirror 
10% of UK shopping is electronic 
Cars with automatic steering 
Position monitor ICs built into cars 
 
 
GWU 
2010 AI houses that react to occupants 
Voice interface for home appliances 
Mood sensitive light bulbs 
Electronic wallpaper 
Anti-noise technology built into homes 
Washing machine aware of contents and selects cycle 
ICs in packaging of food control its cooking 
90% of telephone calls are tetherless 
All new cars fitted with basic cellular communications with automatic 
distress systems 
Urban car co-pilot 
 
   
 Leisure   
2003  Cyberspace make-up  
2004 Action man toys engage in war games over networks 
Toys with network based intelligence 
Garden audio systems 
 
2005 Toy soldiers with video camera eyes enrich play 
Voice control of many household gadgets 
Personalised adverts on TV and radio 
Video walls - single screens 2m across 
Most portables powered by fuel cells 
Conferencing technology for remote socialising in public places 
Cameras built into glasses recording what we see 
Theatres gain extra revenue by allowing internet attendance 
Smart tickets for navigation through airports 
Assisted lane keeping systems in trucks and buses 
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2006 Emotionally responsive toys and robots  
2007 People have virtual friends, but don't know which ones  
2008  Virtual Reality overlays on the real world 
Automated real life highlight channels on digital TV 
 
2010 'smelly telly' using ICs with small reservoirs of chemicals 
25% of TV celebrities are synthetic 
Separate volume controls for different people in a room 
Social software organising functions 
Loneliness in aged population greatly reduced by networked 
communities 
Robotic dolls and pets account for 10%of domestic telecomm traffic 
 
   
 Security and law  
2003 Devices registered in homes and will not work if stolen  
2004  Security Barbie used for locating lost children  
2005 Behaviour alarms based on human mistake mechanisms 
Cheap miniature cameras cause social backlash 
Video surveillance built into telephone boxes 
Neighbourhood intranets 
 
2008 Net chat sites insist on proof of identity 
Robotic security and fire guards 
Law: logic checkers highlighting contradictory evidence 
 
2010 Neighbourhood video surveillance networks, but surveillance of 
neighbours becomes a problem 
Household access by facial recognition 
Extensive use of electronics to monitor police behaviour  
Criminal tagging augmented with video and audio sensors 
Computer advice to jurors on probability issues 
 
 
     Table: Example Timeline of Future Technologies (November 2001, contributed by BT Exact) 
The impact of two major events at the start of the 21st century, the terrorist attacks on the 
USA and the stock market crash in telecommunications and new media, have altered 
some of the perspectives. The increased investment in advanced military capabilities and 
security technologies should accelerate the application of biometrics, but paradoxically, it 
appears to have put back the take-off point as governments seek to assure stable standards 
and interoperability and corporate customers await the improved performance that 
government will force through, while the large volumes of product for the government 
should reduce the price for subsequent applications. Perhaps this observation reflects the 
increasing maturity of the biometrics market. Reflecting upon the adoption of new 
technologies, many forecasters echo Paul Saffo who comments that 'all fundamentally 
new technologies overpromise in the short term, but overdeliver in the long term'.  
 
A selection of more recent reports on future trends, that have taken this new world into 
account, offer the following observations44: 
 
Political, social and commercial trends  
  
1. The increase in size of the European Union making it the only possible 
counterweight to a single military and commercial superpower, but in ways that offer 
a different perspective on world governance. 
2. Reduction in the scope of the welfare state, as the cost spirals out of control with 
increasing pressures on government to keep taxation low; zero inflation reduces 
opportunities for 'hidden' taxation increases. 
3. Coins and paper money increasingly become relegated to small-scale transactions. 
4. Increase in whole-life education, from increased investments in pre-school children 
to tailored short programmes for adults. 
5. Continuing conflicts in the less-developed world, and increase in tension in Taiwan 
and Korea. 
                                                                 
44 Newsweek Issue on The World in 2012 (16-23 September 2002); Business Week, 25 Ideas for a 
Changing World, (19-26 August 2002);  MIT Technology  Review, The State of Innovation, 105(2)  
55-63 (June 2002); Eamonn Kelly, Peter Leyden and the members of the Global Business Network, 
What's next?, John Wiley (2002) 
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6. The 'wild card' of a major disruption to the continuing economic well-being of the 
developed world through a terrorist attack using a dirty nuclear bomb or readily 
available chemical or biological agents, or a determined attack on an unsecured part 
of a critical national infrastructure. (The impact on national and regional economies 
of i) relatively confined anthrax dispersal and ii) the SARS outbreaks demonstrates 
the fear that these would cause). 
7. Tensions as wealthy regions in otherwise mismanaged nations demand greater 
autonomy. 
8. Transport hubs (railway stations and airports) become the magnet for shopping and 
entertainment zones; multi-purpose environments are developed with successful 
cities needing to offer facilities that appeal to the wealthy knowledge worker. 
9. Increase in retirement age by 5 years by 2010. As the percentage of retired increases 
relentlessly new opportunities arise to address this market, in preference to the youth 
orientation of 1960-2000. (Two-thirds of all retired people that have ever lived are 
alive today, many of whom are relatively wealthy. With the post war baby boomers 
moving past their 50th birthday, significant opportunities for specialised healthcare 
will emerge.) Alternatively, a massive labour shortage may require increase in 
immigration of young people into the developed world. 
10. Male insecurity increases as more women take on traditionally male roles in the 
service sector and managerial jobs, while traditionally blue collar (male-dominated) 
jobs continue to disappear. 
11. Continued dispersal of jobs to countries with the cheapest 'all in' rates, and its 
progression to more high added value activities (data processing, software 
development and call centre operations). 
12. Move away from technology utopianism and belief in wealth for its own sake 
(manifested in anti-globalisation protests, downshifting from stressful jobs, new ideas 
of holistic management, apocalyptic literatures and fundamentalist beliefs); although 
the future-orientation of the US will continue to drive innovation after a hiatus over 
the next few years. 
13. Corporate mismanagement that surfaced in the early years of the 21st century 
increases the drive for transparency, accountability and responsibility for 
sustainability. 
14. The quality of data and information becomes key as its volume and accessibility 
increases. Increased need for better information and metrics for investors in 
enterprises, especially in measuring intangible assets.  
15. Copying of, and competition to, successful new products follows ever more quickly. 
16. Changes in marketing to more entertaining, crisper, interactive messages that will 
appeal to an audience that is losing trust in organisations, technologists and 
traditional institutions. 
17. Development of new products and services will increasingly depend on bringing 
together creative people from diverse backgrounds. Social entrepreneurship may 
work in hand with conventional corporations and governments to uncover new 
demands in the marketplace. 
18. There is an untapped market for simple-to-use products for the less-developed world. 
 
Technology trends  
 
1. Growth of grid comp uting networks, networking devices of diverse types and 
functionality; pervasive, ubiquitous and 'disappearing' computing; more adaptive, 
self-healing and dependable networks that respond to surges in demand or loss of 
connectivity; the associated opportunities for massive crime and terrorism if their 
security is compromised. 
2. Extensive use of RFID technologies for article control in manufacturing and 
wholesale and retail merchandising. 
3. Pharmaceutical products, diets and bodies tailored to the individual using gene 
manipulation, and marketed to increasingly knowledgeable patients. There will be an 
emphasis on minimised side effects and reduction in the costs of in-hospital care. 
4. Industrial biotechnology may take the role of the engine of technology-driven growth 
that IT played in 1985-2000. 
5. Weapons based in space 
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6. Nanotechnology possibilities: the computer in the fibres of a shirt, microscale 
sensors, and implications for novel approaches to health. 
7. New services that will make use of the potential of the over-investment in core 
telecommunications networks, both fixed and mobile. 
8. Ambient intelligence or pervasive computing will deliver smart systems embedded in 
everyday objects. 
9. The toy market is about to be transformed with products using AI, wireless 
communications, multimedia and virtual reality. Spin-offs will benefit other sectors. 
10. A new perspective on the impact that probability, uncertainty and unpredictability 
have on systems making use of advanced technologies. A recognition that 
technologies are not 100% reliable or guaranteed to work in an intuitively simple 
way: precision warfare, network security systems and encryption, forensic analysis, 
biometrics, computer modelling of weather, national identity cards, safety tests on 
cars, digital archives, …).  MIT professor of aeronautics, John Hansman says - 
speaking of advances in transportation IT (but extendable to other areas of IT), 'as the 
complexity and information flow in these systems increase, the human will become - 
or in some cases has already become - the limiting factor in the design and operation 
of the system'. Lessons from complexity theory, such as the emergence of 
unpredicted effects from interacting non-linear systems, may start impacting on 
system design. 
 
Impact upon the take-up of biometric technologies 
 
The reality of these trends will determine whether services using biometrics will be 
needed or commercially viable at a particular point in time – or even be acceptable to 
users. For example, recently a debate has begun on the wisdom of development of 
nanotechnologies. For some commentators, the fear is that uncontrolled release of 
systems could result in unpredictable and catastrophic consequences for the human race. 
Increased physical security in laboratories and manufacturing facilities may be required, 
with clear accountability based on undisputed logging and audit. A biometric system 
linked directly into operation of individual pieces of fabrication equipment would be 
preferable to access control systems on doors and entrances. Work on such security 
mechanisms could begin now, if the legal requirements for operation of equipment 
requiring a defined expertise level were upgraded to mandating the use of 'state-of -the-
art' technologies.  
 
3.8  System integration considerations 
 
The studies accompanying this Roadmap clearly confirm that integrating a biometric into 
services or products is not a simple substitution of a device and software for a key, a card 
or a password. In this section we examine some of the design considerations, especially 
for medium and large scale deployments. 
 
User-centred design - a requirement for successful biometric deployments 
 
For example, the limited experience of successful large scale deployments is that the 
principles of user-centred design need to be at the heart of the design process. This is not 
just confined to biometric-enabled applications. In recent years, there has been a growing 
acknowledgement of the need to understand the potential end user's needs and the context 
in which they will be asked to operate a system45. There will also be processes that 
involve other colleagues and customers; a social perspective is also required. The 
realisation of this dimension to the design process has encouraged research into different 
methodologies and evaluation of these methodologies in real world situations.  Initially, 
the focus has been on usability, defined in ISO standards as 'the extent to which a product 
                                                                 
45 For example, Hugh Beyer and Karen Hotzblatt, Contextual design: defining customer-centred 
systems, Morgan Kaufmann (1998) 
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can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency 
and satisfaction in a specified context of use'46. However, the ambit of User-Centred 
Design (UCD) is more far-reaching. Jokela47 comments that four activities underpin the 
definition used in these standards: 
 
- Understanding and specifying the context of use, in terms of the user, the 
environment and the tasks 
- Defining the user and organisational requirements for successful application, thereby 
setting the guidelines for the design  
- Building in the knowledge of human-machine interaction principles into the design 
- Evaluating the performance in the context of the task 
 
The extent of user involvement can vary from system designers observing the 'status quo' 
and inferring better ways of integrating new functionalities, through to a fully 
participatory approach in which end users take an active role. Methodologies that can 
support the aims of UCD include modelling of the roles and responsibilities of actors or 
stakeholders using Soft Systems techniques48, semantic analysis of the actions and 
behaviours of the principals in transactions49 and the use of scenarios in the development 
of a product or service that has abstract tasks or where the unfamiliarity with technology 
presents a barrier to understanding50. Kujala has reviewed the benefits and costs of UCD, 
noting the limited amount of research that has followed though the application of such 
principles. He acknowledges the additional resources and possible delay in the delivery of 
the system, but argues that on balance there are positive benefits to be gained51. 
 
For many years, the Scandinavian approach to participatory design of Computer and IT 
systems resulted in a number of apparently successfully applied methodologies. Of recent 
years, this school of design has perhaps lost its direction, with Eevi Beck locating the 
fault with trends such as the growth of consumerism and the strength of large corporate 
entities52.  However, as technology grows ever more complex, there may be a move back 
to simplification of interfaces as embedded, ubiquitous computing renders many IT 
functions virtually invisible53. For biometric-enabled systems, this could be both a 
promise (of transparent authentication) and a threat (privacy-threatening systems that 
track users without their knowledge). Design of such embedded systems will require 
careful attention to these concerns and opportunities. 
 
Further discussion of the results of the BIOVISION project work on user-centred design 
is postponed to Section 5.1. 
 
Comprehensive design frameworks for systems using biometrics 
 
Participatory design is just one element of a more comprehensive and radical approach to 
the design of biometric-enabled systems. From anecdotal evidence of the reasons for the 
lack of full deployments following many trials using a biometric, it appears that a more 
                                                                 
46 ISO 9241-11 (1998) and ISO 13407 (1999) 
47 Timo Jokela, Assessment of User-Centred Design Processes as a basis for improvement action, 
(Oulu University, 2001) 
48 P, Checkland and J Scholes, Soft Systems Methodology in Action, Wiley (1990) 
49 G Dhillon and J Backhouse, Structures of Responsibility and Security of Information Systems, 
European Journal of Information Systems 5 2-9 (1996) 
50 S Bodker, Scenarios in User-Centred Design - setting the stage for reflection and action, 32nd 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (1999) 
51 S Kujala, User involvement: a review of the benefits and challenges , Behaviour and Information 
technology, 22(1) 1-16 (2003) 
52 E. Beck, On participatory design in Scandinavian computing research,  Univ. of Oslo, Dept. of 
Informatics Research report 294, ISBN 82-7368-244-7, ISSN 0806-3036 (August 2001) 
http://folk.uio.no/eevi/research/pub-papers/rrepBeck2001.doublepages.pdf 
53 Peter Tolmie et al, Unremarkable Computing, Proc of CHI 2002 
http://www.xrce.xerox.com/Publications/Attachments/2001-104/Unremarkable-computing.doc 
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comprehensive design framework is needed. There are a number of resources that will 
help the prospective designer and operator, but further research is required to integrate 
these methods and to validate them in major deployments: 
 
· General guidance is available on product selection and implementation, e.g. for 
certain applications involving identification and authentication for use by 
governments54; 
· Papers on general design methodologies55; 
· Development of BANTAM: a system modelling language56; 
· Isolated instances of compilation of lessons learnt across a number of pilot 
deployments57; 
· Integration of fallback methods58. 
 
Work on two requirements capture methodologies has already started. In Section 3.1 we 
introduced the Application-Technology Compiler and the BIOVISION method of 
comparing the requirements of a system to the capabilities of various biometric solutions.  
 
A complementary approach, which we shall discuss at length in this section, was initially 
focussed on specifying the requirements for operational testing of a biometric in the 
context of a real world service59.  As applied to requirements capture, it may make no 
assumptions about a specific biometric method; indeed, the analysis might determine that 
an alternative, non-biometric approach, would be more suitable or cost-effective. Once 
the operational requirements of the system are defined, the BIOVISION Application-
Technology Compiler can be used to match the capabilities of biometric solutions to the 
system requirements.  
 
Four levels of system description are defined in B-SAD* and the service analysed in 
sufficient detail to move to discussion with suppliers or integrators. 
 
At Level 0, a number of classes of a service are defined. For a biometric system to be 
acknowledged as one belonging to Class 0a, it must satisfy a number of conditions, chief 
among which are: 
 
1. Identification or recognition of a human individual 
2. Use of a biometric feature of the individual in order to determine or verify identity 
3. Operation in a near real time manner 
4. Requirement for automated processing and storage of biometric data for 
identification and/or verification 
 
By relaxing these four requirements in turn, we identify other services that do not fulfil all 
of these conditions, but which should be considered when designing ‘biometric’ systems. 
It may be that a service does not require a full biometric implementation, perhaps to 
protect end users’ privacy in a technical manner: 
 
                                                                 
54 UK Biometrics Working Group, Use of Biometrics for Identification and Authentication: Advice 
on Product Selection,  http://www.cesg.gov.uk/site/ast/biometrics/media/Biometrics%20Advice.pdf 
(Issue 2.0, 22 March 2002) 
55 Marek Rejman-Greene, A Framework for the Development of Biometric Systems, Biometric 
Technology Today  (January 2003) 
56 Julain Ashbourn, BANTAM User Guide, Springer (2002) 
57 Department of Defense, Case Studies http://www.defenselink.mil/c3i/biometrics/case.htm  
58 Dialogues Spotlight Research Team, Apology strategies, security data, insult rate and completion 
procedures , 
http://spotlight.ccir.ed.ac.uk/public_documents/technology_reports/No.5%20Verification.pdf 
59 This discussion is a development of a paper by Craig Arndt of Mitretek Systems, Biometric 
Standard Application Description (B-SAD) methodology submitted to ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC37 SG5 
(23 July 2003). B-SAD* is a variant of this methodology that is being developed for requirements 
capture. 
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· Class 0b services (failing to meet condition 1) may relate to non-human entities 
– animal identification; or relate to human beings but without the primary need 
to identify them, for example, by clustering of facial images that relate to 
individuals – as in the ChildBase applications cited in Section 6.8.  
· Class 0c services provide automatic identification where no human feature is 
required (such as knowledge of a PIN or password together with a token). 
· Class 0d services remove the requirement for quasi real time operation 
(condition 3). Examples are manual identification of fingerprints by specialised 
staff and analysis of DNA under current laboratory conditions.  
 
At this stage, the operator may determine a number of options, one or more of which may 
involve the use of a biometric. 
 
At Level I, the classification consists of four classes of operation each considered in a 
number of different contexts: 
 
- Class 1 (one-to-one verification of identity) 
- Class 2 (one-to-many positive identification) 
- Class 3 (negative identification, confirming that a person is not in a specific group or 
database) 
- Class 4 (one-to-few matching, where the individual is  either a part - or not - of a 
small group of possible matches) 
 
Note that this classification does not match with the AFNOR classification of applications 
introduced in Section 1.1. 
 
The context dependency for each class is in two parts: 
 
- with or without the presentation of a token 
- the user being cooperative, un-cooperative or unaware (surveillance mode) 
 
Level II specification addresses the system's operational characteristics. Documentation is 
required for each of five groups of operational characteristics: 
 
- Operational environment: temperature, lighting, vibration, contamination, noise 
- Operational mode of the system: role of the human in the decision loop, attended or 
unattended operation 
- End user population: Size of user population and size of the database, Distribution 
and diversity of the population, location of the population, special characteristics of 
the population, operation or processing in different countries, social and 
psychological disposition towards biometric systems  
- Exception handling: procedures in the case of alarms being set off, procedures for 
those who experience difficulty in enrolment, procedures for false rejection, 
procedures for disabled individuals, procedures for VIP individuals. 
- System interfaces: links to external workflows, processes, systems and databases - 
whether these are legacy, currently under development or envisaged in the future)- 
with specific reference to systems that are permitted to receive either the results of 
biometric processing or biometric features or templates, links to external hardware 
and support systems including those to audit and logging schemes. 
 
At this level, a full understanding of the user and their relationship with the task and 
application needs to be defined. This B-SAD* approach has to be supplemented with the 
results of the BIOVISION project results on user perceptions summarised in Section 5.1. 
 
Level III specification defines the system requirements for the service: 
 
- Performance. For a verification service, this can be quoted in measures such as FAR, 
FRR, time to match, time to search a database, etc., and specified to pre-determined 
confidence levels; tradeoffs can be explored between various combinations of the 
measures; different performance requirements can be set for initial operation (to 
 
BIOVISION Roadmap Issue 1.1                                                                              15 October 2003  
76 
allow for familiarisation and training by enrolment officials and end users unfamiliar 
with systems), and - where appropriate - for operation where users are habituated; 
further levels may need to be determined for alarm or warning of problems with the 
system, and additional levels at which operations are terminated and the system is 
withdrawn from service; 
- Required rate of deployment of the system to meet commercial or political 
objectives; 
- Standards compliance, to include desired or undesirable interoperability with other 
systems in the country or worldwide; 
- Systems security specification; 
- Secure upgrading of systems, and handover state at specified points in the future (e.g. 
at the end of an agreed period of outsourced operation, or after non-compliance with 
other performance measures)  
- Compliance with privacy and other legal codes, and with any stated preferences or 
commitments to anonymous or privacy-enhancing operation; 
- User interface requirements (to include education and marketing); 
- Other technical application requirements (to include reliability, maintainability, 
durability, etc) 
 
It is our belief that rigorous definition of the specification at the outset - even before 
engaging with individual suppliers - would enable the service operator to clarify the 
business requirements of the system. This requirements specification model is still under 
development; it is possible to envisage further segregation of the analysis into aspects and 
bands of operation that must be met, as compared with those which would be useful if 
provided at a low enough cost. 
 
Note that this approach does not prejudge the use of a specific biometric technology - or 
even the selection of a biometric approach. However, it does require that the operator 
considers the 'real' aims of the project and sets targets that are achievable; for example, 
some banks have been known to set performance requirements of zero false rejections in 
proposed biometric deployments.  
 
Having captured the requirements, operators can challenge system integrators to offer 
solutions that will address the totality of the list. Their responses will often indicate 
inconsistent or contradictory elements, and more likely point to the need for detailed 
piloting and trials to ascertain whether proposed solutions are workable. The extent of 
these trials - and who bears the costs - need to be resolved at an early stage in the 
negotiations. At this point, revisiting the B-SAD* requirements analysis in the light of 
proposals from system integrators should highlight those aspects which have had to be 
compromised in achieving a practical solution. A tool that can support this process is the 
Application-Technology Compiler described in Section 3.1.4, which assesses the extent to 
which specific biometric technology matches the requirements of an application in all - or 
some - of the critical measures. 
 
In reality, it is unlikely that operators will take such a cleanly logical approach. Even 
before the completion of an outline specification, they will have been influenced by 
publicity about the capabilities of systems already using biometrics. Some operators will 
be afraid of being seen as outdated in their thinking if they fail to make use of the most 
modern technologies. The benefit of an agreed methodology (such as B-SAD*) is that 
independent monitoring of the process of system procurement is possible, allowing 
citizens to engage in meaningful dialogue with governments and end user organisations to 
effectively represent the interests of their communities. 
 
Once the system requirements have been agreed, and the feasibility studies, work 
breakdown structures, etc have been completed, the development of robust designs needs 
to be undertaken in a way that reflects the requirements in an accurate way. This is hardly 
a trivial exercise for most medium- and large-scale deployments for systems using 
biometric methods. Even in less complex systems, maintaining the consistency 
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throughout the design process is difficult60. This is an area where applied research could 
provide useful processes for European systems integrators. It is also an unfortunate reality 
that during the design and development of these systems, 'requirements creep' will take 
place. Operators will either realise that the system description was incomplete, or political 
imperatives make the introduction of new features a mandatory requirement for the 
system. Recognising that appropriate measures are required to address these realities 
should reduce the impact of such changes on the cost and performance of the delivered 
system. 
 
Although these issues have been addressed in deployments, there is little publicly 
available analysis. As part of the remit of the European Biometric Forum to reduce 
fragmentation in the European market, the EBF should consider advocating research into 
best practices in the design of biometric-enabled systems. Ethnographic studies of 
deployments, supported by the lessons learnt from other large-scale system developments 
would improve the likelihood of future successful system deployment and the sharing of 
knowledge for the benefit of operators who are unfamiliar with biometrics and the 
challenges these methods pose to the design community. 
 
Specific design challenges 
 
One research challenge that has not been addressed to date is consideration of fallback 
methods , when a user is either unable to enrol, or if enrolled correctly, fails to be 
recognised within the maximum number of attempts. The need for a secure alternatives to 
a biometric methods is acknowledged, but little published material is available to indicate 
how this should be approached. One exception is a study by the University of Edinburgh 
on strategies for failure of speaker verification systems that reported, in addition, on user 
attitudes to failure of systems 61. 
 
Other facets of system design that should be considered from the outset include security 
and the response to user concerns about privacy and abuse of the system in general. Three 
fundamental principles of secure design of systems are i) commencement of the design of 
the security of the system as early on in the process as possible (the later that this is 
postponed, the more expensive and unsatisfactory solution will result); ii) frequent 
revisiting of the security design in response to changes in the design of the overall system; 
iii) assessment of the security policy and security implementation by a third party. It may 
not be economic to undertake a full security evaluation in accordance with the Common 
Criteria, but an independent detailed review should be a part of any deployment. 
 
In order to take account of the privacy implications of a proposed biometric-enabled 
deployment, a Privacy Impact Assessment should be carried out at an early stage 
(Sections 5.1 and 5.5 provide background material - from the viewpoint of end users and 
the legal context, respectively.) Such a PIA will document the possible privacy-related 
issues, take account of the views of the stakeholders (or their representatives), ensure that 
the legal requirements are met (together with any codes of conduct or privacy principles 
to which the organisation is a party) and develop a strategy of addressing each of these in 
turn. As for the development of a secure system design, the solutions may need to be 
revisited if the system itself undergoes significant changes during its  development. 
However, there is a vocal constituency that believes that the rights of end users need to be 
protected in a more proactive manner. They will assert that the complexities of an 
installation using a biometric may be beyond the understanding of even conventional 
system analysts, and the hazards involved in using the technology, may require the 
maximum of openness and transparency during all stages of the development together 
with additional security mechanisms and procedures to protect the interests of all 
                                                                 
60 James Kirby, Rewriting requirements for design, Proc IASTED International Conference on 
Software Engineering and Applications (SEA) 2002, Cambridge, Mass, USA. 
61 Dialogues Spotlight Research Team, Apology strategies, security data, insult rate and completion 
procedures , 
http://spotlight.ccir.ed.ac.uk/public_documents/technology_reports/No.5%20Verification.pdf  
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concerned.  A willingness to understand this perspective and engage in a discourse at an 
early stage will help mitigate any subsequent adverse publicity. The results of applied 
research into the underlying differences of approach would help the prospective operator 
in negotiating with such parties. For example, Whitworth and de Moor have explored the 
concept of 'legitimacy'62 and there is a growing literature on trust and 'fairness' that may 
support this aim. 
 
The BIOVISION Privacy Best Practices document63 offers guidelines for designers on 
compliance with European legal requirements. There are other resources available that 
provide good design rules. One example is provided in the recent National Research 
Council report on authentication.64 Although written from a US perspective, many of 
these rules echo the legal constraints in the European data protection. Taken together, 
such resources offer checklists that the system integrator should consider in any design, 
and an example of which is shown below. 
 
 
Minimising Risks 
 
R1  Authenticate only when needed and only for well-defined purposes, details of 
which should be openly available wherever possible; 
R2 Anonymise personal data wherever possible; 
R3  Minimise the scope of data collected to that which is necessary, and remove 
securely any intermediate data that is not required (e.g. original images from the 
biometric sensor); 
R4 Minimise the opportunities for inference of physical or psychological 
characteristics (or medical conditions) unrelated to the authentication process; 
R5 Biometric data should be stored with the minimum of other personal data; 
R6 Consider the options of decentralised data storage and user control over their 
personal data; 
R7 Minimise the time for which the data is retained; 
 
Security considerations 
 
S1 Secure the biometric data during collection, storage, transmission, use and 
destruction; this includes the results of operations on the biometric data; 
S2 Identify who will have access to the collected data; 
S3 Ensure that only specified types of access to, and use of, such data are 
permitted; 
S4 Ensure secure audit of the use of the system, protecting against unauthorised 
modification and destruction of such audit records; 
 
Consideration for the user 
 
U1 Involve the person who is to be authenticated in the process; 
U2 Minimise the intrusiveness of the authentication process; 
U3 Minimise the intimacy of the data that is collected; 
U4 Failure of the system should not place the subject at a disadvantage; 
 
Policy Management 
 
                                                                 
62 B. Whitworth and A de Moor, Legitimate by design: towards trusted socio-technical systems, 
Behaviour and Information Technology, 22 (1) 31-51 (2003) 
63 Astrid Albrecht, Privacy Best Practices in deployment of biometric systems, Issue 1 (2003), 
available at the http://www.eubiometricforum.com website. 
64 Stephen Kent and Lynette Millet, Editors for the Committee on Authentication Technologies and 
Their Privacy Implications, Who goes there? Authentication through the lens of privacy, National 
Academies Press (2003) at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309088968/html/ Recommendation 3.2  
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P1 Clearly articulate the policies under which the system will operate, and 
wherever possible allow subjects to view these policies in close proximity of 
time and place of operation; 
P2 Any changes in these policies should be communicated to the subjects in an 
effective manner; 
P3 Third party audit of compliance to such policies should be considered; 
P4 Failure to operate to these policies should result in appropriate redress to the 
subjects of the authentication process and penalties to the operators of the 
system;  
 
Errors and exceptions 
 
E1 Wherever possible, offer an alternative – non-discriminatory – system, for those 
people who are unable to use the system or have valid objections to its use, 
informing them of risks and benefits of not participating in the biometric 
system;  
E2 Provide methods for the subjects of the authentication to check and correct the 
data about them that is used for authentication, and - if appropriate - to remove 
themselves from the system;  
E3 A secure process for the withdrawal of the biometric system should be 
developed. 
 
Middleware 
 
For all but the smallest deployments, good middleware will be a prerequisite for robust 
designs. In outline, it is the 'glue' between the biometric and the application. Although 
there is some debate as to what the integrator should expect from the supplier of 
middleware, some elements that are often included are: 
 
- Facilitation of a heterogeneous authentication environment with different biometric 
methods, legacy systems, using passwords, smart cards, etc; 
- Storage and application of reference templates as and when required; 
- Securing of the system components; 
- Logging and analysis of performance. 
. 
A number of suppliers have been in the market for some time. Among these are 
SAFLINK and BioNetrix in the USA and Daon and ISL (Informer Systems Ltd) in 
Europe. With much biometric hardware being designed in accordance with BioAPI 
standards, there is increasing differentiation between suppliers in the architectural designs 
they work to, whether basing their designs to work optimally with existing operating 
systems and business process models or by developing their own design. Although a 
small market at present, the middleware sector is forecast to expand rapidly as soon as 
interest in biometrics in medium scale deployments (500-50,000 users) starts to take off.  
 
Scalability issues 
 
Many suppliers can be trusted to implement small scale designs using biometric 
technologies. However, as the size of the deployment increases, it becomes proportionally 
more complex to satisfy the more diverse requirements of such systems. Scalability is 
often a matter of experience, and there are no clear rules to help clients in determining 
whether their requirements can be addressed using small scale design methodologies. 
Capacity and resource utilisation may appear to be straightforward, but bring unexpected 
problems as the complexity of interactions with other systems become clearer. Scalability 
needs to be considered in all aspects of the system design: in the hardware - both 
biometric and support and in the middleware, in data extraction, the algorithms, databases 
and business processes. A comprehensive guide to scalability issues in the design of 
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larger biometric systems remains to be written, but some of the key aspects will certainly 
include65: 
 
- A more comprehensive analysis of the error rates than is usually pursued at the level 
of the device and its dependent software (see Section 4). Failure to accept a user's 
biometric sample, for example, could depend upon database management errors as 
well as changes in the immediate environment or variations in the user's positioning 
or behaviour. As the size of the subject population increases, unexpected features of 
the biometric method being used will begin to surface in increasing numbers. For a 
small deployment, the security policy could tolerate a change of operating threshold, 
since the officer can make a local judgement in the context of the service. The key to 
this aspect of the deployment is extensive testing at the technology, scenario and 
operational levels; simulation and modelling of systems; development of validated 
reference systems, as well as staged deployments across different cultural groups. 
 
- Architecture. As the system size increases, it touches an increasing number of other 
systems, some of which may anticipate simple 'yes/no' answers from an 
authentication scheme. Individuals not familiar with the particular features of 
biometric systems can take decisions at fault centres and help desks that can lead to 
system close-down or degradation. Mission critical or 'fail-to-safety' systems could 
be compromised. Unless a biometric-enabled system is isolated from other business 
processes, further complexities can be anticipated as multiple feature interactions 
emerge during pilot testing. The operation of fallback systems will change the 
context of operation of the business processes.  
 
- Requirements creep during the design and development. Not all of the requirements 
can be captured unequivocally at the start of the programme. The failure or cost over-
run of many headline systems both for governments and large multinationals can be 
traced to the addition of additional functionality during an extended development 
period. Clear management responsibilities and a single champion for the programme, 
who remains in post from the project inception through to its handover, may reduce 
the impact of such changes. This champion should clarify the priorities of all major 
stakeholders, and assess the evolution of their strategic goals over the period of the 
development and deployment, possibly using the roadmapping techniques described 
in Section 2. Acceptance criteria for the final system will have to be developed anew 
for each application, since there is little prior experience in this area. 
 
- Security. Protection profiles are available for small and mid-range systems, whereas 
large scale public systems will probably require specialised security designs.  For 
example, AFIS systems for the law enforcement community operate in closed 
communities, whereas civil AFIS systems are likely to have a much higher 
interconnectedness with other systems. If the biometric is to be used in any legal 
proceedings arising from attempted fraud or other criminal activity, then both the 
system design and the underlying technologies will need to be accredited in an 
appropriate manner. The evidential value relating to biometric methods is still a 
matter for debate66, and the numbers of experts is relatively low (except for 
fingerprint identification). 
 
- Patents and licensing. Numerous patents have been granted over the past four 
decades for authentication schemes. Large scale systems will, in particular, be likely 
targets for legal action. 
 
- Limited expertise of personnel in both the core technologies and in design 
methodologies to ensure robust, secure and acceptable systems. There are relatively 
                                                                 
65 Julian Ashbourn, Applications Scalability, http://homepage.ntlworld.com/avanti/scalability.htm  
66 Michael Bromby, At face value?, NLJ Expert Witness Supplement page 302-3 (February 28, 
2003) 
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few specialists who understand biometric methods and their application to specific 
systems, and no certification scheme for those who claim to have such experience. 
 
- Support, maintenance and business continuity. With little experience of large scale 
systems, assessment of operational risk is likely to be an issue. If too pessimistic a 
view is taken, the costs of providing for alternatives will become a significant item in 
the budget for the system. If the risks are not fully appreciated, costs during operation 
of systems could escalate. 
 
- Enrolment and registration of end users. There may be a pre-existing database of 
users (such as an HR database of employees), although it may not be dimensioned for 
the additional data required from a biometric system. Furthermore, since biometric 
authentication is likely to be viewed as a more trustworthy method by the 
organisation - and any partner organisations relying on such authentication both at 
the initial deployment of the system and in the future - the security policy should 
insist on an appropriately secure confirmation of the identity of the user at enrolment. 
 
- Operational management. Future upgrades are inevitable (for example, as further 
security vulnerabilities are encountered), and the system should be capable of 
accepting upgrades in the sensor, algorithms, etc. in a cost-effective manner. Some 
contracts operate for a fixed term on an outsourced basis, and the operator of the 
service for which biometric methods offer the authentication should plan for 
handover at the end of the contractual period.  
 
RC/SD1  RC - SYSTEMS and DESIGN 1: Successful implementation of systems 
using biometric methods requires an inter-disciplinary design approach. There are 
few specialist designers able to put together an integrated design that addresses the 
already documented issues and concerns. 
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4.    Technologies 
There are numerous methods that make use of an individual's individual physical 
characteristics or behavioural traits. This section will summarise the main aspects of each 
of the principal technologies, identify the main commercially available systems, overview 
the research effort in each area and provide a view onto the future of the approach. The 
methods that will be analysed are: 
 
1. automatic facial recognition, using either visible light or infra-red illumination 
(or a combination of both)  
2. recognition by fingerprint or surface features extending along the finger  
3. iris recognition  
4. recognition by means of the blood vessel patterns in the retina  
5. hand geometry 
6. the pattern of veins on the back of the hand  
7. speaker verification  
8. dynamic signature recognition  
9. keystroke dynamics.  
10. other potential biometric methods (including gait recognition, lip movement 
analysis, ear shape biometrics, odour recognition, quasi-real time DNA analysis)  
11. multiple biometrics - combinations of one of the above with another biometric or 
another form of authentication  
 
An initial discussion positions alternatives to the use of biometrics. Often there are 
alternative ways in which a solution can be developed. In some deployments, a decision 
to select a biometric has been made on the grounds of its innovative features appealing to 
the system specifier, its high visibility or because of well-targeted marketing by 
companies with a vested interest in selling their products. There is also a suspicion that in 
some jurisdictions, the requirement for a biometric solution or even a specific technology 
has been written into legislation following lobbying by suppliers, without a corresponding 
examination of alternative approaches. 
 
In this section of the Roadmap, the aim has been to summarise key aspects of the current 
status and future prospects of each technology using a common framework: 
 
· Introduction 
 
This overview summarises the most significant features of the technology and the way in 
which it is being applied. 
 
· Survey of principal technical approaches to the practical realisation of the biometric 
 
A technology can be implemented in several distinct ways. For example, in the most 
common situation, there will often be  
 
a) a number of different sensor options (e.g. all-optical, capacitive silicon and electro-
optic plastic sensors are available for fingerprint biometrics) and  
b) the algorithms used to define a template and the matching process can vary widely 
(again for fingerprint approaches, the system designer has a choice of working with 
the image as a whole or with the key points on an image - the 'minutiae').  
 
The best way in which the authentication decision is displayed can also be dependent 
upon the application and capabilities of a specific way in which the technology is 
implemented. For facial recognition, some systems will preferentially deliver a 
percentage probability of match between template and the image captured during 
operation; whereas others will offer a sequence of the top matched images for final 
decision by a human in an attended operation. 
 
· Principal commercially available systems  
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A selection of those suppliers of system level solutions has been compiled. Users of the 
Roadmap should note that the market is fast changing, and that lists such as these can 
become rapidly outdated. Many companies are privately owned (especially some of the 
more innovative ones) and sales figures for these are unavailable. 
 
· High profile deployments 
 
This section points out the more interesting deployments of a technology. These may not 
necessarily be the most extensive, or the newest; the aim is to highlight systems that 
demonstrate the opportunities offered by biometric technologies. 
 
· Testing and factors limiting the performance of the specific technology 
 
At the heart of the decision on which technology to use (or whose approach is best, or 
indeed, whether to use a biometric at all), is the question: how will it perform when it is 
operational in the context of the application that is under consideration? It would be 
courting commercial disaster if the decision were made solely on the basis of projections 
of performance grounded in a mathematical model offered by a supplier. Ideally, there 
will be a reference implementation of the same version of the biometric hardware and 
software operating in exactly the same application. It will have been working for more 
than two years with substantial numbers of end users - whose demographic profile is very 
similar to that in the proposed implementation (in respect of gender balance, age 
distribution, educational background, attitude to novel technologies, cultural orientation, 
political environment, etc.) and in which the physical environment is very similar. 
Performance measurements will have been logged throughout the deployment and the 
result of attitude surveys will also be available. Rarely, if ever, will all a reference site 
meet these conditions.  
 
Instead, the feasibility study for a proposed implementation will need to plan for a 
programme of testing throughout the design and deployment of the system. Not only does  
this represent a significant additional cost, it also requires a considerable degree of 
expertise in the design of such tests. It may be that a consortium of prospective operators 
working with a number of suppliers can share the costs, although this will be at the 
expense of some degree of direct matching to the specifics of the implementation by 
individual operators.  
 
Many years of experience in the conduct of such tests has been distilled in an 
internationally accepted document that is the basis for work on an ISO standard on the 
testing and reporting of biometric devices67.  
 
Three types of evaluation of the performance of systems should be distinguished, each of 
which gives different types of information to stakeholders in the decision on 
implementation of a system: 
 
- technology evaluation, generally comparing the algorithms used by different 
suppliers; 
- scenario evaluation tests at the system level, with a specific sensor, a selected 
algorithm, and a user experience that mimics the simulated 'real world' 
environment; 
- operational evaluation aims to 'determine the performance of a complete 
biometric system in a specific application environment with a specific target 
population' 
 
In general, a number of performance metrics will result, the principal ones being the rates 
or probabilities associated with 
 
                                                                 
67 Tony Mansfield, Best Practices in Testing and Reporting Performance of Biometric Devices 
(Version 2.01, August 2002) 
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- failure to enrol individuals and to generate a (reference) template, either because they 
are  missing the relevant bodily part or function, or are unable to make the system 
work to the acceptable quality level; 
- failure to acquire an image or signal of a sufficient quality; 
- false rejection (Type I error)  of the correctly presented user that should have been a 
match to an enrolled template, but failed due to - for example - changes in appearance 
or action of the individual; 
- false acceptance (Type II error)  of an impostor who is falsely matched against a 
wrongfully claimed identity. Note that there are different types of false acceptance 
tests. Most automated systems of testing will test all of the presented images against 
all templates and look for accidental matches and these are the results presented in 
the following sections.  'Live' tests of varying levels of severity will pit the human 
adversary against the machine with different degrees of knowledge about the 
operation of the system and biometric characteristics of the target subjects. 
  
Understanding the presentation of test results requires an appreciation of the way in 
which biometric systems work. Most biometric systems offer an adjustable function, 
called the threshold setting, which allows system designers to alter the balance between 
false acceptance and false rejection.  
 
- The results of tests can be shown as two graphs, with the proportion of both types of 
failure being plotted as the threshold setting is changed. At one value of this setting - 
the Equal Error Rate (EER) - the proportion of false accepts is the same as that of 
false rejects. Although of no significance in itself (as security and usability 
requirements for a system will determine the specific rates), the EER is sometimes 
used as a figure of merit.  
- An alternative way of presenting the results is to derive a single graph of the rate of 
'false negatives' against that of 'false positives': the 'Receiver Operating 
Characteristic' (ROC).  A related form is the Detection Error Trade-Off (DET) curve: 
a replotting of the ROC on a dual logarithmic scale to enable better comparison 
between similar-performing systems. 
- In some tests (termed 'closed set'), impostors are assumed not to exist and all users 
are assumed to be enrolled in the system. In this case, another reporting metric is to 
report the probability that an individual appears as the first match in a list of possible 
matches. By extension, Rank n  performance reports the probability that the correct 
individual appears in the top n of possible matches. 
 
Many of the performance measures obtained in independent tests fall short of the claims 
of suppliers of biometric systems - often by a considerable margin68. Additionally, in the 
absence of standardised methods of ascertaining the error rates in real world applications, 
performance in laboratory settings are often the only available measures, and these may 
focus on the algorithm, rather than assessing a complete subsystem. However, it appears 
that some biometric systems are being deployed with threshold settings set at insecure 
levels in order to maintain service levels. A greater level of transparency is required in 
order to encourage research and development aimed at improving the performance of 
such systems. A part of this work would determine whether there are fundamental limits 
to the accuracy with which biometric methods (and specific ways in which a biometric 
method may be implemented by a supplier) can characterise an individual. 
 
RC/C1  RC - COMPONENTS 1: R&D effort is required to improve the operational 
performance of existing biometric systems. In some cases, the error rates are 
substantially below what is required for the applications for which they are sold, and 
'quantum' improvements in their performance may be required.  
 
 
                                                                 
68 A comprehensive list of evaluations is collated in a BIOVISION report: Tony Mansfield, 
Biometric Performance Evaluations (25 January 2002) in Michael Behrens et al, Discussion paper 
on actual testing programs and recommendations: Annex 2 (July 2003) 
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RC/C2  RC - COMPONENTS 2: There is little understanding of the fundamental 
limits to the performance that could be attained using a specific biometric 
 
 
· Specific user issues in the implementation of this technology in solutions 
 
Some of the technologies have been associated with possible concerns that are specific to 
the method (e.g. methods that use supplementary light sources to illuminate the face or 
facial features). 
 
· The legal and regulatory dimension 
 
Although the use of all biometric methods appears to fall within EU laws on personal data 
protection, in some countries there are other laws and regulations that restrict the use of 
certain technologies. In particular, facial recognition and fingerprint systems have specific 
restriction on their use in certain countries. There is a cultural and historical background 
that underpins the differences between member states, especially in the consideration of 
privacy and personal data. Some Data Protection Commissioners respond by placing 
limits on the tracking of people or access by law enforcement to biometric identifiers. 
 
· Standardisation activities 
 
Although there is considerable activity related to biometrics in general in the ISO 
standardisation subcommittee 37, a number of the technologies are the subject of specific 
proposals for standardisation of the image transfer. 
 
· Key research initiatives 
 
This section reviews a selection of the more ambitious research projects that will impact 
on future use of the technology. 
 
· Outlook on the future of this technology 
 
4.0  Alternative authentication technologies 
 
Conventionally, discussion on methods for the authentication of individuals centre on one 
of the following types of credential (Section 1.1): 
 
· Authentication by demonstration of knowledge known only to the individual ('what 
you know') 
· Authentication by possession of a unique, unalterable token ('what you have') 
· Authentication by a physical property or action that is unique to the individual ('what 
you are or do') 
 
Our experience is that such uniqueness, unalterability, etc. is not a practical option for 
applications that have to be operated by people with limited time, memory and attention - 
using systems that have to justified by demanding business cases. Of course, two (or all 
three) of these approaches can be used serially or in parallel to improve the level of 
security. For example, a speaker verification system can make use of a password or 
number sequence that is special to the one individual. The real improvement needs to be 
assessed carefully, preferably on the basis of testing under real, operational conditions. 
 
There are a few other alternatives that have been described and this summary of the range 
of options aims to provide a complementary view to the discussion on individual 
biometric technologies. 
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4.0.1 Knowledge-based systems 
 
The user-name and password combination is by far the most prevalent method of 
authenticating persons on computer-based systems. This is an example of a recall-
oriented knowledge-based authentication scheme, and its persistence in spite of the well-
known problems merits more detailed consideration. A number of variants exist, such as 
'question-and-answer' approaches. Yet this is not the only form of a KBS authentication 
scheme. In the 1990's, recognition-orientation was suggested as a way of overcoming 
their deficiencies. Studies showed that people appeared to remember and recognise faces - 
even those of unfamiliar people - more reliably than other unrelated facts. Similarly, 
recognition of random images was also proposed in the form of Déjà Vu 69. This work was 
commercialised as Passfaces70. Research on the usability of such systems demonstrated 
problems when users were faced with having to use these for more than one application.  
 
Passwords have a long and well-established provenance, at least in the field of physical 
security. Although not operated automatically, for many centuries these provided a 'friend 
or foe' identification to sentries at gatehouses, on the presumption that it would be 
difficult to pass on an unknown phrase to others at a time when there was no form of 
electronic communication. Frequent change of password was recognised as a key 
requirement, with lack of trust in the loyalty of guards and in recognition of the 
possibility of exchange with enemy agents. 
 
The user name/password combination was adopted early on in the computer age, when 
the rules were appropriate for the typical end user (usually a technically aware 
professional operating a single, closed user group IT system). Some systems offer a 
degree of user choice, provided that common dictionary words are not used. The hazards 
of allowing such choice (e.g. selecting foreign language words) have forced many system 
administrators to enforce randomness in the selection and use of passwords. Rules for 
these were codified in a US Department of Defense memo and FIPS standard that 
calculated the required password length and ageing time to assure a given level of 
security. Even now, many password systems are designed on the basis of this approach, 
even though the human memory assumptions that underlie the methodology have been 
disproved. 
 
PIN numbers have been the technique of choice for applications that make use of number 
keypads (e.g. in telephony applications and in retail financial services). False accept rates 
should be 1 in 10,000 for a 4 figure PIN, but allowing user self-selection can result in the 
use of birth dates, house numbers, etc, many of which can be guessed by knowledgeable 
adversaries. 
 
A number of 'knowledge-based' alternative techniques have been proposed, although the 
usability of many remains to be proven: 
 
· 'Question and answer' systems that require answers to a number of questions about 
user preferences and history71 that the user is presumed only to know; 
· 'Associative passwords' that provide challenge-response interactions to a selection 
from a large number of previously determined word pairs, e.g. 'black-eye'72; 
· A longer passphrase or sentence, preferably one that makes no logical sense 
                                                                 
69 R. Dhamija and A Perrig, Déjà vu: A user study using images for authentication, Proceedings of 
9th USENIX security Symposium, pp 45-58 (2000), available at 
www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec2000/full_papers/dhamija/dh  
70 commercialised by IDArts in 1999 
71 M Zwiran and W Haga, Cognitive passwords: the key to easy access control, Computers and 
Security 9(8) 723-36 (1990)  
72  M Zwiran and W Haga, A comparison of password techniques for multilevel authentication 
mechanism, The Computer Journal  36 (3) pp 227-37 
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· Visual knowledge-based systems, using either faces which the user has memorised 
previously or randomly-generated art, such as the inkblot method suggested by 
researchers at Microsoft Research73. 
 
Problems . A detailed assessment of the use of passwords in 'real life' situations has been 
undertaken by Angela Sasse and her colleagues at University College London74.  
 
· The multiplicity of passwords that many knowledge workers are required to use (in 
one organisation, an average of 16 per person), with differing change regimes and 
combinations of minimum/maximum lengths results in considerable confusion 
amongst end users of such systems.  
· The mismatch between password mechanisms and users' capabilities is clearly 
evidenced from studies of 'real world use'. Forcing randomness in the selection of 
PINs and passwords is often seen as a challenge by end users to explore the limits of 
the algorithm designed by the security team.   
· Resetting of passwords in a corporate environment occupies a substantial proportion 
of the IT helpdesk's time.  
· Reuse of passwords between applications of differing security levels pose a clear risk 
of dissemination of this secret. The 'secret knowledge' required as a backup security 
question in many financial applications - the user's mother's maiden name - can no 
longer be treated as confidential data.  
· PIN numbers are even more of a problem with heavily used numbers being quickly 
forgotten even after relatively short periods of not being used.  
· Many security policies now recognise that users write down passwords, and have 
resorted to suggesting that this be done in a non-obvious way and then keeping the 
note in a secure place. 
· The importance of passwords and PINs as the key security measure is easily 
forgotten, and even conscientious users can fall victim to social engineering75.  
 
With regard to legal liability, the use of passwords and PINs can also pose legal problems. 
For example, in Germany, the use of the so-called prima-facie evidence often leads to 
legal disadvantages to the PIN-user as he is confronted in court by arguing that he has not 
kept the PIN sufficiently secret as he was supposed to do according to usual contractual 
conditions imposed by, for example, financial institutions with regard to the use of cash 
dispensers.76 
4.0.2 Authentication by possession 
 
A number of methods have been used from physical keys to locks, cards of various types, 
through to dongles or USB tokens that require their insertion in PCs for data or software 
to be operated. Some 'calculator' type cards (such as SecurID) have a display that displays 
a sequence of random numbers, changing in synchronisation with a server. These may be 
used in conjunction with a PIN to strengthen the authentication. An interesting variant on 
this is the Quizid electronic token77, which replaces the PIN with a five colour button 
sequence (which has additional support for the memory in terms of positioning of the five 
                                                                 
73 Suzanne Ross, Is it just my imagination?, 
http://research.microsoft.com/displayArticle.aspx?id=417  
74 Angela Sasse et al, Transforming the ‘weakest link’ – a human/computer interaction approach to 
usable and effective security in Internet and Wireless Security (Eds. R Temple and J Regnault, 
Institution of Electrical Engineers pp 243-261 (2002)  
75 Social engineering refers to methods of obtaining critical information by unauthorised individuals 
through the use of plausible ruse or excuses. For example, Office workers give away passwords for 
a cheap pen! Information Security Bulletin  www.chi-publishing.com/portal/index.php?id=487 (18 
April 2003). A comprehensive study of social engineering has been written by Kevin Mitnick, a 
hacker who explored its practical aspects: Kevin Mitnick, The art of deception, John Wiley (2002) 
76 See for example Astrid Albrecht, Consumer Acceptance and Legal Frameworks, pp. 68 ff., in: 
Lockie, Mark/Deravi, Farzin: The Biometric Industry Report, Elsevier Advanced Technology, 
Oxford December 2000 
77 www.quizid,com  
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coloured buttons. The suppliers claim that people's memory for colours is better than for 
numbers.) 
 
Clearly, the complexity of design and resistance to copying determine the level of 
security, while they offer little protection against their being lent to another person by 
someone who does not require their use for that duration. For example, plastic cards have 
become more sophisticated from the initial use of 300 byte magnetic stripe versions. The 
information from these could be copied easily using equipment costing a few hundred 
euros. Next generation systems with more complex types of material in the magnetic 
strip, and stripes with imprinted watermarks in the magnetic pattern have been introduced 
to counter such copying. Chip cards with a built-in silicon integrated circuit have proved 
more robust against such simple forms of copying, while sophisticated encryption co-
processing and the use of public encryption techniques have improved some aspects of 
security. Ultimately, though, users have to be trusted not to part with the token, and to 
report its loss immediately to the authority that manages any revocation measures. 
 
The RESET roadmap project has overviewed the future challenges and opportunities for 
the use of smart cards ('chip cards')78 It notes the very large number of devices shipped 
annually (approximately 1.9bn units in 2002, with a doubling to 3.8bn by 2005). By far 
the largest number is for use in the telecom sector (1.5bn in 2002), followed by 170m 
units delivered into the financial arena.  
 
Specific comments about the range of applications and the drivers for the use of smart 
cards in the period up to 2005 include: 
 
· Of the telecom use, a substantial number (over 2/3 of the total produced for this 
sector) are memory-only devices, with just over 400m being SIM cards. The 
consortium believes that the potential of m-Commerce has been hampered by a lack 
of standards and fragmentation in solutions, but that it will continue to be a priority 
for the new generation of services built upon the advent of 3G mobile systems, 
expected to start in a major way in Europe in 2004. 
· The migration of standards in the financial sector towards EMV for chip based 
payment, and consequent shift in liability for those not using such cards, by 2005 
should ensure the uptake of IC cards for this type of application. 
· Up to 200m cards are predicted to be used for personal identification by 2005. 
 
Key challenges that are foreseen in the future are: 
 
· A move towards Java open source platform operating systems that can support multi-
tasking; 
· Improved communications between card and reader, in terms of data exchange speed 
and lower power consumption; support for protocols that offer better confidentiality 
and security; and improved mobile connectivity; 
· Faster access to non-volatile memory and enhanced RAM capacity; 
· Better design tools and design methodologies; 
· Two possible ways of enhancing the functionality: through improved card 
functionality with key pads, displays, biometric sensors and better network 
interfaces; or alternatively, through the development of more powerful user terminals 
such as the PDA, which could be used the trusted device for applications as diverse 
as access to buildings and ATM cash access; 
· Improved security by eliminating the leakage of information through side-channels, 
better physical security protection techniques (such as tamper-resistant chips), more 
powerful evaluation tools, and improved cryptology solutions. 
 
Proposals for more complex (and possibly more secure) schemes for authentication by 
possession have included parasitic authentication, whereby a second unit is required as 
well as a smart card. This unit would be a small, self-powered, disposable device that 
                                                                 
78 RESET project: Draft Roadmap v 2.0 (28 March 2003) www.ercim.org/reset  
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would communicate with the smart card79, such as an RFID device. Incorporation of such 
devices into watches, rings, etc would improve the likelihood of their being always 
available, while mobile phones could serve as a similar carrier. 
 
4.0.3 Authentication by location 
 
For many years, Caller Identification has been the authentication method of choice for the 
telecommunications operator. This sufficed when customers had one phone, fixed at a 
single address, with a single individual responsible for all of the transactions made using 
that phone. As the numbers of mobile telephony terminals grew, such a model was no 
longer a viable option. Although mobile operators could determine the cell from which a 
call was made, more precise location information was not possible in the initial releases. 
The need to locate people in an emergency and the opportunities offered for new services 
based upon location have revived interest in the possibility of location-based 
authentication. (Many fraud protection systems have used the impossibility of an 
individual being at two separate sites separated by a considerable distance to reduce the 
incidence of cloning fraud, whether of mobile phones or credit cards.)  A combination of 
location-, possession- and knowledge-based authentication could drive novel applications 
without the need for a biometric infrastructure. The advent of pervasive computing in the 
second half of the decade could hasten the arrival of such systems. 
 
Note, however, that there are significant privacy concerns in the aggregation of such 
information. Care with the system design and storage of such data is needed if such 
location-based technologies are to be accepted by the public at large. The PAMPAS 
Roadmap offers a number of scenarios, visions and challenges for such systems 80.  
Notions of tuneable anonymity, user-centred mechanisms that allow the controlled release 
of personal information, etc require further research to ensure that solutions are developed 
that offer benefits to end users and operators, whilst providing security and protection for 
both. 
 
4.0.4 Authentication by history of use 
 
Human beings are, in the main, creatures of habit; yet in the developed world, they are  
increasingly offered a multitude of complex options. Most resort to selecting a narrow 
range from the totality of opportunities, and for 'everyday activities' such as shopping, 
working, routine leisure pastimes, etc. they repeat a similar pattern, week after week and 
month after month. For example, once a pattern of use of a complex software program has 
been established, most users will not deviate from this. Both marketing specialists and 
fraud detection programs make use of these habits to codify individuals according to 
behaviour and pattern of use of services.  Their use for authentication has not been fully 
developed. Clearly, the likelihood of false rejection at times of extreme need (emergency, 
such as illness or accident) or unusual circumstances (for example, when on holiday) 
limits the use of this method. Nevertheless, in combination with other approaches, 
history-based authentication could allow for innovative service offerings.  
 
As with location-based authentication, this approach could be seen to be privacy-invasive 
and appropriate measures will be necessary to protect the individual. The advance of 
ubiquitous RFID (radio-frequency identification) tags in clothing, jewellery, money, etc. 
raises the prospect of another form of history-based authentication: the RFID-sensed 
individual. Potentially, these tags can be made the size of small silicon integrated circuits 
in a plastic packaging at 10 cents and below in price, with individual identification for 
each chip. A human person passing by a portal that has been set to collect all forms of 
RFID data could be identified and re-authenticated at a different time and place, even 
though they may change some of their clothes and jewellery. 
                                                                 
79 Tim Ebringer et al, Parasitic Authentication, IFIP CARDIS 2000, pp 307-25 (2000) 
80 PAMPAS (Pioneering Advanced Mobile Privacy and Security) Deliverable D03: Refined 
Roadmap (28 February 2003) at www.pampas.eu.org 
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4.0.5 Authentication by implanted chip 
 
The logical extension of RFID tags is the implantable transponder, already used as an 
identification device for many household pets and larger farm animals. In April 2002, 
Applied Digital Solutions was given approval by the US Food and Drug Administration 
for their VeriChip, a 12mm by 2 mm sized device81. Insertion of the unit using a 
hypodermic syringe can be performed as an outpatient or GP surgery procedure, under a 
local anaesthetic.  Although the current applications call for association with other 
implanted prosthetic devices, the use for certain categories of prisoner could be 
envisaged. Clearly, all of the privacy and security concerns mentioned in the previous 
sections apply, as well as the potential for any unexpected medical side effects due to the 
invasive surgery. 
  
4.1  Automatic face recognition (AFR) 
 
As one of the longer established biometric systems, AFR has been available commercially 
for many years. The ubiquity of CCTV82, especially in the UK, has led to an increase in 
interest in the application of this technology for surveillance. A major area of research 
centres on the use of biometric techniques to match images recorded in photographs (such 
as those in passports and other identity documents) with real time video or photographs 
captured at a specific place or time. In the future, current research into emotional states 
and gesture recognition could add another dimension to the use of face recognition as 
more than a security mechanism. 
 
Although at first sight, AFR appears to be an easy and acceptable method of 
authenticating individuals, in practice, the performance of many systems is very 
susceptible to changes in the angle of incident light and in the pose of the subject. The 
high incidence of twins in the population also acts as a security limitation, at least for 
some applications, although the developers of infrared imaged recognition systems claim 
that their method is less susceptible to twin confusion. 
 
4.1.1 Principal methods83 
 
The following ways of operating an AFR system have been documented: 
 
· capture and processing of the facial image by a single digital still or video camera 
using ambient light 
· capture and processing of the image of a face under infrared illumination, or a mix of 
visible and infrared lighting 
· capture and imaging of faces using stereoscopic camera systems  
 
The most commonly used algorithms are based on the following approaches: 
 
1. Spectral image decomposition.  
This method seeks to break down the facial image into the sum of many sub-
images. (These sub-images can be superimposed to reconstruct the facial image.) 
Such sub-images can either be global - representing parts of the entire face - or 
local - representing only parts of the face (e.g. upper right hand corner, middle, 
etc). Principal Component Analysis is a global representation commercialised by 
Viisage. Local Feature Analysis is a local representation, as commercialised by 
Identix, another US vendor. It is worth noting that neither method attemp ts to 
locate facial landmarks such as the nose, eyebrows, chin, etc; nor does either 
                                                                 
81 Gaia Steden, I've got you under my skin, Global ID Magazine 6 pp 54-5 (2002) 
82 Closed Circuit TeleVision Systems 
83 Note that not all methods are listed for this (or other) biometrics  
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method make use of direct physiological measurements such as the distance 
between landmarks. Neural networks can be used with either global or local 
methods to measure the similarity between enrolment and sample images of the 
face. 
2. Elastic bunch graph matching. 
The approach used by ZN-Vision represents the face by an elastic graphical 
overlay, fixing it to the specific pose and expression by adjustment of the key 
points on a face by an appropriate distortion of an originally rectangular mesh. 
Each node on the mesh is assigned a particular filter structure that represents 
local features in the vicinity of the node. Both local and global comparison of 
node features is made at verification. 
3. Combination of spectral analysis and 3-dimensional modelling derived from 
geographical imaging systems. (This approach has been developed by Imagis 
Technologies of Canada.) 
 
4.1.2 Principal commercially available systems 
 
Identix (Visionics) 
(USA) 
Commercialisation of research at 
Rockefeller University 
http://www.identix.com  
Viisage (USA) Commercialisation of work by the 
MIT group 
http://www.viisage.com/i
ndex.htm  
Imagis (Canada) Company diversified from a 
satellite image processing 
company 
http://www.imagistechno
logies.com   
ZN Vision (Germany) Commercialisation of research at 
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum and 
University of Southern California. 
In the process of acquisition by 
Viisage. 
http://www.zn-ag.com  
Cognitec (Germany) Spin off from Siemens-Nixdorf www.cognitec-
systems.com  
 
Template sizes for commercial systems are quoted in the range from 84 bytes to 
1.3kbytes. 
4.1.3 High profile deployments of facial recognition systems 
 
Deployments using AFR include: 
 
· London Borough of Newham's fitting of Visionics' algorithms to a network of CCTV 
cameras across this local council area in London. It has been claimed that the level of 
street crime was reduced through a deterrent effect, and surveys have shown that the 
local citizens feel safer for the addition of such a technology84. 
· A large trial of facial recognition from Cognitec has been underway for some time in 
Australia. The SmartGate project enrolled over 4000 Quantas crew members 
travelling through Sydney airport and now checks their identity by comparison of the 
passport photograph with the image captured by cameras at the immigration desk. 
Some unfavourable comments were voiced when it appeared that some Japanese 
                                                                 
84 CCTV: constant cameras track violators, NIJ Journal 249 p. 20 (2003) 
www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/jr000249d.pdf  for a description of the system in operation 
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businessmen were mistakenly authenticated after exchanging passports. The 
AUS$1m+ project is designed to be extended to other Australian airports from 2004 
onwards, provided that the pilot is completed successfully. 
· Announcement of the use of ZN Vision's facial recognition system in securing access 
for season ticket holders to Hannover Zoo in Germany. The potential deployment 
size is all of the 60,000 users of such tickets. 
· Imagis has sold a system to Scotland's Grampian police authority to compare the 
identity of arrested individuals against the database of photographs of criminals. 
· Imagis has also developed ChildBase, a facial recognition software package for the 
UK's National Crime Squad that aims to organise the many hundreds of thousands of 
Internet images of sexually abused children into clusters relating to individual 
children85. Newly acquired images can be compared with others in the database to 
ascertain whether they are of an existing child or of a new victim. It has demonstrated 
the capability of grouping together brothers and sisters in the database.   
 
4.1.4 Testing and issues of performance limitation 
 
Tony Mansfield of the National Physical Laboratory lists the following evaluations of 
facial recognition systems (together with more recent testing) 86: 
 
AcSys Biometrics  IBG 2001, FRVT 2002 
Banque-Tec  FRVT 2000 
Cognitec Systems   FRVT 2002 
C-VIS  FRVT 2000, FRVT 2002 
DCS AG BioID BIOIS 2000 
Dermalog  BIOIS 2000 
Dream Mirh  FRVT 2002 
ETrue  FRVT 2000, IBG 1999 
Eyematic Interfaces  FRVT 2002 
Icinquest  FRVT 2002 
Identix (Visionics) FaceIT NPL 2000 
  FRVT 2000, FRVT 2002 
  IBG 1999, IBG 2000 
Imagis Technologies  FRVT 2002 
Lau Technologies  FRVT 2000 
Miros  Truface ICSA 1998 
Viisage  IBG 2001, FRVT 2002 
VisionSphere Technologies  FRVT 2002 
ZN Face  BIOIS 2000 
 
The test centres undertaking these evaluations are as follows: 
 
BIOIS Study: www.bsi.de/aufgaben/projekte/biometr/biois -e.pdf (May 2000) 
FRVT 2000: Facial Recognition Vendor Test 2000 test of algorithms used in AFR with 
results at: (Feb 2001) 
FRVT 2002: Face Recognition Vendor Test 2000, results at 
http://www.frvt.org/FRVT2002/documents.htm (March 2003) 
IBG 1999, IBG 2000, IBG 2001 are three sets of scenario tests undertaken by the 
International Biometric Group, with details available for purchase from this 
consultancy 
NPL (CESG/BWG) Scenario Testing: 
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/technology/biometrics/media/Biometric%20Test%20Report
%20pt1.pdf  
 
 
                                                                 
85 Lisa Kelly, Police invest in ChildBase system, Computing (16 July 2003) 
86 Tony Mansfield, Report Biometric Performance Evaluations (25 January 2002) 
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Best performing systems (technology evaluation: algorithm only) 
 
The key conclusions from the most recent study of the algorithms used in AFR (the 2002 
version of the FRVT) are summarised below. In the main test, photographs of more than 
37,000 visa applicants were used, equal number of men and women, with a strong bias to 
subjects aged 18-40, and collected in Mexico by the US consulate). For each individual, 
at least three photographs were available, taken up to three years apart. All are front-
facing (to within 10 degrees), the subjects co-operate with the system and have a neutral 
expression. As such, the results from this large scale test represent the performance of 
state-of-the-art algorithms under nearly ideal conditions. A significant proportion of the 
images were taken at less than 60 days after the initial photograph, and hence, the better 
performance for short term use such as for immigrant visas can be assessed. Nevertheless, 
we quote the average results for a range of separations in time. 
 
· Verification performance: under reasonably controlled lighting conditions in an 
indoor environment, the best systems operate at the following levels of accuracy: 
 
FRR is 10% for a FAR of 1% 
FRR is 4% for a FAR of 10% 
 
(More correctly, these figures relate to FNMR and FMR, since - amongst other 
differences - only one recognition attempt is made.) 
 
The dramatic effect of changing lighting conditions is illustrated when tests are 
undertaken outside of the laboratory environment on the same day that one set of 
images were obtained indoors: the FRR increased from 4% to 46% for a FAR of 10% 
 
· Identification performance: The results are stated for the percentage of faces that are 
correctly identified as the most likely match. The best system performed as follows: 
 
- the correct face was located as the top match 85% of the t ime in a database of 
800 subjects; 
- the correct face was located as the top match 73% of the time in a database of 
37,000 subjects; 
- the correct face appeared in the top 50 matches 87% of the time in a database 
of 37,000 subjects. 
 
· Watch list performance: For a false alarm rate set at 1%, the best system performed 
as follows: 
 
- with a watch list of 25 people, it detected and identified them 77% of the time; 
- with a larger watch list of 3,000 people, this rate dropped to 56% 
 
The data in the FRVT2002 evaluation enabled some other general conclusions to be 
made. Performance in successfully identifying individuals is not uniform across gender or 
age; it also deteriorates the longer the interval between an initial enrolment and 
subsequent recognition. Summarising the extensive data that is available, performance 
decreases by approximately 5% for each of the following; 
 
- for females (males are recognised more easily) 
- for every 10 years reduction in age (older people's faces are recognised more 
easily) 
- for every year since the original photograph was taken (rapid ageing of 
faces) 
 
Performance testing (access control scenario, together with watch list) 
 
A report on the use of facial verification techniques in a scenario setting accompanied by 
a watch-list application has been published, using Identix (Visionics) equipment: a 
custom design for the verification scenario and FaceIT Surveillance and Argus for the 
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watch list application.87 Approximately 140 subjects from a USA facility were enrolled 
on a video system and then re-recorded up to 38 days later, for assessment of the 
verification performance of the system. A database of 14,000 images from the same 
facility was collected for the watch list scenario.  
 
Factors influencing the performance of systems: 
 
Factors affecting the performance of systems operating using ambient illumination are88: 
 
· Changes in direction of incident light will often result in problems in enrolment or 
verification 
· Some systems are particularly sensitive to the presence of glasses and will give poor 
verifications when the glasses are removed. 
· A complex or confusing background behind the user may cause problems in 
identifying the position of the face.  
· Variation in pose of the user (tilt and rotation angles greater than 20-30 degrees) will 
often degrade the performance of systems. 
· Changes in the application of cosmetics, or colouration of the face can impact on 
system performance 
· Beards, moustaches and change of hairstyle can affect the performance of systems  
· Skin tone or colour may affect the algorithms locating the position of the face. 
· Medical conditions such as bruising or temporary swelling of parts o f the face may 
cause some system to perform less effectively. 
· The facial appearance of young people or very old individuals may change quickly, 
so that templates may need to be updated at more frequent intervals. 
 
The susceptibility of algorithms to each factor will vary, with extensive testing the only 
way of ascertaining how well each system performs. 
 
Security evaluations 
 
There have been no formal security evaluations of face recognition systems. In its testing 
of devices for simple spoofing, the German magazine c't showed that simple 'live and 
well' measures to detect the presentation of a still image were insufficient. In the specific 
case quoted, the replay of a video clip in which the subject moved from side to side was 
accepted as a live individual.89  
 
TNO in the Netherlands have undertaken research into the detection of 'look-alikes', a key 
concern for passport issuing authorities.  3 commercial systems were trialed using 129 
subjects over a period of 6 weeks. In general, the results were not encouraging; indeed, 
some of the lower quality photographs performed better than higher quality ones, possibly 
due to a wider range of expressions being captured in the latter case90. 
 
4.1.5  User concerns 
 
Integration of AFR systems into surveillance systems is a contentious issue. Its trial at the 
Super Bowl 2001 in a covert manner caused significant embarrassment91 that was not 
                                                                 
87 Mike Bone and Duane Blackburn, Face Recognition at a Chokepoint: Scenario Evaluation 
Results (14 November 2002) 
88 Tony Mansfield, Best Practices in Testing and Reporting Performance of Biometric Devices 
(Version 2.01, August 2002).  
89 Lisa Thalheim et al,  Body Check: Biometric Access Protection Devices and their Programs put 
to the Test, http://www.heise.de/ct/english/02/11/114/ 
90 Koos van Woerden, biometrics in travel documents: suitability of face recognition for look-alike 
detection, European Conference for Issuing Authorities of Travel Documents,  The Hague (20-21 
June 2002) 
91 ACLU Calls For Public Hearings on Tampa's "Snooper Bowl"  Video Surveillance 
http://www.aclufl.org/snooperbowl2-01.html  
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helped by its subsequent use in a couple of Florida cities. More recent criticism has 
centred on the limited performance in trials of AFR for watch-lists at US airports, even 
though the results were in line with the conclusions of the FRVT trials mentioned above. 
Expectations of much better performance had been raised and there is a need for an open 
discussion of this type of application.  
 
The deployment of an AFR in the London Borough of Newham was, in contrast, handled 
with sensitivity, with prominent notices displayed in the neighbourhood and continued 
dialogue with the local community. It should be noted, however, that even in this case, 
many citizens were unclear about the role of the police authorities and the capabilities of 
the technology. 
 
Thermal images may offer additional information about the subject. For example, Pavlidis 
et al at Honeywell showed that when subjects were startled, there was an instantaneous 
redistribution of blood flows away from the cheeks and towards the eyes92. 
 
A full discussion of the issues is available in an article by Philip Agre of UCLA 93. He lists 
the following arguments against the deployment of systems: 
 
· High potential for abuse 
· Ease of aggregation of data with that from other systems  
· Inaccuracy in operation of AFR systems  
· An inappropriate technology for the requirements that are made upon it  
· Impact of its use in shopping malls, etc, changing the power balance between 
shopper and retailer 
· Lack of understanding by citizens of the possibilities of such systems  
· Difficulty of providing notice of the existence of such systems in public places 
· Deployment in other countries where controls on abuse are less or absent 
 
System operators should take such observations into account when designing public-
facing deployments, working to Codes of Practice that have been agreed locally. 
 
4.1.6  Legal and regulatory dimensions 
 
Privacy issues with regard to AFR include the fear of loss of control through better 
possibilities of tracking and tracing people, creating high substantial personal profiles and 
increase video surveillance.  
 
Also of concern is the unwarranted possible link to watchlists, for example of suspected 
criminals. One measure to establish more transparency and therefore minimise the 
worries of citizens, is the legal obligation (e.g. in German privacy law) to always give 
visible notice of the use of video surveillance in public places as metro stations or buses. 
 
4.1.7  Standardisation activities relevant to face recognition  
 
Standardised data formats for the interchange of facial image data are recognised as a 
requirement for the interoperability between applications and instances of the application. 
Work is underway in the ISO/IEC standardisation activity to define such formats, with 
text of ISO/IEC 19794-5 being circulated for comment and balloting by national bodies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
92 I Pavlidis et al, The face of fear, The Lancet 357 (9270) (2001) 
93 Philip Agre, Your face is not a bar code: arguments against automatic face recognition in public 
places, dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/bar-code.html (5 May 2003) 
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4.1.8  Principal research projects developing facial recognition systems 
 
Results of research are available in the open literature and in conferences such as the 
IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face and Gesture Recognition94 and the 
AVBPA, International Conference on Audio- and Video-based Biometric Person 
Authentication95.  
 
University of Manchester (Dr Tim Cootes) http://www.st-outreach.org.uk/docs/studies/cs-
43.htm A European Commission funded project, IST-1999-11587 U-FACE (User friendly 
face access control system for physical access and healthcare applications) ended in 
October 2002 (http://www.uface.org).  The same team leads on a DTI-sponsored research 
project – SCID – that aims to develop technologies to link facial biometrics with vehicle 
identification technologies to support authentication in ‘drive-in’ retail applications96. 
 
Another UK project aiming to use facial image systems is CRIME-VUs, but the 
automatic aspect of biometrics is less important in this proposal. This work, led by 
Stirling University, is investigating whether the use of three-dimensional reconstruction 
of faces can help with the identification of criminals 97. A further project in the same DTI 
research portfolio addresses intelligent analysis of CCTV footage to identify unusual and 
unexpected behaviour98.  
 
HISCORE is a project developing a leading edge 3D- and colour subsystem based on off-
the-shelf CCTV-cameras and projectors and validate this subsystem in two application 
areas - face recognition and gesture recognition99. 
 
The COST 275 consortium is addressing opportunities for remote, online recognition of 
consumers using both speech and facial biometrics in a co-operative programme that is 
scheduled for completion by 2005100. 
 
4.1.9  Outlook for the future 
 
AFR has the potential for creative integration with other technologies to add value beyond 
simple authentication in support of the developing vision of pervasive computing or 
ambient intelligence. The performance of current basic systems limits its direct usefulness 
for many applications. However, the large number of extensive databases of photographic 
images, and the relatively low cost and high availability of hardware, argues for increased 
investment in new and improved approaches. The key aspects that need to be resolved 
are101: 
 
· Impact of partial occlusion of the face, such as the placement of hands, large 
sunglasses, and reading matter. 
· Variation in pose of subjects, beyond about 30-40 degrees of the rotation of the head. 
Evidence from FRVT2002 shows that morphing of off-axis images into what they 
could look like when face-on dramatically improves the performance of algorithms.  
· Variation in illumination. In particular, FRVT2002 showed that changes from 
internal artificially lit environments to operation outdoors nearly halved the rates of 
verification. 
                                                                 
94 The most recent conference in the 5th IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face and 
Gesture Recognition, Washington, DC (20-21 May 2002) 
95 The most recent one is the 5th in the series, held in Surrey University, UK 
http://avbpa2003.ee.surrey.ac.uk  
96 http://www.dti-mi.org.uk/newweb/scid.htm  
97 http://www.psychology.stir.ac.uk/crimevus/index.htm  
98 http://www.dcs.qmul.ac.uk/research/vision/projects/ICONS  
99 http://uranus.ee.auth.gr/hiscore  
100 http://www.fub.it/cost275/  
101 Ralph Gross et al, Quo Vadis Face Recognition, Report CMU-RI-TR-01-17 (June 2001), 
dagwood.vsam.ri.cmu.edu/FaceRecognition/Html/discussion.htm  
 
 BIOVISION Roadmap Issue 1.1                                                                             15 October 2003  
97 
  
· Performance degradation as a function of time.  
· Changes in expression, especially when mouth deformation or eye narrowing occurs. 
· Performance dependencies on gender and age. 
· Registration of the probe image and the stored database of faces. 
 
Current areas of research interest include the use of infrared methods102 (which are 
claimed to offer more degrees of freedom) and exciting work with three-dimensional 
methods of coding of the face. There is also early evidence linking improvements in 
performance to higher resolution images, both in spatial dimension and intensity103.  
Some researchers also believe that there is still much to be gained from a better 
understanding of how the brain recognises previously met people104.  
 
There is also some disagreement on whether video sequences help recognition. 
FRVT2002 results seemed to demonstrate that this is not the case, even degrading the 
performance of some systems. Another area of continuing research is into three-
dimensional imaging of faces. An intermediate stage of taking up to 5 images at different 
pose angles during enrolment has been examined.  
 
Whatever techniques are used, the route forward could be the integration of 
  
a) methods that develop a model of the face from a gallery of many images of the face 
under different conditions and  
b) the result of a knowledge base using the best available information as to how the face 
changes as a function of the variables mentioned above.  
 
At the same time, new ideas continue to emerge. In early 2003, a software house, Delean 
Vision105, announced a new approach, based upon reflectivity of skin surfaces, either 
from the face or hands. This should depend upon the shape of features on the face, their 
textures and the colouration. Full images are stored, resulting in a template size of over 
100kB. 
 
The potential for integration with systems that offer so-called intelligent HCI can be 
assessed with reference to work such as that of computer-based interpretation of human 
activities106. Clearly, there are major risks to users’ privacy through the extension of such 
applications107, and any R&D projects should build in protection measures to limit the 
opportunities for such abuse.  
 
The field of intelligent video surveillance has been reviewed as part of the EC funded 
European Research Network for cognitive AI-enabled Computer Vision Systems 108. 
Section 4.2.3 of their Roadmap summaris es the research agenda: 
 
                                                                 
102 Francine Prokoski, History, Current Status, and Future of Infrared Identification, IEEE 
Workshop on Computer Vision Beyond the Visible Spectrum: Methods and Applications (CVBVS 
2000) and Jonathan Dowdall et al, Face Detection in the near-IR spectrum 
http://www.cs.unr.edu/~bebis/facedetectionIR.pdf Image and Vision Computing (paper accepted) 
103 Comment by Jonathon Phillips at the 4th International conference on Audio- and Video- Based 
Biometric person Authentication Conference, AVBPA 2003, Surrey (June 2003) 
104 Rama Chellappa et al, Human and machine recognition of faces: a survey, Proceedings of the 
IEEE, 83 (5) 705-740 (May 1995) Section III; Vicki Bruce and Andy Young, In the eye of the 
beholder: the science of face perception, Oxford University Press (1999) 
105 deleanvision.com  
106 Zoran Duric et al, Integrating Perceptual and Cognitive Modelling for Adaptive and Intelligent 
Human-Computer Interaction, Proc of the IEEE, 90(7) 1272 –1289 (July 2002) 
107 Ioannis Pavlidis et al, Thermal Imaging for Anxiety Detection, IEEE Workshop on Computer 
Vision Beyond the Visible Spectrum: Methods and Applications (CVBVS 2000) 
108 James Crowley, Cognitive vision research roadmap, IST-2001-35454, Section 4.3 (draft 2.5 25 
March 2003) www.ecvision.info  
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- Robust, real-time algorithms and systems with the ability to perform with minimal 
manual reconfiguration on variable environments, with self-calibration and automatic 
adaptation to cope with changes in lighting, scene geometry and activity; 
- Systems able to cope seamlessly with addition or removal of new cameras and 
sensors, with ease of installation and maintenance in general;  
- Systems able to work over periods of months with minimal human intervention; 
- Continuous and accurate annotation of activities in the field of view using natural 
languages, i.e. the recognition of the behaviour of people and vehicles and prediction 
of further activity based upon the application area, together with decision-making 
capabilities based upon such data;  
- Development of application-independent platforms based upon underlying 
knowledge bases; 
- Particular attention to security and integrity of the data, especially for evidential use 
of the images. Privacy issues need to be resolved as well as linking to other measures 
in crime prevention. 
 
4.2  Fingerprint recognition 
 
The use of finger and palm impressions to seal transaction has been prevalent for at least 
two centuries. However, the scientific study of the ridge detail was not undertaken until 
the latter part of the 19th century, and even then, this research was focussed on possible 
classification of groups and not individuals. These studies concluded that ridge detail 
exhibited a high degree of immutability and uniqueness. The first reference to fingerprints 
as a  'forensic' tool came in 1880 with the publication of an article by Henry Faulds in the 
scientific journal, Nature. By the early 20th century, fingerprints had largely superseded 
the use of the 'anthropometric' system of measurement that had been devised and 
championed by Alphonse Bertillon.109. Concern about the accuracy of that system had 
followed a number of high profile mistakes caused by human error and incorrect 
statistical assumptions that were inherent in the system. It should be noted that the rise of 
fingerprints as the principal means of verification of identity within criminal justice 
systems in the early 20th century has resulted in the legislative position being firmly 
biased towards this form of identification. 
 
The challenge of partially automating the process of identifying possible matches of latent 
prints left at the scene of crime with previously stored records preoccupied the forensic 
services of many police forces. Extensive automation of the process, through the 
development of Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) technology has only 
proven feasible in the past quarter century, with final comparison still being left to expert 
examiners. Three suppliers dominate the market, with relatively few standards locking 
many systems into one of these proprietary solutions. Capture of the fingerprint data from 
suspects has also moved from the traditional 'ink and paper' method to live-scan optical 
systems some of which can collect all 10 prints in a single imaging of both hands on a 
large glass plate.  
 
Many suppliers and commentators argue that AFIS systems should not be regarded as true 
biometric technologies, and aim to distance their offerings from the algorithms and 
processes used in conventional systems sold into the criminal justice sector. Nevertheless, 
a significant majority of non-AFIS biometrics still uses the same minutiae method (the 
fine detail in the ridge and valley structure of a fingerprint) that underpin AFIS 
technologies. However, the impossibility of reconstructing a full fingerprint image from 
the template data, and the major task of translating these suppliers' biometric templates 
into a form that enables direct comparison with those held by criminal records offices, 
should assure some critics.  
 
                                                                 
109 Richard Caplan, How fingerprints came into use for personal identification, Journal of the 
American Academy of Dermatology 23 (1), 109-114 (July 1990) 
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Nevertheless, proposals for national civilian identification schemes (civil ID) do appear to 
be based upon current AFIS solutions. Indeed, the current proposals for ISO standards for 
civil systems under development in SC 37 are moving closer to those in use by the 
criminal justice sector (ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2000). Although data protection legislation in 
Europe could require separation of the two types of system, strong technical and 
procedural controls would need to be developed to limit the opportunity for 'function 
creep'. In other countries, the checking of images of fingerprints - obtained at the time of 
enrolment into civil ID or immigrant visa schemes - against databases of criminals may 
not be protected in similar ways. 
 
The wealth of data about fingerprints  (for example, the experience in legal acceptability 
of expert evidence in criminal cases, and the incidence of missing fingers or difficult-to-
read prints) could underpin any legal challenge to authentication of users by means of this 
method. Note, however, that the specific ways in which the biometric is implemented will 
limit the accuracy of the method and the consequent room for non-repudiation and legal 
admissibility.   
 
A recent text on the ways in which fingerprint recognition systems have been developed 
and tested gives considerably more detail about current practice and capabilities110. 
 
4.2.1  Principal methods 
 
A fingerprint is constructed and classified using three levels of detail in the pattern of 
curving line structures called ridges 111, where the skin has a higher profile than in 
surroundings valleys: 
 
- The first level of detail consists of the patterns formed by the raised ridges contained 
on the surfaces of the fingertips and the valleys between them. This level may take 
account of the pattern, its orientation and other features such as the number of ridges 
present between measurable points - such as the innermost recurving ridge of a loop 
pattern and the delta where ridges come together in a clearly distinguishable way. 
- Second level detail takes the comparison of one fingerprint impression against 
another to the minutiae level, where fixed points on the ridges are identified and 
plotted. Usually these features are plotted at either the point where the ridge divides 
(at a bifurcation), or where it ends (ridge ending). Such minutiae maps can then be 
compared across the two impressions, either manually or using feature comparison 
algorithms.  
- Third level detail takes account of the positions of the individual pores on a friction 
ridge (poroscopy) or the patterns that are formed along the edges of the edges of the 
ridges (ridgeology) - techniques that are being using increasingly within law 
enforcement applications, especially where only small parts of the detail of finger 
ridges are available. 
 
However, images are plastically deformed when fingers are pressed against a hard surface 
in asymmetric ways. These images are also subject to noise in the form of dirt, scratches 
on the fingerprint surface, etc. Hence it is not possible to match one fingerprint image 
against another in a simple way. The aim of biometric systems is to extract features in 
ways that are robust to these effects generally using second level detail. 
 
The most common form of the fingerprint biometric system has two primary components: 
the sensor and the algorithm that processes the image to a template and subsequently 
compares captured images in operation of the system with the stored template.  
 
Sensors 
                                                                 
110 Davide Maltoni et al, Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition, Springer-Verlag (2003) 
111 Asker M Bazen , Fingerprint Identification – Feature Extraction, Matching, and Database 
Search. PhD thesis (August 19th 2002). 
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Seven types of sensor are recognised: 
 
· Optical sensing;. Usually offered in the form of an optical prism with a source of 
light on one face, a camera on another face to sense the light that is reflected off the 
finger that is pressed against a third face of the prism. Total internal reflection off the 
ridges modulates the incident light to develop an image of the fingerprint pattern. 
Initially quite large, smaller units to fit into a PC mouse have been commercialised. 
Sub-$100 complete peripherals (PC mouse) have been marketed. 
· Capacitive Silicon. Introduced in the mid 1990's, these are similar to an unpackaged 
IC. A thin sliver of silicon is processed into a fine matrixed array of small capacitors 
with the finger offering the other plate. The distance between a ridge and the silicon 
plate differs from that between a valley point and its corresponding point on the 
silicon, leading to a difference in the capacitance, the distribution of which images 
the fingerprint detail. Two forms are available: dc and ac coupled. A number of 
European suppliers offer this type of device (Infineon, Fingerprint Cards, ST 
Microelectronics), and 'whole finger' versions of up to 18mm by 13mm sensing area 
are available, as well as much smaller ones (down to 10mm by 1mm), for 
applications where the cost of silicon or miniaturisation are important considerations. 
In the past, there have been some problems with resistance to electrostatic discharges 
and performance with very dry or very moist fingers. Current pricing is in the $25-40 
unit price in 10,000 unit quantities, with the aim to reduce this to a $5 unit cost in the 
near future. Smaller area devices that can be swept by the finger reduce the cost to 
about $10 each in 10,000 unit orders (2002 prices). An example of the device 
integrated into a component is the Siemens PC mouse, priced at $129. 
· Electric field sensors. Similar in form factor, to the capacitive silicon device, an 
electric-field sensing device is available from Authentec. 
· Thermoelectric sweep sensor. Atmel offer a 14mm by 0.4mm linear sensor that 
responds to the difference in temperature and thermal conduction between the ridge 
in contact with a semiconductor surface and the valley where there is no contact. A 
version is integrated into the popular iPAQ h5400 Pocket PC. 
· Ultrasonic sensing . A quite large unit that is claimed to have better performance as it 
senses the pattern of the ridges underneath the skin surface, thereby reducing the 
effect of surface dirt and skin cuts. There is one commercial supplier, Ultra-Scan. 
· Pressure array. BMF/Hitachi have recently a device with a two-dimensional matrix 
of micro-miniature pressure sensors that is claimed to be more resistant to spoofing 
by a synthetic finger 
· Electro-optic plastic sensors combined with a photodiode array 
 
The performance of these devices varies considerably. In particular, users should 
ascertain whether these devices will meet the criteria required in their specific application 
relating to: 
 
· Cost 
· Robustness, resistance to ageing, durability 
· Power consumption in quiescent and operational modes 
· Size 
· Dot pitch 
· Behaviour under electro-static discharge 
· Environmental operation for sweaty and dry fingers 
· Resistance to false finger submission and other security issues 
· Usability 
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the future of fingerprint biometrics seems to be assured, 
with many now being available in the top end of consumer and business electronic 
equipment. Examples are PDAs (HP's iPAQ h5400), laptop PCs (Samsung PC10), mobile 
phones (DoCoMo F505i) and secure mass storage through the use of USB peripherals 
with fingerprint access control (e.g. Thumbdrive Touch for up to 256Mb storage priced at 
$249) 
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4.2.2  Principal commercially available systems 
 
This is a fast developing area, as the prospect of volume application to electronic and 
computer equipment becomes more real. At the time of writing, the main suppliers of 
hardware in this sector of the fingerprint biometric market are: 
 
· Atmel 
· Authentec 
· Fingerprint Cards 
· Fujitsu 
· Identix 
· Infineon 
· Secugen 
· Sony 
· ST Microelectronics 
· Ultra-Scan 
· Veridicom 
 
Companies such as Sagem and Identix are key suppliers in the livescan market. 
 
Algorithms for use with these sensors are developed by a number of companies, amongst 
which are 
 
· Cogent, NEC, Printrack and Sagem for AFIS systems  
· Bioscrypt, Siemens and many others for the smaller size market. 
 
Template size for systems is generally in the range of 250 bytes to 1kbyte, although IBM 
have used systems with 80kbytes to improve search times through large databases. 
 
4.2.3  High Profile deployments 
 
An early use of fingerprint biometrics was in the securing of payments to the retired and 
dependants of miners in South Africa. Over the past decade, this has grown to regular 
payments to over 1 million people, with the original system being superseded by a more 
modern version.  
 
Many high profile welfare payment systems in the USA have also been secured by the use 
of fingerprint biometrics, with the primary aim of preventing multiple applications for 
social security payments in different counties in the same state. The longest established 
one  - in California - has annual running costs of $11m, but has recently been subjected to 
criticism for these high costs. 
 
In the UK, asylum seekers now have to register and be fingerprinted. These fingerprints 
are checked against previous applicants who have been refused entry. Certain ports of 
entry are equipped with portable units that enable a quick check to be made against the 
same database. 
 
A major project to register 60m Nigerian voters was undertaken recently using 60,000  
'systems in a briefcase' comprising a digital camera and an automatic fingerprint reader 
unit from Sagem - its MorphoTouch. 
 
As from January 2003, asylum seekers applying to countries within most of the EU will 
be checked against the EURODAC database of fingerprints of such applicants, in order to 
determine the country responsible for their processing and to prevent multiple 
applications for permission to stay. Strict controls apply to access and use of the 
information.  
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4.2.4  Testing and issues of performance limitation 
 
Testing of algorithms used in fingerprint recognition has been undertaken by a 
consortium of the Biometric System Lab at the University of Bologna, the Pattern 
Recognition and Image Processing Laboratory of Michigan State University and the U.S. 
National Biometric Test Center at San Jose State University. Two rounds of testing have 
been completed, with results from the later one, FVC2002 released early in 2003112.  The 
total number of algorithms tested in FVC2002 is 31. Four databases of fingerprint images 
were used as the test group (including one with synthetically generated images). Tests 
were conducted with two optical and one capacitive scanner. Several aspects of the test 
should be noted: 
 
· The test was designed to compare the performance of algorithms only, and the use of 
different types of sensor was incidental to the main purpose of the test 
· The sample size was small (90 students) and the average age was unrepresentative of 
most applications (20 years old) 
· Each subject was tested three times, with a minimum of two weeks separating each 
test 
· Only four fingers were tested; the forefinger and middle finger of each hand 
· Attempts to examine the effect the impact of wet and dry fingers and exaggerated 
finger misalignment were included in the third session 
 
The best performing algorithms demonstrated the following performance: 
 
Sensor Equal error rate False non-match rate 
for False match rate 
of 1% 
False non-match rate 
for False match rate 
of 0.1% 
Optical 0.1% 0.11% 0.21% 
Capacitive 0.37% 0.32% 0.61% 
 
These results should be used as a guide to the best performance that can be expected for 
the algorithm only under the stated testing conditions.   
 
A technology evaluation of large and small scale fingerprint matching technologies has 
been announced recently by NIST113. Termed FpVTE (FingerPrint Vendor technology 
Evaluation), it will use multiple tests to evaluate the performance with combinations of 
fingers from 1-10, using the methodologies that NIST have developed for automatic face 
recognition in the FRVT2002 series of tests. It will cover different types of operational 
systems from (single and multiple finger) livescan as used for visa enrolment and police 
booking systems through to comparison with rolled and flat inked fingerprints in legacy 
criminal databases. 
 
The International Biometric Group undertook four rounds of testing between July 1999 
and December 2002114. Little information is available publicly on the results of such 
testing, although the most recent group involved checking of performance twice only - 
once after enrolment and once again several weeks afterwards. The most recent tests 
covered systems from the following fingerprint suppliers: Bioscrypt, DigitalPersona, 
Fujitsu, Identix, Indivos, Siemens, STMicro and Ultra-scan. The 2001 series included 
evaluation of products from BES, Identix, Precise Biometrics, Sagem Morpho, SecuGen 
and Sony. 
 
As in any biometric, the key to good performance is in ensuring a high quality enrolment. 
This requires training of the enrolment officials and clear instructions to end users (either 
by the official or by the equipment), together with an effective software package that 
                                                                 
112 D Maio et al, FVC2002: Second Fingerprint Verification Competition, (2002) at 
http://bias.csr.unibo.it/fvc2002  
113 http://fpvte.nist.gov  
114 www.ibgweb.com/reports/public/comparative_biometric_testing.html  
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detects when the enrolment is of indifferent quality. These may request the user to 
reposition their finger, or to apply more or less pressure. More than one try should be 
required to examine repeatability, although the range of variation is of necessity likely to 
be small, with users often being careful to reposition their fingers.  Similarly, in 
operation, the image capture needs to be optimised, e.g. through regular cleaning of the 
contact surfaces.  
 
Controversy continues as to whether the template should be updated with time. There are 
security considerations in not allowing any changes to the template, as the fingerprint 
details should remain stable over the middle part of the subject's life; during childhood, 
the resolution of scanners may not be sufficient to obtain the required level of detail, and 
as people get older, the elasticity of the skin may pose other problems. Nevertheless, very 
good images may be occasionally detected during operational use, which could improve 
the subsequent performance. Also as more of the finger is accessed, through unintentional 
displacements during the operation of the biometric, more minutiae points may be 
discovered (or a larger part of the fingerprint mapped, in the case of non-minutiae based 
systems). The decision requires a more detailed understanding of the application and its 
security demands, although there appears to be some evidence in favour of template 
updates. 
 
Large scale fingerprint identity systems (such as those used for the matching of 
fingerprints at the scene of crime) operate in a different environment from those described 
above – often with specialist hardware and software. The performance of these systems is 
highly tuned to the particular deployment. With the introduction of civil AFIS systems 
(for checking of identities before the issue of passports or visas, or use in a border control 
application), independent assessment of the system performance is required prior to sizing 
and specification for a given environment. As one of the requirements following from the 
USA’s Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, NIST was charged with a 
study on the performance of such specialist systems. The key results of this study115 have 
been published as  an executive summary of the results and recommendations on face, 
fingerprint and iris recognition (the main conclusions are summarised in Section 6.2), 
with a more recent detailed report providing the supporting evidence for the conclusions 
in respect of fingerprint verification. Most of this study refers to a matcher developed 
using COTS116 hardware and software, although an initial comparison with commercial 
AFIS systems validates the conclusions from the COTS evaluation. 
 
Security and security evaluations  
 
The first biometric to be evaluated against the Common Criteria was Bioscrypt's 
Enterprise for NT Logon, version 2.1.3117 with a determination that the system as tested 
could be trusted to an assurance level of EAL2 - a rather low level of assurance on the 
scale from EAL1 to EAL7. 
  
Fingerprint systems have featured prominently in the well-reported informal tests carried 
out in 2002. For example, the tests described in the German magazine c't showed that a 
well-known fingerprint-secured PC mouse was successfully circumvented118. A latent 
print left on the device, was reactivated , allowing the verification of the preceding 
person.. Clearly, a software solution to this problem, checking successive images for 
exact matches could have avoided this problem. In a separate test, false fingers made 
                                                                 
115 Charles Wilson et al, Studies of fingerprint matching using the NIST Verification Test Bed 
(VTS), NISTIR 7020, NIST (7 July 2003) 
116 COTS: 'Commercial Off The Shelf' components. 
117 http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/services/ccs/bioscrypt.html   
118 Body Check: Biometric Access Protection Devices and their Programs Put to the Test, 
c't (11/2002, p 114 translation) http://www.heise.de/ct/english/02/11/114  
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from gelatin were accepted by many fingerprint biometric devices119. The threat that this 
poses to the security devices should be measured against the difficulty in making such 
fake fingers if users are unco-operative. These results have prompted extensive research 
into the hardening of devices through the addition of  'live and well' functionality. Valorie 
Valencia has characterised such methods as making use of: 
 
· Intrinsic properties of a living body (such as the reflectance spectrum from a live skin 
surface or the oxygen interchange in blood) 
· Signals generated involuntarily by a living body (such as the pulsing of blood, 
transpiration of gasses and body odour and electrical signals such as ECG). 
· Bodily response to a stimulus through a challenge-response approach (e.g. the 
dynamic change of skin colour when a finger is pressed against a surface)120 
 
The Hungarian company, Guardware, was one of the first companies to claim a 
fingerprint biometric device that addresses these issues in a satisfactory way121. 
 
4.2.5  User concerns 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some users are concerned about the ability of third 
parties to abuse the trust placed in single application use of fingerprint biometrics, in 
particular through the linkage that a fingerprint system could allow to other information, 
should the biometric be used as a unique identifier. For them, the possible link to existing 
criminal records adds to their concerns. Clear statements of principle and independent 
verification of security controls may be one way to assuage these fears. In other cases, the 
avoidance of centralised databases may be key. 
 
Other commentators believe that it may strike against the principle of informational self-
determination: the control that human beings should be able to exercise over personal data 
about themselves.  
 
4.2.6  Legal and regulatory dimensions 
 
Some countries have specific laws that apply to fingerprint recognition that could limit 
the wider use of fingerprints in commercial security systems. 
 
4.2.7  Standardisation activities 
 
Standards work in relation to the exchange of data has been accelerated by the formation 
of ISO/IEC JTC1/SC37. Existing FBI standards122 for data compression and interchange 
of images form the basis for some of this work. Currently the multi-part standard ISO/IEC 
19794 for data interchange formats has three parts devoted to fingerprint biometrics: 
 
· Part 2: Finger Minutiae 
· Part 3: Finger Patterns 
· Part 4: Finger Images 
 
 
                                                                 
119 T. Matsumoto et al, Impact of Artificial Gummy Fingers on Fingerprint Systems, 
Proceedings of SPIE Vol. 4677, Optical Security and Counterfeit Deterrence Techniques 
IV, 2002. 
120 Valorie Valencia, Biometric Liveness Testing, CardTechSecureTech 2002 
121 http://www.guardware.com  
122 NIST, American National Standard for Information Systems - Data Format for the Interchange 
of Fingerprint, Facial & Scar Mark & Tattoo (SMT) Information, ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000, NIST 
Special Publication 500-245 (27 July 2000) 
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4.2.8  Principal research projects 
 
With the increase in the probability of implementation of solutions using fingerprint 
biometrics, there is a recognition of the need to accelerate research and development to 
assure operators, integrators and end users of their robustness, security, usability, etc. 
Among the target areas for such research are: 
 
· Device interoperability, allowing users to enrol on one reader with its specific 
performance and characteristics, while verification can take place on a number of 
proprietary platforms.  
· Lightweight fingerprint ve rification. Many opportunities for biometric solutions 
will require operation with restricted memory and processing capabilities. The 
authentication device maybe be embedded in systems that have very clear limitations 
and complex algorithms may not port to these, either in terms of storage capacity or 
the decision times. Examples of systems where such limitations may apply include 
smart cards, mobile phones and PDAs. 
· Fingerprint watermarking. Watermarking of fingerprint images aims to embed 
watermark information along with the fingerprint image without impacting on the 
performance of the system as a biometric. The aim is improve the security of the 
fingerprint transfer, storage and use.123 
· Secure devices . For fingerprint biometrics to be used in medium-to-high security 
environments, e.g. in laptop computers holding company confidential information, 
the security of the core devices and their interfaces to applications may have to be 
improved. Some systems recognise this and Sony's FIU-900 peripheral shows how 
some of the requirements may be addressed. Storage of secret and private keys (for 
symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, respectively), tamper-resistance and anti-
spoofing measures may all need to be considered.  
· Continuous classification schemes  where fingerprints are not classified in non-
overlapping classes, but are characterised by a numerical vector summarising its main 
features 
· Pattern matching algorithms , which have shown to be capable of providing very 
high levels of accuracy 
· Fingerprint image mosaicing techniques to increase accuracy with the recent 
increase in interest in small sensors 
· Fingerprint video recognition. Using a video sequence of images in place of a 
single still image for the recognition purposes  
 
New sensors are continually being developed. SABRINA, an EC project, is producing 
prototype versions of a miniature ultrasonic device under the leadership of Hitex124. 
FingerCard was a recently completed EC-sponsored project using Infineon sensors 
integrated onto smart cards and was directed towards an understanding of the technical, 
user and commercial opportunities that such a card could offer125. The E-POLL project 
has developed a electronic voting system incorporating fingerprint biometric security126. 
PAIDFAIR is yet another EC project that will use fingerprint biometrics as part of a 
Digital Rights Management solution127. Finally, ViPBoB is a project that addresses the 
template storage risks, by developing a Virtual PIN. Fingerprint biometrics will be used to 
demonstrate the system128. 
4.2.9  Outlook for the future 
 
A greater diversity of fingerprint devices is available than for any other biometric. If they 
gain acceptance and production volumes rise, the price per unit is bound to fall. 
                                                                 
123 http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/abstracts.html  
124 http://www.sabrina.uni-karlsruhe.de/publicdescription.html  
125 http://www.iht.com/articles/75010.html and http://www.hsb.nl/fingercard.html  
126 http://www.e-poll-project.net/innovations.htm  
127 http://virtualgoods.tu-ilmenau.de/2003/VG_Codemeter.pdf  
128 http://vipbob.gi-de.com/vipbob/index.html  
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Nevertheless, there are still considerable challenges to be met, not least from the user 
accpetance perspective.  
 
Fingerprint verification may be a good choice for closed user groups, in which users can 
be given users adequate explanation and training, and where the system operates in a 
controlled environment. It is  therefore not surprising that the biometric of choice for 
logical access control on workstations is the fingerprint, due to the relatively low cost, 
small size, and the ease of integration of fingerprint authentication devices.  
 
As electronic devices begin to be used in more high value applications, e.g. 3G mobile 
phone services and e-commerce starts gaining momentum, the attraction of securing these 
services with biometrics will become ever more evident. The range of possible 
applications can be deduced from the following current commercial deployments (albeit 
in small numbers at present): 
 
· PDAs (HP's iPAQ h5400 available at £499 in the UK) 
· laptop PCs (Samsung PC10) 
· mobile phones (DoCoMo F505i) 
· secure mass storage through the use of USB peripherals with fingerprint access 
control (e.g. Thumbdrive Touch for up to 256Mb storage priced at $249) 
· cars (one-touch personalisation for up to four individual drivers of the Audi A8 using 
a fingerprint sensor to the side of the gear change adds approximately £1,000 to a 
£50,000 car. Seats, mirrors, steering column and air conditioning are preset for each 
person.) 
 
4.3  Iris Recognition 
 
First of all, we should note the existence of two separate methods of making use of the 
eye as a biometric. Iris Recognition, the newer approach, takes images of the visible, 
coloured, part of the eye and processes these into templates called iriscodes. An older and 
very different approach, which is no longer being actively marketed, is retinal scanning. 
Retinal scanning requires considerably more co-operation from the user, imaging the 
pattern of red blood vessels behind the eyeball and requiring more sophisticated optical 
instrumentation.  
 
Iris recognition is a relative newcomer to the portfolio of biometric methods, yet it has 
established itself as a key technology with the potential of addressing many of the more 
demanding applications for secure authentication. In particular, it holds great promise for 
use in large scale identification systems, where individual distinctiveness of a template is 
a critical requirement. It is therefore a competitor to AFIS fingerprint systems and should 
be considered wherever there are public concerns about crossover use between criminal 
and civil identification systems. However, the lack of experience in working with large 
numbers of users puts it at a disadvantage with the century of experience with the use of 
fingerprints. 
  
4.3.1  Principal methods 
 
Iris recognition systems operate by capturing an image of the eye (generally using visible 
and IR illumination). The concept patent for iris recognition is held by Iridian, and 
expires in 2004/5. A variety of algorithms 129 for extracting biometric data from the iris 
image and comparing sample against templates have been proposed; those by Daugman, 
Lim and Noh are implemented in commercial systems. 
 
                                                                 
129 Information obtained from the website www.iris-recognition.org maintained by Jan Ernst 
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Daugman130 2D-Gabor demodulation. Hamming distance for classification. 
These algorithms are licensed by Iridian, and are used in several 
commercial systems. 
Wildes et al.131 Patented early prototype. Sophisticated hardware setting to 
obtain undistorted and high-quality image data.  
Boles and 
Boashash132 
Zero-crossings of one-dimensional wavelet transforms. 
Zhu et al.133 Gabor- and multiresolution analysis. 
Lim et al.134 Wavelet features, competitive learning approach.  
Used in some commercial systems  
Muron et al.135 Highly proprietary hardware. Using optical Fourier power 
spectrum. 
Tisse et al.136 Frequency analysis of the analytic image 
Noh et al.137 Multiresolution ICA approach 
Used in some commercial systems  
 
4.3.2  Principal commercially available systems 
 
Company Products Algorithm 
Panasonic BEM-ET100(Authenticam) 
BEM-ET300 
BEM-ET500 
Oki IrisPass-handheld 
IrisPass-WG 
LG Electronics IrisAccess 2200 
IrisAccess 3000 
 
 
 
Daugman 
Alpha Engineering Veri-Iris  Noh 
Evermedia EVER COP EC-1100 
Senex TrueEye 
Lim 
Neurotechnologija VeriEye  
IriTech Iris2000  
 
                                                                 
130 Daugman J. High Confidence Visual Recognition of Persons by a Test of Statistical 
Independence, PAMI 15(11) Nov 1993, 1148-1161 
131 Wildes R, Asmuth JC, Green GL, Hsu SC, Kolczynski RJ, Matey JR & McBride SE. A system 
for automated iris recognition, IEEE Workshop on Applications of Computer Vision, 1994 
   Wildes RP. Iris Recognition: An Emerging Biometric Technology, PIEEE 85(9) Sept 1997, 1348-
1363 
   Wildes RP, Asmuth JC, Hanna KJ, Hsu SC, Kolczynski RJ, Matey JR, McBride SE. Automated, 
non-invasive iris recognition system and method, U.S. Patent No. 5,572,596 issued November 5 
1996 
132 Boles WW & Boashash B. A human identification technique using images of the iris and wavelet 
transform, IEEE Trans. Signal Processing, 46(4) Apr 1998,1185-1198 
133 Zhu Y, Tan T & Wang Y. Biometric Personal Identification Based on Iris Patterns, ICPR2000, 
Vol II 805-808 
134 Lim S, Lee K, Byeon O & Kim T. Effective Iris Recognition System by Optimised Feature 
Vectors and Classifier in 6th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
(PRICAI2000) eds Mizoguchi R & Slaney JK, Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 
1886, 167-176 
135 Muron A, Kois P & Pospísil J. Identification of persons by means of the Fourier spectra of the 
optical transmission binary models of the human irises , Optics Communications, 192 (3-6) 2001, 
161-167 
136 Tisse C, Martin L, Torres L, Robert M. Person identification technique using human iris recognition, 15th 
International Conference on Vision Interface, Calgary, Canada, May 2002 
137 Noh S-I, Pae K, Lee C & Kim J. Multiresolution Independent Component Analysis for Iris 
Identification, International Technical Conference on Circuits, Systems, Computers and 
Communications, Phuket, Tailand, July 2002 
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4.3.3  High Profile deployments 
Netherlands – Amsterdam Schiphol airport – PRIVIUM system 
Launched in October 2001, the PRIVIUM system allows subscribers to clear immigration 
members using iris recognition and smart card as proof of identity. The scheme is open to 
all European Economic Area passport holders and basic subscription costs €99. There is 
no central database—the iriscodes for both eyes are stored on the smart card. The system 
uses the LG IrisAccess 2200 equipment, and currently has around 4000 members. 
Pakistan – UNHCR – Repatriation programme for Afghan refugees 
In Pakistan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is using iris 
recognition to help stem fraud whereby some refugees returning to Afghanistan were 
doubling back across the border to claim repatriation allowances multiple times. Their 
system uses the LG IrisAccess 2200 equipment, and has over 22000 enrolments. 
United Arab Emirates – Expellee tracking and border control system  
Commencing in 2003, for travellers arriving at air, sea and land ports, a 1:many check is 
made against a database of irises of previous expellees. The database contains some 83 
500 people (by May 2003). 
Canada – Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) – CANPASS-Air 
Pre-approved travellers will be able to clear immigration using iris recognition as proof of 
identity. The scheme is to be open to US and Canadian citizens and permanent residents, 
and costs $CAN 50. The rollout commenced in March 2003 at Vancouver International 
Airport. 
 
Pilots 
UK – Nationwide Building Society 
One of the earliest public tests of iris recognition was in 1998, when the Nationwide 
Building Society ran a trial using Sensar iris recognition equipment in an NCR automated 
teller machine outside their offices in Swindon. Public response was very positive, though 
the rollout of such ATMs over the banking network would not have been economic.  
Similar trials were subsequently run at several other banks in other countries, e.g. 
Dresdner Bank in Frankfurt; Bank United in Houston. 
Netherlands – BZK and TOV – Rotterdam e-reporting pilot project 
A small-scale trial was run by the alien police in Rotterdam, using an iris recognition 
system for registration and reporting of aliens. 
Saudi Arabia 
In 2002, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of the Interior ran an evaluation of iris recognition for 
tracking Hajj pilgrims. Some 20,000 selected pilgrims were enrolled over a two week 
period.  
UK – Heathrow 
A six-month trial of the use of iris recognition for expedited processing of arrivals 
through immigration. 
Japan – Narita – E-Airport 
A three-month trial running January to March 2003, allowing Japan Airlines frequent 
flyers to register iris and face images for subsequent expedited check-in. The trial used 
BEM-ET500 equipment. 
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4.3.4  Testing and issues of performance limitation 
 
Existing studies show that iris recognition should be accurate enough for an identification 
search in large databases. One problem with the technology however is that there are no 
existing (sequestered) databases of a size commensurate with the performance capabilities 
of the technology. This prevents a third party evaluation of the extent of the performance 
capabilities of the technology. (Fingerprint technology, by contrast, can be tested on very 
large legacy databases from criminal justice systems.) The evaluations of the technology 
that have been publicly reported are all of systems using the Iridian algorithms. 
Mansfield, et al. 2001 – Biometric product testing final report  
An evaluation of the IrisAccess 2200 system in a scenario of access control in an office 
environment. Available on the CESG website www.cesg.gov.uk. 
Cambier, J. 2002 – Iridian cross-comparison test.  
A technology evaluation using a large database of iriscodes collected from several 
different applications, allowing 1 billion different iris comparisons. Available from 
Iridian Technologies website www.iridiantech.com. 
DoD ARL 2002  
Results of the Department of Defense / Army Research Lab scenario evaluation were 
reported at the Biometrics Consortium Conference in February 2002. 
Sandia 1996 
In 1996 Sandia evaluated a prototype system. Their report is available at 
http://infoserve.sandia.gov/sand_doc/1996/961033.pdf 
 
4.3.5  User concerns 
Safety 
Occasionally people express concerns about the safety of iris recognition. In part this 
concern stems from a misconception on how the system operates, and an assumption that 
the iris is “scanned” by laser. In fact the iris is imaged by a normal camera, though 
additional illumination may be provided though use of near infrared LEDs. Analysis  of 
illumination levels for the Iridian based systems shows that, even under worst-case 
assumptions, these are still significantly lower than the maximum permitted levels of the 
relevant standards. 
Inclusivity 
As with any biometric, there will be groups of people unable to use the system, or having 
additional difficulties in using the system. One obvious case is due to the rare condition 
known called aniridia, where eyes have no iris. Further cases are blind people who, 
depending on the type of system, may find it very difficult to aligning their eyes with the 
camera; and those with nystagmus (tremor of the eyes). Systems mounted at normal eye-
height may be impossible to use by people in wheelchairs. In order to get the best possible 
enrolment, people may have to remove hard contact lenses (if worn) when enrolling. 
 
4.3.6  Legal and regulatory dimensions 
 
No specific regulations appear to limit the use of this technology. 
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4.3.7  Standardisation activities 
 
An Iris image interchange format is in the processes of being standardised in ISO/IEC 
JTC1/SC37. 
 
4.3.8  Principal research projects 
 
Iris recognition vendors are known to be working to improve “liveness” testing within 
their devices. Work is also underway investigating the possibilities for iris recognition 
based on images taken at greater distances than at present, i.e. 2-3 metres as opposed to 
20-30 centimetres. 
 
4.3.9  Outlook for the future 
 
As larger-scale applications come about, larger databases will become available for 
performance evaluation. 
 
Improvements in image acquisition are likely, making it easier for people to use the 
system, e.g. removing the need for alignment with the system, and for acquiring usable 
iris images with poorer illumination, at greater distances, and from moving targets 
 
4.4  Retinal Scanning  
 
Retinal scanning is the other eye biometric. Developed in the 1980's, it was the first of the 
highly automated, high accuracy systems and as such became a favourite of Hollywood 
films. Even now, many years after it has been eclipsed by iris recognition, security 
specialists and journalists still confuse the two technologists. 
 
4.4.1  Principal methods 
 
One supplier, EyeDentify, commercialised the technique in the 1980's. The user was 
asked to fixate on an alignment mark and a low intensity infrared light swept in a circle 
centred at the fovea, the area of sharpest vision in the eye. 320 measurements of the 
reflectivity of the retina were taken during this sweep, identifying the presence of blood 
vessels when this reflectivity changes. These results are then converted into a small 
template, typically from 72-96 bytes. 
 
4.4.2  Principal commercially available systems 
 
Currently, the sole supplier of equipment does not appear to be actively marketing 
devices or software. A system appears to be available for the identification of animals 
using retinal scanning. 
 
4.4.3  High Profile deployments 
 
Many of the systems were deployed in areas subject to high security, such as banks, 
prisons and military areas. 
 
4.4.4  Testing and issues of performance limitation 
 
The EyeDentify Information Security system was evaluated in 1989 by the National 
Computer Security Center (part of the NSA at that time) under the TCSEC scheme for 
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assessment of the security of Information and Authentication subsystems (a predecessor 
of the Common Criteria), meeting the requirements for class D1138. 
 
4.4.5  User concerns 
 
The early commercial implementations of this technology were difficult to use by 
untrained personnel. When added to fears about the safety of the equipment, this meant 
that operators were unwilling to consider its use other than in very high security 
environments, or in closed communities of users, such as prisons or military 
establishments. A comment in an internal test report by a reseller summarises this 
succinctly: 'Not tested because employees are afraid of this device'. Various reports on the 
health aspects of the operation of retinal scanning were commissioned by EyeDentify. 
 
4.4.6  Legal and regulatory dimensions 
 
No legal limitations are recorded. 
 
4.4.7  Standardisation activities 
 
There are no known activities in this area. 
 
4.4.8  Principal research projects 
 
No major projects are underway. 
 
4.4.9  Outlook for the future 
 
The installed base of equipment, together with its acknowledged high performance, 
should guarantee a continuing interest in this method. Rumours of new entrants to the 
retinal scanning market continue to surface from time to time. Nevertheless, any new 
version will face stiff competition from the more established iris recognition technique.  
 
4.5  Hand geometry  
 
This biometric is one of the more mature approaches to human identification and has 
proved particularly useful in both physical access control and in cross border verification. 
US patents were issued as early as 1971, but the current limited range of devices goes 
back to 1986 and the granting of a patent to David Sidlauskas in 1988139. The company he 
founded in 1986, Recognition Systems, appears to have maintained a similar core 
technology since its initial range of products. It proprietary and undisclosed algorithm 
produces a template of 9 bytes for the pseudo three-dimensional representation of a hand, 
which is normally 'averaged' or updated once a confirmed authentication deviates by a 
predefined margin beyond acceptable limits140. This Handkey device is quite bulky since 
the whole hand is placed on a reflective platen and located through butting four location 
pillars into the skin surface between the base of fingers and thumb. A smaller unit has 
been subsequently introduced by BioMet Partners - the Digi-2 - which only required the 
placement of two fingers on a plate with a single vertical locating pillar. 
                                                                 
138 NCSC, Final Evaluation Report EyeDentify, Inc EIS System, CSC-EPL-90/006 (24 September 
1990) 
139 David Sidlauskas, 3D hand profile identification apparatus, US Patent 4736203 (5 April 1988) 
140 Richard Zunkel, Hand geometry based verification, Chapter 4 in Anil Jain et al, Biometrics: 
Personal Identification in Networked Society, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1999). This method 
uses two 2-dimensional shadows of the fingers taken at right angles. 
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4.5.1  Principal methods 
 
The Recognition Systems unit operates on silhouettes of the plan view of the hand 
obscuring the reflection of light from a highly polished aluminium surface, together with 
a side view obtained by reflections off a side mirror. 96 measurements of the gross hand 
features are taken and reduced to the 9 byte template. For optimum performance, users 
should be trained to locate the hand by firstly touching the platen with forefinger and 
middle fingers, and then gliding it to mate with the vertical pillars at the base of the 
fingers. The system is designed to be used with the right hand face down, although 
operation is also possible with the left hand positioned palm upwards. 
 
Less information is available about the design and optimal operation of the Digi-2, 
although it is public knowledge that major system redesign was required to ensure 
reproducible performance at the major reference installation at Walt Disney World. 
 
4.5.2  Principal commercially available systems 
 
Although there have been numerous studies of alternative hand geometry systems, the 
market consists almost exclusively of two units, as described above. The majority of 
installed units are those of the Recognition Systems' Handkey in its various versions - 
although it is understood that the core technology remains substantially unchanged from 
the initial units. Currently, more than 70,000 units are installed. Although networking of 
units is offered, many installations are standalone physical access control systems with 
the templates of persons permitted access to a room or building stored in the reader, and 
accessed through a PIN issued to each user (although it should be noted that in general, 
knowledge of the PIN is not a secret). 
 
4.5.3  High Profile deployments 
 
The Handkey formed the basis of many of the initial INSPASS deployments at US and 
Canadian airports in the 1990's, to ensure fast and automatic verification of identities at 
immigration control. Initial experience with the product demonstrated that even though it 
had performed well in laboratory tests at Sandia Laboratories, further work was needed to 
meet the operational performance required for 'trusted traveller' application. For a variety 
of reasons, the numbers of airports at which this service was offered and the user 
population stabilised several years ago (50,000 frequent travellers enrolled and monthly 
use by an average of 23,000 people141). With the introduction of the US-VISIT system, 
the future of INSPASS remains unclear. A similar system is in use for 100,000 Israeli 
citizens returning through Ben Gurion airport in Tel Aviv, and a combined biometric is 
due to be introduced for Arab workers crossing into Israel.  
 
4.5.4  Testing and issues of performance limitation 
 
The sales of hand geometry equipment were given a substantial boost by the very 
favourable results of the 1989-91 evaluation of its performance by Sandia National 
Laboratories (as one of six biometric methods tested on 100 volunteers)142. The one try 
EER for the ID3D-U unit tested at 0.2 %, with 0.1% FRR attainable at a different 
threshold when three tries were allowed. A study conducted several years later by the 
same laboratory under real operational conditions (units sited outside buildings) showed 
considerably higher failure rates that required sophisticated optimisation techniques to 
ensure correct operation. Direct sunlight affected the performance adversely, and dust and 
sand was also found to be detrimental.  
                                                                 
141 Testimony by Martin Huddart before Senate subcommittee on technology, terrorism and 
government information, www.iwar.org.uk/comsec/resources/senate-biometrics/te111401st-
huddart.htm (14 November 2001) 
142 James Holmes et al, A performance evaluation of biometric identification devices, Sandia report 
SAND91-0276 (June 1991) 
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In the CESG/BWG testing programme of 2000, a Recognition Systems HandKey II was 
tested in a 'normal office environment' scenario. No failures to enrol or acquire were 
noted in the generally young group of technically oriented subjects. Equal error rate 
performance under these somewhat idealised conditions was ascertained to be just over 
1% with a substantial improvement if the users were allowed the conventional three tries. 
The IBG conducted a test on the system in December 2002 as part of its fourth round of 
comparative testing. 
 
4.5.5  User concerns 
 
The same Sandia tests showed that hand geometry was favoured by users, possibly 
because of their frustration in the poor performance of some other systems on trial. Over a 
third of the respondents felt that this unit was the most friendly and fun to use, requiring 
least proficiency in use. 
 
4.5.6  Legal and regulatory dimensions 
 
There appear to be no additional constraints on hand geometry in the legal systems 
studied in this work. 
 
4.5.7  Standardisation activities 
 
None commenced at present. 
 
4.5.8  Principal research projects 
 
Hand geometry has been deployed extensively in physical access control systems and 
there continues to be interest in linking this approach with other methods of 
authentication, such as palmprints143. Some research continues in developing alternatives 
to the existing proprietary algorithms. 
 
4.5.9  Outlook for the future 
 
Hand geometry addresses the needs of a clear niche in the marketplace - access control 
and time and attendance where the ultimate in security is not a critical factor. As a well-
established and well-characterised system, it is likely to continue to serve this 
marketplace, although other methods using cheaper and more compact hardware (e.g. 
those using fingerprints) are likely to draw customers away from this sector. Issues of 
security, robustness and user acceptance will determine the extent of this migration. 
 
4.6  Vein Pattern  
 
Towards the end of the 1980's, Joe Rice noted the prominence of veins on the back of 
peoples' hands and surmised that there would be sufficient variation between individuals 
to offer this as a biometric method of authentication. Subsequent work by the holders of 
the Veincheck licence, the UK's BTG, demonstrated the feasibility of robust template 
formation and the practicality of its use. Imaging of the pattern was aided by the use of 
infra-red illumination. The non-invasive nature of the biometric encouraged prediction of 
its more extensive use, and although the system development has been completed, no 
commercialised product is currently available. In the CESG/BWG 'normal office 
environment' tests carried out in 2000, a development prototype of the Veincheck failed 
to perform very well. 
                                                                 
143 Ajar Kumar et al, Personal verification using palmprint and hand geometry biometric 
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Recently, an alternative system based upon so-called Vascular Pattern Recognition has 
been commercialised by TechSphere144 of South Korea and distributed by Identica 
Corporation of Canada. Relatively few details of the core technology are available on the 
company’s website but the VP-II system is claimed to be usable by 99.98% of the 
population. Patterns are captured by an infra-red optical system with a temperature sensor 
providing a measure of security against spoofing. Fujitsu have also introduced a system 
based upon vascular features.  
 
Research continues on this method145. 
 
4.7  Speaker Verification 
 
The distinctiveness of people’s voices is due to both physiological and behavioural 
differences in speech production. The physiological differences are due to the differences 
in the shape of the vocal tract. Behavioural differences are due to speaking style, and 
include aspects such as accents and language. The behavioural element means that even 
identical twins will have some differences in their voices.  
 
4.7.1   Principal methods 
 
Speaker verification systems fall into two classes depending on whether the recognition is 
text dependent or text independent.  
Text dependent 
Text dependent systems know in advance what the speaker is supposed to say. Typically 
the person will speak a short ‘passphrase’ that will then be compared against a model or 
template based on that person's utterance of the same words during enrolment. Sometimes 
there is a single, fixed passphrase – this raises the possibility of an attack using a 
recording. To overcome this problem, the system may enrol the person using multiple 
words or phrases, perhaps the digits “0” to “9”. Then the person can be asked to speak a 
random selection of these. This challenge-response method makes it much harder to 
attack a system using recordings. 
 
Explicit knowledge of the words being used means that the systems can be fairly accurate 
at recognition on fairly short amount of speech, provided the speaker is being 
cooperative.  
 
Text-dependent speaker verification is generally used for “positive” 1-to-1 verification 
applications. 
Text independent 
Text independent systems, do not know beforehand what the speaker will say. Generally 
such systems will have to make use of whatever speech is available for both enrolment 
and verification. To get a reasonable performance, the systems require a far greater 
amount of speech. Such systems are more robust for recognising uncooperative speakers. 
Text independent speaker verification is more likely to be used for forensic or covert 
applications. 
 
4.7.2   Commercially available products 
 
                                                                 
144 http://www.tech-sphere.com/english/home.htm  
145 AISAT Research, Thermographic imaging of vein pattern in the back of the hand, 
www.cowan.edu.au/fste/aisat/research.htm  
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There are a variety of commercially available speaker verification products, ranging from 
the basic speaker verification SDK, through products targeted at particular applications, to 
services allowing the speaker verification task to be outsourced. Often products are 
integrated with speech recognition. 
SDKs and ‘Engines’ 
Examples: 
 
· Nuance Verifier 
· SpeechWorks' SpeechSecure 
· VeriVoice SL 
· Anovea SVLib 
Application specific products  
Examples: 
 
· SpeakNSet – (a password reset application) 
· OTG’s SecurPBX (protection for voicemail, long-distance trunk calls, etc) 
· OTG’s Help Yourself (automated PKI profile administration and recovery) 
· Vocent Password Reset 
· Vocent Confirmed Caller 
Services 
Examples:  
 
· Buytel (now Voicevault) 
 
4.7.3   Deployments 
 
There are many deployments of speaker verification systems. Some of the major types of 
application are listed below. Most applications are telephone-based – this is an obvious 
niche for speaker verification biometrics. 
Password reset 
A large proportion of calls to IT helpdesks involve password reset. There are now a 
number of automated password reset products on the market that use speaker verification 
to help ensure that only the account owner can reset their password. Such systems can be 
more secure than relying on the IT helpdesk staff to correctly identify the caller, and also 
can offer a considerable cost saving. 
Automated parolee monitoring/curfew systems 
Speaker verification systems are also being used for monitoring parolees, to ensure that 
they attend rehabilitation, obey curfew orders, etc. Such systems may call the parolee at 
the location where they are supposed to be, and ask them to repeat phrases to allow 
verification. Alternatively the parolee may have to call in from a particular phone line at a 
certain time, and their presence at the appropriate location is checked using calling line 
ID, and speaker verification. 
 
Example: In the UK, this has been deployed in the Youth Justice Board's Intensive 
Supervision and Surveillance Programme for house arrest and curfew enforcement. A 
similar system has been deployed in the USA under the ShadowTrack name. 
Telephone shopping 
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Instead of having to remember a PIN to authorise expenditure on their accounts, customer 
authentication can be based on speaker verification.  
Examples of the method are: 
· In the USA, the Home Shopping Network deployed speaker verification in 1999 
to identify and authenticate frequent shoppers. 
· In Australia – Optus  – Trial (commencing 2002) of voice verification to 
authorise payments to top-up their mobile phones. 
Customer Call Centres 
Speaker verification can be used instead of PIN and/or operators asking personal 
questions to authenticate the caller. 
 
Examples of this application are: 
· In UK – Nationwide Building Society (Trial) 
· In Brazil – Banco Bradesco – Telephone banking 
Staff access 
Example of this use is in Canada – Bell Canada – Speech Enabled Field Access System 
 
4.7.4 Testing and Performance 
 
NIST runs a regular programme of technology evaluations for speaker verification 
systems. Some results are reported 146 but these do not include performance of 
commercially available systems. Additionally a number of scenario evaluations have been 
conducted as listed in the following table. 
 
Vendor System Test 
Alpha Microsystems Ver-A-Tel 
ECCO VoiceKey 
Sandia 1991147 
 
Voice Strategies VACS 
Ensigma  
Sandia 1993148 
 
v7.0.4 CCIR 2001149 Nuance 
v6.2.4 CCIR 2000150 
OTG / T-Netix SecurPBX 
SpeakEZ v1 
NPL/BWG/CESG 2000151 
 
Texas Instruments  Mitre 1977152 
  
                                                                 
146 G. R. Doddington et al, The NIST Speaker Recognition Evaluation – Overview, Methodology, 
Results, Perspective See also http://www.nist.gov/speech/publications/index.htm, 
http://www.nist.gov/speech/tests/spk/index.htm 
147 J.P. Holmes et al, A performance evaluation of biometric identification devices. Sandia Report 
SAND91-0276, June 1991. http://infoserve.sandia.gov/sand_doc/1991/910276.pdf 
148 J. R Rodriguez I et al, A performance evaluation of Biometric Identification Devices, Sandia 
report SAND93-1930 
149 Evaluation of Nuance v7.0.4 Speaker Verification Performance on the Dialogues Spotlight UK 
English Database, Dialogues Spotlight Technology Report, CCIR, 2001  
http://spotlight.ccir.ed.ac.uk/public_documents/technology_reports/verifier report V7.pdf 
150 Large Scale Evaluation of Automatic Speaker Verification Technology, Dialogues Spotlight 
Technology Report, CCIR, May 2000  
http://spotlight.ccir.ed.ac.uk/public_documents/technology_reports/Verifier_report.pdf 
151 A J Mansfield et al,  Biometric Product Testing Final Report 
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/technology/biometrics/media/Biometric Test Report pt1.pdf 
152 A Fejfar and J W Myers, The testing of three automatic identity verification techniques. Proc. 
International Conference on Crime Countermeasures, Oxford, July, 1977 
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4.7.5   Standardisation 
 
Work on SVAPI–(Speaker Verification Application Programmers Interface) predated the 
work on BioAPI. However speaker verification community seems to be underrepresented 
on SC37 Biometric Standards. For example, as yet there are no proposals for a biometric 
speech data interchange format. 
 
4.7.6  Research projects 
 
In the UK, PUMA, a DTI-sponsored project using speaker verification, aims to develop 
an innovative approach to fraud prevention and improved human-machine interaction 
through adaptive personalisation of the human-machine interface in mobile 
communication devices such as cellphones and PDAs153. In a project aimed to finish in 
2005, the COST 275 consortium is using both speaker verification and facial recognition 
to authenticate consumers over the Internet154. 
 
4.7.7  Outlook for the future 
 
One of the current problems for speaker verification, that of coping with low quality 
microphone types, and noise on the telephone link may be much alleviated as the 
technology in these areas improves. 
 
Current systems do not make use of individual’s phraseology, style, the idioms they use 
and other speech data that humans use in the recognition task. The use of such 
information could lead to improvements in text independent speaker recognition. 
Currently there seems to be little work in developing standards for interchange of 
biometric speech data.  
 
4.8  Dynamic signature verification/recognition (DSV/DSR) 
 
Writing is typically a multidimensional phenomenon. It is, on the one hand, a dynamic 
phenomenon, involving psychological, neuro-psychological, and motor dimensions. On 
the other hand, it is a physical phenomenon, not only with the artistic, symbolic and 
graphological dimension.  
 
Capture of the writing dynamics enables the determination of characteristic time functions 
from which more dynamic features - like the duration of writing or the average writing 
speed - can be determined. It offers the opportunity to determine the specific writing 
frequency for a particular person through the transformation of the writing signal.  
 
From the point of view of forensic handwriting comparison, the key to the verification of 
the authenticity of questionable signatures lies in the reconstruction of the writing motion 
and its elements. The difference between genuine and copied signatures is based on the 
amount of pressure applied and on the structure of the writing line. Furthermore, the 
determination must reflect the observation that signatures from the same person may 
show different writing speeds.  
 
Dynamic signature recognition systems can either work in verification or identification 
mode. Recognising signatures is the comparison of a typical behaviour. The identification 
of two dynamic signatures can be directly traced back to the signals of the captured 
motion. 
 
4.8.1  Principal methods 
 
                                                                 
153 http://www.dti-mi.org.uk/newweb/puma.htm  
154 http://www.fub.it/cost275  
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A wide range of equipment is available for digitising signatures: pen pads (both with and 
without display) and special pens. Recording devices are distinguished by the type and 
number of sensors used, e.g. acceleration sensors, power sensors or a combination of the 
two. Additional distinguishing features are the number and resolution of recordable 
writing signals. An interesting alternative was developed to prototype level by Rolls 
Royce in the UK, using the acoustic emissions generated when a pen moves across a 
surface. Uniquely, in this case, the spatial form of the written signature is not captured. 
 
The quality of data captured from these input devices varies widely, and as of the present 
time, there is no standardisation for hardware devices.  It is likely that a larger 
organisation will use a number of different input devices such as a mixture of tablets (also 
called "pads"), tablets with a display, Tablet PCs and Personal Digital Assistants (PDA). 
Specially designed pens had not been commercialis ed to a great extent as of early 2003.  
 
Usually the signer relies on optical feedback of his writing results on paper. If the input 
device does offer a display, it has to deliver an exact optical feedback throughout the 
writing process. Should users realise that their signature varies from the usual result on 
paper, usually they will alter the way of writing in response. A secure and unambiguous 
communication between capturing device and processing unit is also necessary.  
When using a pad or tablet without a display, it is important to keep in mind that first-
time users may experience some difficulty when writing on a clean surface while at the 
same time viewing the captured signature on a nearby monitor. To avoid this problem 
some suppliers offer the option to use paper and write with a normal pen or a special 
inking pen. 
 
In general, any signature recognition method aims to authenticate the signature data 
sample as the genuine version from a specific person. Biometric data can be classified 
according to the type of features that are used: parameter-based or function-based 
signature verification. Besides the verification technique, reference construction plays an 
important role, as it directly influences the verification performance. However, we note 
that methods for reference construction are rarely discussed in the scientific literature. 
 
4.8.2  Principal commercially available systems 
 
Verification Software Vendors for DSV / DSR 
 
Name City Country Website 
CIC Redwood Shores USA www.cic.com  
Cybersign Tokyo Japan www.cybersign.jp.com  
Softpro  Boeblingen Germany www.softpro.de  
SQN  Ranconcoas USA www.sqnsigs.com  
Wondernet  Kibbutz Givat 
Hashlosha 
Israel www.penflow.com  
 
Capture devices for DSV /DSR - Tablet Manufacturers 
 
Name City Country Website 
Acecad Taipei Taiwan www.acecad.com 
Interlink Electronics Camarillo USA www.interlinkelectronics.com 
MotionTouch Ltd Surrey UK www.motiontouch.com 
Topaz Systems  Simi Valley USA www.topazsystems.com 
UC Logic Taipei Taiwan www.superpen.com 
Wacom Saitama Japan www.wacom.co.jp 
 
Capture devices for DSV / DSR  - Tablet PC Manufacturers 
 
Name City Country Website 
Acer Incorporated Taipei Taiwan www.acer.com 
 
 BIOVISION Roadmap Issue 1.1                                                                             15 October 2003  
119 
  
Aopen Taipei Taiwan www.aopen.com 
Aplux  Taipei Taiwan www.aplux.com 
First International  Taipei Taiwan www.fic.com.tw 
Fujitsu Siemens Bad Homburg Germany www.fujitsu-siemens.com 
HP Compaq Houston USA www.hp.com 
Motion Computing Austin USA www.motioncomputing.com 
NEC Tokyo Japan www.nec.com 
PaceBlade Technology Wanchai  Hong Kong www.paceblade.com 
Sotec Tokyo Japan www.sotec.co.jp 
Tatung Taipei Taiwan www.tatung.com 
Time Group Ltd. Lancashire UK www.timeeducation.com 
Toshiba CSG Irvine USA www.toshiba.com 
VIA Technologies Taipei Taiwan www.via.com.tw 
ViewSonic  Walnut USA www.viewsonic.com 
WalkAbout Computers W. Palm Beach USA www.walkabout-comp.com 
Wistron Corporation Taipei Taiwan www.wistron.com 
 
Other capturing systems are based on measuring pressure and angles of  tilt using a 
special pen. Vendors like ICA Vertrieb (Stuttgart / Germany) 155 or GouLite (Israel) are 
offering such devices. Other companies, such as LCI SmartPen (Belgium)  156 and PDI 
Systems (Germany), seemed to have exited the market since 2000/01, as their websites 
are no longer operational. 
4.8.3  High Profile deployments of DSV / DSR systems 
 
At the time of compilation of this  section (January 2003), we were aware of the following 
high profile European projects: 
 
· Nationwide Building society in the UK announced a  roll-out  for its customers, using 
hardware provided by MotionTouch and software supplied by CIC and Florentis  
 
· Mercedes AMG  (Daimler Chrysler) are deploying a product liability process with 
hardware provided by Interlink and software developed by SOFTPRO. 
 
4.8.4  Testing and issues of performance limitation 
 
Dynamic signature recognition addresses the problem of recognising signatures from data 
captured with a sensitive pad that provides discrete pen trajectory information. In contrast 
with other pattern recognition techniques, such as speech recognition and optical 
character recognition, there has been no significant progress over the past few years in 
making publicly available large corpora of DSV/ DSR training and test data, and no open 
competitions have been organised. An independent dynamic signature technology 
benchmark - comparable to the fingerprint verification competition FVC157 at the 
University of Bologna - is still awaited and a review of the technical literature on 
signature verification testing reveals a wide variety of conflicting and contradictory 
testing protocols.  
 
                                                                 
155 Website of ICA Vertrieb: www.ica-vertrieb.de/main1081350.htm  
156 GMD: Usability of Biometrics in Relation to Electronic Signatures EU Study 502533/8 (Version 1.0 
September 12, 2000 GMD, p.65) 
www.sit.fhg.de/english/SICA/sica_projects/project_pdfs/eubiosig.pdf  
157  http://bias.csr.unibo.it/fvc2002 The aim of the FVC initiative is to encourage the construction of 
a common basis for research and evaluation of  state-of-the-art fingerprint-based biometrics for both 
industry and academia.  
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4.8.5  User concerns 
 
It is a centuries old tradition for important documents to be signed as proof of their 
authenticity. An increasing number of documents are produced and processed 
electronically in order to accelerate business processes and to reduce the costs of handling 
through substitution of paper. However, it is important not to minimize the media cuts. 
Today several substitutes are used which are not very appropriate – for instance an image 
of the signature is scanned and copied into a document. This is a contradiction to the 
original aim, as signatures should guarantee the authenticity and integrity of a document, 
not be capable of undergoing a cut and paste procedure.  
 
DSV / DSR approaches capture the shape of a signature as well as the non-visible 
characteristics of the movement of the hand, so as to allow for a later comparison. The 
information about the signature is stored in an encrypted form, alongside the document. 
Optionally, it is possible to integrate these with various forms of electronic signatures. 
In this case, should the content of the document be changed by an unauthorized person, 
the display of the signature will automatically indicate that the current status of the 
document is not authorized. Another option is to protect a document against unauthorised 
access using s ignature recognition as an alternative to the common protection of a 
document by means of a password. 
 
4.8.6 Legal and regulatory dimensions 
 
One could argue that DSV/DSR can be associated with a declaration of intent of the 
signatories in legal transactions. Traditionally, the act of signing with a conventional 
written signature offers a  (legally binding) declaration, leading to a parallel conclusion 
for electronically submitted signatures. Also the cultural meaning, and commonly 
approved acknowledgement of, the handwritten signature should lead to a greater 
acceptance by end users. In addition, DSV/DSR can be used in the context of digital 
signatures which themselves are regulated according the EU directive on digital 
signatures and the respective national implementations in member states. 
 
It is unclear whether, in the absence of strict safeguards against replay and reuse in other 
applications, the legal admissibility of evidence from DSV/DSR systems may be 
questioned. 
 
4.8.7  Standardisation activities relevant to DSV / DSR  
 
A typical dynamic signature recognition module includes the classical pattern recognition 
components of signature data capture, processing, transmission, storage, and 
authentication. At the system level in real applications, signature recognition techniques 
may be integrated with other technologies to form a complete solution. All these devices 
could inter-operate for maximum flexibility. BioAPI standardisation addresses this issue. 
This protocol offers standardised interfaces to existing dynamic signature recognition 
technology and thus facilitates interoperability and interchangeability of the technologies.  
 
Another issue is determining the data format for interoperability when the data is required 
to be shared between multiple systems using signature recognition technologies. Until 
now, interoperability between different dynamic signature recognisers has not been 
possible.  
 
Test databases and testing procedures are not available for dynamic signature recognition 
technology. A standard database and a standard testing procedure will provide users with 
a comprehensive understanding of a dynamic signature system, and guide users to the 
right choice. 
 
A working draft for an ISO standard for signs and signatures has been tabled (WD for 
19794-7, if approved in the future). 
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4.8.8  Principal research projects developing DSV / DSR systems 
 
There is only one European research project for signature recognition systems at the time 
of compilation of this report: 
 
ZAVIR is a project within the focus "IT security" of the programme "Living and working 
in a networked world" funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research. One aspect of this work deals with on-card matching algorithm for dynamic 
signatures. 
 
4.8.9  Outlook for the future 
 
Increasing interest for the application- and solution-oriented integration of dynamic 
signature recognition systems into existing services is evidenced by the growing number 
of applications that are being addressed. 
 
At present, many organisations are satisfied when they have captured an image of a 
signature to add it to a document. They are unaware that such an image may be copied 
and used without authorisation in other documents. Often such companies would be 
surprised and concerned to learn that the data captured could not be used for 
authenticating people, and that they will need to authenticate their signatories separately. 
We believe that there has to be a significant rise in the awareness that there are more 
characteristics of a signature than those that are just visible.  
 
These solution-oriented views (including the application of smart cards, standardisation 
and certification) are laying the foundations for widespread market success by 
encouraging the standardisation of integration capabilities and verifiable quality. 
 
RC/TTL4  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL etc 4: A programme of database 
construction and testing should be initiated especially for those biometric methods 
for which such large scale databases are still not collected or publicly available. 
Certain biometric methods (e.g. multimodal biometrics) will require specific 
algorithm testing schemes and research may be required to devise the most 
appropriate methods . 
 
 
4.9  Keystroke Dynamics  
 
Recipients of Morse Code messages in the Second World War noted that certain 
individuals showed individual patterns of keying. This observation led some researchers 
in the late 1970's to consider whether the same effect could be replicated on computer 
keyboards. As the volume of electronically entered information started to increase, the 
attraction of discovering the extent to which such regularities could form the basis of a 
behavioural biometric resulted in a number of research papers and one commercial 
product.  
 
4.9.1  Principal methods 
 
Gaines and his colleagues at the Rand Corporation demonstrated the potential of 
Keyboard Dynamics (KD) in 1980 by measuring the keystroke latency intervals between 
adjacent letters in text typed by seven professional secretaries. This required the 
 
BIOVISION Roadmap Issue 1.1                                                                              15 October 2003  
122 
collection of a rather large set of input data158. A 1986 patent suggested that typing your 
own name would lead to more stable performance and better user acceptability. 
Alternatively, users could be asked to type out the 1000 most common words in the 
English language to provide a solid base for subsequent analysis. Subsequent systems 
have emphasised the text -dependent and text -independent approaches to various degrees, 
with some attempts to advocate specialised keyboards that also recorded the pressure 
directed to letters. 
 
4.9.2  Principal commercially available systems 
 
The main supplier of keystroke dynamic software has been through a number of 
takeovers, the latest being the acquisition by BioNet Systems of the latest versions of the 
BioPassword product (version 4.5). Prices for licenses during its previous ownership by 
Net Nanny ranged from $40-100 per seat depending on the size of the deployment. 
 
4.9.3  High Profile deployments 
 
There have been no large scale deployments. 
 
4.9.4  Testing and issues of performance limitation 
 
Most research papers show results obtained by sub-100 size samples. For example, a 1992 
study at the Naval Postgraduate School carried out under relatively uncontrolled 
conditions demonstrated performance of a commercially available BioPassword Model 
2100 using 24 Chinese male officers. High variability in performance was noted between 
individual users, with a high average of false rejects at the first attempt (4.4%), for a false 
acceptance rate of 3-4%159. The suppliers of the commercial software note that a test was 
undertaken in 2000 by the Financial Services Technology Consortium and the 
International Biometric Group, but no further information is available. 
 
4.9.5  User concerns 
 
No known assessments. 
 
4.9.6  Legal and regulatory dimensions 
 
Use of keystroke dynamics could be associated with keystroke monitoring programmes 
whose use could be limited by privacy laws and local codes of conduct. 
 
4.9.7  Standardisation activities 
 
There are no standardisation activities at present  
 
4.9.8  Principal research projects 
 
Keystroke Dynamics continues to offer a major research challenge. The absence of 
hardware costs allows many universities to set this technique as a research topic for 
students who are unaware of the considerable difficulties that attend this method and its 
successful implementation. A slow, but steady, flow of papers reaches the technical 
                                                                 
158 Material on the early years of KD is based upon a paper reviewing the field: Rick Joyce and 
Gobal Gupta, Identity authentication based on keystroke latencies Coomunications of the ACM 33 
(2) 168-76 (February 1990) 
159 Hung-I Kuan, Evaluation of a biometric keystroke typing dynamics computer security system , 
Naval Postgraduate School (March 1992) 
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journals. The FernUniversitat Hagen in Germany is interested in the technology160. Small 
scale studies of applying neural network based KD to PIN entry have been carried out by 
the UK's University of Plymouth's Network Research Group, as part of a programme to 
secure access to mobile devices. 6 digit PINs on a subject group of 14 persons showed a 
FRR of 30% and FAR of 10%161. Recently, Fabian Monrose and colleagues at Bell Labs 
have suggested the use of adaptive hardened passwords that recode the password based 
upon attaining of the correct time differences between sets of letters in a typed password 
by the authorised user162.  Test results carried out on 20 users (1 password and 481 logins) 
appeared promising. Bergadano and colleagues at Turin University have demonstrated 
considerable improvement in text -dependant (683 characters), fault tolerant typing 
dynamics163. Their testing of 154 subjects with varying keyboard skills showed a FRR of 
4% against FAR of less than 0.01%. Such long texts are not a replacement for password 
authentication, but extending these techniques to large amounts of freely chosen text 
could result in improved performance of such systems. 
 
4.9.9  Outlook for the future 
 
In spite of the confident forecasts of many over the past two decades, the QWERTY 
keyboard has resisted all attempts at displacement by speaker recognition software. By 
2010, we anticipate that there will still be many keyboards, although the growth of 
smarter, embedded intelligence at home, work and leisure, and improvements in the 
performance of speech recognition, should reduce the proportion of computing terminals 
that use typed text entry. Unfortunately, current research is unable to guarantee that the 
performance of KD will improve substantially beyond its current levels, in spite of 
several interesting recent results. The use of this biometric is, therefore, likely to remain 
confined to specific niche areas. 
 
4.10 Other biometric methods under development 
 
Many other human characteristics have been proposed over the past three decades, and 
work continues at generally low levels of commitment. An optimistic assessment of the 
timescales includes: 
 
· preparation of the research project for funding support and recruitment of the 
researcher: 2 years; 
· the three year average duration of a research project in a university (geared to the 
duration of PhD programmes); 
· either securing of first round venture capital funding or agreement on joint 
development with an existing corporate laboratory: 1-2 years; 
· demonstration of commercial feasibility: 2-3 years; 
· testing and refinement of the biometric: 1-2 years. 
 
Such an analysis demonstrated that there will be no novel biometric introduced 
commercially within the timeframe of this roadmap. However, work is already underway 
in a number of the following technologies, and the timescales for these should be 
correspondingly adjusted. 
 
                                                                 
160 cs.fernuni-hagen.de/researchAreas/cryptology/main_Computer_User.html      
161 T Ford and S Furnell, User Authentication for keypad-based devices using keystroke analysis , 
162 Fabian Monrose et al, Password hardening based on keystroke dynamics , International Journal 
on Information Security, in press 
163 Francesco Bergadano et al, User authentication through keystroke dynamics , ACM Transactions 
in Information and System Security, 5(4) pp 367-397 (November 2002) 
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DNA recognition164 
 
A high resolution DNA profile arguably offers the most definitive form of human 
identification. A match probability derived from a DNA profile can now approach a 
frequency of one individual in the entire population of the planet and statistical 
estimations of individual profile frequencies are well supported by population studies. 
DNA is present in all the body’s tissues and is routinely shed in sweat, saliva, skin cells 
and hair, etc and provides a pervasive trace source for use individual identification. 
Unfortunately DNA extraction and amplification - the processes used to derive DNA 
profiles from biological samples - are time consuming and expensive. According to many 
commentators, an instantaneous, sensitive, affordable and non-invasive method of DNA 
profiling is the ‘Holy Grail’ of human identification.  
Glass-and-silicon chip micro-reactor laboratories offer a promising route to a solution to 
this problem. The micro-lab - some are as small as 1 cm3 - is fabricated so that all of the 
reagents, mixing and temperature controls, and analytical pathways form integrated chip 
components. Being self-contained and disposable, the device is labour saving and less 
error prone, and less vulnerable to contamination by intrusive DNA than current 
procedures. The micro-channel architecture, micro-etching and electro-osmotic design of 
the chip components are optimised to aid the analytical process. 
New generation single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) profiling micro-reactors will 
offer a further advantage in that DNA profiles are determined by a single base change and 
not fragment length, avoiding the necessity for a gel-electrophoresis component to resolve 
DNA lengths present. This should increase the efficiency of analysis and allow each 
result to be encoded in the minimum number of binary digits, making the whole process 
more amenable to electronic transmission, database storage and remove verification. 
At present, connections to the external world are necessary to provide power and control 
systems to the chip. Portable control systems with remote access to computer databases 
linked to disposable devices could offer a way to use DNA micro-laboratory chips in 
mass screening or scene of crime scenarios. 
No biometric ever seems to offer a single solution in identification and in the case of 
DNA it is the lack of a means of remote detection that is the flaw. There may be sufficient 
cellular debris and genetic material in exhaled breath - for example - to provide a DNA 
profile, so an instant DNA breathalyser may not be far over the horizon. 
 
Drivers for the development of such novel systems are not limited to advanced forms of 
biometrics; other applications include medical diagnostics, and food and agriculture, as 
well as forensic, commercial and security related uses. 
 
Gait recognition 
 
The way in which people walk has been investigated for a number of years by several 
research groups, and in particular Southampton University in the UK and Georgia 
Institute of Technology. Two principal approaches have been documented, the model 
based and the model-free165. Models have been based on the pendulum-like action of the 
movement of the thighs. Model-free representations determine 'eigengaits' from a 
principal components analysis of the motion using an optical flow model. Interest has 
increased from defence users of CCTV systems anxious to obtain more useful 
information from people walking at a considerable distance from the cameras, and hence 
beyond the working distance of facial recognition biometrics. 
 
                                                                 
164 Acknowledgement is made to Martin Evison and Ray Allen of Sheffield University who 
provided material for this section. 
165 A Kale et al, Gait analysis for human identification, 4th Audio and Video-based biometric person 
based authentication, AVBPA 2003  706-14  (June 2003); John Carter and Mark Nixon, Measuring 
gait signatures which are invariant to their trajectory, Measurement + Control 32 265-9 
(November 1999) 
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A related technique - useful for tracking individuals in a closed user group - is Overhead 
View Person Recognition. This technique fixes upon characteristic features of a person, 
e.g. hair colour and texture, to track a person using a network of ceiling mounted 
cameras166. 
 
Skin reflectivity 
 
Lumidigm have patented a method of characterising the reflectivity, absorbance and 
scattering of light from the skin of individuals, as a function of wavelength of incident 
light and the distance between the light source and the skin surface. The method is under 
development for a commercialised product167.  A related technique is based upon the 
scattering of light from the nail bed under the fingernails. Spectrometry of the light 
absorbed by blood and scattered by skin is claimed to offer a way of distinguishing 
individuals 168. 
 
Lip movement biometrics 
 
This biometric could be an adjunct to either facial recognition or speaker verification 
systems, with the aim of improving the performance of either of these two methods169. 
IDIAP at Martigny in Switzerland are making significant progress in this field. 
 
Ear-based biometrics 
 
Systems have been proposed that make use of 
 
a) The outer shape of the ear. This already used by a number of police forces to identify 
criminals, and the subject of the European Commission funded FEARID project. 
Research into the use of this feature as a biometric has been reported by a number of 
groups170. 
b) The otoacoustic emissions measuring the response to a transient input signal 
broadcast into the ear171. 
 
Odour recognition  
 
In lists of biometric methods, odour recognition is usually added to illustrate the diversity 
of the field. The detail accompanying this claim is often very sketchy; not surprisingly, in 
view of the absence of any recent work in the field. In an overview report on biometrics 
published in 1995, forecasts of commercialisation of the technique within two years of 
further development were made. At the time, Leeds University and Mastiff Electronic 
Systems had been developing Scentinel for 8 years. The company, which licensed 
technology from Bloodhound Sensors, highlighted initial results in an article in the 
Financial Times of the same year, demonstrating how profiles of four subjects could be 
captured using 16 sensors, each of which was tuned to a different chemical172. Since then, 
little has been heard of this technology, in spite of Bloodhound's managing director 
                                                                 
166 Ira Cohen et al, Vision-based overhead view person recognition (2000) 
167 www.lumidigm.com  
168 Taegeun Kim and Yong Woo Kim, Individual identification by extraction of nail bed pattern of 
the finger nail using confocal scanning optical system, Hankook Kwanghak Hoeji 13 (2) 155-61 
(April 2002) 
169 J S Mason and J D Brand, The role of dynamics in visual speech biometrics  (2002) 
170 Belen Moreno et al, On the use of outer ear images for personal identification in security 
applications, 469-76 (1999); Mark Burge and Wilhelm Burger, Ear biometrics in computer vision, 
822-6 (2000) 
171 Early warning system could combat fraud, The Guardian (UK), (13 January 2003) 
172 Clive Cookson, A brave new olfactory world, Financial Times (8 June  1995) 
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suggesting that it would be 'more reliable and convenient than other biometrics such as 
those based upon voice recognition or hand-prints'. 
 
Since that time, development of electronic noses has advanced. Many different types of 
sensor have been developed, aiming to reduce the size of the hardware, make the pattern 
recognition algorithms more robust and counter the drift in performance of most sensors. 
Several dozen companies have developed electronic nose products for a wide range of 
applications. These include tracking unpleasant smells to their source such as those from 
farm animals and fungi in buildings, diagnosis of certain medical conditions, monitoring 
of industrial scale processes on foods and beverages, fundamental studies on biological 
processes and combustion process in jet engines, and design and developments of 
perfumes and fragrances. DARPA are also funding studies on explosive mine 
detection173. 
 
Sensor developments that are particularly of interest in the context of human odour 
sensing include the microfabrication of channels and micropumps, and the construction of 
CMOS sensors that use FET transistors sensitive to specific gases and vapours. The new 
nano-technology paradigm is the key to developing gas chromatographs, mass and optical 
spectrometers that could perform the complex analyses of human generated odours.  
 
The extent to which electronically sensed individually distinct odours can be measured 
remains uncertain, although certain clues are coming to light. For example, analysis of 
breath for halitosis has been demonstrated using a 40 element sensor array, with varying 
sensitivities174. Rome University has recently demonstrated how an electronic nose can 
determine the vapourised concentration of a male pheromone from axillas of students; 
tests showed a bimodal distribution whose origin is the subject of further research175.  
 
In December 2002, DARPA solicited bids for 'odortype detection' biometrics based upon 
observations in mice that the same set of genes that code for the recognition of self/non-
self in internal immune systems (the Major Histocompatibility Complex - MHC) also 
code for individual odour types176. Limited evidence exists for parallel expression of the 
individuality of odours for human beings. The programme envisages a test-ready sensor at 
the end of 5years and 6 months after its start, by which time most of the fundamental 
questions would have been resolved.  
 
Forensic dental biometrics 
 
Anil Jain and colleagues at Michigan State University have started work on semi-
automatic recognition of individuals after death using the deceased person's dentition177. 
Although generally biometrics does not concern itself with the identification of dead 
bodies, the numbers of victims of massacres or large scale terrorist actions merit 
consideration of automation of the process. 
 
Pressure sequence 
 
An interesting behavioural biometric has been described by Pieter Hartel. On the basis of 
small scale testing, Pieter claims that there is a distinctiveness in the way that individuals 
tap a mu sical tune or rhythm, data which can be captured using a polymer thick film 
                                                                 
173 T.C. Pearce et al, Handbook of Machine Olfaction: Electronic nose technology, Wiley-VCH 
(2003) 
174 ibid, quotes the results from S Ehrmann et al, Applications of a gas sensor microarray to human 
breath analysis, Sensors and Actuators, B, 65 247-249 (2000) 
175 Corrado di Natale, Human skin odour analysis by means of an electronic nose, Sensors and 
actuators B65 pp 216-219 (2000) 
176 The US Army Research Office broad agency announcement DAAD19-03-R-0004 (December 
2002) 
177 Anil Jain et al, Dental biometrics: human identification using dental radiographs, 4th Audio-and 
video-based biometric person authentication conference AVBPA 2003 429-37 (June 2003) 
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piezoelectric or piezoresistive sensor capable of integration with conventional smart 
cards. These initial tests on 34 subjects generated an EER of about 2%178. 
 
4.11  Multiple biometrics 
 
The previous sections have shown that no biometric technology offers a perfect solution 
to authenticating individuals, even though some are beginning to demonstrate very 
impressive performance in certain application spaces. For those methods that are less 
accurate, yet may be more suitable in certain systems on the grounds of cost, availability 
of sensors, etc., combining more than one instance of the biometric (e.g. both eyes or 
more than one finger) is an option; as is the integration of results from more than one 
biometric technology (multi-modal biometrics). Alternatively, combining a biometric (or 
more than one) with a non-biometric authentication technology could also lead to 
improved security. A final way in which multiple biometrics could be implemented is for 
more than one type of algorithm to be used for the same underlying technology. For 
example, a video camera could take a sequence of images; these would be distributed to a 
number of software modules, each of which would attempt to match the images against a 
database of templates (which could be more than one for each individual). One module 
could operate optimally for 'full face on' images, whereas others might be able to make 
better use of a number of images from different angles. In addition, it might be shown that 
certain individuals were more readily identified using specific algorithms.  
 
The fusion of data is of course critical in this type of application and research continues 
on determining models for such fusion. (Clearly, a simple model for fusion of data, at the 
output of two biometric systems, has severe limitations. Combining in either OR or AND 
mode leads to improvement in one type of error at the expense of an increase in the other 
rate.) Fusion of outputs from a high performance system and one with a weaker 
performance presents additional challenges. 
 
Other benefits that may result from the use of multiple biometrics include provision of 
fallback measures in case of disabled users and the opportunity of adjusting security 
thresholds for differing situations and times. 
 
Key requirements for success in future research is the creation of large databases of 
simultaneously acquired data for the individual modalities, and for testing and evaluation 
methodologies that will aid in the development of this promising approach to biometric 
authentication. 
 
4.11.1  Principal methods 
 
Ross and Jain note that there are three ways of fusing all-biometric data179, although a 
fourth approach has also been described: 
 
· Fusion at the feature extraction level, creating a complex template that represents the 
individuality of the person in the aggregation of data from the respective biometric 
systems. The informational value of the combined template depends upon the degree 
of independence of the individual traits that are used in the biometric systems. 
· Fusion at the matching score level, bringing together the match scores from each of 
the biometric technologies, and applying specialised techniques to arrive at a final 
decision. 
· Fusion at the decision level, with a voting scheme to determine the outcome of 
independently derived pass/fail decisions from the individual biometric technologies. 
                                                                 
178 Neil Henderson et al, Polymer thick-film sensors: possibilities for smart card biometrics , 
www.ub.utwente.nl  
179 Arun Ross and Anil Jain, Information Fusion in Biometrics, (preprint, 14 November 2002) 
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· 'Layered Biometrics', in which users must pass each successive biometric test before 
passing onto the next one. Successful completion of this route allows the user access 
to the protected resources. 
 
4.11.2  Principal commercially available systems 
 
Systems were available from Keyware (Belgium) and Dialog Communication Systems, 
the suppliers of BioID180. Keyware sold off its biometric components to Identix in 2002. 
It is believed that a Malaysian company is still offering multiple biometric systems. 
 
BioID combined recognition approaches based upon facial, voice and lip movement 
biometrics. In the case of face and lip biometrics, a result is only considered reliable if the 
best match to a template exceeds the match to the next ranking template by a pre-defined 
threshold. Fusion at the matching score level offered systems integrators or administrators 
a variable security threshold, based upon a weighted summation of two or three 
acceptable results from each of the base biometrics.  
 
4.11.3  High Profile deployments 
 
At the time of writing, there were very few pilots or deployments using more than one 
biometric method. Nevertheless, the recommendation by NIST for the use of both facial 
and fingerprint recognition for immigrant visas to the USA may require consideration of 
multimodal strategies that such a proposal implies. 
 
4.11.4  Testing and issues of performance limitation 
 
Large scale testing of multimodal (and multiple) biometric systems is still to be 
undertaken. As the section below on standardisation makes clear, the absence of agreed 
protocols and large databases is a limiting factor in the application of multiple biometrics. 
One of the best compilations of data is the European XM2VTS database which consists of 
facial images, sequences of video and audio recordings of speech obtained from 295 
subjects, and collected in four sessions at monthly intervals.  
 
4.11.5  User concerns 
 
The studies associated with this roadmap demonstrate the considerable challenge in 
developing a user-friendly system with just one biometric. More ingenuity will be 
required to ensure that end users accept that a second or third system is required, and that 
these methods are integrated in the most appropriate way. Much will depend on the 
specific requirements of the application. Parallel or serial operation, the extent to which 
users have to make a conscious effort to divert themselves from the operation without the 
biometric, and the explanations which are offered; all will be crucial in determining the 
acceptance of more complexity. 
 
4.11.6  Legal and regulatory dimensions 
 
There appear to be no specific legal barriers to the use of multi-biometric systems over 
and above any restrictions relating to the individual biometric methods, although 
proportionality could be an issue unless the rationale for its use were explained and 
accepted by end users. 
 
4.11.7  Standardisation activities 
 
                                                                 
180 Robert Frischholz and Ulrich Dieckmann, BioID: a multimodal biometric identification system, 
IEEE Computer, 64-68 (February 2000) 
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A proposal for a study project was made in the USA's INCITS Technical Committee M1 
to clarify the taxonomies of operation and specify methods of evaluation of the 
performance of this type of system181. Subsequently, the Korean national standards 
agency, KATS, put forward a proposal for an API framework that would enable the 
combination of results from at the Biometric Service Provider level - not at the biometric 
feature level182. This work was not progressed and a new proposal for a Technical Report 
is under discussion. 
  
4.11.8  Principal research projects 
 
This is an active area of research in which European companies and consortia (e.g. the 
European Commission funded BANCA project183) have played a major role in the 
immediate past. The University of Surrey's team at the Centre for Vision, Speech and 
Signal Processing continues to work with a number of European partners to optimise the 
performance of systems, testing against the X2M2VTS multimodal database. Other 
pioneering studies are in progress at the Pattern Recognition and Image Processing 
Laboratory at Michigan State University. 
 
In the UK, IAMBIC, a DTI-sponsored project, has used multimodal biometrics and 
intelligent agents to develop new frameworks for secure access control in on-line 
environments184.  Fingerprint, speech and facial recognition were fused and trialled in a 
healthcare setting. One interesting feature was the inclusion of user-behaviour monitoring 
at the server. 
 
4.11.9  Outlook for the future 
 
The use of multiple biometric strategies, whether these are multimodal or just using two 
or more approaches for the same biometric method, appears to have a promising future. 
The research to date has shown that performance can be improved over the use of a single 
system, but most of the studies have been carried out on relatively small datasets. This 
roadmap demonstrates the complexity of deploying a system using even one biometric. 
Adding more complexity through the use of a further biometric will have to be justified 
on a clear cost-benefit basis. 
 
RC/C3  RC - COMPONENTS 3: In view of the limitations of individual biometric 
methods, further research is needed to optimise the performance of multi-modal 
biometrics. This should focus on improvements in the approach to fusion of 
measures, as well as to address the requirements of specific applications and services 
 
 
4.12  Future developments 
 
This review of the component technologies demonstrates the diversity of biometric 
methods. It is difficult to explain why these should all be considered in the same context, 
since the difference in performance and applicability between fingerprint and iris methods 
on the one side and keyboard dynamics and hand geometry are substantial.  
 
In looking towards the future, one obvious question concerns the ultimate performance of 
a specific method. Given the best algorithms and a co-operative population, what are the 
                                                                 
181 M1/03-0141 Study Project proposal: Evaluating Multi-Modal Biometric Systems: Concepts of 
Operation and Methods of Performance Evaluation (17 March 2003) 
182 ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC37, N164: New Work Item  Proposal on a Multi-Modal Biometric Framework 
(6 May 2003) 
183 http://falbala.ibermatica.com/banca/index.html  
184 http://www.iambic-project.org  
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limits to enrolment and operation? A detailed analysis of the competing ways of 
implementing each technology could indicate that more effort should be devoted to a 
specific approach, or that the technology will never attain the robustness and repeatability 
demanded by some applications.  
 
A similar question could be posed regarding the templates used by different systems. 
How can one characterise the proximity to 'uniqueness' in a population, whether at the 
national level or in a closed user group? Other related unknowns include the variation or 
entropy for specific classes of the population, whether segmented by gender, by age, 
ethnicity, etc. Finally, relatively little work has been undertaken on long term stability of 
templates (over periods in excess of 5years), in spite of the assumption that many 
potential operators make that their investment will keep on returning value for the lifetime 
of their customers or employees. Both fingerprints and iris patterns should exhibit such 
stability, but specific implementations, whether using a given type of sensor or algorithm 
could influence the stability. Most of the world's criminal fingerprint records are likely to 
consist of young males, and the ability of 80-year old women to provide usable 
fingerprints to silicon sensors remains to be demonstrated. 
 
The hunt for a better biometric continues, with new ideas being examined. The use of 
real-time DNA analysis has been discussed in the popular press, even though it may be 
many years before all of the problems are resolved185. A methodology to help inventors 
with their ideas would be helpful, and the research described above should help them 
determine whether there is a commercial business case for their proposal.  
 
RC/C4  RC – COMPONENTS 4: Research into the ultimate limits of performance 
with various methods of implementing specific biometric techniques 
 
 
RC/C5  RC – COMPONENTS 5: Research into the 'uniqueness' of a template, and 
the extent to which it depends upon demographic factors such as gender, age, 
ethnicity, etc. Do such templates exhibit stability over extended periods of time (> 5 
years)? 
 
 
RC/C6  RC – COMPONENTS 6: A methodology to determine whether novel 
methods of using the human body for secure authentication are worth supporting 
 
 
RC/C7  RC – COMPONENTS 7: Use of DNA as a biometric, including the 
development of protection mechanisms. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
185 The Case for national DNA identification cards, 2003 Duke L. & Tech Rev. 0002, 
www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0002.html (31 January 2003) 
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5. Critical Issues in the Application of Biometrics  
The successful deployment and operation of applications using biometrics depends not 
only on the technology and its integration with other functionality in a service, but needs 
to take account of the 'human' and 'social' elements. A series of BIOVISION studies 
summarised the current state of the art in each area, identified the crucial issues still to be 
resolved, and assessed their impact on a range of applications that are the subject of this 
roadmap. A number of unresolved issues are proposed as the subject of proposals for 
research projects or calls for social interventions such as new or amended legislation and 
codes of practice.  
 
5.1  End user perceptions 
 
Biometrics as a technology has taken a long time to become established in practical 
applications and still has some way to go before gaining mass acceptance levels. The 
fascination with the biometric technology of the last decade has now moved to a more 
objective thinking about the use of biometrics in typical everyday applications. Vendors 
are more aware of biometrics and how they might be used to their advantage. It is 
understood that desired response time, available performance or required accuracy rates 
are playing an important role in the decision process.  But until now, a more in depth 
understanding of human factors has been neglected.  
 
Issues of usability have generally been left to "programmers", who have not concentrated 
on issuing guidance around usability issues to improve the end-user perception and 
experience. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that vendors, consultants, systems 
integrators and users seem to speak different languages, leading to potential 
misunderstanding and confusion.  
 
Software support 
 
The first key activity of the BIOVISION project team in this area was the development of 
Pentakis. This complements the BANTAM (Biometric and Token Technology 
Application Modelling Language) methodology that may be used across barriers of both 
language and expertise. Furthermore, its use extends into aspects of procurement and 
training, providing prospective users and developers with a complete package. Note that 
the BANTAM User Guide186 provides extensive practical guidance for both users and 
developers in this context. 
 
To encourage a wider public acceptance and thus usage of biometrics, it is extremely 
important to develop systems that are easy to understand and easy to use. Training plays a 
large part in this respect and, ideally, a comprehensive training package should be devised 
at the time of application development. All too often, however, detailed information about 
a specific application is not easy to find, not comprehensive and not in an understandable 
form.  
 
Initially, it appears that people have a spontaneously positive attitude towards biometrics. 
At a second glance there is a tendency to be sceptical, especially with regard to the 
privacy issues when using biometrics. The way that users are given assistance during their 
first contact with a biometric system is key to its acceptance and their willingness to use it 
in future. A comprehensive explanation of the system and good operating instructions at 
the time of registration will have a positive influence on a user’s evaluation of the 
technology and subsequent use under real operational conditions. In particular users may 
well want to know how the technology works, where the data is stored, which data is 
registered, how the data is protected, who has access to the data and who is operating the 
system. Users have also expressed worries that their biometric data could be counterfeited 
or misused. However these doubts appeared to depend on the system operator. 
                                                                 
186 Julian Ashbourn, BANTAM user guide, Springer (2002) 
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We need to expand our thinking from individual device performance through to 
considering the performance of the system as a whole - including the interaction between 
human and technology. Most biometric systems require a degree of user interaction at 
some point, thereby necessitating consideration of user psychology. In this respect, there 
is a distinction between a ‘professional’ user (someone such as a systems administrator or 
an individual who uses a specialist application) and a ‘general’ user (someone who is 
required to use the system in a number of circumstances).  
 
In order to understand aspects of user psychology and the associated impact upon systems 
performance, it is important to obtain metrics that are robust and useful.  The User 
Psychology Index (UPI) has been developed over several years in order to provide a 
suitable methodology with which to assess this dimension. More recently, it has been 
translated into an easy to use software utility, a revised version of which is included 
within the Pentakis software programme. Pentakis additionally includes modules with 
which to assess transaction times, scalability, population profile analysis and cost 
analysis. These are all related areas in the context of acceptable implementations of 
applications featuring biometric identity verification. There will be further developments 
of the Pentakis concept in the future. 
 
Developing a framework  
 
Until recently, security research had largely ignored usability issues. Studies which 
showed that many users circumvent IT security have led Bruce Schneier to coin the 
phrase that security is only as good as it’s weakest link, and that users are the “weakest 
link” in the security chain. This sentence is catchy, but not entirely helpful, because it 
implicitly places the blame for this state of affairs on the users. The security research 
community has begun to realise that usability in real-world operation and user acceptance 
are essential pre-requisites for effective security systems, and has started to adopt user-
centred design approaches and methods to ensure usability and acceptance.  As part of the 
second strand of BIOVISION activity in this area, the end user perception team 
commenced work in this area specifically addressing biometric systems.  
 
The conceptual framework for a user-centred approach has four interacting key concepts: 
 
· users,  
· their goals and task,  
· the technology, and  
· the context of operation.   
 
Essentially, the user and the technology interact to achieve a specific goal (users tend to 
have a standard set of goals, and a number of tasks they are involved with to achieve 
them).  This interaction takes place in a particular physical and social context.  In 
BIOVISION, the team has started to create a user-centred taxonomy of all the 
characteristics of any of the four key concepts that could be relevant to the 
implementation of biometric technology.  For example, users can have physical 
characteristics that make operation of certain biometric systems difficult, or beliefs or 
attitudes that pre-dispose them against certain types of operation.  In some tasks, speedy 
access is imperative, in others it is not.  The impact of factors in the physical environment  
– such as lighting– are reasonably well understood, but the implications of different social 
contexts are less well ascertained.  The BIOVISION project has started to collect data to 
populate the taxonomy with relevant factors. 
 
We have noted that the context affects the interaction between user and system - and vice 
versa. For example, systems working well for the individual single user in a quiet office 
may not perform adequately in a shared office. On the one hand, a user interface can 
operate well when the user can focus on the task without undue interference, while it is 
not surprising that the same system shows poor performance when the user's attention is 
distracted. As offices and other environments grow more complex, such group 
interactions multiply. 
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Existing knowledge about these factors is largely based on observations of specific 
implementations. This data can help to identify some relevant factors. For instance, 
empirical findings from the BioTrusT project and from the Federal German Consumer 
Association have shown that: 
 
· Contact with biometrics, and therefore using authentication systems based on 
personal human characteristics, appears to make people more sensitive to the 
implications for their use. 
· Users have a definite need for information about the mechanisms of operation of 
such systems. 
· Consumers are well aware of the disadvantages of conventional methods and 
would prefer biometric methods instead of passwords or PINs. At the same time 
the need for secure storage and handling of biometric data was very pronounced 
among the users. 
· Enrolment should be performed by experienced staff who are aware of the 
quality levels that are required of the recorded data.  
· User guidance is also important. Users want a detailed explanation of the way in 
which they are asked to present their biometric features. This is  important as 
active co-operation from the user is nearly always required. 
· There appear to be no one single biometric characteristic that is suitable for all 
kind of people. People are as different as their physical characteristics are 
individual. 
 
However, there is a pressing need for systematic studies of performance in real-world 
context - and furthermore, these studies should address extended use.   
 
We have no scientific approaches to compare performance of mechanisms in the field; a 
methodology similar to the performance testing method described in Section 4 is required.  
Similarly, data on user attitudes have been largely collected from one-off focus groups.  
There have been no studies of how user perceptions and attitudes develop as a result of 
longer-term interaction, or how users prioritise conflicting goals, beliefs and attitudes.   
 
In-depth and contextualised research on end-user-perception has started addressing the 
gaps in the taxonomy.  We have focussed on collecting data on performance in real-world 
contexts, conducted in-depth analysis of qualitative data (using Grounded Theory 
analysis) to construct models of perceptions, beliefs, and decision-making processes of 
different user groups, and in different contexts of use.   
 
Finally, user-centred design proscribes going beyond studying users and their interactions 
with the technology. We have applied participatory design methods to involve 
prospective users in the process of identifying requirements and designing a technology 
solution.  We have conducted a pilot workshop with users from one specific domain (the 
health sector) and with specific biometrics manufacturers.  The aim of the workshop was 
start engagement in a process of collaborative design.  Starting from the key problems 
that users encounter in achieving their goals, developers work through scenarios to 
determine if biometric technology can help to solve those problems, and how it would 
have to be implemented to operate in this specific context. 
 
The empirical work undertaken by the team identified a key result: user acceptance of 
biometric solutions depends in the main on whether the solution offers benefits in terms 
of convenience, rather than whether it results in enhanced security. The relief from mental 
demands that multiple PINs and passwords place on individuals was almost palpable. 
However, while biometrics can an inherent advantage over knowledge-based 
mechanisms, this advantage can only be realised if a biometric solution  
 
- provides a good fit to the production and security tasks that users have to carry out, 
i.e. it is well integrated into the work process 
- performs well (in respect of acceptable speed and low error rate) in all aspects of its 
use (during installation, at registration, in daily use and under exceptional conditions) 
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- is trusted to be safe with the biometric data secured and without the potential for 
reuse for other purposes. 
 
Most users that were interviewed would welcome the introduction of additional features 
to personal electronic applications that improve safety or convenience in their use. 
However, there is a bifurcation when they are asked about the use in enhancing public 
safety and in passport and border control applications. In general, the older respondents 
welcomed these uses, with the perception often expressed in terms of 'it would help to 
catch illegal immigrants and criminals, while the ordinary citizen has nothing to worry 
about'.  The other group of participants, however, was distinctly sceptical about the 
benefits and saw potential threats. For them,  
 
- such applications are seen as 'for the convenience of government agencies, rather 
than for the citizen' 
- agencies are not trusted to secure the biometric data to an adequate extent 
- data would be used for purposes other than those advertised.  
 
Previous work in relation to multimedia applications suggests that risks to users must be 
made explicit in advance of any deployment, with users being given a choice as to 
whether to use them. Furthermore, it seems that implementation standards and the 
opportunities for redress that should be a feature of commercial implementations should 
also apply to government applications. 
 
The research priorities that this work has uncovered include: 
 
- New forms of requirements capture and application design are needed. 
- Performance measures of systems in daily use under operational conditions need to 
be researched and standardised for ease of cross-comparison 
- Evolution of the perceptions of end users and the influence of the social groups of 
which they are a part need to be understood, as a pre-requisite for engaging the most 
effective forms of managing the fears and concerns of users 
- Studies of the long term risks and of the potential of biometric methods to elicit 
mental and physical conditions 
- Improvements in the legal and regulatory framework to include the provision of 
recourse to law and financial redress in case of intentional or unintentional misuse. 
 
 
RC/TTL5  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 5: Further research is needed, 
based upon the initial proposals in the BIOVISION project, that will test perceptions 
by end users and the social groups of which they are members. This should also 
examine the evolution of such perceptions and whether different techniques apply to 
other social groups and cultures. 
 
 
RC/PS1  RC - PRODUCTS AND SOLUTIONS 1: Transparent - yet not covert - 
systems with excellent adaptive user interfaces, delivering apparently 
'instantaneous' authentication for end users 
 
 
RC/PS2  RC - PRODUCTS AND SOLUTIONS 2: Systems that are easy to install 
securely, with useful and appropriate feedback if they fail 
 
 
RC/C8  RC - COMPONENTS 8: Systems that minimise the mental and physical 
load on the end user, particularly if that end user is physically or mentally disabled. 
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5.2  Security 
  
Improving security, or improving usability while maintaining security, is a main driver 
for using biometrics. Though biometrics have been successfully deployed to improve 
security in many applications, in general these are closed systems with co-operative users. 
There are several security issues that have yet to be fully addressed if biometric methods 
are to be deployed more widely.  
 
What is Security? 
 
The need for security, and the meaning of security for any application, will depend on the 
purpose of the application and the environment in which it will operate. For access 
control, the risk is typically unauthorised individuals masquerading as authorised users – 
in biometric terms individuals attempting to make their biometric features look like 
someone else’s - and the measure of security will be the level of protection offered 
against unauthorised access. In such cases the distinction between authorised users and 
others is usually clear. 
 
For other applications, the chief risk may be individuals establishing multiple identities, 
for the purpose of extracting multiple benefits or credentials in different names – in 
biometric terms, users attempting to make their biometric features NOT look like 
themselves. Here the distinction between authorised and unauthorised users is less clear in 
that a user may have both a legitimate identity and other, illegitimate ones. 
 
The security requirements and measures are quite different for these two cases, and 
practical applications may be even more complex. Real-world applications can embody a 
range of different functions, each with its own distinct set of security risks and associated 
security requirements. 
 
Few high security applications 
 
To date most biometric deployments have relatively low security requirements, either by 
design, or by the nature of the application. Of the potential future applications for 
biometrics, their use for national identification systems will require substantially higher 
levels of security than those for current biometric systems, especially if the biometric 
templates and/or images are stored in a central database. Security would also need to be 
strengthened when the same biometric is used for a variety of applications. 
 
‘Live and well’ features 
 
There is a pressing need to improve biometric products to make it much harder to spoof 
the devices by artificial means, or by mimicry. While it is true that existing publicised 
exploits have been performed on relatively cheap low-end devices, it is not clear whether 
the more sophisticated, and expensive, currently available systems would be much better. 
Moreover, for negative ID systems, e.g. for establishing a unique identity, these ‘live and 
well’ features must address the fact that it is generally easier for someone to appear not as 
themselves (false non-match) than to appear as someone else (false match). 
 
Template protection & consent 
 
Work has commenced on template protection techniques that can bind a biometric 
template to a particular application, disabling its use by any other application (without the 
application provider’s consent). Such techniques may be extensible allowing the user to 
withdraw consent and disable the template (as they do not have the option to change their 
biometrics). 
 
People and security 
 
People are often the weakest link in a security system. A biometric ID system may need 
to protect against  
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· collusion between a fraudster and enrolee or enroler,  
· insider fraud directed against the company or an enrolee, and  
· intentional or unintentional bypass of security procedures 
· fraud perpetuated by legitimate enrolees, through the establishing of multiple 
identities.  
 
Security evaluations 
 
For biometrics to become accepted as a security technology it would seem appropriate 
that biometric systems are formally evaluated for security. The Common Criteria (CC) 
framework has been validated for many other IT systems, although accreditation can be 
time consuming and expensive. Even if vendors intend their products to be offered for 
such evaluation only at some point in the future, development of software and hardware 
should be undertaken in a way that will facilitate such an evaluation process. At present, 
however, only two biometric systems have been evaluated under the Common Criteria, 
and these only at a basic assurance level (EAL2)187.  In part this may be due to the high 
cost of CC evaluation in relation to the value of assets currently protected using 
biometrics, and also that there are not a standard set of security tests. It should also be 
noted, however, that suppliers are reluctant to publicise the details of the proprietary 
algorithms used in their engines, and that for those biometric technologies that are still 
developing (e.g. face recognition), these algorithms are subject to continuing change. 
Assessing the security of a biometric without a formal certification continues to be 
problematic for system designers and operators. 
 
A further issue is the difficulty inherent in statistical testing – the number of impostor 
attempts required is inversely proportional to the error rate required, and it is simply 
infeasible to make, say, 3 x 1011 attempts to show an error rate of 10-11 (an error rate 
required for some national ID systems, for example). In time, these issues may be 
addressed by standard security evaluation methodologies for biometrics, and by an 
improved understanding of the scaling of the performance of biometric systems as larger 
biometric deployments are made. 
 
RC/Sec1  RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 1: Methods are required to 
evaluate and compare the security of biometric systems. Schemes other than the 
Common Criteria framework should be investigated for their suitability. The level 
of security should appropriate to the application and the risks involved. In 
particular the binding of the application to the result of the biometric authentication 
has to be secure. In view of the value of databases of biometric identifiers to other 
people and organisations, these may need to be secured against both internal and 
external threats using state-of-the-art techniques. Appropriate security is also 
required for the templates during their transmission between database and 
application. All security measures subject should be periodically subject to a review. 
 
 
RC/Sec2  RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 2: Methods for the design 
and secure implementation of appropriately secondary systems that cope with both 
false match and false non-match errors. Such strategies may be required to operate 
in a gradual manner. 
 
 
RC/Sec3  RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 3: Development of design 
methodologies that support the secure integration of biometric data in applications 
such as the Criminal Justice Sector, while limiting the opportunity for misuse and 
'function creep'. These could make use of binding of the user's identity, the 
application, template and user's expression of consent as well as validation by 
external Trusted Third Parties. 
                                                                 
187 The results on only one have been published. 
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RC/Sec4  RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 4: Biometric data for 
different applications (or held centrally and on-card) may require to be of different 
types (or held in incompatible formats) in order that centrally held information 
cannot be misused. 
 
 
RC/Sec5  RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 5: Provision of 'live and well' 
features in biometric systems is a high priority, especially when these are unattended 
or only intermittently attended by security personnel. Testing of the liveness of the 
biometric signal needs to be commensurate with other security aspects of the system 
 
 
RC/TTL6  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 6: Tools and methods for the 
forensic investigation of the abuse of biometric methods. 
 
 
RC/C9  RC – COMPONENTS 9: Performance improvements are needed to reduce 
the possibility of chance matches between different people, and for identification of 
non-cooperative users in negative identification applications 
 
 
5.3  Safety and medical issues 
  
One of the issues that causes concern in the application of biometrics is that there may be 
a direct or indirect medical risk. We aimed to examine these concerns for the specific 
cases of face and iris recognition, fingerprint and hand geometry biometrics. 
 
Many established commentators in the field of biometrics maintain that ‘user acceptance’ 
ought to be considered as one of the most significant factors in the successful take-up of 
biometric applications. However, the term ‘user acceptance’ encompasses many aspects, 
from individual psychology to ergonomics, but rarely has it been examined with respect 
to the medical aspects. This is mainly due to the limited knowledge about biometrics 
amongst the general public partly due to the limited deployment in the everyday life of 
citizen, consumer and employee. As biometrics gains prominence, we anticipate that 
curiosity or speculation could make potential users question the direct or indirect effects 
of biometric techniques on their health.  
 
The diffusion of inaccurate or uninformed data may have impact adversely on a specific 
technique, as well as on the wider biometric world. Such hostility could easily feed upon 
other concerns such as privacy. A clear assessment of the medical issues should pre-empt 
these concerns, so that, for example, reluctance to use certain sensors is not easily 
justified on hygiene fears.  
 
There are, of course, international standards for the safety of many of the components 
used in biometric systems, and these should be used wherever possible. Nevertheless, care 
will be required in the interpretation of these in the context of novel technologies. These 
considerations are termed the direct medical implications of the application of 
biometrics and their impact should be examined for those systems that are likely to be 
most widely used. 
 
There is another class of medical concern, termed indirect medical implication, where 
physical or mental characteristics or conditions might be deducible from biometric 
measurements. Some methods, such as iris recognition, have specific concerns. Followers 
of iridology would claim that medical conditions could be diagnosed from an iris image. 
However this has little or no scientific or medical support. Reassurance to such 
individuals as to the information that is stored in the template may go some way towards 
countering even their concerns. The scientific basis for the elucidation of certain 
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behavioural traits or physical conditions from biometric signals has begun to be analysed, 
with some initial results available on the assessment of anxiety states.188  Of course, the 
possible future use of DNA analysis as a biometric (not a feasible option currently) raises 
potential issues of privacy and indirect medical implication, whilst other proposed 
techniques that are not strictly biometrics could add to the confusion in the mind of the 
public at large.189 
 
RC/Med  RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: MEDICAL ASPECTS: Further 
development of the BIOVISION methodologies for ensuring health and safety in 
systems using biometrics and the non-disclosure of medical conditions. 
 
 
5.4  Future directions in the underlying technologies and applications  
 
The individual descriptions of technologies in Section 4 show how the future direction of 
each method is being shaped by the requirements of applications. The detailed studies 
completed by the BIOVISION consortium (summarised in Section 3.1) offer a framework 
for considering the matching of functional requirements with what a commercially 
available system can offer.   
 
The members of the consortium have looked at the research programmes and the 
subsequent formation of SMEs in some cases to capitalise upon that research. It 
acknowledges that some projects were successful in advancing the fundamental aspects of 
biometrics. For example, the Fourth framework BIOTEST project laid the groundwork 
for testing and reporting, which is now being adopted by ISO/IEC SC37 SG5 as an 
international standard. 
 
However, many projects appear to be disconnected from developments in the commercial 
sector and from any viable applications. Often, basic information about the subtleties of 
the using biometrics is rediscovered, sometimes quite late in the lifetime of the activities.  
In any proposals, the sponsoring body should insist on clearer setting of objectives, 
especially if the results of the work are directed towards impacting on the market. 
 
 It is clear that the research and commercial dissemination routes often do not meet. 
Research meetings speak to other researchers, with potential commercial users finding 
difficulty in interpreting the significance of their findings. In turn, commercially run 
conferences often fail to take account of ongoing research projects, for fear of confusing 
the target audience most of whom appear to be newcomers to the field. An exa mple of the 
response of the commercial sector to the opportunity of showcasing cutting edge research 
is the award of prizes for such studies by the organisers of Biometrics 2002 in London190. 
We anticipate that the European Biometric Forum will play a key role in co-ordination 
through the EBF of research projects, interpretation and demonstration. 
 
RC/RA  RC - RESEARCH ACTIVITIES: Following the initial phase of establishing 
research teams throughout European organisations, funding bodies should now 
ensure that new research projects are based upon a solid appreciation of both the 
current status of the research as well as the realities of commercially viable 
                                                                 
188 Frank Deane et al, Theoretical Examination of the Effects of Anxiety and Electronic 
Performance Monitoring on Behavioural Biometric Security Systems, Interacting with Computers 
7(4) pp 395-411 (1995);  Ioannis Pavlidis et al, Thermal Imaging for Anxiety Detection, IEEE 
Workshop on Computer Vision Beyond the Visible Spectrum: Methods and Applications (CVBVS 
2000), 
http://www.htc.honeywell.com/people/ioannis_pavlidis/Publications/Docs/IEEE_ICIP_01.pdf  
189 US General Accounting Office, Investigative Techniques: Federal Agency Views on the 
Potential Application of ‘Brain Fingerprinting’, GAO-02-22 (October 2001) 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/brainfinger.pdf  
190 Biometrics 2002: 5th world conference and exhibition on the practical application of biometrics, 
London 7-8 November 2002 
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deployments. If the European biometrics sector is to flourish, timely sharing of 
knowledge between the research and commercial sector is vital.  
 
 
5.5  Legal and regulatory dimensions 
 
Data protection 
 
The legal and data protection issues surrounding biometrics have given rise to much 
comment and concern. These concerns have arisen from the user community due to 
worries that their biometric data will not be properly protected, may be accessed or stolen 
and used for criminal or fraudulent purposes or indeed that that they may be tracked and 
traced while going about their daily activities.  Some commentators believe that there are 
inherent dangers in the application of any biometric, and that these are sufficiently serious 
to warrant critical examination of any proposals for their use. This has appeared to be the 
position of some EU Data Protection Commissioners; as demonstrated in responses to a 
questionnaire that was sent to all the Commissioners191. 
 
The EU Commission itself has classified biometrics as a privacy enhancing technology 
and it is understood that the Commission would wish biometric technologies to be 
developed more towards the preservation of users' privacy192, an opportunity that has been 
downplayed in discussions on deployments of these technologies. For example, a securely 
designed access control system using a fingerprint or iris recognition biometric can offer a 
better solution to a medical database system, than one using keys (which can be lent to 
unauthorised personnel) and passwords (with their reduced accountability and ease of 
abuse). In this way, a biometric can be a positive measure to improve the privacy of the 
individual – provided that the system is designed and implemented with an appropriate 
methodology. Such systems can offer a clear competitive advantage if the whole life costs 
(including training and reassurance to end users) are taken into account. Privacy Best 
Practices offers initial guidance for operators and users. 
 
In reality, there are a number of different viewpoints, and the opportunities and dangers 
are dependent to a large extent on the context in which a biometric is deployed and the 
way in which protection of personal data is viewed by the system designer and operator. 
It is not helpful to reduce the debate to the place where the template is stored, whether on 
a card held by the individual or in a central database. A useful approach is to conduct a 
Privacy Impact Assessment at an early stage of the design (using the Privacy Best 
Practices as developed in draft form in BIOVISION), to allow a public discussion on the 
proposed deployment and its security, and then to continue to offer information and 
support to end users during the implementation and rollout of the system (see also Section 
3.8). 
 
The intention of BIOVISION has been to develop best practice in this area. The answer to 
the resolving these differing viewpoints may lie in addressing these concerns directly and 
provide guidance to the biometrics industry and to those that use biometric technology, to 
ensure that its use complies with data protection and (or) privacy requirements. Indeed, 
some commentators believe that it may be necessary to update current data protection 
regulations to take into account the new issues exposed by this relatively new technology.      
 
The starting point for discussion on the privacy aspects of biometrics in Europe is the 
1995 EU Directive on Personal Data193 and the national laws that implement this directive 
                                                                 
191 BIOVISION project: Astrid Albrecht, Best Practices in deployment of biometric systems (2003). 
In particular, CNIL - the French DP authority seems to be able to call in any proposal for the use of 
biometrics in the public arena. 
192 The Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection is completing a study on biometrics which is 
due for publication in mid 2003. 
193 Directive 95/46/EC http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/law_en.htm  
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in the respective Member States194. This transposition has led to notable divergences in 
terms of the Member State requirements with regards to biometrics and the review of law 
and practice in the individual countries is a major output of the BIOVISION activities in 
this area195. These issues have been examined through a questionnaire to the Data 
Protection Commissioners, which has ascertained their current views on the application of 
biometrics. 
 
Additional legal issues 
 
From a contractual perspective, for those companies that are manufacturing, developing 
and purchasing such technologies there are many new issues to be faced. These require 
that in the contractual area there is a great need for transparent, fair, comprehensive and 
non-discriminating conditions, which are also valid for the necessary informed consent 
for data processing.  
 
Enterprise applications of biometrics are steadily increasing for such applications as 
physical and logical access. It has to be further examined which legal requirements are to 
be fulfilled in terms of industrial law and participation of the companies` data protection 
officer. Whereas, for example in Germany strong legal requirements exist, in other 
European countries this is not mandatory but may increase the employees’ acceptance of 
a biometric system. At the current stage, operators who have to take the employees rights 
into consideration cannot be sure of meeting the legal requirements also in terms of 
protection the privacy of the users.  
 
The consortium has provided the first input to the biometric community that will help it in 
dealing with the legal and contractual issues involved in the use of biometrics.    
 
It is increasingly becoming apparent that one of the drivers for this particular sector is that 
of regulation and legislation. This is apparent from many sources including the expected 
tender from the UK Home Office for a biometric programme in 10 UK airports as well as 
the programme for biometrics in the passports and visas of all the US visa waiver 
countries. The BIOVISION project has examined and catalogued such regulatory 
issues196. 
 
Biometrics and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
 
PETs offer technical solutions to the challenge of maintaining the data subject's control 
over their personal data. These also enable organisations that use such data to avoid 
reliance on people and procedures. For example, employees can make mistakes, can be 
subverted by bribes or be blackmailed. Managers can decide to allow 'function creep' 
following pressure to cut costs or justify the business case for a new service. Procedures 
can also not be followed, for instance when a security officer relaxes rules on writing 
down passwords in the face of widespread disobedience of the original security policy.  
 
Texts such as Fischer-Hubner's define a range of possible objectives of PETs197: 
 
· Anonymity or pseudonymity 
· Depersonalisation, rendering data into an anonymous format  
· Unobservability 
· Unlinkability 
· Delocalisation 
                                                                 
194 http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm  
195 Astrid Albrecht, op cit, collates responses from the data protection commissioners of Denmark, 
France, Germany, Portugal, Sweden and the UK 
196 BIOVISION report: Astrid Albrecht and Martin Walsh, Report on legal and privacy issues  (July 
2003) 
197 Simone Fischer-Hubner, IT-Security and Privacy: design and use of privacy-enhancing security 
mechanisms, Springer-Verlag (2001) 
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Biometric methods offer a measure of protection for personal data, through auditable 
access control, either to filing cabinets of manually held data through physical access 
control, or to material held in databases through electronic control of access. If viewed in 
this way, they can be seen to be privacy-enhancing. However, databases of biometric 
identifiers - whether these are images of faces or fingerprints, templates, or pointers to 
where these are stored - are liable to be targets for criminals. They could be governments 
that wish to extend the use of the biometric to other services that were not envisaged in 
the initial proposals. The management of private organisations could trade their 
authentication capabilities if the local legal environment did not preclude this. In each of 
these cases, a biometric system incorporating privacy-enhancing measures could support 
the rights of the individual data subject. 
 
One of the earliest attempts to create a commercially viable privacy enhancing biometric 
was the Mytec optical computer. A coherent light source reflected off an optical 
fingerprint-sensing device, and coded the fingerprint into the two-dimensional Biocrypt 
image using a proprietary one-way optical function. This could then operate the protected 
applications, e.g. through releasing the private key in a PKI system. Only the 
reapplication of the correct finger would enable that function to be performed. As the 
fingerprint was itself optically encoded, it would not be possible to regenerate the initial 
image or link it to a specific individual.  
 
ZN Vision has developed a Privacy Filter that blurs facial images in a CCTV system and 
sets an alarm once a face is recognised by its algorithms, decoding the image for use by 
the legally permitted authorities198. 
 
More recently, other systems have been proposed. For example, Philips engineers have 
proposed a delta-contracting and epsilon-revealing function, along with 'helper' functions 
to code the biometric information robustly and securely199. There are other approaches 
such as hiding watermark functionality within the template generation algorithm and the 
use of cancellable biometrics through the application-dependent distortion of the image 
(notification of a stolen biometric allows the re-enrolment to a different distortion 
function)200.  
 
RC/TTL7  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 7: Further development of the 
Best Practices, based upon experience of similar codes in other fields. One specific 
application could be in the integration with Privacy Impact Assessments, together 
with advice to auditors confirming the adherence to such a Code. 
 
 
RC/TTL8  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 8: Further studies should 
continue to monitor the progress towards a uniform interpretation of the privacy 
issues surrounding the use of biometrics in the countries of the EU (including the 
Newly Accessioning States), and support the activity of the Article 29 Working Party 
with impartial information about developments in biometrics. Users' experience in 
the application of biometrics should be collated and interpreted with the aim of 
either lobbying for a revision in the legal regime or for retention of the status quo . 
 
RC/TTL9  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 9: The status of those unable to 
use the preferred biometric solutions should be recognised, whether these are in the 
private or in the public sector. Solutions are required that will limit the long term 
exclusion of such individuals from the opportunities offered by uniform secure 
authentication. 
                                                                 
198 Tamed snoopers, www.zn-ag.com/news/2001/en_wiwo_2001_10_11.htm   
199 Jean-Paul Linnartz and Pim Tuyls, New shielding functions to enhance privacy and prevent 
misuse of biometric templates, 4th International conference on Audio- and Video- Based Biometric 
person Authentication Conference, AVBPA 2003, Surrey (June 2003) 
200 N K Ratha et al, Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems, 
IBM Systems Journal 40 (3) 614-634 (2001) 
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RC/TTL10  RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 10: Work is required to develop 
a framework for the legal admissibility of biometric data. This should build upon the 
existing procedures for scene of crime fingerprints and handwritten signatures. 
 
 
 
5.6  Standardisation activities in biometrics 
 
The wide range of different biometric methods (see section 4), and the ways in which 
such methods are implemented by the 200+ suppliers, fails to allow for complete 
standardisation. The templates are defined in proprietary ways with (often secret) 
algorithms that process the raw images or signals from the biometric sensors into 
templates which form the basis for future comparisons. It is only in the case of 
fingerprints that there is a standard approach for the basic building block in many 
systems. In these systems, the ends of fingerprint ridges or points where a ridge splits into 
two ('minutiae') represent key points. Nevertheless, each supplier using this approach will 
code the minutiae in different ways.   
  
Several years ago, the industry recognised that one of the deterrents to the adoption of 
biometric methods was the lack of any interoperability between systems. Most of the 
suppliers of devices and sensors, or the specialist software that was needed to operate a 
biometric-enabled system, were relatively small and undercapitalised. Even if the 
companies survived, upgrades might not be compatible and maintenance costs were 
unpredictable, if the customer was tied to the one supplier. The BioAPI initiative was one 
of a number of application programming interfaces that were proposed in 1998-9 to 
provide a measure of reassurance. The initial consortium included Compaq (now HP), 
Microsoft, IBM, Novell and companies that later became Identix and eTrue. (Microsoft 
continued to partner a small private company in developing a lower (device) level API 
called BAPI201, and this major player has committed to introducing this de facto standard 
in the next version of its operating system.) Intel joined the BioAPI consortium, bringing 
with it the Human Resources Services extension to the CDSA from the Open Group. 
Version 1.1 of BioAPI, along with a final reference implementation, was released in 
March 2001 and approved as an ANSI/INCITS standard 358-2002 in February of 2002. 
 
BioAPI202 allows a common way of communicating between the basic technology of a 
biometric device and another application. The goal was to support as wide a range of 
applications while remaining neutral to both vendor and biometric method. It consists of a 
set of function calls in C together with defined data structures, specific error handling 
routines and conformance requirements. A number of optional features are included, such 
as control of the user interface, implementation in client/server mode and data signing and 
encryption. The data structure of the Biometric Information Record (BIR) - albeit with an 
opaque template block - is defined as well. Its interoperability with Intel's Common Data 
Security Architecture (CDSA) allows a more complete security environment to be 
defined.  
 
The BIR is designed to conform to an already defined standard for the file format 
containing the biometric template. The emerging CBEFF standard (currently renamed as 
the Common Biometric Exchange Framework Format) had been published originally in 
March 1999. It describes a set of data elements in the form of a header and biometric data, 
with the data header containing information such as version number, length of data, type 
of biometric (and, for example, which finger it relates to), whether or not the data is 
encrypted, and the domain of applicability (e.g. only for verification). The owner of the 
specific format and the specific type is coded in the file in a standard way, against a 
                                                                 
201 BAPI – The biometric standard 
http://www.iosoftware.com/Documents/The%20Biometric%20Standard.pdf  
202 www.bioapi.org  
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registration with the authority, the IBIA (International Biometric Industry Association). A 
number of changes have been proposed and an augmented version is currently available 
in draft form203. The file format is harmonised with the BioAPI BIR and with the financial 
industry's X9.84 standard. 
 
A working group in the American Bankers Association produced a standard for the 
financial services sector that has since been adopted by ANSI, the US national standards 
body, with work in progress to develop it into an international ISO standard. X9.84 
describes the mechanisms to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of biometric data 
in transmission and storage, as well as to authenticate the source of such data. It specifies 
the management of this data throughout its life cycle, the security of the hardware, and its 
application both to verification and identification of employees and customers as well as 
to physical and logical access control. The biometric record used in X9.84 is compatible 
with the CBEFF file structure. 
 
As another example of application specific standards, Intel has issued guidelines for the 
use of fingerprint sensors in notebook computers and evaluated three silicon sensors 
against these guidelines204. 
 
Meanwhile, other standards had been under development. For example, ISO's sub-
committee SC17 on Cards and Personal Identification continues to work with the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) on standards for the airline industry. 
Another group, SC27, on IT security techniques is also working on security testing and 
evaluation of biometrics. The potential overlap between these two bodies and possible 
activities under the new biometrics group, SC37, was one of the concerns expressed by 
national bodies that opposed the creation of the new ISO sub-committee on biometrics. 
 
The UK government's Biometric Working Group (BWG) was started several years ago to 
co-ordinate the efforts of individual departments and to progress the development of these 
methods through research and specific tasks related to the needs of the government 
community. CESG, the Communications Electronic Security Group, operates this activity 
with funding from the Office of the eEnvoy. 
 
BWG has supported the UK's National Physical Laboratory in developing its competence 
as the world's prime testing centre for biometrics, publishing the Best Practices205 
guidance for testing and reporting which also forms the basis for a special working group 
in the new ISO biometrics sub-committee SC37. (Note that the original work that led to 
the NPL's pre-eminence was the outcome of another European research programme, 
BIOTEST.) The BWG has also developed the Protection Profile for the security 
evaluation of biometric devices under the Common Criteria scheme206. 
 
A similar body to the BWG is the US Biometrics Consortium. Although it has a larger 
membership and a wider remit than the BWG, both research and standards-oriented work 
is undertaken within the various BC working groups. Its six-monthly 
workshop/conferences are very well attended with detailed technical presentations. 
 
Other more specialised activities are also underway in specific countries, e.g. the 
AAMVA (American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators) research into a 
                                                                 
203 Fernando Podio et al, NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), Revised CBEFF 
NIST/BC Biometric WG Draft of Common Biometric Exchange Framework Format (CBEFF) Draft 
NISTIR 6529-A in internal review. (v7, available to national standards organisations as ISO/IEC 
JTC1/SC 37 N37) 
204 Biometric User Authentication: Fingerprint Sensor Product Guidelines 
http://www.intel.com/design/mobile/platform/downloads/FingerprintSensorProductGuidelines.pdf 
(15 September 2003) 
205 A Mansfield and J Wayman, Best Practices in Testing and Reporting Performance of Biometric 
Devices (V 2.01, August 2002) www.cesg.gov.uk/technology/biometrics  
206 http://www.cesg.gov.uk/technology/biometrics/media/bdpp082.pdf (Draft Issue 0.82, 5 
September 2001) 
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standard for driving licenses in the USA and Canada, which is investigating the use of 
biometrics in this de facto identity card. 
 
During 2002 there was an ongoing discussion on the benefits of 'fast tracking' certain of 
the more generic standards at the international level through ISO/IEC, the joint 
International Standards Organisation and International Electrotechnical Committee207. 
This resulted in the creation of subcommittee SC 37, whose inaugural meeting was held 
in Orlando, USA in December 2002, with a remit to address four activities:  
 
· APIs, such as the BioAPI 
· File formats, such as the augmented version of CBEFF 
· Profile development, based upon these two 
· Standardisation of biometric templates. 
 
As a result, both BioAPI and CBEFF are being put forward for adoption as standard, and 
provided that no major objections are received, these should attain the status of a standard 
in late 2004 (current versions for ballot by national standards bodies are FCD19784 and 
CD19785, respectively). Work has also commenced on a number of additional standards, 
among which are Biometric Data Interchange Formats for the images from face, 
fingerprints and iris recognition (part of the ISO/IEC multi-part standard WD19794) and 
a standard for biometric testing and reporting (NP19795). Six working groups carry on 
the work of the sub-committee SC37, with the first meetings held in Ottawa in April 2003 
and Rome in September 2003: 
 
WG1. Harmonized biometric vocabulary  
WG2. Biometric technical interfaces (BioAPI and CBEFF) 
WG3. Biometric data interchange formats 
WG4. Biometric functional architecture and related profiles208 
WG5. Biometric testing and reporting 
WG6. Cross-jurisdictional and societal aspects 
 
The harmonised vocabulary is likely to be incorporated as part of a current standard, ISO 
2382.  
 
RC/S1  RC - STANDARDS 1: Interface standards are needed for all aspects of the 
operation of systems using a biometric. These should be in a form that is easily used 
by the design community and readily applicable to the variety of applications that 
are described in this roadmap. 
 
 
RC/S2  RC - STANDARDS 2: The prime driver of standardisation appears to be 
early application to border security and towards improvements in the physical 
security of transportation systems (especially in airports). Will this impact upon the 
usefulness of such standards in other application areas? 
 
 
RC/S3  RC - STANDARDS 3: Standards should be appropriate for specific 
application areas (including the legal and societal context). Work on 'profiles' should 
be grounded in case studies of existing and proposed systems  
 
 
                                                                 
207 A preparatory paper on the need to address interoperability in smart card and biometrics was 
prepared by FhG-SIT and Giesecke & Devrient in the autumn of 2002. Bruno Struif et al, TB 1 - 
BioNorm: Need for specifications and standardisation to achieve interoperability in the field of 
smart cards and biometrics , www.electronic-identity.org (23 October 2002) 
208 A standards profile for a specific function (e.g. verification of identity) is a complete collection 
of references to other standards with the options in those standards defined specifically for the 
function. 
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RC/S4  RC - STANDARDS 4: Work to support the standards activities in testing, 
validating, accrediting and accepting deployed systems at the hardware, algorithm 
and user acceptance levels. 
 
 
RC/S5  RC - STANDARDS 5: Although a study group (SG6) has been formed to 
examine legal and societal aspects of standardisation, historically, standards bodies 
have been reluctant to develop international standards in this area. At present, the 
usefulness (and acceptability to some national bodies) of such a standard remains to 
be proven. 
 
 
RC/S6  RC - STANDARDS 6: Relatively few players are taking an active role in the 
development of standards, even though standardisation initiatives are being 
accelerated to meet the requirements of border control applications. Other national 
bodies (including many in the EU) are unaware of the implications of such 
standards. Sharing of knowledge should be encouraged through the formation of a 
European special interest group. 
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6.    The immediate outlook for the application of biometrics 
6.1  Overview  
 
For many years consultants have predicted the imminent take-off of the market for 
biometrics, through the acceptance of these technologies as a cornerstone of improved 
security or more convenient access to personalised services. For many reasons this take-
off has failed to materialise. These have included the lack of an objective valuation of the 
resources that needed to be protected by advanced security mechanisms. Even when such 
data was available (e.g. for fraudulent credit card transactions), deployment and 
operational costs far outweighed the savings that could be made. For a long time, the 
industry attempted to convince everyone of its maturity, in spite of the slow progress to 
standardisation, the unresolved doubts on privacy and the generally limited capital base of 
the suppliers of core technology. It was also recognised that the government sector (which 
includes in Europe, most of the education and health sectors and much of the transport 
infrastructure) would probably have to give the lead, since - just as the biometrics 
industry was beginning to address these criticisms - the retrenchment in IT spending in 
2000-3 placed a halt on major infrastructural expenditure. The growth in identity theft in 
the USA appeared to be insufficient to galvanise the private sector into addressing the 
need for stronger authentication. Other reasons of a more general nature are discussed in 
Section 7.1. 
 
It was only the response to the threat of terrorism posed by the open borders in the USA 
that appeared to guarantee a future income stream to biometric equipment suppliers, even 
though revenues from this group of applications will only start to flow towards the end of 
the period under review in this section, 2003-5. Furthermore, as the result of the 
Enhanced Border Security Act209, a requirement has been placed on the countries of the 
European Union to have a biometric-enabled travel document programme in place by 
October 2004 for those travellers visiting the USA. In parallel, a number of European 
countries (among which are the Netherlands, the UK and Germany) have decided to 
improve the security of their travel documents through the possible use of a biometric. In 
the UK, this coincided with a consultation exercise on a nationwide Entitlement Card that 
would provide some of the functions of a national identity card. Among the options for 
this card (and indeed the issue of future key documents such as the passport and driving 
licence) was a national biometric database that would ensure the unique identity of every 
citizen210.  
 
It remains to be seen what the impact of these government activities will be on the private 
sector. It is certain that the impetus that it has given to standards work and to the 
improvement in secure and robust biometric sensors will feed through into a re-
appraisement of the opportunities for their more widespread use.  
 
Status and growth of the market for biometrics 
 
Throughout 2002, a number of reports had been produced that attempt to forecast the 
future revenues in the biometric sector through to 2007 and beyond. Some have sufficient 
detail to enable an assessment to be made of the market in Europe. The table below 
summarises the key figures. It is immediately clear that there is considerable confusion as 
to the meaning of the 'biometrics industry'. Does it include revenues from the very large-
scale AFIS systems which have been dominated by a few very large companies and 
which represents a market that dwarfs the other biometric applications? Some forecasters 
include the revenues of system integrators; some do not. The reliability of forecasts in the 
                                                                 
209 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (14 May 2002) 
210 Note that such a database would be unlikely to be adopted in other EU countries such as 
Germany. 
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longer term is also in doubt, since decisions on many of the opportunities such as the 
UK's national biometric database have not yet been made. We have, therefore, chosen to 
limit the analysis of the near term future to 2005. 
 
 2002 2005  
 World Europe World Europe  
Jan 02211  $70m  $240m Includes logical 
access, civil ID and 
criminal justice 
applications 
April 02212 $200m  $1.5bn $500m Excludes integrator 
revenues, end user 
purchases and AFIS 
Summer 
02213 
$600m  $2.2bn ($200m)
214 
Includes AFIS, civil 
ID and middleware 
Autumn 02215 $260m     
Dec 02216 $110m  $476m  'moderate forecast' 
April 03217 $946m    Includes AFIS, civil 
ID 
 
Table: Forecast revenues for biometrics 2002-2005 as reported in 2002-3 
IBG's analysis of the predicted market share of the individual technologies shows 
surprisingly little change during the period 2001 to 2003 (Note that AFIS systems are 
excluded in their predictions)218: 
 
 2001 share 2003 share 2002 2002 
Fingerprint and finger-scanning 49 52 42 38 
Facial recognition 15 11 13 17 
Hand geometry  10 10 12 18 
Iris recognition 6 7 11 17 
Speaker verification 4 4 5 3 
Dynamic signature systems  3 2 6 6 
Middleware  12 12 10  
 
Table: Market share of biometric technologies (2001/2003 from IBG compared with data 
from two other consultants’ reports) 
 
The additional columns list the distribution of revenues in 2002 according to two other 
consultants' reports. 
                                                                 
211 IDC, For your eyes only - Biometrics and hardware authentication in Europe (January 2002) 
212 R Norton, Where will Biometric Revenues grow from 2002 to 2006?, IBIA Biometrics Advocacy 
Report, IV (6) 5 April 2002 
213 International Biometrics Group, The future of biometrics: trends to 2004, Biometrics 2002 
conference and exhibition (London, 6 November 2002, based upon the IBG's Biometric market 
report 2003-2007) 
214 Europe and Australia will account for $190m (13% of total) in 2004 
215 Elsevier Advanced Technology, The biometric industry report: forecast and analysis to 2006, 
(review in Biometric Technology Today, January 2003) 
216 Allied Business Intelligence, Biometric Systems:Worldwide deployments, market drivers and 
major players (2002) 
217 Business Communications Company, RG-276 The global biometrics market, predicting an 
average annual growth rate of nearly 30% to 2007 ($3.4bn; compare IBG's forecast of $4bn by the 
same date) www.bccresearch.com/editors/RG-276.html  
218 IDC quotes global figures of fingerprint recognition (44%); facial recognition (14%); speaker 
verification (10%); iris recognition (8%); other (24%). Emma Nash, Pay attention, 007; biometrics 
has some real-world potential, Computing (7 August 2003), p.22 
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Biometrics supporting services 
 
The categorisation of application areas shown in the table below attempts to avoid double 
counting, and illustrates the diversity of opportunities that could exploit the specific 
characteristics of biometric technologies. In the succeeding sections, we examine current 
initiatives and future trends in a selection of the most promising domains. These have also 
been chosen to demonstrate the variety of drivers that will impact upon the adoption of 
new solutions using biometrics: 
 
· the impact of decisions taken outside of the European Union (improvements in the 
security of air travel); 
· the challenge of integration of many diverse and complex services in the Internet age 
provided by a single supplier (government-to-citizen services); 
· fragmentation of responsibility for the development of new security solutions in a 
single sector (physical and electronic service security in the health sector);  
· cost-benefit, security and robustness considerations (security of services in the 
financial sector). 
 
 
Sector   Comments 
Fundamental 
identify 
services 
National ID card 
Passport  
Birth and death registration 
Social security card 
Significant work is 
underway in the UK and 
the Netherlands 
governments in respect 
of passport and national 
cards (UK Passport 
Service committed to 
use in 2005 onwards). 
Use of biometrics in 
welfare benefit payment 
has been a long-
standing feature of some 
states programmes in 
the USA. 
Government to 
Citizen services 
Registration of home, change of 
address 
Driving licence 
Asylum seekers card 
Work permit  
Immigration visas 
Tax payment 
Wills & testaments 
Voting - registration  
e-Voting 
Physical access to buildings 
Governments in Europe 
are committed to an 
increase in the 
proportion of services 
that are directly 
accessible electronically 
(most cite a substantial 
portion by 2005). In the 
UK, possible use of a 
national biometric 
database in the issue of 
driving licenses after 
2007  
Health Medical card 
Primary care 
Hospital services 
Physical security of hospitals and 
institutions 
Pharmaceutical testing records 
Databases - data protection & integrity 
Integrity and sourcing of food 
Support for the disabled 
 
Government  
Education Examination and tests 
References 
Child protection register 
Physical security in buildings 
Iris and fingerprint 
recognition systems 
have been introduced 
into a few UK schools 
for library book control 
and meal payments.  
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Criminal 
Justice 
AFIS  
Criminal records 
Prisons, probation, tagging 
Identity of officials 
Personal weapon control 
Surveillance of public spaces 
Extension of the AFIS 
systems to other 
biometrics: palmprints 
and facial images. UK is 
developing a roadmap 
for future use of 
biometrics in this sector. 
UK's use of face 
recognition in CCTV 
cameras in Newham is 
likely to be extended.  
Defence 'Friend or foe' on battlefield 
ID cards 
Weapon control 
Tracking human activities on ground 
Extension of the US 
Department of Defense 
smart card to include a 
biometric. 
Transport  Cross-border travel 
Security of hubs (airport, stations)  
Security of access to vehicles (trucks, 
planes)  
Passenger-baggage reconciliation 
Ticket control 
Alert for previously convicted 
disruptive passengers on flights 
(International) driving licence 
Numerous trials of face, 
fingerprint and iris 
systems. Main driver 
will be the requirements 
of the US for biometric 
identity checks at 
borders from 2004 
onwards. Use of 
fingerprint security for 
airport staff at London's 
City airport. 
 
Critical 
infrastructures 
Logistics 
Food, water, sewerage, fuel, electricity, 
telecomms networks 
TWIC programme for 
all workers in transport 
sector in the US (12 -15 
million) envisages the 
use of biometric 
authentication. 
Physical access 
control 
Access to buildings 
Time and attendance 
Single cash and ID card 
Time and attendance is 
a large market for 
biometrics in the USA 
Process flow Logical access and accountability  
Databases HR and customer databases - data 
protection and integrity 
 
CRM Identifying customers at call centres  
Logical access Email and IT for business processes  
Internal 
organisations 
Background 
checks 
Search for previous criminal 
convictions – under mandatory schemes 
 
Manufacturing Access control To specific machines and processes  
Personal  Opening and moving accounts 
Aggregation of accounts 
Electronic (web) transactions 
Insurance 
 
Point of sale Credit and debit cards Relatively little activity 
currently. In the UK, 
introduction of PIN 
needs to be completed 
first. 
Financial 
services 
Back office Accountability of transaction 
Interbank transfers 
Dealer desks 
 
Age-limited 
services 
Tobacco, alcohol, TV and video and 
Internet  
 
Removal of 
banned or 
excluded people 
Casinos 
Night clubs 
Football hooligans 
 
Privileged 
services 
Frequent users (air miles, loyalty cards) 
Airport lounges 
'All inclusive' resorts 
Gyms and fitness centres 
Digital Rights Management (originating 
or using copyright material) 
Season tickets (train, football, theme 
parks)  
 
Specific users 
only 
Leasing/lending valuable artworks 
Dating services 
 
Leisure 
services 
Service sharing Car personalisation (rental and family) 
Personalisation of PC and TV settings 
in a family 
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 Hotels Meals, rooms, gym: payment and 
personalisation 
 
Physical access Replacement of keys on doors  Home security 
Theft protection Personalisation of products and services  
Telecomms Theft protection Mobile and fixed phone authentication  
 
Table: Selection of services that could make use of biometric technologies 
 
6.2  Biometrics applied to identity and identity documents  
 
For many governments, the most significant element in their relationship with citizens is 
the establishing of a unique and usable identity. From registration at birth, to issue of 
identity cards, social security and health cards and passports, through to registration at 
death, a stable and unalterable identity for each person is an underlying requirement for 
such a relationship. It is the key to operation of an efficient system of law and order, to 
the collection of taxes and distribution of benefits, and to the re-entry of citizens to their 
home country. Most governments, even in the European Union, still have distributed 
identity systems, resulting in the absence of a coherent single view across all their 
services. With their commitment to electronic delivery of services, it is likely that 
governments will want to unify these systems. Inevitably, this will impact on 
commercially delivered services, through the blurring of the boundaries between the 
public and private sectors, and the use of more reliable identities and services developed 
by the state.  
 
More secure identities are likely to benefit the individual through efficiencies in the 
operation of government and in the reduction of identity fraud (see Section 6.5). There 
are, however, considerable hazards in maintaining aggregated databases, even if they 
operated under the safeguards of the European privacy and data protection regime. Not 
only would such databases be tempting targets both for criminals in each state, and 
entities outside of the country, the freedom of action for individuals could be reduced 
from that enjoyed currently (See Section 1.2 for a further discussion of the issues). There 
are many legitimate reasons for using multiple identities, and government agencies need 
to recognise the arguments for proportionality in their dealings with their citizens. In 
many instances, the option for anonymity in the use of services is questioned by 
authorities. The threat of terrorism has even legitimised the American concept of TIA - 
Terrorist (previously Total) Information Awareness - the nation-wide mining of all 
electronically collected data in an effort to track suspicious activity. The extension of 
such measures to other aims of governments, such as the reduction of the 'black 
economy', is an obvious example of 'function creep', even though the side-effects of these 
actions could be socially unpredictable and destabling. 
 
National identification schemes for governments are more complex than they appear to 
many naïve commentators. Even in the EU, there is a wide diversity of approaches to the 
issuance and operation of documents and identification numbers219, reflecting the custom 
and practice in the member states before the formation of the Union. For example, a 
universal personal number is only used in some countries; there are no identity cards in a 
                                                                 
219 editors ARTTIC, Electronic Identity White Paper, E-ID White Paper, part of the eEurope Smart 
Card Charter and initiative (January 2003); and B&L Management Consulting GmbH, Study on the 
deployment and interoperability of electronic and biometric authentication and identification, Draft 
Final Report for the European Commission (June 2003), and recommendations from the Brussels 
Workshop (3 April 2003). Porvoo EID Group, Report on Seminar on Interoperable European 
Electronic ID/Public Service cards, (Dublin, 20-21 November 2002). For a recent compilation of 
national identity schemes worldwide, see chair Joe Fontana, A national identity card for Canada? 
Report of the standing committee on citizenship and immigration, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/Documents/37/2/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/cimmrp06-
e.htm (October 2003) 
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few states; and depending on where you are, identity cards may be required to be carried 
on the person at all times; registration authorities may be centralised or delegated to local 
municipalities.  
 
The main options for modern national identification schemes include: 
 
§ A universal single identifier, usually in the form of a serially allocated number 
§ A database entry linked to identifier, recording either permanent information (date of 
birth, gender, identity of parents) or including variable information such as address. 
§ A paper document recording the birth of the individual, with date of birth, gender and 
parental details. 
§ An identity card, issued at birth or at a specific age, which may record overtly or in a 
machine readable form only, information such as the universal identifier and some or 
all of the information in the database. 
§ An identity card with electronic functionality, such as digital certificates for use in 
transactions that make use of PKI (Public Key Encryption) security technologies 
§ An identity card with or without electronic functionality that stores a biometric 
template or image for comparison of the identity of the principal with the person 
presenting the card. 
§ A social security or health card, specifically issued for the respective purposes, but 
with some use as an identification document. 
§ A machine readable travel document (most commonly, a citizen's passport) issued in 
formats defined by ICAO220 
§ A driving licence. Although issued for a specific purpose, it is often used as an 
identification document, especially in the US. 
 
As the move towards e-government gains momentum, proposals for a new range of 
identity cards with electronic functionality have resulted. The most eagerly anticipated 
was the Finnish PKI card; however, the take-up has been somewhat disappointing (only 
10,000 issued by April 2003) at a cost of 29 euros and validity of only three years. A 
larger acceptance has been seen in the Estonian card, of which more than 130,000 were 
issued in its first year of operation. The new Italian card has the option of fingerprint 
encoding221 while the Belgian government commenced the issue of such cards in April 
2003 at a cost of approximately 10 euro. Interoperability of these electronic cards has 
been examined in a White Paper from the Finnish Population Registration Centre222. 
 
In the move towards more secure systems, suppliers of database and biometric solutions 
have undoubtedly skewed the debate in favour of their commercial aims with over-
simplified scenarios. Increasingly, however, there is evidence of more careful analysis of 
the feasibility of such schemes, the cost (both in the initial deployment, as well as the on-
going enrolment and maintenance), the extent of the benefits to stakeholders, etc.223 The 
debate needs to be conducted with a recognition of the numerous options, and the 
implications for the convenience and protection of individuals, as well as for 
interoperability within a state and between states both in the EU and world-wide. 
 
Biometric methods are viewed as critical components in many of the proposals, with face, 
iris and fingerprint recognition technologies particularly evident in many of the proposals 
and trial implementations. At present, no countries in Europe have a full biometric-
enabled identification document (although Spanish cards store a fingerprint image). 
Outside of Europe, there have been a number of deployments and a number of others 
have been announced. Examples include: 
                                                                 
220 International Civil Aviation Organisation 
221 Mario Gentilli, Italian electronic identity card - principle and architecture, Proc of the 27th 
VLDB conference, Rome (2001) 
222 available at project EUCLID's site: www.electronic-identity.org  
223 Thien-Loc Nguyen, National Identification Systems, MSc thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (June 2003), at theory.lcs.mit.edu/~cis/theses/nguyentl-masters.ps; and Computer 
Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, Ids - Not that easy: Questions 
about nationwide identity systems, National Academy Press (2001) 
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· Brunei (ultimate use 400,000, started July 2000, 8k smart card with two thumbprint 
templates) 
· Hong Kong (to start in July 2003 using thumbprints) 
· Macau's Citizen Card  with dual fingerprint identification (540,000 people) 
· Malaysian MyKad identity cards (3 million in circulation in January 2003) and 
passports (the latter with a pair of thumbprints coded at 500 bytes per print)224 
· Mauritania (1.1m citizens, fingerprints) 
· Nigeria (60m fingerprint registrations) 
· Oman (to start in November 2003 with a fingerprint verifier) 
· Peru (13m people enrolled, fingerprints, stored as 2D bar code) 
· Uganda (face recognition) 
 
However, it is clear that if the underlying register of individuals has been compromised, 
the addition of a biometric identifier to the existing range of identity documents based 
upon this register will only compound the problems. Hence, any data cleansing should be 
done before the introduction of new identity cards with biometric authentication. At the 
same time, the political decision is required as to how widespread will be the sharing of 
such primary data between departments in a government. In most EU countries, this will 
be limited by law. In others, the need to reduce the possibilities of widespread identity 
theft may lead to a compromise that is agreed with the citizen. In such cases, the use of 
technical and procedural measures to limit sharing in instances where it is not permitted 
may reassure some individuals. Nevertheless, an open debate is needed, with the 
recognition that identity databases will be very attractive targets for criminal activity. The 
need to provide for change of identity in legitimate cases, for example such as in witness 
protection programmes, has to be borne in mind in any designs. 
 
Undoubtedly the main driver for the more widespread use of biometrics in travel 
documents in the near future has been the decision of the US Congress to mandate their 
inclusion i) in visas for travellers to the US and ii) in passports for any country currently 
exempted under the Visa Waiver programme225.  Although the legislation appears to 
require such countries to have a programme  in place to issue such passports from October 
2004, certain statements from senior US officials seem to indicate that any passports 
issued after that date must have biometric identifier(s). Industry sources believe that this 
is an unattainable goal. The simultaneous revision of the passports of over 20 major 
countries, with new equipment needed to securely seal in the silicon integrated circuit, the 
setting up of Public Key Infrastructures to secure the electronic data into the chip, and  
testing the new range of passports together with the integration of processes of biometric 
enrolment and issue of passports seems unlikely to be completed within this timescale. By 
mid July 2003, there had still been no public statement of the biometrics to be used, nor 
any details of the technical specifications. Indeed, at this time, the ISO standards 
organisation were still discussing the standards for formats of the exchange of biometric 
data and the APIs and file formats that would be used. 
 
The leading EU countries involved in the development of biometric methods in identity 
and travel documents have been the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy. In the 
summer of 2002, the Home Office in the UK issued a consultation document on 
'Entitlement Cards', strongly linking the proposal for a new type of card to the increasing 
incidence of identity fraud226. The consultation, which closed at the end of January 2003, 
focussed strongly on the use of biometrics in reducing the opportunity for multiple 
applications for identification documents. In the absence of pre-existing identity cards, a 
national database of individuals using one or more biometric methods would ensure that 
anyone attempting to apply for a second passport or driving licence would be identified. 
In time, the proposal envisaged that every person above the age of 16 would be registered, 
and those who did not require a driving licence or passport would be issued with an 
                                                                 
224 Eddy Cheah, The new Malaysian smart passport, Keesing's Journal of Documents issue 1 (2003) 
225 US Congress, Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (2002) 
226 Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud: A Consultation, (Home Office, July 2002) 
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Entitlement Card. The results of the consultation are expected soon, and plans for trialling 
of the various options are underway. The response of the UK's Information Commissioner 
highlighted the numerous options that were offered in the paper, making it difficult for 
him to assess the extent to which the benefits of such a unique plan would 'outweigh the 
risks to privacy, human rights and social values'227. He laid particular stress on fitness for 
the range of identified purposes; he notes the need for clearer proposals with safeguards 
in relation to the quality, amount and adequacy of data; and recommended that the 
database underlying the proposal store the minimum amount of data necessary to allow 
the system to work correctly. In a separate move, the Home Office has committed itself to 
the issue of supplementary passport cards with a biometric identifier228.  
 
Additionally, the UK has had considerable experience in the operation of an Asylum 
Seeker's Card. For over 18 months, all asylum seekers are required to register for a smart 
card and provide a set of fingerprints using a livescan electronic capture system. These 
are stored in a database. Individuals who attempt to re-enter the UK as asylum seekers 
after their claims have been dismissed are caught by immigration officers equipped with 
fingerprint readers at the ports of entry.  
 
The Netherlands has also been active in this area, hosting the first European conference to 
explore the options for the application of biometrics in travel documents229. Having 
completely updated its range of passports, identity cards and emergency issue identity 
documents in October 2001, the aim of the Dutch authorities is to introduce usable and 
secure biometric authentication to reduce the incidence of 'look alike fraud'. It has trialled 
a number of applications using biometrics and the Ministry of Justice is rolling out a PKI-
based electronic card to its 40,000 employees using smart card and RFID technology. 
Fingerprint biometrics with the match of template to image presented at the reader taking 
place on the card itself. 
 
France's standardisation committee, AFNOR, has a specialist working committee on 
biometrics, CN FTS/GE1. By examining the opportunities for its use by the French 
government and other large organisations, it has recommended that fingerprint 
authentication is used on the grounds of 
 
· Ready availability of cost-effective terminal equipment for fingerprint capture 
· Individual granularity is possible under 1:N comparison 
· Storage of minutiae using the template defined by AAMVA (Northern American 
driving licence organisation) is possible using either 2-dimensional barcodes or smart 
cards, since the required storage amounts to 1 kbyte per fingerprint230.  
 
For a number of years, ICAO has been examining the options for a standard biometric in 
passports and other machine readable documents. On the basis of these studies231, it has 
recently recommended that the primary identifier should be a standardised digitally stored 
                                                                 
227 Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud: the Information Commissioner's Response to the 
Government Consultation Paper, (January 2003) www.dataprotection.gov.uk See also the 
comments by George Radwanski, Privacy Commissioner of Canada against the introduction of a 
national identity card in that country, in his statement to the Canadian House of commons on 18 
March 2003 at www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/2003/02_05_a_030318_e.asp  
228 UK Passport Service, Corporate and Business Plans 2003-8, (2003) envisages the completion of 
an implementation plan and business case for biometrics in passports by March 2004. The Passport 
Card, which is suggested to be used for travel within the EU, is likely to go ahead beforehand, but 
will only use digitised facial images. 
229 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, European conference for issuing authorities of 
travel documents: exploring the use of biometrics in travel documents , The Hague (June 2002) 
230 AFNOR document CN FTS N39, Recommendation of the AFNOR Committee CN FTS/GE1 
regarding biometric application to different organisation, like French government and other 
AFNOR committees, statement for consideration by the BIOVISION consortium (3 June 2003) 
231 Executive Summary: Technical Report on ICAO work on selection and testing of a biometric 
technology for identity confirmation with machine readable travel documents (MRTDs), 
www.icao.int/en/atb/fal/mrtd/biometric_tech.htm  
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facial image in support of facial recognition technologies. Furthermore, it recognises that 
countries can use 'standardised digitally stored fingerprint and iris images as additional 
globally interoperable biometrics'. Countries are encouraged to store this type of data on 
32 kbyte contactless smart cards232. These recommendations recognise that there are no 
standard templates for these technologies, and that mandating of proprietary solutions 
would not be acceptable. In view of the reduction of the price of higher capacity devices, 
some ICAO delegates would have preferred the use of 512kbyte storage media (either IC 
or optical memory cards).  
 
The ISO biometrics sub-committee SC37 has begun the standardisation process for the 
interchange of such biometric images with the text of committee drafts ISO/IEC 19794-5 
(facial image format for data interchange), 19794-4 (finger image based interchange 
format) and 19794-6 (iris format for data interchange) being circulated for comment by 
national bodies. Comments on working drafts were reviewed at the meeting of ISO/IEC 
SC 37/SG3 in Rome in early September 2003 and will be further developed in the run up 
to the February 2004 meeting in Sydney. 
 
There are other organisations also considering more secure identity documents. The 
International Labour Office in Geneva is reviewing Convention 108 for seafarer's national 
identity documents. In its recent report, it discusses the results of its consultations with 
governments233. Russia, China and Japan considered that the use of biometrics was 
problematic. The UK and the US supported its inclusion, although the US wanted the 
template, and not the 'biometric per se', to be stored for reasons of privacy. The 
Netherlands stated that, if a biometric were to be used, it should be in accordance with 
ICAO standards, while Portugal considered the use of fingerprints to be essential.  The 
first national office to introduce this type of document could be the Liberian International 
Ship and Corporate Registry, who propose to store fingerprints on the identity cards of 
seamen in ships flying the Liberian flag.  Recently, the ILO has moved towards the use of 
a template of a fingerprint as the biometric of choice.  
 
Clearly, securing identity documents (especially for travel) will be an early large-scale 
application of biometrics, and successful deployments could pave the way for more 
widespread use both by governments and private enterprise. Much of the detail of the 
operation of the biometric component in these systems remains to be determined. 
Although data interchange formats for biometric images are being proposed and a 
standard for the interchange of minutiae in fingerprints is also under consideration 
(ISO/IEC 19794-2), how these will be applied is still to be resolved. For example, the 
specific case of a national biometric database envisaged under the UK's Entitlement Card 
paper, proposals appear to require that every citizen is uniquely identified and checked 
against the biometric data of all other citizens. If the level of alarms due to false matches 
begins to rise, substantial human intervention will be required. Few biometric methods 
can address the required levels of accuracy. With presently available commercial 
implementations, facial recognition falls many orders of magnitude short of the required 
performance. In contrast, theoretical modelling of the operation of iris recognition 
systems together with a recent analysis of many groups of tests suggests that this method 
could be used successfully. However, deployments of this biometric to date have been 
relatively small (20,000 maximum population size). More detailed studies will be 
required to determine the proportion of the population unable to use the system, either 
through failure to enrol successfully, or through problems in day-to-day operation. This 
leaves fingerprint identification as the most likely contender, in spite of privacy concerns 
and the unease amongst certain sections in society about the possible crossover between 
criminal and civil AFIS systems. Experience from the many instances of quasi-automated 
criminal AFIS systems (notably the near 5m UK records and the FBI's 45m IAFIS system 
in the US) can lead to more confident predictions about the performance of a civil system 
                                                                 
232 Tom Kinneging, ICAO opts in favour of non-contact chip technology, Keesing's Journal of 
Documents Issue 1 pp 3-6 (2003) 
233 International Labour Office, Report VII (1): Improved security of seafarers' identification 
(2003). Page 12 summarises the responses of governments to proposals for biometrics. 
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using minutiae. The minimum number of fingerprints required for a given level of false 
matches can be determined from consideration of such data.  
 
In the USA, NIST (the National Institute of Science and Technology), was tasked with 
determining the minimum requirements for a system that would address the demands of 
the system envisaged under the USA Patriot Act (2001) and the Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (2002)234. Taken together these translate to: 
 
· Denial of a visa for a foreign national identified as having a criminal (presence on the 
FBI's IAFIS 45m database) or being on a 'watch list' 
· Verification that a person who has been issued with the visa matches the identity of 
the person at the entry point into the USA 
 
The conclusion of this study is that for the timescale envisaged, only facial and fingerprint 
systems are commercially available with the requisite size of databases of images for 
testing the performance of systems. The first requirement, identification against the total 
criminal database is a major challenge. Not only did existing technology demonstrate a 
2% failure to acquire rate, single finger performance on identification is inadequate. The 
authors of the report suggest 4 fingerprints would be a minimum requirement (thumb and 
index fingers of both hands), although 6 would be preferable, especially for women who 
consistently show a higher proportion of poor images. The implication of the NIST 
findings (not explicitly stated) is that a full 'tenprint' set obtained by a livescan electronic 
hardware is necessary, with a backup of a facial recognition system. Comparison of the 
performance of facial and fingerprint identification for different database sizes was 
quoted as follows: 
 
Gallery size Single fingerprint 
recognition rate 
Facial recognition rate 
100  90% 
500 95%  
1000  83% 
10,000 90% 77% 
100,000 86%  
  
The recommendation for the second requirement, for verification at the port of entry, is 
for a dual biometric system using two fingerprint images (not a proprietary template using 
minutiae) together with a facial image. At less than 10 kilobytes per image, the 
verification of visa identities would require a 32K IC card. This system could be 
compared with the Basel project at Israeli-Palestinian border crossings: face recognition 
and hand geometry biometrics have been combined on an 8K contactless smart card for 
verification of identity of the 120,000 daily workers who used to travel between the two 
countries.  
  
With the 10 new states joining the EU in 2004, the opportunities for the introduction and 
use of biometrically-secured identity documents could be a major source of revenue for 
suppliers and integrators. In 2000, the population of the 25 states was over 450m people. 
What proportion of this population would be covered remains to be determined. The UK 
government for example, has consulted on a proposal to cover everyone over the age of 
16 (51 million) over a 6 year period, together with a number of other non-casual visitors 
to the UK. If accepted, the deployment would be considerably advanced by the end of 
2010, the time horizon of this report235. We note that no other member state has made 
                                                                 
234 NIST, NIST standards for biometric accuracy, tamper resistance and interoperability, (13 
November 2002). The facial recognition results build on the FRVT2002 results summarised in 4.1.4 
and the fingerprint performance for AFIS-type systems derives from a study: Charles Wilson et al, 
Studies of fingerprint matching using the NIST Verification Test Bed (VTS), NISTIR 7020, NIST (7 
July 2003) 
235 The Home Secretary has indicated that he intends to put forward these proposals for approval by 
the Cabinet in the summer of 2003. 
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corresponding proposals. However, we would expect that countries with advanced 
electronic identity cards (e.g. Finland and Estonia) would consider the use of biometrics, 
especially if the British example were seen to be on a successful path. The new Italian 
identity card has provision for the inclusion of a biometric, and it is understood that the 
Spanish government is actively considering a new form of identity card. Netherlands has 
issued a commercial call for information on the use of biometrics The German authorities 
have paid particular attention to the possibilities offered by decentralised use of 
biometrics in passports, with specific reference to ways in which facial recognition could 
be used. As we discuss in the following section, soon after 2005, travellers to the US will 
require some form of biometric, either in the passport itself, or in a document issued in 
conjunction with the passport (in 2002, there were nearly 8.3m visitors from Western 
Europe to the US)236. Although, political decisions will dominate the date at which the 
take-up of biometrics starts to increase significantly, there seems to be little doubt that in 
the second half of the decade, millions of European citizens will start to use these 
technologies. 
 
The introduction of a biometric-enabled identity card requires considerable preparatory 
work. In particular, the purpose of the biometric element should be clarified from the 
start. Is it to establish a single unique identity, or is it to ensure that a user has no previous 
criminal convictions, or to assist in the authentication of identity when government or 
commercial services are used - or a mix of each of these? The choice of biometric method 
will be determined by the performance requirements, acceptability by citizens, security 
requirements, etc. It is instructive to compare the performance of the largest current 
biometric systems - the AFIS systems used by police forces throughout the world. In 
particular, the FBI's IAFIS 10-print matching system has been characterised in some 
detail237.  The majority of electronic checks of the 45 million records were completed in 
between 4 and 7 minutes (depending on civilian or criminal requirements), although 
considerable numbers took longer than 2 hours. The FTE (Failure to Enrol) rate is about 
0.5% for criminal searches and 2.5% for civilian background searches. 
 
Clearly biometric systems with improved performance may be required. Should this be 
the case, the consequent delay in launching a system will be evident. The Diagrammatic 
Form of a Roadmap (end page of this document) illustrates the timescales based upon the 
best estimates from the industry. Had requirements for the deployment been clearly 
articulated by mid 2003, a supplier with a development programme underway already 
could deliver a product, P2, in time for trials starting in 2005. Legislation may be required 
to permit some aspects of operation of such a system, and this should be feasible in 
parallel with trialing and prototyping. Procurement is estimated at approximately one 
year, ready for initial deployment at the beginning of 2008. Supplier S2, without a 
programme in place, will take longer to develop a solution and may miss the deadline. If, 
however, governments demand a more radical solution requiring research (taken to be a 
three-year project), the message of this analysis is that deployment is unlikely before 
2010. Unexpected changes in the drivers for development (or inhibitors, e.g. resistance by 
special interest groups) will modify the start date for deployments. 
 
In the light of this background survey, it is instructive to review the recommendations of 
the Brussels workshop of experts called to discuss the results of the preliminary report on 
electronic and biometric authentication and identification238: 
 
                                                                 
236 GAO, Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0338.pdf (November 2002) page 14. In a survey carried out in 
October 2002, only 3 of the EU countries stated that they would be able to meet these obligations 
by the requisite date.  
237 GAO, Technology Assessment: using biometrics for border security, GAO-03-174, page 149 
238 B&L Management Consulting GmbH, Study on the deployment and interoperability of 
electronic and biometric authentication and identification: Recommendations from the Brussels 
Workshop (3 April 2003); the list of recommendations are the Editor's summary of a more 
comprehensive paper. 
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· Better communication of the issues surrounding user acceptance of these new 
technologies, to decision makers in governments and to solution providers, while 
providing transparency and reassurance to the end users. 
· Development of use cases to demonstrate interoperability in border control, 
document handling (both in private and public sectors) and in access to electronic 
services on an international basis. 
· Development of a framework for interoperability 
· Undertaking several large scale independent operational tests using biometrics within 
the framework for interoperability. 
· Consideration of how multiple biometrics can be used in this type of large scale 
system. 
· Encouraging vendors towards a degree of standardisation in biometric templates, but 
recognising that in the short term, the image itself has to be used in applications 
where interoperability is required. 
· Development of guidelines for the best possible image capture during enrolment 
· Extension of BioAPI to include security aspects and XML-based standards 
· Proactive communication of the existing legal and privacy requirements to those who 
are unaware of their significance. Although these do not specifically address 
biometrics, there appears to be no need to make changes to the legal framework (with 
the possible exception of a directive on authentication in general). However, a Code 
of Conduct and Best Practices are currently under development and these should be 
widely disseminated once completed. 
· The evidential value of biometrics in law needs to be improved239, with further 
independent evaluations, such as those under the Common Criteria. 
· Development of business cases for electronic and biometric identification that 
demonstrate their legal viability 
 
Some time into the future, a biometric-enabled identity could form the basis of a cashless 
society, based upon the use of the biometric alone. Although its  technical feasibility can 
be visualised, for many citizens, such a technological solution would be viewed with 
concern - at least in today's environment. The R&D projects which have been undertaken 
(examples of which are listed in Appendix 3) point to exc iting possibilities, but without a 
corresponding understanding of the societal changes that would either encourage their use 
or the problems that need to be resolved, such futuristic designs may remain firmly in the 
realm of science fiction.  
 
Nevertheless, there are many organisations and individuals that have concerns with the 
introduction of identity cards, and comments have been made that, although citizens are 
in general in favour of their introduction (or at least not actively against their 
deployment), once the cost and legal implications for the individual citizen are clarified, 
the opposition to their use can increase substantially240. 
 
6.3  Secure air travel through the use of biometrics 
 
The tourist industry is one of the largest in the world, contributing approximately 10% of 
the world's GDP. The World Travel and Tourism Council estimates that in 2003, travel 
and tourism in the EU will account for over 7m jobs (4.4% of total employment), with an 
                                                                 
239 Work on development of the fundamental scientific data on fingerprint uniqueness is being 
undertaken as part of project TSWG Task T-1595 Statistical Analysis of Forensic Ridge Matching 
Criteria. 
240 see chair Joe Fontana, A national identity card for Canada? Report of the standing committee on 
citizenship and immigration, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfocomDoc/Documents/37/2/parlbus/commbus/house/reports/cimmrp06-
e.htm (October 2003) 
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indirect impact on a further 13m jobs. Over the next ten years, it is forecast to increase at 
a compound growth rate of 4.2%241. 
 
Although by no means the greatest component of tourism, air travel is seen by 
governments as the highest priority for improved security in the wake of the events of 
September 11th. However, any new security measures will inevitably impact on the 
traveller, the airport authority and the airline unless these are introduced in ways that 
acknowledge the realities of current processes and minimise the additional costs and 
inconveniences that will result. In spite of occasional reduction due to war and terrorist 
incidents, air travel has shown a continuing strong growth rate that is scheduled to 
continue into the foreseeable future. Over 1980-2000, passenger numbers increased at 
nearly 6% pa, with the number of passenger kilometres increasing even faster. 
 
Biometric authentication can play a role in increasing the security in travel in a number of 
ways: 
 
· Restriction of physical access to parts of airports, railway stations, etc to those who 
have been vetted and then authorised to enter such areas (An example is the recent 
announcement of fingerprint authentication of all airport workers at the City airport 
in London) 
· Authentication of pilots, drivers of trains, buses and trucks, stewards and those 
involved in supporting operations such as air traffic control. 
· Issue of tamper-resistant visas to immigrants and visitors in their home countries, and 
authentication at border entry and exit. 
· Authentication of holders of passports at ports of entry and exit (as well as ticket 
purchase if required) 
· Operation of watch lists for specific individuals who may be travelling with false 
documentation or under aliases. 
· Reconciliation of baggage with passengers at boarding, in transit and on arrival 
· Tracking of individuals and groups of people at airports and railway stations, and 
observance of unusual activities. 
 
This section aims to illustrate the complexities in deployment of biometric solutions, 
bearing in mind some of the elements from the longer term scenarios developed in section 
3.5.  (Note that this aspect of the Roadmap was completed before the significance of the 
US proposals for tighter control on travel was recognised).  A proposal to introduce a 
biometric on a passport as part of a package of security measures can have implications 
on operations far removed from those envisaged by politicians in framing laws. 
 
Aims and objectives 
 
The principal objective may be to reduce the likelihood of terrorists entering the 
destination country of a flight, or to limit the probability of hijackers seizing control of 
aircraft. However, some politicians may decide that this is an opportunity to tighten up on 
immigration (people overstaying their allowed time in the country) and on prospective 
asylum seekers. For others, it may be the time to consider adding other criminals to watch 
lists, perhaps even catching up with those travellers who failed to pay their taxes or 
parking fines. There will always be the aim of reducing costs, especially if people are 
employed in large numbers, whether by airlines, airport operators or government 
agencies. Finally, the traveller should not be forgotten; air travel is particularly stressful 
and making the process more convenient could be a useful bonus.  
 
Decisions 
 
                                                                 
241 World Travel and Tourism Council, European Union travel and tourism. A world of opportunity, 
(2003, based upon assumptions of either no war in Iraq or a quick, decisive and contained military 
action) 
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Balancing all these objectives is not a simple matter, and decisions are made by key 
players that may act to the detriment of other stakeholders. Of course, supplier and system 
integrators can lobby for their individual solutions, which may be incompatible with those 
in other airports or countries, but which may be adopted because laws are framed in their 
favour. Once the high level decisions are taken, implementation will require adjustment 
of these aims, while the day-to-day operations are left in the hands of the frontline 
managers, especially in the early stages of a deployment. Responsibility for data 
collected, checked, added to and passed onto another actor will move back and forth 
between the various players, with each message having to be delivered securely and each 
message incurring an additional cost. Throughout this process, issues of interoperability 
with existing processes and systems, and between this airport's or airline's services and 
those in other countries, will have to be addressed. In all of these changes, the biometric 
has to be robustly integrated, in spite of the performance limitations, the legal 
frameworks, the difficulty of enrolling and linking the biometric data to the correct 
identity, etc that are noted elsewhere in this Roadmap. After deployment, it may not be 
clear that any more terrorists or criminals are caught; they may have been sufficiently 
deterred to try other means of achieving their aims.  At best, it may have been a tool in 
reducing the risk to travellers or governments.  
 
The stakeholders 
 
We can characterise a number of different groups that have a voice in determining the 
operation of biometric systems in the aviation environment: 
 
· determining the framework for the deployment, and the rules under which these 
operate: parliaments, Ministry of the Interior, passport issuing authorities, regulators, 
Ministry of Finance 
· setting the day-to-day operation of these rules: immigration officers, customs 
officials, border police 
· bodies providing the infrastructure for travel: airport operators, reservation systems, 
carriers (including check-in staff and departure lounge personnel), communications 
network operators , media, 
· travellers, criminals, mass media, etc. 
 
The trials  
 
A number of European initiatives have looked at the way in which biometrics can play a 
part in enhancing aviation security242. Probably the longest running and highest profile 
scheme is Privium at Schiphol airport with iris recognition biometrics used for 
verification of the identity of trusted (and pre-enrolled travellers). The iris code is stored 
in a secure way on a smart card (for data privacy considerations), and additional benefits 
are offered in return for a service costing from 99 euros pa. The take up remains rather 
low. A trial of the same biometric is underway at London's Heathrow airport. 
 
Contrast this with the 150,000 Israeli users of a hand geometry system at Ben Gurion 
airport. A similar series of continuing pilots was conducted by US and Canada under the 
INSPASS programme but internal politics and problems with costs apparently curtailed 
their use. Finally, mention must be made of three initiatives that could yield useful 
insights into the future use of biometrics. The European Commission-funded project, S-
Travel led by SITA, will run a pilot over 2003-4, modifying the Departure Control 
Systems on Alitalia flights between Athens and Milan. The second initiative, 
Travelscape, aims to develop a future view on the best way forward in air travel, so as to 
provide all stakeholders, from governments to airlines and travellers, with a better and 
safer experience. Finally, IATA's Simplifying Passenger Travel programme (SPT) has 
                                                                 
242 A list of biometric installations at airports, the technologies used at each, and the integrator and 
website for further information is available in a BIOVISION report: Michael Behrens et al, 
Discussion paper on actual testing programs and recommendations: Annex 1 (July 2003) 
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launched test beds in Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and the UK that use 
biometrics for improvement of aviation security and passenger convenience243. 
 
The key factors 
 
All will measure performance and success in different ways. Fast throughput at lowest 
cost will be of prime importance to airport authorities and carriers. Convenience and 
trustworthiness will be key to the end user experience. Immigration officials will want the 
fewest possible false alarms, but with the highest security and probability of capturing 
criminals. In designing the processes, software and hardware, integrators need to take 
account of all of these competing factors: 
 
· Cost (including that related to secure messaging) and return on investment over the 
timescales of interest to the respective parties, balanced by cost savings by removing 
existing paper-based processes  
· Aggressive timescales to build and deploy 
· Transaction times (especially at peak times or seasons of the year) 
· Penalties for failure in detection or throughput 
· Responsibilities for the respective activities 
· Complexity of the technical infrastructures 
· Impact on other processes 
· Physical restrictions on space - footprint of the hardware 
· Distribution of checks along the sequence of check-in, passport check, security 
check, boarding, etc. 
· Robustness of solutions, actions in case of failure of the biometric (fallback options), 
exception handling especially at peak times, response to unco-operative individuals 
or groups or intentional damage to the hardware by travellers or insiders 
· Error handling, separation of processes, redundancy, aggregation of data 
· Liability if a traveller misses a flight or connections or is refused entry to the 
country244. 
· Privacy considerations; who owns the data, for what other purposes can it be used, 
and what controls are in place to limit the use in other countries? 
· Interoperability and scalability of solutions - role of standards bodies in providing 
tailored solutions that do not overburden particular players. Calibration of nominally 
identical systems between airports.  
 
Role of the European Biometric Forum  
 
In complex applications of biometrics - such as aviation, it is important that the numerous 
stakeholders appreciate the different perspectives before decisions are taken. In addition 
to sharing the understanding the significance of the factors that have been highlighted in 
this roadmap, and the information gained from the numerous trials, the EBF should 
provide a resource for those who are newcomers to the field. This can be in the form of 
vendor-independent summaries of the results, presentations and displays on current best 
practice, ands access to consultants who are recognised as having the requisite 
experience. 
 
The commitments 
 
At the end of the recent meeting of G8 Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs, a high 
level working group on biometric technologies was announced, co-chaired by the US and 
                                                                 
243 IATA Annual Report 2003 
244 The difficulties of operating watch lists have been demonstrated by current, non-biometric, 
systems of checking on the backgrounds of passengers; see EPIC, Documents show errors in TSA's 
'No-Fly' watchlist, www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/watchlist_foia_analysis.html  
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France. The meeting would report on ways to develop the technologies, including the 
manner of assessing their effectiveness245.  
 
The US has already led with an announcement that as from the beginning of the 2004, all 
visitors travelling to the US by air and sea will be fingerprinted and photographed on 
arrival, with a Congress appropriation for $400m for the first part of the US-VISIT 
project 246. Procedures to check visitors at the exit from the US are also envisaged. This is 
part of the programme to gradually include biometric verification of identity for all 23 
million annual visitors to the US, the technical background and financial assessment for 
which was published by the US General Accounting Office in November 2002247. This 
very comprehensive report concluded that there were three considerations to be addressed 
before going ahead with such a system: 
 
· A decision is needed on how the technology would be used 
· A cost-benefit analysis is required 
· A trade-off analysis is also needed between the increased security offered by 
biometrics and the impact on areas such as privacy and the economy. 
 
The GAO costed four different scenarios: 
 
 Initial cost, 
$ 
Annual 
recurring 
cost, $ 
Watch list check before issue of travel 
documents 
53m 73m 
Watch list check before entry to the US 330m 237m 
Issue of visas with biometrics 1.4 - 2.8bn 0.7 - 1.5bn 
Issue of passports with biometrics 4.5 - 8.8bn 1.6 - 2.4bn 
 
A more recent report from the GAO complains that security and privacy had not been 
addressed at a quite late stage in the development of the exit-entry project for visitors to 
the US248.  The latest assessment is for tender documents to be returned by the Autumn of 
2003, with the awarding of the contracts in early summer of 2004. As the GAO notes, 
however, 'effective security cannot be achieved by relying on security alone. Technology 
and people must work together as part of the overall process'249.  
 
In late July 2003, the US announced plans for the inclusion of biometrics in its own 
passports. Production of documents with a contactless smart IC and compressed full face 
image (but with no further biometric) would begin on the same day as the requirement for 
Visa Waiver countries - 26 October 2004250. 
 
Andrew Schulman has analysed a previous attempt to introduce biometrics as part of the 
US/Mexico Border Crossing Card251. Surprisingly, fingerprints were taken and coded 
onto the cards, but the budget for fingerprint readers was never made available. The 
                                                                 
245 US Department of State,G-8 Countries urge use of biometrics in fight against terrorism, 
www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/2003/05-08.htm  
246 Wall Street Journal Europe, In anti-terror move, US visitors on visas will be fingerprinted, (20 
May 2003); Department of Homeland Security, Remarks by Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson on 
the launch of the US-VISIT program, 
www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=44&content=738&print=true 
247 US General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using biometrics for border security, 
GAO-03-174 (November 2002) http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf  
248 General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve 
Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03563.pdf 
249 Nancy Kingsbury, Border Security: challenges in implementing border technology, testimony 
before the US Senate, 12 March 2003 GAO-03-546T 
250 John Leyden, US names the day for biometric passports , The Register (22 July 2003) 
251 Andrew Schulman, The US/Mexico Border Crossing Card (BCC): A case study in biometric. 
Machine readable ID (Revision 29 April 2002) 
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detailed examination of the history of this project should serve as a warning to 
governments on how not to design, implement and deploy such complex technologies. 
 
In June, the European Commission has announced the results of a feasibility study into a 
common Visa Information System (VIS) to be used by the Member States of the EU252. 
This will be a two-tier system comprising of a C-VIS  (a central VIS) and an N-VIS, a 
National VIS. It recommended that guidelines for system development and the setting up 
of a legal basis for its use should be agreed by the Council of Ministers by the end of 
2003. By analysing the three options of face, fingerprint and iris recognition, it 
recommended the use of fingerprint biometrics as the primary identification method, 
while 'a second biometric identifier such as facial recognition could be implemented to 
improve the accuracy'. This would appear to go against the ICAO recommendation that 
will be followed by the USA in its discussions with Visa Waiver countries. The feasibility 
study calculated the system development costs would be in the range of 130-200m euros. 
 
More recently, the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Directorate appeared to align its 
thinking with that of the ICAO recommendations253. Facial images would be the primary 
identifier to ensure interoperability, while a second biometric, the fingerprint would be 
used for background checks on a 1-to-many basis. 
 
 
6.4  E-health applications: biometrics as a series of point solutions? 
 
In the era of exponential expansion in the application of technologies for the mass market 
following the Second World War, no sector has appeared to offer more to the citizen, but 
delivered less, than the medical field. With a rapidly ageing population, the breakdown of 
the extended family and rising expectations of individual happiness and freedom for pain, 
the pressures on health services in Europe have been increasing year upon year. There is 
no sign that these pressures will abate over the next 10 years. However, the necessary 
investment in IT to improve efficiencies and security (e.g. to reduce errors due to manual 
record keeping) has fallen behind the corresponding investment in the private sector. 
Authentication of medical and social support personnel, correct identification of patients, 
and physical access control to buildings are examples of opportunities for biometric 
systems. Other aspects are described in a comprehensive European Commission funded 
study on benchmarking for the progress of ICT adoption by the health sector254. Key 
issues identified in this report include privacy, confidentiality, reliability and 
effectiveness. However, much of the analysis of the issues is at a high level, and 
consideration of specific security mechanisms is often absent. 
 
 The fragmentation of responsibilities and budgets within the health services of individual 
countries is likely to limit large scale deployment of such systems, unless legislation 
mandates improvements across the sector. At this time (Summer 2003), there is no 
indication of any such proposals in the EU. We anticipate that any such legislation would 
result from a high profile event that brought the limitations of current systems to the 
attention of lawmakers. In the USA, the recognition of the need to improve security of 
patient records moving between the various stakeholders in the sector resulted in the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act (HIPAA), which requires greater 
attention to authentication (but not requiring the stronger security potentially offered by 
biometric solutions). In the meantime, point solutions - such as the use of iris recognition 
                                                                 
252 European Commission recommends using biometrics for new EU-wide Visa Information System, 
eGovernment News, http://europa.eu.int/ISPO (11 June 2003) 
253 Biometric identifiers for visa and residence permit for third country nationals - European 
Commission puts forward proposal 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/intro/wai/news_240903_1_en.htm (24 September 
2003) 
254 A review of the issues in the application of ICT technologies to the health sector is presented in 
the EC funded SIBIS report, SIBIS - Workpackage 2: Topic research and indicator development: 
Topic  report 9: Health (July 2002) 
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in a hospital in Bad Reichenhall in Bavaria to prevent child abduction - are likely to 
proliferate255. 
 
In this section, we look to two areas of potential deployment: the personal services sector, 
where medical support and social welfare support for the aged overlap; and the general 
hospital and general practitioner environment. 
 
Scenario: social welfare and medical support for the elderly living at home 
 
A unique token, the Single Access Key (SAK) could extend the time that the increasingly 
infirm can remain in the family home without having to move to a communal 
environment with the additional expense and restriction on personal liberty that this 
entails .  By reducing all devices, cards and identity documents to just a single and simple-
to-use device, the SAK would enable the holders to move through the complexities of 
modern life, even as their faculties were failing. This device could be smart card, a smart 
watch or bracelet or even an implanted RFID chip that would allow the user to access all 
types of systems in his daily life, whether in public or private transport, movement 
through the home, access to email or withdrawal of cash.  
 
The list of applications is extensive and only a selection is listed below to illustrate the 
range of services: 
 
· Remote management of home systems: alarms, heating, appliances, etc. 
· Payments: at petrol stations, etc. 
· Remote bank transactions over the phone or Internet. 
· Medical surveillance for disabled and elderly people, especially in closed 
environments: home, hospitals, etc. 
 
Scenario description  
 
Mary, a very busy executive, departs from home everyday leaving her mother, Joan, a 
disoriented elderly person, alone at home in a village far from the nearest town and close 
to the national border. However, she leaves in the confidence that an ‘integrated biometric 
system’ takes care of her mum, and that she is not being abandoned without any support. 
In case for an emergency, she would be advised by the integrated system. 
 
When Mary leaves, she opens the car with the single access key that ‘configures’ the car 
(she shares it  with her husband who is somewhat taller and more heavily built) and starts 
it up with the same key. On her way to the office she fills in the car in the petrol station to 
take advantage of the cheaper fuel prices in her home country and pays automatically 
using her SAK, while at the same time the automatic timer sets off a phone call to her 
office switching on the heating and the microwave to deliver a hot cup coffee on her 
arrival. 
 
She walks through the entrance without the need for a key or other card as the contactless 
SAK has communicated with the face recognition system there, confirming that the image 
matches the template on her key. Her computer is already configured in line with her 
calendar and high priority jobs that have been activated by the incoming emails from her 
manager. The built-in camera monitors her actions and gestures, communicating with the 
SAK to ensure that when she leaves the desk, any confidential documents or applications 
are temporarily closed down. Any specific transactions that require a specific legal 
attestation of identity are confirmed with the computer's fingerprint system, which again 
can communicate with the SAK to offer a local check on the identity of the user.  
 
Suddenly, she receives an emergency call from the home monitoring service that her 
mother had been noted behaving in an atypical way by the indoor camera. The call centre 
                                                                 
255 USA: Newborn infants protected against abduction with iris recognition, Business Wire (20 
November 2002) 
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had confirmed that she had not moved back into the vision area of the camera, while the 
general movement detector was showing no activity in the house. A doctor who happened 
to be registered to the system as visiting family a few streets away was called on his 
mobile communication system and his fingerprint template was then downloaded 
temporarily to Joan's front door so allow him to enter the house. On finding that she was 
unconscious, the doctor calls for an ambulance, in the meantime being able to provide 
appropriate temporary medication, based upon Joan's medical file which he accesses 
using a face and voice biometric at Joan's broadband-enabled computer. These medical 
records are updated immediately, so that when Joan arrives at the hospital - which 
happens to be across the border, the next stage of medical support can be delivered 
seamlessly, improving her chances of a quick recovery.   
 
Her own health record on her SAK is updated after she signs in with her fingerprint and 
the fingerprint of the doctor - a mechanism that was instituted to assure patients that no 
secret information is stored without their knowledge. For her, the SAK is a bracelet, as 
she has difficulty in remembering to take a card with her wherever she goes. Its other 
advantage is that the doctor can programme in a warning sound to remind her to take the 
pills at the required time. These will be stored in her house in a container that has a very 
cheap fingerprint sensor; it will send a message back to the SAK when it is opened, 
cancelling the reminder and ensuring that only the specific patient is able to take the 
expensive and dangerous medication.  
 
An anonymised record (but securely cross-linked to her previous use of medical facilities) 
is sent to the independent office for monitoring side effects of medication in the country 
where the hospital is sited, as well as to her health insurance company in her native 
country, which authorises payment to the hospital and doctors. An audit record is 
encrypted using the biometrically validated digital signatures of the patient and doctor. 
These records will be automatically scanned monthly to assess performance of doctors 
and hospitals across the country. However, since the data protection authorities of Joan's 
native country have expressed reservations about some aspects of the use of biometrics 
for such financial accountability, a second level of anonymisation is applied for Joan, In 
this way, her identity is protected with cryptographic protocols. 
 
When Mary arrives at the hospital, she sees that her mother is in good shape, but not able 
to recognise her after the shock. Nevertheless, the authentication offered by Mary's SAK 
card is  proof enough to discharge Joan into her care.  
 
On her way home, Mary remembers that she failed to sign off the final job she was 
completing. That is no problem for the biometric enabled world, as she is able to use an 
intermediary service from a motorway service station. However, this uses voice and face 
as the only biometric methods, not the enhanced fingerprint system which offers the 
higher level of authentication. (One had been in place but had been vandalised so often 
that the operators had removed it). However, seeing that her mother is by her side, the 
intermediary service calculates the risk associated with accepting the authentication 
offered by both persons together, agreeing that to be sufficient to meet the immediate 
requirements of the service, provided that Mary signs it off again using the more secure 
system at the next opportunity. 
 
In the evening, their neighbours come round to enquire after Joan's health, and Mary takes 
the opportunity to enrol them into the house entry system as authorised visitors, but only 
to be allowed in when the house is occupied and the warning system is activated. At other 
times, Joan's privacy is protected, so that they have to ring the doorbell as any other 
visitor. 
 
Finally Mary retires to bed exhausted after a hard day - but this time there is no need to be 
authenticated by any biometric. She falls asleep while reading a book: the latest, tenth, 
novel in the Harry Potter saga, as the movement sensor by her bed triggers the gradual 
reduction of the light levels in the bedroom.  
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In her own room, Joan is kept under the ever watchful eye of the bedroom camera, 
continuously checking for abnormal reactions to the medication, backed up by an hourly 
visual confirmation by a nurse at the hospital where earlier in the day she had received 
such timely treatment. 
 
 Commentary on the scenario 
 
Again, as in many instances in this report, the emphasis in this scenario is on usability and 
on integrated services that simplify the world for the end user, while allowing them 
control of their privacy. Integration with intelligent systems, that have context awareness 
built in, or use interfaces that allow intuitive programming by end users. Diversity of 
sensors and service operators offering different levels of security appropriate to the needs 
and abilities of the user. Transparency and seamless operation wherever possible, but over 
identification when a clear business need is required (electronic transaction at the office, 
addition of sensitive information to an Electronic Patient Record). For the older person or 
one who is often confused, these measures will be particularly important, but only if they 
are robust and 'fail to safety'.   
 
Protection of the privacy of individuals, while taking advantage of the biometric 
authentication is  the subject of active research at present. Papers have hinted at methods 
that could be used256. 
 
Much of the technology is available in component form today. However, progress 
towards an integrated service as described is likely to be slow, unless towns or regions 
with an exceptionally high proportion of elderly people decide to work as a community to 
demonstrate the business case for such a scenario. The cost of such systems would be 
substantially less than that of major modifications to the physical environment of the 
elderly person (addition of bathrooms downstairs or electric stair lifts on staircases) - 
costs that are already borne by either the state or the individual. Early demonstration of 
the use of integrated technologies could provide the stimulus for more extensive 
deployment of systems.   
 
Hospital and family doctor services 
 
Provision for health services in the EU is characterised by the diversity of different 
schemes and services. In March 2003, the Council of the EU proposed a EU-wide health 
insurance card from the Summer of 2004, to replace the paper documents for cross-border 
access to health services, although there are no plans to include a biometric 
authentication. In many countries, IT investment has not kept up with the requirement to 
provide an efficient and safe operating environment257. 
 
Aims of an electronic, biometric-secured health card 
 
There are a number of possible reasons for better authentication in the health sector. 
Traditionally hospitals have been open sites with little control on visitors to patients, 
unless these were under arrest or confined under mental health regulations. In spite of the 
                                                                 
256 Gerit Bleumer, Biometric yet privacy protecting person authentication, Information Hiding 
LNCS 1525 (1998) Springer Verlag  pp 99-100; Jean-Paul Linnartz and Pim Tuyls, New shielding 
functions to enhance privacy and prevent misuse of biometric templates, 4th Conference on Audio- 
and Video-based Biometric Person Authentication, AVBPA 2003, pp 393-402 
257 A benchmark study showed that a junior doctor in the British National Health Service spends up 
to a third of his time on unnecessary and secretarial duties. The European Commission is paying for  
a research project that should provide guidance to decision makers in member states on the cost 
models that should support a range of e-Health investments. See 7th Annual European Conference 
on Electronic Health Records London UK (December 2002). In the UK, the budget for IT services 
in year 2002/3is approximately £1.6bn out of a total NHS cost of £68bn. An additional allocation of 
£1bn for IT services was added under the NHS Modernisation Fund in the seven year period from 
1998 with the aim of contributing to the doubling of the IT spend 
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valuable equipment (both IT and specialist monitoring systems), patients being at their 
most vulnerable (old people and babies in particular), and the availability of drugs, 
hospitals in general are not designed as physically secure places. There have also been a 
number of well-documented cases of individuals passing themselves off as medical 
practitioners. Hospital patient records are also not well secured, and a recent report of 
Irish Republican terror groups attempting to infiltrate hospitals in Northern Ireland to gain 
such data is unlikely to be the only case.  
 
Outside of the hospital, the Electronic Patient Record (EPR) initiative aims to offer 
portability of a person's medical history, so that wherever they are - abroad or involved in 
an accident, patients will be treated quickly in line with their past medical 
interventions258. Another opportunity that is being exploited by a number of US biometric 
suppliers is in the signing off of the results of legally mandated tests on pharmaceutical 
products, a clear example of the use of biometrics as a tool for non-repudiation. 
 
In summary, the range of possibilities is very wide indeed:  
  
· E-diagnosis  
· Drugs Distribution and prescription 
· Credential Checking 
· Secure information for the supply chain 
· Health Insurance Card 
· Secure and accountable transition from paper legacy systems  
· Traceability of Diagnostic Data 
· Set up Supply Chain 
· Order Trials accountability in case of litigation 
· Data Integrity 
· Clinical trial integrity 
· Physical access 
· Emergency procedures 
 
Nevertheless, the range of stakeholders is extensive, with management responsibilities 
often distributed across a number of government agencies and departments, together with 
conflicts in priorities between doctors and managers. 
 
Actors in the health sector 
 
· Ministry of Health 
· Regulatory and legislative authorities (including data protection)  
· Insurance companies 
· Hospital management 
· Medical Staff 
· Laboratory Staff 
· Ancillary staff 
· Service providers 
· Medical Researchers 
· Ambulance services 
· Patients 
· Patient organisations 
· Visitors 
· Miscreants 
 
Current Status 
 
                                                                 
258 The UK's NHS has a target to create an EPR infrastructure in every acute hospital by 2005. 
Other countries in the EU, such as Sweden, Ireland and Austria have parallel plans. 
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The Netherlands has undertaken initial trials for the distribution of methadone to habitual 
drug users. Although the use of a biometric was considered in the trial, it was decided not 
to use it at that stage. Interviews with participants during the trial showed a high degree of 
acceptability of fingerprint authentication, and it is understood that a future roll-out will 
include the use of fingerprint authentication. This could be the beginning of an extension 
to a number of biometric-authenticated services for those with chronic diseases. Trials 
with Parkinson’s disease patients have used fingerprint biometrics.  
 
In the UK, there have been a number of continuing intermediate scale trials (at the level 
of several thousand users) by the NHS Information Authority, both as substitutes for 
passwords in PCs, for the protection of sensitive medical records and for use by patients 
in accessing their own records. Little information is available on the extent to which these 
have been successful, although the leading integrator, ISL (Informer Systems Ltd) claims 
usage of its authentication solutions at more than 600 installations with over 25,000 users.  
 
Other trials that have been noted, that make use of biometrics, include: 
 
· Physical access control in Sweden 
· The use of soleprints to identify babies in Germany 
· Sign off of testing of pharmaceutical products in the USA 
· Proposed telemedicine trials in Italy  
 
The use of Public Key Infrastructures in the medical sector ought to be tracked, since 
investment in the renewal of a security infrastructure could be accompanied by use of 
biometrics to replace the less than adequate password that protects a private key. An 
example of a project that is examining interoperability issues at the cross-border level 
(Germany, Greece and Finland) is RESHEN, an EU funded activity for Regional Secure 
Healthcare Networks259. 
 
   Key factors in the take-up of biometrics in the health sector 
 
Since the medical sector in Europe is funded to a significant extent by the state with drug 
costs and wages and salaries a visible part of the budget, there has been relatively little 
investment in IT and IT security. In the UK, this is being addressed as part of a major 
uplift in investment over the forthcoming budgetary period. However, there is little 
evidence of a concerted effort in any European country to consider more advanced non-
medical technologies such as biometrics. Amongst the reasons that have been proposed 
are: 
 
· Very limited awareness of the possibilities of biometrics 
· Apparently high costs  
· Identity theft not taken as seriously as it should be 
· Security not a high priority 
· Safety concerns 
· Health services are not well integrated, so benefits of reuse across competing 
departments with access to different budgets are not appreciated. 
· Quality concerns 
· Potential integration with other services is unrecognised 
· Power of the medical practitioner may be undermined 
 
Possible roles for EBF 
 
The European Biometric Forum could act as a catalyst to highlight the opportunities in 
this sector, offering an independent vision and source of reliable information. Lessons can 
be learnt from one application that is likely to be heavily promoted in the US: the security 
of hospital patient records. Although the HIPPA legislation does not mandate the use of 
                                                                 
259 www.biomed.ntua.gr/RESHEN  
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biometric authentication, it is probable that many solutions will make use of these 
technologies.  
 
Other activities that would contribute to the development of a stronger understanding of 
the options opened by biometrics include: 
 
· Promotion of initial awareness of the range of opportunities 
· Dissemination of publicly available information 
· Database of deployed systems  
· Encouragement of partnerships that will run pilot and demonstration projects 
· Integration of the Electronic Patient Record and smart cards 
· Monitoring the status of relevant regulation 
 
 
6.5  Use of biometrics by the financial sector 
 
Key opportunities for the use of these methods by this sector include: 
 
§ Customer-facing systems: Point of Sale (POS), Automatic Teller Machines (ATM), 
on line retail transactions, cashing of cheques for people without bank accounts, 
signing of insurance claims, etc 
§ Call-centre applications secured by speaker verification of callers, possibly 
supplemented by confirmation of knowledge-based authentication 
§ Notarisation systems. Authenticated signatures of financial transactions, e.g. a written 
signature biometric of a salesman used in combination with a digital signature to a 
document confirming that a client has seen the information provided in that document  
§ Security of high value back-office applications such as treasury, dealer rooms and  
interbank transfers 
§ Network logon, especially where accountability is required and separation of duties 
needs to be enforced (reducing the possibilities of a recurrence of the Barings Bank 
fraud).  
§ Time and attendance applications, and monitoring of employee activity to reduce all 
forms of insider fraud 
§ Protection of customers' financial data to permit only authorised viewing or alteration 
§ Physical access control to data centres and other high risk areas 
§ Automation of workflow through the replacement of paper-based systems. Since 
written signatures underpin many of the legal transactions in this sector, the use of a 
signature biometric may offer a legally acceptable alternative to the written version. 
 
Note that a major application already in place in the USA - screening of employees for 
criminal records, by comparison of their fingerprints with FBI databases - is less likely to 
find acceptance in Europe. 
 
Two key factors appear to be prominent in the discussion of the deployment of biometric 
systems by these organisations - in particular to their customers.. Firstly, it appears that in 
spite of their wide experience with managing risk, banks employ IT specialists who 
demand very high performance of biometric systems, often in excess of those implied by 
conventional PINs or passwords260. Secondly, the larger banks in Europe are generally 
conservative in their use of public-facing security technologies. They recognise the risk of 
a premature introduction of untested systems and the impact on trust in them by the public 
should the security of these systems be broken. A third factor, acceptance by the public, is 
likely to be offered as yet another reason for delaying a decision, even once these 
technical concerns have been resolved.  
 
------- 
                                                                 
260 Examples of these stringent performance requirements were noted in the European collaborative 
BANCA project, http://falbala.ibermatica.com/banca/index.html 
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Credit and debit card fraud continues to rise inexorably, and it is therefore not surprising 
that banks, financial institutions and their associations (such as APCAS in the UK and 
TeleTrusT in Germany) continue to examine the commercial potential of biometrics in 
reducing fraud at the Point of Sale.  Section 3.4 examined two scenarios for the future 
application of biometrics in this sector. In this section, the focus changes to the 
assessment of possibilities for their use in the near term (2003-2005), concluding that 
customer-facing applications are unlikely to be introduced widely over this period in 
Europe. Nevertheless, operations in the back offices of the financial institutions may 
begin to see the use of these systems in larger numbers in the early stages of the following 
period (2006-10). 
 
Many of the issues that are  discussed in this Roadmap have held back the widespread 
deployment of biometrics, although numerous trials have been undertaken and many 
reports issued. For example, in the early 1990's, the UK's Midland Bank undertook a 
Dynamic Signature verification trial, and in the mid 1990's the Nationwide Building 
Society led a major investigation into their use, with headline making trials of ATMs 
using Iris Recognition. They were also part of PICASSO, a European project. Other ATM 
manufacturers such as Oki have als o trialled the use of biometrics, but the additional 
expense and need for customer training has curtailed this work. In the early 1990's, 
Barclays Bank in the UK suggested performance requirements for biometrics in terms of 
FAR. FRR and time for transaction, based upon typical POS operations. In the US, the 
Financial Services Technology Consortium (an industry body representing many leading 
financial institutions) continues to sponsor studies on biometrics. Most recently, a study 
into the application of speaker verification has been completed261. 
 
However, studies by Germany's TeleTrusT organisation and its working group on 
biometrics, BioTrusT, have been far from favourable when it considered the use of these 
methods for ATMs. Issues of unacceptably high error rates for mass market services, the 
large infrastructural changes required in the 'back end' systems, lack of all of the required 
standards in the financial service sector, and legal and regulatory uncertainties contributed 
to the negative tone of the report. This is backed by an appraisal of the opportunities by a 
respected UK sector journal published some time after September 11th262. A roll call of 
the prime financial institutions repeated the same message, 'we have looked at biometrics, 
but we have no immediate plans - we have to look at the business case'. However, it was 
not only the costs that worried the head of policy card services at APACS, the association 
representing these institutions in the UK. Both the problems generated by false rejects on 
the daily number of 11 million bank transactions, and lack of a biometric that would have 
extensive acceptability amongst its customers were cited as causes for concern. Indeed, 
one unnamed source went as far as saying that it would take as much as a decade before 
the banking community would consider the introduction of biometrics. Before that, the 
UK programme of introducing a PIN to the credit card has to be completed263. 
 
Alternative approaches to biometrics are possible. For example, in the first half of the 
1990's, cards with small photographs of the holder were issued by the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and the National and Provincial Building Society in the UK. The claim was that 
fraud on two of the RBS's card had dropped by 99% and 85% respectively, saving the 
bank nearly £1m264. It was not clear whether this was as the result of displacement of 
crime to cards issued by other vendors, since trials by the University of Westminster in 
1996 seemed to demonstrate its low value as a security device when offered to 
supermarket checkout operators265.  
 
                                                                 
261 www.ftsc.org/projects/voice-authentication  
262 Sean Jackson, Stand and deliver, Banking Technology 19 (1) 44 (February 2002) 
263 Traders gear up for chip-and Pin future, Computer Weekly 27 March 2003. By the end of 2005, 
most of UK's 110m credit and debit cards will be chip-and PIN enabled at a cost of over £1bn. 
264 Guardian, Photocards slash fraud and save bank £1m, (13 August 1996) 
265 Richard Kemp et al, When seeing should not be believing: photographs, credit cards and fraud, 
Applied Cognitive Psychology (1996) 
 
BIOVISION Roadmap Issue 1.1                                                                              15 October 2003  
170 
In the autumn of 2002, the Nationwide Building Society announced the rollout of a 
biometric solution whose business case was based upon savings in costs (by moving from 
paper-based processes to an all-electronic system) and responsiveness to the customer, 
with security only a secondary aim.  In fact, this deployment would replace the need for 
frequent faxing of images of signatures between the 681 branches of this organisation266. 
Dynamic Signature Verification software from CIC and tablets supplied by MotionTouch 
are being integrated by Florentis. Only in the third phase of the deployment will 
automated signatures by verified. Extensive work on the user aspects of the hardware and 
software should improve its chances of success, and template ageing is used to take 
account of changes in signature.  Nearly 60 subjects took part in four centres, and one of 
the developments was to change the feel of the surface of the signing pad towards that of 
paper.  
 
Up to seven signatures are stored with a decision function determining which of the 
signatures will be dropped at the time of verification. Legal admissibility issues had to be 
considered, bringing in experts from Australia and Canada. Among the lessons learnt was 
the long process of obtaining agreement at all levels in the organisation, helped both by 
the involvement of many stakeholders, as well as by small and frequent deliveries of 
results, which kept a continuing interest in the project.  
 
In summary, the outlook for the use of biometrics in the financial sector over the study 
period looks far from promising. Nevertheless, a number of banks have shown interest in 
using biometric authentication in the 'back office' applications, where they can learn about 
the challenges of introducing these methods under controllable conditions, and not risk 
the possibility of an expensive failure by premature use amongst their customers. There is 
a strong base for standards in this application, through the development of standard X9.84 
by the American Bankers Association. 
 
The use of biometrics by EU governments in passports will, no doubt, be followed with 
interest by the banking community - especially if this moves to electronically-enabled 
identity cards. In some countries, such a move may be the cue for involvement by 
financial institutions, since many of the deployments will rely for part of their business 
case on participation by the private sector. The experience of Finland in not getting 
sufficient take-up for its non-biometric card should be studied by any country planning to 
follow suit. Such considerations would appear to rule out extensive use of biometrics, 
either for cash transfers, ATM use or Point of Sale before 2008. The analysis of scenarios 
in Section 3.4 lists some opportunities and challenges. One advantage for this sector is the 
availability of a security standard for the use of biometrics: X9.84 (see section 5.6) 
 
One factor that could bring forward the use of better authentication is the rising incidence 
of identity theft. In the US, this is seen as a major - and escalating - hazard of life in the 
21st century. Its incidence is quoted variously as 750,000 people victimised annually (by 
US government agencies), through to Gartner's estimate of 7 million in 2002267. The UK 
government's consultation paper on Entitlement Cards quoted a figure of £1.3bn as the 
minimum cost to the economy.  These figures do not reflect the misery that victims of 
such identity fraud suffer over long periods (up to several years) as they attempt to rebuild 
their credit records. In many cases, the financial institutions appear to be unable to 
remove all traces of these transactions, and the problem recurs even though the individual 
has been assured of its solution. Biometric methods of authentication could have a role to 
play in reducing the level of fraud, although insecure operation of such biometric-enabled 
systems could paradoxically increase the damage to individuals. Criminal entities would 
inevitably target such systems, either to ensure that their own identities were not 
compromised, or to commit more sophisticated frauds. Assuring the security of such 
systems over the lifetime of individuals will be a challenging objective. 
                                                                 
266 E-signatures win over iris scans, IEE Review p.14 (January 2003) 
267 Robert O'Harrow, Identity Crisis, Washington Post (10 August 2003). See also a review of 
policies, technologies and procedures from a US standpoint in John Vacca, Identity theft, Prentice 
Hall PTR (2003) 
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6.6  Physical access control and 'time and attendance' applications 
 
In section 3.3 we examined the long term outlook for the use of biometric methods for 
physical access control, identifying two scenarios for their future wide scale application. 
Currently, most of the access control market for corporate government use consists of 
visible identity cards and security staff to check that the photograph of the individual 
matches that on the cardkey. Further restriction of access to individual parts of a site or 
office usually relies on keys and door locks. As organisations review their physical 
security, swipe cards or proximity cards replace keys, often integrated with the corporate 
identity card. Relatively few biometric systems have been installed, as testified by the 
need of suppliers to issue press releases every time a larger campus is converted to these 
technologies. In the past few years, a number of integrators have started to offer tailored 
solutions for improved 'time and attendance'.  
 
The T&A proposition centres on a number of benefits: 
 
· reduced 'buddy punching' fraud in which employees sign out on behalf of workers 
who have left the premises earlier - or even failed to turn up at work at all;  
· improved quality control in industries with large workforces of semi-skilled labour; 
especially in developed countries, well-suited individuals can be recruited and 
trained, only to be replaced soon afterwards by less suitable friends and relatives;   
· more accurate completion of timesheets by the staff, as the incidence of human errors 
is reduced;  
· improved physical access control, so that only authorised staff are allowed on the 
premises.  
 
Taken together, these benefits should ensure that this type of application should be 
attractive to employers of large groups of unskilled and semi-skilled staff - provided that 
the cost is kept low and that the workforce accepts its use. Much of the $100m market in 
2002 represented deployments outside of Europe, since (especially outside the UK), the 
attitude of employees towards the introduction of new technologies is uncertain. Even in 
the UK, these issues need to be handled with care, as witnessed by the strike by British 
Airways ground staff at Heathrow in 2003 following proposals to introduce swipe cards 
for T&A.  
 
Kronos - one of the leaders in T&A applications - have developed biometric solutions; 
they appreciate the need for employers to consider the acceptance issues through the 
preparation of education material268. The reassurance focuses on three factors:  
 
- the storage of mathematical representation of fingerprints - not the fingerprints 
themselves 
- incompatibility with AFIS devices and systems  
- speed and accuracy of operation, eliminating false readings. 
 
For many years, hand geometry systems were synonymous with access control, and even 
though the PAC/T&A sector accounts for over 80% of sales of hand geometry biometrics, 
revenue from systems using fingerprints actually exceeds that of hand geometry sales. Iris 
systems come a distant third - mainly deployed where perceived security requirements 
demand this approach. Taken together, these three technologies account for over 90% of 
this sector. Growth of acceptance and widescale use in Europe will depend upon the 
resolution of acceptance, cost and robustness issues.  
 
                                                                 
268 Kronos Inc, Ease employees' privacy concerns about biometric technology, www.kronos.com 
(2003) 
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6.7  Car personalisation and security 
 
The use of keys to secure cars represents a considerable overhead for many fleet operators 
and rental companies. Keys are often mislaid, lost or stolen. It is not surprising, therefore 
that moves towards keyless, card-based systems are already underway - with Mercedes 
and Renault offering these options. An additional benefit of a biometric system would be 
in personalisation of the settings for seating and other user-adjustable controls in modern 
cars. This second opportunity has been seized by Audi in its recently introduced A8 
model269. Addition of personalisation for up to four drivers is available at an additional 
2% on the price of this top of the range model. Gartner has estimated that by 2010 
approximately 8m new cars would be fitted with biometric identifiers (early 2002 
estimate, worldwide). Relatively few cars would be equipped before the take-off in the 
second half of the decade, an assessment shared by other consultants. Before widespread 
adoption can take place, a number of issues have to be successfully addressed: cost, 
reliability, robustness in the electrical environment and resilience against dirt, dust and 
chemical cleaners. 
 
6.8  Applications in the Criminal Justice Sector 
 
The law enforcement community has an interest in the development of robust methods of 
identification to reduce the opportunities for identity theft270, to apprehend criminals with 
improved detection based upon scene-of crime evidence (including that obtained by 
CCTV systems) and to deter potential criminals from engaging in antisocial activities. In 
the UK, PITO, the Police IT Organisation are helping to define the research agenda and 
preparing a parallel roadmap that will help long term planning by solution suppliers and 
individual police forces. Databases of face and fingerprints are already well established in 
the police forces of all countries. In addition, there is a standard for distinguishing scars 
and tattoos. We have also mentioned the work on the use of external ear shape and there 
is extensive development in capturing palmprints from the scene of crime.  DNA profiles 
are now routinely collected in the UK, and retained on computer even if the individual is 
released without charge by the police271. If iris recognition becomes a widely accepted 
biometric, there is no doubt that databases of iris images will also be developed. As the 
UK's NAFIS272 contract is in the process of re-negotiation, PITO is looking towards a 
new vision for an integrated identification service. 
 
The aggregation of data can be used to increase the rate of crime detection, and reduce the 
likelihood of miscarriages of justice, provided that the probabilistic nature of the evidence 
from biometric systems is recognised and end-to-end traceability is maintained. The legal 
admissibility of biometric data will remain to be confirmed in the courts, but every stage 
in the process of data collection, through template formation and update, processing, 
linkage to the application and independent assignment of identity needs to be secured. 
The dangers of aggregation need to be recognised, though, especially if governments 
choose to misuse the systems to coerce their citizens or to manipulate electronic data in 
support of otherwise lawful aims. A fingerprint reader in every policeman's pocket linked 
over the mobile phone network to a database may exclude possible suspects in a quick 
and efficient manner. In another environment, it can be viewed as a symbol of the power 
that the policeman has over a minority exercising their human rights. Suppliers of 
biometric systems may need to consider the extent to which their technologies can be 
                                                                 
269 www.audiworld.com/news/02/a8launch/content6.shtml  
270 APACS claims that identity theft cost £20.6m in 2002, up from nearly £15m the previous year. 
Ways to beat the identity thieves, Financial Times 25 March 2003. A much wider definition 
suggests that, worldwide, the problem could amount to $221bn 
www.aberdeen.com/2001/research/05030013.asp (Aberdeen group paper: Identity theft: a $2 
trillion criminal industry in 2005) 
271 As of June 2003, in the UK, police hold nearly 5m sets of fingerprints and over 2m DNA 
profiles. 
272 National Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (UK) 
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misused and the impact that the resultant adverse publicity will have on the likelihood of 
acceptance of their products in the EU. 
 
Other opportunities that developments in biometrics offers include improvements in 3-
dimensional rendition of suspect's faces which may in due course support the 
identification of potential suspects by victims of crime and similar use in the video 
identity parades of suspects273. Effective biometric systems could be used to enforce court 
orders to restrict the mo vement of individuals away from key witnesses or family 
members. 
 
It appears very likely that the use of biometrics by the Criminal Justice sector will 
increase dramatically, from securing access to the increasingly rich data sources in the 
identification databases, through to supporting the police officer requiring a fast 
verification of a citizen's identity. However, deployment of new technologies requires a o 
public debate on the checks and balances that should be in place for the protection of the 
citizen. The complexities of biometric systems, and the impact of many years of 
Hollywood films and television series, can be balanced by an impartial source of 
trustworthy data to allow society to establish a level playing field for such discussions. 
 
Recently, a facial recognition system from Imagis has been configured for use in 
clustering Internet images of victims of child abuse. The ChildBase application developed 
for the UK police checks whether images obtained from the PCs of individuals accused of 
downloading relate to previously known victims 274. Nearly 1m images were stored in the 
initial database which opened for operation in the Summer of 2003. Initial testing of the 
system has proved very successful as a support tool for the criminal justice system, even 
reputedly identifying siblings. This is one example of a biometric system that operates 
outside of the normal range of identification and verification. 
 
Other applications of facial recognition, especially in the context of CCTV enhancement, 
are discussed by Michael Bromby, who provides a first view onto some of the legal issues 
that may accompany these innovations275. 
 
RC/Sec3  RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 3: Development of design 
methodologies that support the secure integration of biometric data in applications 
such as the Criminal Justice Sector, while limiting the opportunity for misuse and 
'function creep'  
 
 
6.9  Online authentication for consumers and employees 
 
The EC funded BEE project addressed many of the issues in the application of biometrics 
to online transactions, especially for e-commerce276.  To support the existing knowledge 
on the technical aspects, an ongoing 4m euro project, COST275, aims to investigate 
effective methods for the identification of individuals over the Internet using speaker 
verification and facial recognition277. The results of this COST Action project will be 
disseminated into the technical literature and through the organisation of specialist 
workshops. 
                                                                 
273 In the UK, the current system for video identification parades, VIPER, has enjoyed considerable 
success. 
274 Lisa Kelly, Police invest in ChildBase system, Computing 16 July 2003 
275 Michael Bromby, Computerised facial recognition systems; the surrounding legal problems, 
cbs1.gcal.ac.uk/law/users/~mbro/ documents/LLMDissertation.pdf    (September 2000) 
276 Business Environment of Biometrics involved in electronic commerce 
http://www.expertnet.net.gr/bee/ (IST-1999-20078, completed June 2002). Specifically, document, 
D7.1 Conclusions and Recommendations (June 2002) 
277 COST Action 275, Biometrics-based recognition of people over the Internet, 
www.fub.it/cost275  
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In its concluding report of June 2002, the BEE consortium noted that there were no major 
'showstoppers' in the application of biometrics in this segment of the market for 
authentication. However, it did recognise that improved - and secure - performance was a 
prerequisite to assuring users that the technologies would address their requirements. Also 
of primary importance was the need to form a working group that would co-ordinate 
standards activities (particularly for interoperability) and best practices, especially in 
areas such as privacy protection. This is a role that the European Biometric Forum is 
aiming to fulfil, and the publication of the Best Practices in Privacy in Biometrics278as 
part of the BIOVISION project will form one of the strands of work that the EBF will 
continue. Certification services will also be needed to provide an external monitoring of 
compliance with such best practices. Finally, it noted that very little work had been 
undertaken in establishing whether ethnicity could be deduced from biometric measures. 
In passing, we note that not timescales were offered for incorporation into the present 
Roadmap. 
 
Developments continue in a number of areas that should ensure that future mass market 
systems are both cost effective and easy to install and operate. Microsoft has indicated 
that it will include a proprietary biometrics API ('BAPI') in a future release of the 
Windows operating system, thereby facilitating the integration of compatible biometric 
sensors into PCs and laptops. Sensors are continuing to fall in price, with suppliers 
offering even smaller devices to reduce the cost of the silicon in fingerprint systems. Even 
full scale sensors integrated into standard peripherals are now affordable; a standard 
Siemens computer mouse is now available in the UK at £36 in unit quantities. In a recent 
move that demonstrates the acceptability of fingerprint biometrics as a security device, 
Intel has issued guidelines for the use of fingerprint biometric sensors in notebook PCs 279 
and evaluated three commercial sensors against these guidelines, the Atmel Fingerchip, 
AuthenTec’s TruePrint AES 3400 and the TCRU1 from ST Microelectronics280. 
Suggested performance targets are FAR of less than 0.01% and FRR of less than 2%, with 
the individual cost for such devices (inclusive of software costs) not exceeding $10 in 
100,000 up quantities - demanding goals that may represent performance which is 
difficult to attain, and maintain, with current devices operating under conventional 
conditions. 
 
Although the focus of the study was on e-commerce applications, it foresaw the need for 
government to prepare roadmaps for the use of biometrics in on-line access to its services, 
national ID cards and the provision of secure services in the health sector. However, it 
could not have foreseen the impetus that the US Enhanced Border Security Act would 
give towards the demonstration of the feasibility of large-scale systems. 
 
In view of their critical dependence on IT systems, large organisations continue to 
reassess the security of their operations.  In the past, the view of the place of biometrics in 
these organisations was as ‘drop in’ replacements for passwords. The high cost of 
maintaining a help desk for resetting forgotten passwords and the proliferation passwords 
seemed to justify investment in novel technologies. Nevertheless, some organisations 
decided to consolidate legacy computer systems behind a single user interface, in the 
form of a Single Sign On solution (SSO). The pressure to introduce biometric 
authentication lessened.  
 
The next stage was often to consider the introduction of PKIs (Public Key 
Infrastructures), offering non-repudiation (and often confidentiality of emails messages 
                                                                 
278 Astrid Albrecht, Privacy Best Practices in deployment of biometric systems, Issue 1 (2003), 
available at the http://www.eubiometricforum.com website. 
279 Biometric User Authentication: Fingerprint Sensor Product Guidelines 
http://www.intel.com/design/mobile/platform/downloads/FingerprintSensorProductGuidelines.pdf 
(15 September 2003) 
280 Biometric User Authentication: Fingerprint Sensor Product Evaluation 
http://www.intel.com/design/mobile/platform/downloads/FingerprintDeviceProductEvaluationSum
mary.pdf (September 2003) 
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and electronic transactions). However, the complexity of integration with other 
applications and the consequent high costs resulted in lower take-up rates than were 
predicted in the late 1990’s. Had PKIs been adopted widely, it is likely that the use of 
fingerprint verifiers to protect the user’s private key would have followed soon 
afterwards. Since then, another paradigm has arrived: Identity Management281. Through 
the years of restructuring and takeovers, many organisations have complex directories of 
their employees and customers. The same individual or role appears in many places in an 
organisation’s databases, leading to customers and employees having to logon many 
times for similar services. For example, in the financial sector282, banks and insurance 
companies see the prospect of account aggregation as a way of cutting costs and 
increasing their reach. Identity management (IdM) solutions offer the vision of a single 
integrated access to this information, with a set of business processes to support 
authentication and access management (policies and rules that govern access to 
applications), working within the Web Services and federated database frameworks. An 
emerging collection of standards is supporting this initiative, with SAML (Security 
Assertion Markup Language) one of the critical glues. Again, the use of biometrics would 
appear to complement the vision, although many suppliers are still to adjust their 
promotion of biometrics in this context. The opportunity is there, but cost, security and 
user interface issues will determine whether IdM is the breakthrough for biometrics in the 
mass market – or just another grand design that will fade as another acronym takes its 
place. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
281 RSA Security, Identity and Access Management: Transforming e-security into a catalyst for 
competitive advantage, 
https://www.rsasecurity.com/solutions/idmgt/whitepapers/IAMBUS_WP_0403.pdf  
282 FSTC, Identity management in financial services (8 July 2003) 
http://www.fstc.org/projects/liberty/executive-overview.pdf  
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7. Addressing the critical issues 
 
This selection of applications of biometrics illustrates some of the issues that come into 
play when the technology is integrated as part of a complete service. Perhaps one of the 
key areas which has received little or no consideration is in developing the credibility of 
both the biometric proposition and individual technologies. To a large extent, the 
adoption of these methods in the identity document and aviation security field is a tribute 
to the lobbying of the technology suppliers immediately after 9/11. Many commentators 
have questioned whether more secure verification of the identity of visitors to the USA 
would have prevented these tragedies. Nevertheless, it is accepted that there is a role for 
improvements in security throughout the transport infrastructure, from the large hubs, 
such as railway stations and airports, through to the vehicles themselves. However, other 
forms of security are required, especially if the current mode of suicide terrorism by 
individuals with no previous history of such activity increases worldwide.  
 
7.1  Crossing the 'Technology Chasm'  
 
The classical view of a sigmoid curve in the take-up of new technologies is being 
questioned. If this were so, the early adopters would have given way in a ever-increasing 
way to the pragmatists, leaving only the conservatives to remain with the old 
technology283. At least some of the biometric technologies would have been used in large 
numbers, leading to major cost reductions. In point of fact, there have been considerable 
price drops for silicon fingerprint verifiers, but this has not stimulated a corresponding 
growth in the market.  
 
A more recent reading of the diffusion and adoption of novel technologies by Geoffrey 
Moore notes this drop in the take-up rates after the early adopters have explored the new 
technology, but before the early majority feels confident enough to begin to buy into the 
new paradigm284. Of course, the initial group of enthusiasts and visionaries is a pre-
requisite for the follow-through; their demand for novelty and performance, and their 
opinions are taken into account by those who will follow. These are the leaders who 
ensure the visibility of the new technology. However, they also willing to bear the ris ks 
which accompany any new developments. The following group, the early majority are 
pragmatists who have different concerns; they seek industry standards, complete solutions 
and the experience offered by reference sites. Between the early adopters and the early 
majority there may be a hiatus in the sales of novel systems, the chasm, which can lead 
commentators to doubt that the technology will ever be taken up. Some will attribute this 
lack of take-up to a lack of credibility of the technology and prescribe measures to 
address this deficiency285 
 
In Moore's analysis, the credibility issues must be addressed by targeting marketing 
efforts at the leading edge of this early majority. It is the bowling alley (in his 
phraseology) who will provide those reference sites. The challenge for suppliers and 
integrators is to convince this separate niche group in large enough numbers, thereby 
addressing the fears of the main majority who are waiting for sufficient momentum to 
build up in the market. However, once the bowling alley group is convinced, the take-up 
can rise spectacularly, with the majority demanding to be supplied quickly, leading to 
temporary shortages as the suppliers fail to meet the demand (Moore’s tornado effect).  
                                                                 
283 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of innovations, The Free Press (4th edition, 1995). This discussion is 
based on a review by Werner Mulder and Richard Simpson, Supplement to 'DoCoMo's I-mode: 
strategies for success, University of Cape Town Graduate School of Business paper 501-050-4 
(2001). See also Biometrics Market Intelligence, a newsletter that addresses this model for the 
biometrics market www.acuity-mi.com and the discussion in Chapter 2 of D A Norman's The 
Invisible Computer MIT Press (1998) at http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/NORVH/chapter2.html  
284 Geoffrey Moore, Inside the tornado, Harper Business (1995) 
285 Kate Curtis, All IT needs is credibility, The Journal of the Communications Network 2(1) pp 4-8 
(January - March 2003) 
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For the biometrics industry, the market may still exhibit the characteristics of the chasm, 
and requires standards to be in place (ICAO, ISO, X9.84) and the experience offered by 
trusted leaders (in this case, this could be the acceptance by governments of their use). 
 
The increasing number of new entrants may also be confusing potential buyers, as these 
entrants may continue to aim their products at the early adopters, not learning from the 
mistakes of previous innovators286. 
 
The successful deployment in non-governmental services may depend on numbers of 
successful, user-friendly implementations of biometrics in national ID and cross-border 
systems. Returning to the question posed in Section 2.1, there appears to be no clear cut 
'best' application for which biometrics can be advocated in order to reassure the early 
majority. However, the situation could change due to wild card developments (a major 
disruption of the e-commerce market) or a radical reduction in the 'whole life' cost of a 
particular service that makes use of a biometric. 
 
In the meantime, it is important to track the large-scale deployments and encourage the 
designers to follow the precepts that have been discussed in this roadmap. However, there 
are worrying indications that in the haste to deploy systems that meet the deadlines 
mandated by Congress, security and privacy issues have not been accorded the priority 
that we have identified in this report. Perhaps the GAO report will alert systems 
integrators to their importance once the contracts have been signed.  
 
Use by commercial organisations is likely to start in internal applications such as access 
control and logon to enterprise wide applications. These can be simply as standalone 
replacements for existing non-biometric systems. However, the introduction of new 
mechanisms such as biometrics may be more sensibly approached as part of a review of 
the security infrastructure of organisations. One indicator that gives us concern is the slow 
take-up of PKI and applications using them. After the legislative activity worldwide that 
confirmed the role of electronic signatures, it was assumed that rapid uptake of Public 
Key Infrastructures would follow in their wake, with biometric signatures succeeding not 
long afterwards as corporate security officers recognised the weak link inherent in the use 
of passwords and passphrases. The evidence to date is that without a wild card event, 
corporates will continue to rely on well-established security mechanisms and not 
seriously review their exposure to external and internal threats.  
 
If it is not a re-evaluation of the security that acts as a spur to the corporate use of 
biometrics, it may be the recent interest in integrated identity management systems that 
causes management to consider these new technologies. With information about 
employees and customers distributed across many databases, and with little co-ordination 
in updating these, forward-looking organisations are recognising the need to consolidate 
their schemas around LDAP directories and XML standards. Whether this provokes a 
reconsideration of the use of biometrics, with templates stored alongside the newly 
integrated systems remains an open question. 
 
7.2  Future applications 
 
While business ponders on the way in which biometric methods could be used in 
organisations, research projects should address some of the challenges in other fields of 
commerce. Two of the main areas of concern to the security community will be Digital 
Rights Management and Web Services, delivering current and future types of application 
to the consumer in novel ways, and requiring authentication in novel environments. It 
remains to be seen whether biometric verification of identity is required or can be 
justified on the grounds of cost and security. Once the range of applications widens 
significantly beyond transaction verification, PC logon and physical access control, robust 
                                                                 
286 Jon Tullett, Face facts, technology isn't always foolproof, SC Magazine, Editorial of June 2003 
issue, describing his experience of visiting biometrics vendors at the Infosecurity Europe exhibition. 
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middleware should be developed that allows simple, yet secure, integration of 
authentication across a variety of applications.  
 
Analysis of typical biometric applications has shown that people costs dominate 
deployments, whether at enrolment or at helpdesks when users forget which finger they 
used at enrolment or find difficulty in adjusting the incident light in a simple face 
recognition system. Innovative strategies in both these people-dominated facets of the 
operation of authentication systems should be encouraged as the savings will be made 
directly on the cost of complete systems. 
 
Looking further into the future, we can foresee a time when biometrics will be part of a 
'fit and forget' culture, with cheap embedded systems forming part of the fabric of a world 
where computer processing is transparent and users expect systems to operate without the 
need for explicit intervention. In this scenario of ambient intelligence, the biometric will 
have a smart sensor and be significantly smaller than current models (even though the 
new range of silicon fingerprint devices approaches the limit of the human interface). The 
timescale for this type of environment is likely to be at least at the far end of the study 
period (2010), but an early demonstration of the functionality that could be achieved as 
part of an intelligent device fabricated using state of the art technologies would stimulate 
interest.  
 
Summarising the longer term research issues for biometrics, we add the following 
research challenge: 
 
RC/C10  RC - COMPONENTS 10 (LONG TERM): Among the longer term 
challenges for biometrics is the development of very cheap lightweight micro-sensors 
with integrated intelligence and context-awareness obtained by close integration 
with the application. In some instances these sensors will be embedded into the 
fabric of a service in a manner that will be transparent to the end user. 
 
 
7.3  What are the critical issues? 
 
On the basis of the studies undertaken in the BIOVISION Roadmap (and reviewed in 
Section 5), a large number of issues have been tabled (Appendix 1). The consortium has 
generally not looked at the challenges posed by individual technologies, nor considered 
the economic arguments for take-up287.  
 
The consortium has noted that biometric technologies should be viewed as mechanisms  
that address one aspect of an application. Whether the use of biometrics enhances or 
reduces personal privacy, improves or worsens security, makes authentication more or 
less convenient, will depend on other features of the application. This is no different from 
many other technologies. It follows, therefore, that discussion of biometric performance, 
legality or usability should be in the context of a specific application. Moreover, the value 
of biometric methods - in improving security, convenience, etc - should be judged from 
the perspective of operators of services using these methods, and from the experience of 
the end users of such services. 
 
For the early majority to consider investment in systems that are bought primarily to 
improve the security of systems, it is axiomatic that the systems themselves be warranted 
as secure. Some of the present lack of security in stand-alone devices themselves can be 
addressed in the secure design of integrated systems, but a new generation of devices and 
software is anticipated that will offer a higher level of intrinsic security, resistant to the 
spoofing attempts of college students. Although few suppliers will be able to pay for full 
accreditation to Common Criteria at EAL4, more informal testing by independent test 
                                                                 
287 For an overview of the fundamental approaches to the economics of information security 
investments see Lawrence Gordon and Martin Loeb, Economic Aspects of Information Security, 
Rainbow Technologies White Paper (August 2001)  
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houses could provide a measure of reassurance. Governments acknowledge that the 
security of large-scale, government deployments is critical to their introduction, whereas 
many other operators may not recognise its importance. 
 
Systems and services with biometric authentication must be usable by the end users. Not 
only must they be able to enrol large numbers of diverse people at the start of a 
deployment, but the performance must remain satisfactory over periods of years. In some 
applications, the system may be used only very infrequently by some individuals (e.g. in 
cross-border checks against an identity document), while others will be accessed on a 
daily basis. Strategies for fall back to an alternative method often appear to degrade the 
overall security; if frequent recourse to human intervention is called for, overall security 
may suffer, as well as cause others in the user community to question the viability of the 
solution. For some services, even small numbers of failures can have severe repercussions 
(e.g. at a supermarket checkout or immigration control). It is inevitable that some sections 
of the population will find it very difficult to use specific systems. These may be 
disabled288, lack the requisite feature in their body or just fail to meet the fundamental 
requirements for a particular way in which a specific method is implemented. Without 
extensive testing before the final commissioning of systems, the operator risks 
considerable annoyance to groups of customers and the consequent bad publicity that this 
can bring both to his service and to the use of biometrics in general. 
 
Services that incorporate a biometric must also be operated in ways that respect the legal 
requirements with respect to data privacy, health and safety, etc. In spite of the moves 
towards harmonisation of these laws in the European Union, initial rulings point to a 
diversity of culturally-determined interpretations, which will cause difficulties for 
suppliers aiming to offer Europe-wide services. Although there are many exemptions for 
governments in these laws, society will require evidence of the need to take advantage of 
them. 
 
The diversity of biometric methods, and the variety of ways in which a method is 
implemented by a supplier, should work in favour of the end user who is concerned about 
the possible sharing of biometric data across different applications. The arguments for 
interoperability of systems should be examined carefully lest users are disadvantaged. 
Although the existence of a multiply faceted identity for many people may disturb some 
commentators, it is difficult to justify the imposition of uniformity where there is no 
criminal intent to deceive or defraud. User perceptions of the introduction of biometrics 
could be adversely affected by an overbearing attitude. Preliminary evidence from the 
BIOVISION project appears to confirm the willingness to take part in biometric projects 
for the benefit of society, even though some of the citizens may still have concerns about 
the technology itself, whether about the inference of medical conditions or the potential 
of 'function creep'. 
 
Operators of systems that will use a biometric, and suppliers of technology need usable 
standards  that can simplify the procurement process and reassure operators that they will 
not be locked into a proprietary solution. Currently, the development of standards is being 
accelerated to meet the deadlines for the introduction of these methods into machine 
readable travel documents. Such standards could be too prescriptive for less demanding 
applications, even though customers - in their ignorance of the significance of a standard - 
may require supply of systems in conformance with an inappropriate standard. 
 
Research projects should be designed to explore not only incremental improvement in 
the algorithms, but the impact of any improvements on the commercial viability of a 
product. There are numerous uncertainties about performance at the system level, which 
are not addressed by current programmes, and may require joint programmes with 
systems integrators and potential operators.  
                                                                 
288 William Lawson, Enhancing assistive technologies: through the theoretical adaptation of 
biometric technologies to people of variable abilities, www.icdri.org/biometrics/enasstech.htm (19 
February 2003) 
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7.4  The European Biometric Forum 
 
Co-ordination of activities across the European Union has been identified as a key issue. 
Whether in sharing an understanding amongst national standards bodies; informing 
potential operators about the performance they may expect of a specific method; alerting 
a research team to similar work already being undertaken in another country; or bringing 
a sales opportunity to the notice of a potential partner in the same member state, the 
BIOVISION consortium has clearly identified the need for a European Biometric Forum. 
This will inform, share knowledge, offer impartial advice and act as a networking 
organisation. With the launch of the EBF in Dublin on 21 July 2003, the community of 
developers and users of biometric technologies has a common voice representing the 
vibrant diversity of all facets of the development of biometrics in Europe. 
 
In support of this aim, the EBF's key tasks - as defined in the Consultation Document - 
include: 
 
- the setting up of a demonstration centre to act as a showcase for technologies, 
applications and projects  
- the initiation of Special Interest Groups that will work in specific areas of interest to 
the European biometrics community 
- the organisation of a European Media Centre 
- the facilitation of the formation of consortia to work together in research, 
development, deployment and promotion of awareness of biometric technologies 
- the establishment of communication channels  
- the organisation of annual conferences and workshops 
- the encouragement of participation in national and international standards 
organisations 
 
Further information is available at the website of the EBF: 
http://www.eubiometricforum.com 
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APPENDIX 1: Research Challenges  
A considerable investment in research has been made around the world. Examples of 
projects undertaken in Europe are listed in Appendix 3, and many others are still 
underway in the US and the Far East. As the world moves towards major deployments of 
biometric enabled systems, it is timely to consider where the scare resources (of well-
trained and motivated people, as well as financial resources) should be focussed. One of 
the aims of the BIOVISION project was to prepare a prioritised list of challenges, based 
upon a number of workshops that were held and the discussions and analysis that 
followed. A decision was taken to exclude consideration of the individual biometric 
technologies, thereby concentrating on issues that were common to many of the biometric 
methods.  
 
A1.1 US Initiatives in determining a biometrics Research Agenda 
 
In the USA, two initiatives with a similar aim have started with formal reports due in the 
Autumn of 2003. Firstly, the National Science Foundation sponsored a workshop in 
West Virginia in April with 55 participants, addressing four key questions in a cross-
cutting way similar to the BIOVISION approach289 (parallel challenges identified by the 
BIOVISION consortium are noted in brackets): 
 
· Biometric technologies: which are deployed now, available but not deployed, and 
under development with the prospect of being deployed in the foreseeable future? 
Issues that were considered included: 
o template aging, (RC/C5) 
o multimodal fusion, (RC/C3) 
o operational performance modelling from test results 
o quality measures including distinctiveness (RC/C5) 
o overall system performance, including usability, comparison with other 
authentication system performance, optimising the performance of 
systems, impact of error, modelling of throughput, fallback using other 
biometric modalities (RC/Sec2) (RC/PS2) (RC/C1) 
o individual aspects of work on face recognition, fingerprint matching, 
iris recognition and speaker verification 
· What measures of effectiveness are required to ensure that these aid higher levels of 
security? 
o fundamental limits of performance (RC/C2) (RC/C4) 
o assessment of performance of the methods under technology, scenario 
and operational evaluations, statistical method development, limits of 
accuracies and stability of the metrics, 
o effectiveness of fusion 
o scalability of large scale systems  
o large scale multimodal databases (RC/TTL4) 
o modelling of  throughputs 
o impact of public understanding, habituation and use of incentives on the 
performance of systems  
· What are the societal and political implications of these for personal security and 
preservation of individual liberties, and for lifestyles? 
o how does a biometric have a positive or negative impact on privacy, 
should privacy policies be encouraged and what should be in them? 
(RC/TTL7) 
o human factors and usability (RC/PS1) (RC/C8) 
o security of applications and systems, including measurement of 
perceived costs and benefits (RC/Sec1) 
                                                                 
289 Raud Bolle et al, Biometric research agenda: report of the NSF workshop (1 July 2003) 
http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/BiometricResearchAgenda.pdf  
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o enrolment – security using breeder documentation, issues of 
unsupervised enrolment 
o differences between social acceptability of identification and 
verification (RC/TTL5) 
o impact on cost, usability and acceptance of factors such as mandatory 
use, standards, public or private use, data interchange between agencies 
· What are cost-effectiveness tradeoffs in their implementation, the impact on 
productivity, and how is the workforce created? 
o modelling methodologies 
o how do you value the avoidance of very rare events such as 9/11? 
o undesirable side effects of the deployment of biometric systems  
o measurement of deterrent effect of a biometric 
o total cost modelling, including upgrade against move to an alternative 
system 
 
A key recommendation is that biometrics should be recognised as a highly 
interdisciplinary endeavour with technical, economic, social and political dimensions, 
requiring R&D programmes that acknowledge this view (see our RC/SD1 and the general 
approach of the BIOVISION project) 
 
The second activity stems from a US Government workshop held in Washington on 6 
March 2003 which developed an agenda for applied research relevant to the interests of 
government, targeting those areas that were considered to be key to national security and 
prosperity290. Of the 30 areas of work which were identified at the meeting, the following 
were noted as HIGH priority: 
 
· authentication systems for firing armaments 
· biometrics operating outdoors in glare and shadow 
· authentication of personnel in suits that protect against nuclear, chemical and 
biological contamination and warfare 
· development of an enterprise architecture and implementation scheme across the 
Department of Defense, permitting multiple enrolment applications, usage at multiple 
sites with template repositories of various types 
· developing a search front end for the millions of images of faces on the IAFIS 
mugshot file 
· methods of verification of an individual's identity prior to enrolment , and ensuring 
that the link to individuals and their identity claim are consistent across all biometric-
enabled systems 
· collection of biometric data from unco-operative individuals in jails  
· optimisation of fusion of biometric measurements 
· understanding the upper bounds of performance of biometrics (RC/C2) 
· improvement in the usability to end users of the front end of systems  (RC/PS1) 
· capture of facial images in a crowd, and then zooming in to obtain a high resolution 
image of the individual face 
· faster throughput of individuals through systems using a biometric, specifically for 
school safety systems and jails  
· understanding the limitations  and capabilities of biometrics applied on the large 
scale (nationwide enrolment and use) 
· defining standards for exchanging of 'watch lists' 
· wireless transmission of biometric data in remote locations (cities or harsh 
environments) and return of results within minutes 
· specific enrolment and verification of individuals in ships at port  
· understanding the acceptance of biometrics by the public in an international context 
(RC/TTL5) 
                                                                 
290 Duane Blackburn et al, 2003 US government biometrics workshop: overview and summary 
www.biometricscatalog.org , (9 April 2003) 
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- collection and searching iris images by law enforcement agencies (extension to 
IAFIS) 
- long term stability of the biometric measures to determine frequency of re-
enrolment of individuals. (RC/C5) 
 
A1.2 The BIOVISION Research Agenda 
 
During the 14 months of the BIOVISION project, a number of opportunities were sought 
to identify these key challenges. Individual study areas (security, legal, standards, medical 
aspects and applications) contributed insights from their research. Further inputs were 
gained from comments by participants to the BIOVISION Rome workshop in January 
2003. The list (of which this is a part) was then formed into a questionnaire that was 
mailed to a group of key opinion formers in the biometrics community. Based on the 
results of this limited study, those aspects that were judged to be particularly important 
research areas have been labelled as KEY PRIORITY AREAs. Others that were 
considered important have been labelled as IMPORTANT AREA . Note that the first two 
challenges were not included in the questionnaire and that some of the challenges have 
been clustered together in this summary. 
 
These research topics should not be taken individually in isolation. Addressing one (or 
even a few) in isolation will not progress the development of successful deployments. 
More specifically, in any research proposals, the proposers should consider justifying the 
selection of specific research topic areas by the impact that a successful resolution will 
have on increase in the wider acceptability of biometrics, either for all uses, or in the 
specific application are under consideration. This information may not be available at the 
outset of a project, but should be considered during its development 
 
Research Activities 
 
RC/RA: RC - RESEARCH ACTIVITIES: Following the initial phase of establishing 
research teams throughout European organisations, funding bodies should now ensure 
that new research projects are based upon a solid appreciation of both the current status of 
the research as well as the realities of commercially viable deployments. If the European 
biometrics sector is to flourish, timely sharing of knowledge between the research and 
commercial sector is vital.  
FUNDAMENTAL (Not assessed) 
 
Systems and Design 
 
RC/SD1: RC - SYSTEMS and DESIGN 1: Successful implementation of systems using 
biometric methods requires an inter-disciplinary design approach. There are few specialist 
designers able to put together an integrated design that addresses the already documented 
issues and concerns. 
FUNDAMENTAL (Not assessed) 
 
RC/Sec1: RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 1: Methods are required to 
evaluate and compare the security of biometric systems. Schemes other than the Common 
Criteria framework should be investigated for their suitability. The level of security 
should appropriate to the application and the risks involved. In particular the binding of 
the application to the result of the biometric authentication has to be secure. In view of the 
value of databases of biometric identifiers to other people and organisations, these may 
need to be secured against both internal and external threats using state-of-the-art 
techniques. Appropriate security is also required for the templates during their 
transmission between database and application. All security measures subject should be 
periodically subject to a review. 
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
(except for alternatives to Common Criteria and transmission of templates; database 
security is viewed as an IMPORTANT AREA) 
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RC/Sec2: RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 2: Methods for the design and 
secure implementation of appropriately secondary systems that cope with both false 
match and false non-match errors. Such strategies may be required to operate in a gradual 
manner. 
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
 
RC/Sec3: RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 3: Development of design 
methodologies that support the secure integration of biometric data in applications such as 
the Criminal Justice Sector, while limiting the opportunity for misuse and 'function creep'. 
These could make use of binding of the user's identity, the application, template and user's 
expression of consent as well as validation by external Trusted Third Parties. 
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
 
RC/Sec4: RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 4: Biometric data for different 
applications (or held centrally and on-card) may require to be of different types (or held in 
incompatible formats) in order that centrally held information cannot be misused. 
 
RC/Sec5: RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: SECURITY 5: Provision of 'live and well' 
features in biometric systems is a high priority, especially when these are unattended or 
only intermittently attended by security personnel. Testing of the liveness of the biometric 
signal needs to be commensurate with other security aspects of the system 
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
 
RC/Med: RC - SYSTEMS AND DESIGN: MEDICAL ASPECTS: Further development 
of the BIOVISION methodologies for ensuring health and safety in systems using 
biometrics and the non-disclosure of medical conditions. 
 
Deployments 
 
RC/Dep: RC - DEPLOYMENTS 1: The impact of a high profile failure in the application 
of a biometric method could impact on the willingness of other customers to specify such 
methods, and adverse media comment could increase the resistance to their use by 
individuals and groups. 
 
Trials, Testing, Legal, etc 
 
RC/TTL1: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 1: There is no clear ethical framework 
for the development and use of biometrics. To some extent this will be determined by 
individual societies and cultures. However, currently, the agenda is set by cost-benefit 
analysis for improved security, without reference to a more fundamental assessment of 
the advisability of cross-application unique identification of individual citizens and 
consumers. 
IMPORTANT AREA  
 
RC/TTL2: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 2: Social and socio-psychological 
research should be encouraged to understand how identities and personas are used at 
present, and the implication of the use of biometrics on legitimate expression of such 
multiple identities. 
 
RC/TTL3: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 3: The impact of long term exclusion 
of those unable to make use of certain biometrics. 
IMPORTANT AREA  
 
RC/TTL4: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 4: A programme of database 
construction and testing should be initiated especially for those biometric methods for 
which such large scale databases are still not collected or publicly available. Certain 
biometric methods (e.g. multimodal biometrics) will require specific algorithm testing 
schemes and research may be required to devise the most appropriate methods. 
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KEY PRIORITY AREA 
 
RC/TTL5: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 5: Further research is needed, based 
upon the initial proposals in the BIOVISION project, that will test perceptions by end 
users and the social groups of which they are members. This should also examine the 
evolution of such perceptions and whether different techniques apply to other social 
groups and cultures. 
IMPORTANT AREA  
 
RC/TTL6: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 6: Tools and methods for the forensic 
investigation of the abuse of biometric methods. 
 
RC/TTL7: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 7: Further development of the Best 
Practices, based upon experience of similar codes in other fields. One specific application 
could be in the integration with Privacy Impact Assessments, together with advice to 
auditors confirming the adherence to such a Code. 
IMPORTANT AREA  
 
RC/TTL8: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 8: Further studies should continue to 
monitor the progress towards a uniform interpretation of the privacy issues surrounding 
the use of biometrics in the countries of the EU (including the Newly Accessioning 
States), and support the activity of the Article 29 Working Party with impartial 
information about developments in biometrics. Users' experience in the application of 
biometrics should be collated and interpreted with the aim of either lobbying for a 
revision in the legal regime or for retention of the status quo. 
 
RC/TTL9: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 9: The status of those unable to use 
the preferred biometric solutions should be recognised, whether these are in the private or 
in the public sector. Solutions are required that will limit the long term exclusion of such 
individuals from the opportunities offered by uniform secure authentication. 
 
RC/TTL10: RC - TRIALS, TESTING, LEGAL, etc 10: Work is required to develop a 
framework for the legal admissibility of biometric data. This should build upon the 
existing procedures for scene of crime fingerprints and handwritten signatures. 
 
Products and Solutions 
 
RC/PS1: RC - PRODUCTS AND SOLUTIONS 1: Transparent - yet not covert - systems 
with excellent adaptive user interfaces, delivering apparently 'instantaneous' 
authentication for end users 
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
 
RC/PS2: RC - PRODUCTS AND SOLUTIONS 2: Systems that are easy to install 
securely, with useful and appropriate feedback if they fail 
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
 
Components 
 
RC/C1: RC - COMPONENTS 1: R&D effort is required to improve the operational 
performance of existing biometric systems. In some cases, the error rates are substantially 
below what is required for the applications for which they are sold, and 'quantum' 
improvements in their performance may be required.  
IMPORTANT AREA   
(Not for quantum improvements in performance) 
 
RC/C2: RC - COMPONENTS 2: There is little understanding of the fundamental limits 
to the performance that could be attained using a specific biometric 
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RC/C3: RC - COMPONENTS 3: In view of the limitations of individual biometric 
methods, further research is needed to optimise the performance of multi-modal 
biometrics. This should focus on improvements in the approach to fusion of measures, as 
well as to address the requirements of specific applications and services 
 
RC/C4: RC - COMPONENTS 4: Research into the ultimate limits of performance with 
various methods of implementing specific biometric techniques 
 
RC/C5: RC - COMPONENTS 5: Research into the 'uniqueness' of a template, and the 
extent to which it depends upon demographic factors such as gender, age, ethnicity, etc. 
Do such templates exhibit stability over extended periods of time (> 5 years)? 
 
RC/C6: RC - COMPONENTS 6: A methodology to determine whether novel methods of 
using the human body for secure authentication are worth supporting 
 
RC/C7: RC - COMPONENTS 7: Use of DNA as a biometric, including the development 
of protection mechanisms. 
 
RC/C8: RC - COMPONENTS 8: Systems that minimise the mental and physical load on 
the end user, particularly if that end user is physically or mentally disabled. 
 
RC/C9: RC - COMPONENTS 9: Performance improvements are needed to reduce the 
possibility of chance matches between different people, and for identification of non-
cooperative users in negative identification applications 
 
RC/C10: RC - COMPONENTS 10 (LONG TERM): Among the longer term challenges 
for biometrics is the development of very cheap lightweight micro-sensors with integrated 
intelligence and context -awareness obtained by close integration with the application. In 
some instances these sensors will be embedded into the fabric of a service in a manner 
that will be transparent to the end user. 
 
RC/Csupp: RC - COMPONENTS (Supplementary): Smart sensor development to 
improve performance, scalability, functionality, etc 
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
 
Standards 
 
RC/S1: RC - STANDARDS 1: Interface standards are needed for all aspects of the 
operation of systems using a biometric. These should be in a form that is easily used by 
the design community and readily applicable to the variety of applications that are 
described in this roadmap. 
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
 
RC/S2: RC - STANDARDS 2: The prime driver of standardisation appears to be early 
application to border security and towards improvements in the physical security of 
transportation systems (especially in airports). Will this impact upon the usefulness of 
such standards in other application areas? 
 
RC/S3: RC - STANDARDS 3: Standards should be appropriate for specific application 
areas (including the legal and societal context). Work on 'profiles' should be grounded in 
case studies of existing and proposed systems  
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
 
RC/S4: RC - STANDARDS 4: Work to support the standards activities in testing, 
validating , accrediting and accepting deployed systems at the hardware, algorithm and 
user acceptance levels. 
KEY PRIORITY AREA 
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RC/C5: RC - STANDARDS 5: Although a study group (SG6) has been formed to 
examine legal and societal aspects of standardisation, historically, standards bodies have 
been reluctant to develop international standards in this area. At present, the usefulness 
(and acceptability to some national bodies) of such a standard remains to be proven. 
 
RC/C6: RC - STANDARDS 6: Relatively few players are taking an active role in the 
development of standards, even though standardisation initiatives are being accelerated to 
meet the requirements of border control applications. Other national bodies (including 
many in the EU) are unaware of the implications of such standards. Sharing of knowledge 
should be encouraged through the formation of a European special interest group. 
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APPENDIX 2: Current biometric R&D and innovation in Europe 
This incomplete list provides a first attempt at an inventory of the institutions that 
undertake research and development into biometrics and biometric-related fields in the 
European Union, or have a significant involvement in sponsoring or driving the research 
agenda in Europe. This list will be updated in future issues of this roadmap. Any specific 
expertise is identified by the abbreviation of the technology, although many institutions 
conduct research in a number of methods and applications. 
 
AFR: Automatic Face Recognition 
DEPL: Innovative deployments (with subsidiaries of non-European companies) 
DNA: DNA analysis for biometrics 
DSV: Dynamic Signature Verification 
E: Ear shape analysis  
FV: Fingerprint Verification 
G: Gait Recognition 
HG: Hand Geometry 
HV: Hand vein systems  
KD: Keystroke Dynamics 
IA/PR: Image Analysis and/or Pattern Recognition 
ID: Identification systems  
INT: integration 
IR: Iris recognition 
L: Lip movement analysis  
MM: multimodal biometrics 
RR: Retinal recognition 
SV: Speaker verification 
 
Organisation Activity Contact Website 
Austria    
Joanneum Research, 
Graz  
 
FV, IA/PR   
Belgium    
Keyware Technologies Identity 
management 
solutions 
Christian Halet http://www.keyware.co
m 
 
Louvain, Universite  
catholique de 
   
RMA/SIC Brussels     
SITA (international 
services organisation) 
Air security 
applications 
Michel Saunier www.sita.int  
Denmark    
Open Business 
Innovation 
Privacy Stephan Engberg  
Finland    
Joensuu, University of    
Lappeenranta 
University of 
Technology 
   
Nokia Research and 
Technology Access, 
Oulu 
   
France    
Atmel FV  www.atmel.com  
Avignon, Univerisite d’ 
et des Pays de Vaucluse 
   
ENST, TSI (Paris)    
Eurecom Institut,    
 
 BIOVISION Roadmap Issue 1.1                                                                             15 October 2003  
189 
  
Sophia Antipolis  
Evry, University    
GET, Groupe des 
Ecoles de 
Telecommunication 
DSV, MM   
INT MM Prof. Bernadette 
Dorizzi 
www.int-evry.fr  
IRISA (CNRS & 
INRIA), Rennes 
   
LIS, Grenoble    
Sagem  FV, ID, AFIS  www.sagem.com    
Thales Research and 
Technology 
   
Germany    
Bergdata FV  www.bergdata.com  
Berlin, Fraunhofer IPK Systems  Katrin Franke  
BSI Security Dr. Astrid 
Albrecht 
www.bsi.de  
B&L Management 
Consulting 
Consultants  Veronika Nolde www.bulmc.de  
Bundesdruckerei ID  www.bundesdruckerei.
de/en/index.html  
Cognitec AFR Alfredo Herrera http://www.cognitec-
systems.de/index.html  
Darmstadt, Fraunhofer 
Institut Graphische 
Datenverarbeitung  
 Christoph Busch, 
Henning Daum 
 
Darmstadt, Fraunhofer 
Insitute for Secure 
Telecooperation FhG-
SIT 
 Dr Dirk 
Scheuermann 
 
Dermalog FV  www.dermalog.de  
Deutsche Bank INT   
Erlangen, Fraunhofer-
Institute for Integrated 
Circuits 
   
Giesecke & Devrient FV, ID 
systems  
  
Giessen-Friedberg: 
University of Applied 
Sciences 
Applied 
biometrics 
Prof. Michael 
Behrens 
 
Guardeonic Solutions  Dr. Brigitte 
Wirtz 
www.guardeonic.com  
Hitex GmbH FV Dieter Baur www.hitex.de  
Infineon FV  www.infineon.com  
Magdeburg, University 
of  
DSV   
Saarbrucken, Max-
Planck-Institut 
   
Softpro DSV Dr Christiane 
Schmidt 
www.softpro.de 
ZN-Vision AFR Dr.-Ing. Stefan 
Gehlen 
http://www.zn-ag.com/   
Greece    
Expertnet SA General Christos 
Dimitriadis  
http://www.expertnet.n
et.gr/bee/index2.html  
ICCS-NTUA  
 
 Dr. Despina 
Polemi  
http://secgroup.iccs.ntu
a.gr/home.htm 
Net Smart  Lefteris www.netsmart.gr  
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Leondaridis  
Thesssaloniki, Aristotle 
University of  
AFR   
Ireland    
Daon INT Martin Walsh www.daon.com  
Dublin, University 
College 
   
Voice vault SV  www.buytel.com 
Italy    
Bari, Istituto di Studi 
sui Sistemi Intelligente 
per l'Automazione, 
CNR 
   
Bologna, University of, 
Biometric Systems 
Laboratory  
FV Davide Maltoni http://bias.csr.unibo.it/r
esearch/biolab/bio_tree
.html 
Cagliari, University of    
CNR Medical 
Standards 
Mario Savastano  
Milan, Universita degli 
Studi di Milano 
   
Sassari, University of  AFR, MM   
Ugo Bordoni, 
Fondazione  
SV   
Luxembourg    
    
The Netherlands     
CWI, Centre for 
Mathematics and 
Computer Science, 
Amsterdam  
IA/PR Ben Schouten  
Dartagnan Biometric 
solutions 
INT  www.dartagnan-
biometrics.com  
Enschede/Sdu ID systems   www.enschede-
sdu.nl/eng/frmiid.html  
Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties 
ID systems    
Philips Research, 
Eindhoven 
   
TNO, Organisation for 
applied scientific 
research 
Security, 
testing 
  
Twente, University of,  Hand grip  Professor Pieter 
Hartel 
 
Portugal    
    
Spain    
S.L. Barcelona    
Barcelona, Universitat 
Politecnica de 
Catalunya 
   
FNMT, Fabrica 
Nacional de Moneda y 
Timbre 
Fingerprint, 
INT 
 http://www.fnmt.es/ht
ml/taid/cc_taid_ta.html  
Madrid, University 
Carlos III de 
Ear   
Madrid, Universidad 
Politecnica de 
SV, Ear  www.atvs.diac.upm.es 
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Murcia, Universidad de    
Telefonica INT Orestes Sanchez 
Benavente 
www.tid.es  
Valencia, Universidad 
Politecnica de 
   
Vigo, Universidad de  SV, IA/PR   
Zaragoza, Universidad 
de  
G   
Sweden    
Fingerprint Cards AB FV  www.fingerprint.se 
Halmstad University  FV   
Precise Biometrics FV  www.precisebiometrics
.com  
United Kingdom    
Aurora Computer 
Services 
AFR   
AX-S Biometrics Ltd INT Richard Ashwell www.ax-
sbiometrics.com  
Avanti INT Julian Ashbourn homepage.ntlworld.co
m/avanti  
BT Exact  
 
 
System issues, 
privacy and 
social 
concerns, 
standards 
Marek Rejman-
Greene 
www.btexact.com 
BTG HV, DSV Peter Hawkes www.btgplc.com  
CESG Security Philip Statham www.cesg.gov.uk/biom
etrics 
De La Rue ID systems  Bob Carter www.delarue.com 
Domain Dynamics SV  www.ddl.co.uk 
Edinburgh University SV   
Forensic Science 
Service  
SV, FV dr. Didier 
Meuwly 
http://www.forensic.go
v.uk/forensic/entry.htm  
Glasgow, University of, 
Department of 
Psychology 
   
Glasgow Caledonian 
University 
Legal 
Admissibility, 
AFR, DNA 
Michael Bromby http://cbs1.gcal.ac.uk/la
w/users/~mbro/index.ht
m  
Hertfordshire, 
University of 
 Aladdin 
Ariyaeeinia 
 
HP Laboratories, Bristol Security  http://www-
uk.hpl.hp.com/mcs/  
Huddersfield, 
University of 
   
IBM, Hursley Park Various  www.ibm.com  
Identix (US) AFR, FV 
DEPL 
  
Imagis (Canada) AFR DEPL   
Imperial College, 
University of London 
   
ISL INT Derek 
McDermott 
www.informer.co.uk  
Kingston University    
Kent at Canterbury, 
University of  
DSV, others Prof Mike 
Fairhurst 
http://www.ee.kent.ac.u
k/research/elecsys/imag
e/image.html 
Manchester University AFR Dr Tim Cootes  
National Physical Testing Dr Tony www.npl.co.uk 
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Laboratory  Mansfield 
Nationwide Building 
Society  
DSV, others Will 
McMeechan 
 
Neurodynamics AFR, FV  http://www.neurodyna
mics.com/BIOMETRI
CS/biometrics_home.ht
m  
Nuance (US) SV DEPL   
OmniPerception Ltd AFR Dave McIntosh www.omniperception.c
om 
Plymouth University  KD   
Police IT Organisation 
(PITO) 
Criminal 
Justice apps 
Clive Reedman www.pito.org.uk 
Queen Mary College, 
University of London 
   
QinetiQ INT  www.qinetiq.com 
Securivox SV  securivox.co.uk 
Sharp Laboratories of 
Europe 
Smart card  www.sle.sharp.co.uk  
Sheffield University DNA Martin Evison  
Stirling University AFR, 
Recognition of 
faces by 
people 
Prof Vicky 
Bruce 
 
Southampton University  G, Ear, SV Prof Mark Nixon http://www.isis.ecs.sot
on.ac.uk/image/gait/ 
Surrey, University of: 
Centre for Vision 
Speech and Signal 
Processing 
AFR, MM, L Prof Josef Kittler www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/C
VSSP 
TSSI FV, INT Pat Oldcorn www.tssi.co.uk 
University College 
London  
User and 
privacy 
concerns 
Dr Angela Sasse  
Wales, University of (at 
Swansea) 
SV Dr J S Mason  
Other European Countries 
Croatia    
Zagreb, University of HG, Palm Dr S Ribaric www.zemris.fer.hr  
Hungary    
Guradware Systems  FV  www.guardware.com  
Lithuania    
Neurotechnologija FV, Iris   www.neurotechnologij
a.com  
Poland    
Warsaw University of 
Technology 
DSV, IR, 
HG 
Andrzej Pacut, 
Adam Czajka 
www.ia.pw.edu.pl/en/r
esearch/projects/biomet
rics  
Russia    
A4Vision    
Slovenia    
Ljubljana, University of    
Switzerland    
Bern, University of     
Biomet Partners HG  www.biomet.ch 
EPFL, STI-ITS, Lausanne    
Fribourg, University of  SV   
IDIAP (Institute for 
Perceptual Artificial 
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Intelligence), Martigny 
Idencom AG FV Qiu-Ping Zeng www.idencom.com  
Iridian (US) Iris  DEPL   
Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology. Lausanne  
  ltswww.epfl.ch  
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APPENDIX 3: Research Projects in Biometrics 
Research projects that include some elements of a biometric include (unless otherwise 
stated these are, or were, EU funded): 
 
Acronym Name Completion 
Date 
Website Comments 
ASPeCT  Aug 1998 http://www.cordis.lu/info
win/acts/rus/projects/ac0
95.htm  
Telecommunications 
BANCA Biometric 
Access 
Control for 
Networked 
and e-
Commerce 
Applications 
Jan 2003 http://falbala.ibermatica.
com/banca/index.html 
 
BEE Business 
Environment 
of Biometrics 
involved in 
Electronic 
Commerce 
Feb 2002 http://www.expnet.gr/bee
/index2.html  
 
BIOTEST Biometric 
testing 
services 
Oct 1998 http://www.cordis.lu/espr
it/src/21978.htm  
Testing biometrics 
BVN BIOVISION- 
Roadmap for 
Biometrics in 
Europe to 
2010 
July 2003 http://www.eubiometricf
orum.com  
The present project 
CAVE European 
Caller 
Verification 
Project 
Apr 1997 http://www.kpn-
telecom.nl/cave  
Speaker verification 
for phone 
applications 
COST 275 Biometric-
based 
recognition of 
people over 
the Internet 
Jun 2005 http://www.fub.it/cost27
5  
Application of voice 
and face; 4m euro 
project 
E-POLL Electronic 
polling system 
for remote 
voting 
operations 
Aug 2002 http://www.e-poll-
project.net/innovations.ht
m 
Fingerprint 
verification for 
electronic voting 
EUCLID European 
Initiative for a 
Citizen digital 
ID solution 
Nov 2003 http://www.electronic-
identity.org  
Provides resources 
for the eEurope 
Smart Card 
Trailblazer 1 Public 
Identity 
FINGER_CARD  Jun 2002 http://www.hsb.nl/finger
card.html 
Integrated fingerprint 
sensor on smart card, 
and applications 
FG-net European 
group on face 
and gesture 
recognition 
ongoing http://www-
prima.inrialpes.fr/FGnet/
html/home.html  
Foresight reports and 
development of data 
sets. Improvement in 
interpretation of 
CCTV images. 
HISCORE Hi-speed 3D 2000? http://uranus.ee.auth.gr/h Enhanced CCTV 
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and colour 
interface to the 
real world 
iscore with colour and 3D 
IAMBIC Intelligent 
Agents for 
multimodal 
biometric 
identification 
and control 
2003 http://www.iambic-
project.org/  
(UK) Online secure 
access control for 
health sector using 
multimodal 
biometrics 
M2VTS Multimodal 
verification 
for 
Teleservices 
and Security 
Applications 
Sep 1998 http://www.cordis.lu/info
win/acts/rus/projects/ac1
02.htm  
Face and speech 
fusion 
PAIDFAIR Protecting 
Accumulated 
Intellectual 
Data for 
Accounting in 
Real Time 
Nov 2002 http://virtualgoods.tu-
ilmenau.de/2003/VG_Co
demeter.pdf 
Fingerprint 
verification for digital 
rights management 
PICASSO Pioneering 
caller 
authentication 
for secure 
service 
operation 
Jul 2000  Speaker verification 
for secure telematics 
transaction services 
by voice 
PUMA Personalised 
User 
interfaces for 
information 
Management 
and 
Authorisation 
ongoing http://www.dti-
mi.org.uk/newweb/puma.
htm  
(UK) Fraud 
resistance of mobile 
phone and data 
services using SV 
RETRIEVE RealtimE 
Tagging and 
Retrieval of 
Images 
Eligible for 
use as Video 
Evidence 
Nov 2002 http://www.retrieve-
project.org/  
Aim was to enhance 
CCTV surveillance 
systems by providing 
effective search and 
retrieval mechanisms 
for archived digital 
material. 
SABRINA Secure 
Authentication 
by a Biometric 
Rationale and 
Integration 
into  
Network 
Applications 
ongoing http://www.sabrina.uni-
karlsruhe.de/publicdescri
ption.html 
Miniature ultrasonic 
fingerprint sensor 
SCID Secure 
Customer 
Identification 
for Drive-in 
Retailing 
ongoing http://www.dti-
mi.org.uk/newweb/scid.h
tm 
(UK) Face 
recognition for ‘drive 
in’ retail applications 
s-Travel Secure-Travel Apr 2004 FP5 dataabse search at 
http://dbs.cordis.lu/fep/F
P5/FP5_PROJl_search.ht
ml  
Use of biometrics, 
smart cards and 
digital certificates to 
improve travel 
security; trial 
between Athens and 
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Milan in late 2003; 
business model, 
privacy and user 
issues  considered 
TASS Smart cards 
with 
fingerprint 
biometrics to 
allow 
employee 
access to data 
about their 
social security 
entitlements 
1995 - 
Ongoing 
http://www.fnmt.es/html/
taid/cc_taid_ta.html  
Spain. 7m cards 
issued to date. Project 
started in 1995 in 
Cordoba and aim is  to 
complete nationwide 
deployment. 
TSWG Task T-
1595 
Statistical 
Analysis of 
Forensic 
Friction Ridge 
Matching 
Criteria 
Ongoing  UK Forensic Science 
Service and 
Switzerland 
TVID Speaker 
verification 
over the 
telephone 
network 
 http://www.speech.kth.se
/~melin/proj/spver.html  
(Sweden) 
U-FACE User friendly 
face access 
control system 
for physical 
access and 
healthcare 
applications 
Oct 2002 http://www.uface.org Face Recognition 
ViPBoB Virtual PIN 
Based on 
Biometrics 
Feb 2004 http://vipbob.gi-
de.com/vipbob/index.ht
ml 
Encryption to support 
privacy and security 
VIRSBS Visual 
intelligent 
recognition for 
secure banking 
services 
Feb 1999 http://www.cordis.lu/ist/
98vienna/xvirsbs.htm;  
http://www.aramis -
research.ch/e/6165.html  
Facial recognition at 
ATM machines 
Waby Integration of 
face image 
capture and 
recognition 
systems for 
real time use 
  (NL) Aiming for high 
security with high 
speed and a good user 
experience 
ZAVIR Ascribability 
of Actions in 
the virtual 
world 
Dec  2003 http://www.sit.fhg.de/ZA
VIR/ZAVIReng.html  
(Germany) DSV 
biometrics applied to 
electronic signature 
use 
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Glossary: acronyms and vocabulary 
Acronyms 
 
AFIS Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
AFNOR 
AFR 
Association francaise de normalisation, French national standards body 
Automatic Face Recognition 
ANSI American National Standards Institute http://www.ansi.org/  
APACS (UK) Association for Payment Clearing Services  
API Application Programming Interface 
ATM Automatic Cash Dispenser used by banks 
BANTAM  Biometric and Token Technology Application Modelling Language 
BEE A European Commission funded Biometrics project examining the economic, 
technical and social context for the adoption of biometrics in Europe 
B-SAD* 
 
BSI 
Biometric Standard Application Description methodology as applied to requirements 
capture 
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, the German federal security 
agency, www.bsi.bund.de  
BVN An abbreviation for the BIOVISION project 
BWG Biometric Working Group, funded by the UK government, 
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/technology/biometrics/  
CC Common Criteria (for security accreditation) 
CCTV Closed Circuit Television systems (generally used in security surveillance) 
CESG Communications-Electronic Security Group (UK) 
CRM Customer Relationship Management system 
DSV / DSR Dynamic Signature Verification or Recognition 
EBF European Biometric Forum, a new European organisation for all stakeholders in the 
biometric community in Europe, formed in July 2003 www.eubiometricforum.com  
EC European Commission 
EoI Expression of Interest (for Sixth Framework) 
EU European Union (of 15 member states) 
FAR False Accept Rate 
FRR False Reject rate 
FTE Failure to Enrol in a biometric 
HCI Human Computer Interaction 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
ID Identity (as in identity card) 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission http://www.iec.ch  
ISO International Standards Organisation http://www.iso.org  
IST Information Society Technologies 
LED Light Emitting Diode, a semiconductor light source 
NIST (US) National Institute of Standards and Technology 
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/biometrics.htm  
NHS National Health Service (the UK's public medical service) 
NPL National Physical Laboratory (UK) http://www.npl.co.uk/  
PET Privacy-Enhancing Technology 
PIN, pin Personal Identification Number 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
POS Point of Sale 
PR Public Relations 
R&D Research and Development 
RSPCA Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (UK) 
SIA Semiconductor Industry Association (US) http://www.semichips.org  
TRM Technology Roadmap 
UCD User Centred Design 
UPI User Psychology Index 
WP  Workpackage 
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Vocabulary 
 
A number of glossaries of terms have been produced, some of which have gained greater 
acceptance by the biometrics community. Working Group 1 of the SC 37 standards 
subcommittee is charged with developing a harmonised vocabulary. In the interim, the 
Roadmap document bases its usage on that of the 1999 Glossary of Biometric Terms 
produced by the Association for Biometrics and the International Computer Security 
Association291. Where there is a divergence from the AfB/ICSA definitions in the 
following table, this is indicated by a star (*). 
 
AFIS (Automated 
Fingerprint 
Identification System) 
A highly specialised biometric system that compares a single finger image 
with a database of finger images. AFIS is predominantly used for law 
enforcement, but is also being put to use in civil applications. For law 
enforcement, finger images are collected from crime scenes, known as 
latents, or are taken from criminal suspects when they are arrested. In 
civilian applications, finger images may be captured by placing a finger on a 
scanner or by electronically scanning inked impressions on paper 
Algorithm A sequence of instructions that tell a biometric system how to solve a 
particular problem. An algorithm will have a finite number of steps and is 
typically used by the biometric engine to compute whether a biometric 
sample and template are a match. 
API Application Programme Interface. An API is computer code used by an 
application developer. Any biometric system that is compatible with the 
API can be added or interchanged by the application developer. APIs are 
often described by the degree to which they are high level or low level. 
High level means that the interface is close to the application and low level 
means that the interface is close to the device. 
Attempt The submission of a biometric sample to a biometric system for 
identification or verification. A biometric system may allow more than one 
attempt to identify or verify. 
Authentication Alternative term for Verification. See also section 1.2.2 
Behavioural biometric A biometric that is characterised by a behavioural trait that is learnt and 
acquired over time rather than a physiological characteristic. 
Binning Binning is the process of classifying biometric data. 
Biometric A measurable, physical characteristic or personal behavioural trait used to 
recognise the identity, or verify the claimed identity, of an enrolee. 
Biometric application The use to which a biometric system is put. 
Biometric data The information extracted taken from the biometric sample and used either 
to build a reference template or to compare against a previously created 
reference template. 
Biometric engine The software element of the biometric system which processes biometric 
data during the stages of enrolment and capture, extraction, comparison and 
matching. 
Biometric device The part of a biometric system containing the sensor that captures a 
biometric sample from an individual. 
Biometric sample Data representing a biometric characteristic of an end-user as captured by a 
biometric system. 
Biometric system An automated system capable of: 
- capturing a biometric sample from an end user; 
- extracting biometric data from that sample; 
- comparing the biometric data with that contained in one or more reference 
templates; 
- deciding how well they match; and 
- indicating whether or not an identification or verification of identity has 
been achieved. 
                                                                 
291 The full glossary is available at www.afb.org.uk/docs/glossary.htm (used with permission) 
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Biometric technology A classification of a biometric system by the type of biometric. 
Capture The method of taking a biometric sample from the end user. 
Certification The process of testing a biometric system to ensure that it meets certain 
performance criteria. Systems that meet the testing criteria are said to have 
passed and are certified by the testing organisation. 
Comparison The process of comparing a biometric sample with a previously stored 
reference template or templates. See also One-To-Many and One-To-One. 
Claim of identity When a biometric sample is submitted to a biometric system to verify a 
claimed identity. 
Claimant A person submitting a biometric sample for verification or identification 
whilst claiming a legitimate or false identity. 
Closed-set identification When an unidentified end-user is known to be enrolled in the biometric 
system. Opposite of Open-Set Identification. 
* Credentials  Documents, tokens, information or data that establish or confirm an 
individual person’s rights and privileges. (Note that the production of 
adequate credentials need not involve disclosure of identity. Proof of Class 
Membership may be necessary and sufficient.) 
Database Any storage of biometric templates and related end user information. 
* Disruptor A person who disrupts (or attempts to disrupt) the correct operation of a 
biometric system for human identification. Successful disruption leads to 
the system providing false decisions or scores to the application or failing to 
operate at all. 
Eigenface A method of representing a human face as a linear deviation from a mean or 
average face 
End user A person who interacts with a biometric system to enrol or have his/her 
identity checked. 
Encryption The act of converting biometric data into a code so that people will be 
unable to read it. A key or a password is used to decrypt (decode) the 
encrypted biometric data 
Enrolee A person who has a biometric reference template on file. 
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the 
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates 
representing that person's identity. 
Enrolment time The time period a person must spend to have his/her biometric reference 
template successfully created. 
Equal error rate The error rate occurring when the decision threshold of a system is set so 
that the proportion of false rejections will be approximately equal to the 
proportion of false acceptances. 
Extraction The process of converting a captured biometric sample into biometric data 
so that it can be compared to a reference template. 
Failure to acquire rate The frequency of failure of a biometric system to capture and extract 
biometric data (comparison data). 
Failure to enrol Failure of the biometric system to form a proper enrolment template for an 
end-user. The failure may be due to failure to capture the biometric sample 
or failure to extract template data (of sufficient quality). 
False acceptance rate The probability that a biometric system will incorrectly identify an 
individual or will fail to reject an impostor. The rate given normally 
assumes passive impostor attempts. 
False match rate Alternative to False Acceptance Rate. Used to avoid confusion in 
applications that reject the claimant if their biometric data matches that of 
an enrolee. In such applications, the concepts of acceptance and rejection 
are reversed, thus reversing the meaning of ‘False Acceptance’ and ‘False 
Rejection’. 
False non-match rate Alternative to False Rejection Rate. Used to avoid confusion in 
applications that reject the claimant if their biometric data matches that of 
an enrolee. In such applications, the concepts of acceptance and rejection 
are reversed, thus reversing the meaning of False Acceptance and False 
Rejection 
False rejection rate The probability that a biometric system will fail to identify an enrolee, or 
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verify the legitimate claimed identity of an enrolee. 
Field test or trial A trial of a biometric application in ‘real world’ as opposed to laboratory 
conditions. 
*Function creep Extension of the use of biometric data to secondary applications and 
services that were not initially envisaged in the specification of the primary 
service. 
Goats  Biometric system end users whose pattern of activity when interfacing with 
the system varies beyond the specified range allowed by the system, and 
who consequently may be falsely rejected by the system. 
Identification The one-to-many process of comparing a submitted biometric sample 
against all of the biometric reference templates on file to determine whether 
it matches any of the templates and, if so, the identity of the enrolee whose 
template was matched. The biometric system using the one-to-many 
approach is seeking to find an identity amongst a database rather than verify 
a claimed identity. Contrast with Verification. (See also section 1.2.2) 
Impostor A person who submits a biometric sample in either an intentional or 
inadvertent attempt to pass him/herself off as another person who is an 
enrolee. 
Iris recognition A physical biometric that analyses iris features, found in the coloured ring 
of tissue that surrounds the pupil 
Matching The process of comparing a biometric sample against a previously stored 
template and scoring the level of similarity. An accept or reject decision is 
then based upon whether this score exceeds the given threshold. 
Minutiae Small details found in finger images such as endings of ridges (the raised 
markings found across the fingertip) or bifurcations (branches made by 
more than one finger image ridge). 
Multiple biometric A biometric system that includes more than one biometric system or 
biometric technology. 
One-to-many Synonym for Identification. 
One-to-one Synonym for Verification. 
Open set identification Identification, when it is possible that the individual is not enrolled in the 
biometric system. Opposite of Closed-Set Identification. 
Physical/physiological 
biometric 
A biometric which is characterised by a physical characteristic rather than a 
behavioural trait. However, behavioural elements may influence the 
biometric sample captured 
PIN (Personal 
Identification Number) 
A security method whereby a (usually) four digit number is entered by an 
individual to gain access to a particular system or area. 
Recognition The preferred term is Identification. 
Response time The time period for a biometric system to return a decision on identification 
or verification of a biometric sample. 
Score The level of similarity from comparing a biometric sample against a 
previously stored template. 
(Dynamic) signature 
verification 
A behavioural biometric that analyses the way an end user signs his/her 
name. The signing features such as speed, velocity and pressure exerted by 
a hand holding a pen are as important as the static shape of the finished 
signature 
Template Data, which represents the biometric measurement of an enrolee, used by a 
biometric system for comparison against subsequently submitted biometric 
samples. 
Template ageing The degree to which biometric data evolves and changes over time, and the 
process by which templates account for this change. 
Threshold The acceptance or rejection of biometric data is dependent on the match 
score falling above or below the threshold. The threshold is adjustable so 
that the biometric system can be more or less strict, depending on the 
requirements of any given biometric application. 
Throughput rate The number of end users that a biometric system can process within a stated 
time interval. 
Type 1 error In statistics, the rejection of the null hypothesis (default assumption) when it 
is true. In a biometric system the usual default assumption is that the 
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claimant is genuine, in which case this error corresponds to a False 
Rejection. 
Type 2 error In statistics, the acceptance of the null hypothesis (default assumption) 
when it is false. In a biometric system the usual default assumption is that 
the claimant is genuine, in which case this error corresponds to a False 
Acceptance. 
User The client to any biometric vendor. The user must be differentiated from the 
end user and is responsible for managing and implementing the biometric 
application rather than actually interacting with the biometric system.  
Validation The process of demonstrating that the system under consideration meets in 
all respects the specification of that system 
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the 
biometric reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being 
claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrolee’s template. Contrast 
with Identification 
Zero effort forgery Where an impostor uses his or her own biometric sample and claims the 
identity of a different enrolee 
 
 Diagrammatic Form of a Roadmap 
Roadmap: Diagrammatic Representation of an Idealised Roadmap (partly based on Groenvald (1997)) 
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